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Abstract 
The current thesis explores the role played by metalinguistic awareness in language 
acquisition/learning and seeks to develop a theoretical framework in which the integration of 
`knowledge about language' [KALI in the school curriculum can be clarified in terms of curriculum 
planning and pedagogic practice. 
Chapter 1 unravels the confusion surrounding terms such as metalinguistic 'awareness' and/or 
`consciousness' by relating them to the discussion on metacognition currently in vogue in cognitive 
psychology. A taxonomy of theoretical models is considered. 
Chapter 2 relates differences in the definition of metalinguistic awareness and its function in 
language acquisition/learning to the theoretical models outlined in Chapter 1. A socio-cultural 
viewpoint, it is argued, which views metalinguistic awareness arising out of the progressive 
decontextualisation of functional variants, is the most useful in interpreting existing data. 
Chapter 3 seeks to build on Chapter 2 by developing a more elaborated model of the role of 
metalinguistic awareness in the emergence of 'parasitic' language skills within a socio-cultural 
paradigm. The model examines the interdependence of skill and knowledge in the child's 
expanding linguistic repertoire and suggests a taxonomy of 'meta' processes facilitating such an 
expansion. 
Chapter 4 addresses the variability of metalinguistic skills among children in terms of their 
semiotic experience and, largely through a reconsideration of Bernstein's theory of codes, explores 
the implications of such variability for educational development. 
After a critical review of past practice, Chapter 5 proposes guidelines for the integration of 
KAL into the curriculum based upon the notion of the learner as 'reflective practitioner'. Chapter 6 
concretises this approach by seeking to link differences in pedagogy between L1 and L2, and within 
L2 between second and foreign language learning, with differences in the extent of 'reflective 
practice' required. 
In conclusion, tentative suggestions are considered regarding the implications of such an 
approach for Initial Teacher Education. 
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Introduction 
Metalinguistic awareness, according to Cazden (1975: 603), can be defined as "the ability to 
make language forms opaque and attend to them in and for themselves ...". 	 Interest in young 
children's ability to attend to such forms -- rather than to the meaning they convey -- has long been 
a leitmotif of the literature devoted to first/second language acquisition. It can be detected in the 
case studies of Jespersen (1922) to Slobin (1984), the pre-sleep monologues recorded by Weir (1962, 
1966) to Kuzcaj (1983), the self-repair strategies analysed by Clark (1978) and the observations on 
children's apparent eagerness to 'play' with language at all levels as noted by writers from Chao 
(1951) to Chukovsky (1963) or P. and A. de Villiers (1979). Perhaps not surprisingly, considering 
the largely anecdotal nature of the evidence available, attempts to explain children's ability to focus 
on the medium of language as opposed to the message it encodes have varied dramatically over the 
years. Differences have emerged, in particular, as to whether such behaviour is conscious and/or 
volitional in nature and -- depending upon the answers to such questions -- as to whether it plays a 
functional role in the child's ongoing linguistic and cognitive development. 2 It has undoubtedly 
been the uncertainty regarding the cognitive status of such behaviour which prompted Dore et al 
(1988: 11), in their review of the literature relating to 'crib speech', to note that metalinguistic 
awareness "... has often been observed, although never satisfactorily explained, in the language 
development literature". Perhaps the most useful attempt to establish a taxonomy of the various 
forms such awareness has assumed in anecdotal sources is to be found in Clark (1978) and Clark 
and Anderson (1979) although, it should be noted, their tentative interpretation of the findings is 
considered controversial in several respects. 
If earlier references to children's metalinguistic behaviour have been largely anecdotal in nature, 
more recent ones have been based on a systematically experimental approach. 3 As Bowey (1988) 
suggests, this is probably due to the growing interest in cognitive psychology in young children's 
ability to reflect upon and monitor their own mental processes that has pivoted around the notion of 
`metacognition'. Studies in the field of metacognition have been seen to have a bearing on 
children's developing sense of metalinguistic awareness and, conversely, children's ability to reflect 
on and control their own use of language -- as revealed in experiments designed to elicit their 
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appreciation of phonological, morphological and syntactic patterns -- have been seen to have a 
bearing on the emergence of general metacognitive processing. Valuable reviews of the research 
findings and of the links between metalinguistic and metacognitive processing can be found in 
Tunmer et a! (1984), Bowey (1988) and Gombert (1992). While such research has added 
considerably to the earlier data, however, it has tended to compound rather than overcome existing 
disagreements. Differences have emerged not only in the interpretation of the research findings but 
also in the attempt to reconcile such findings with those of the anecdotal literature to create more 
comprehensive theoretical models. In addition to the ongoing problem of the cognitive 'status' of 
metalinguistic behaviour, there would appear to be three principal sources of controversy: 
• what processes give rise to metalinguistic awareness, i.e. are they domain-specific or are 
they related to general metacognitive strategies which, it is widely accepted, tend to 
emerge only in middle childhood;4 
• what function does metalinguistic awareness play, i.e. is it simply a by-product of first 
language acquisition or, on the contrary, does it play a functional role in the child's 
linguistic and cognitive development; and 
• what aspects of language do children become aware of, to what degree and in what order, 
i.e. is there a natural sequencing (or patterning) in the aspects of language children attend 
to? 
Answers to such questions concerning the origins, function and development of metalinguistic 
behaviour are hardly unimportant in that they have a direct bearing on our understanding of the 
language acquisition process. As Clark (op. cit.) suggests, evidence to the effect that children's 
early metalinguistic behaviour is conscious and/or plays a functional role in the internal 
reorganisation of linguistic data, for example, would appear to strongly challenge current nativist 
views on the tacit nature of linguistic competence. 
Answers to the above questions would not only aid our understanding of pre-school language 
acquisition but also of the value of integrating strategies to develop metalinguistic awareness in the 
school curriculum. Traditionally, as James and Garrett (1991) have pointed out, attempts to 
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integrate knowledge about language [hereafter KAL] into the curriculum have been the source of 
considerable controversy. This can largely be explained by the fact that, in the absence of any 
clarity regarding the role of metalinguistic awareness in the extension of learner competence, the 
discussion has tended to shift away from a socio-cognitive towards a socio-political focus. As 
Cameron and Bourne (1989) were to note, this was already implicit in the Newbolt Report (1921) 
which sought to motivate the study of Standard English [SE] on the basis of its potential for 
overcoming social antagonisms and creating what Sampson referred to as a 'common culture'. 
Naturally enough, the debate as to whether KAL aided skill development was rapidly subsumed into 
a wider and more acrimonious debate about the relative value of standard and non-standard dialects 
in which the former was associated with anti-pluralist notions of hegemony. As Cameron and 
Bourne (ibid. 10) were to continue, [SE] grammar became inextricably linked with "... concepts 
such as authority, hierarchy, tradition, order and rules" and hostility to it was seen to fuel "... 
anxieties about the breakdown of law and tradition, not just in language but in society at large". 
Perhaps the most recent example of the tendency to subsume what should be a socio-cognitive 
discussion about the value of KAL into a socio-political one can be seen in the Kingman Committee 
report (1988) and responses to it. The 'model' of the English language recommended by the report 
for study in UK schools was motivated less in terms of its potential benefit for pupils' linguistic 
development and more in terms of its value as a symbol of national identity. As Cameron and 
Bourne (ibid. 13) were again to suggest, such a model appeared -- like the Newbolt Report before it 
-- to 
.... take an authoritarian position by advocating cohesion around one variety of one language 
(Standard English, hereafter SE) whilst at the same time trying to contain diversity by 
downplaying minority languages and non-standard dialects. 
The fact that KAL was identified with imposing a monolingual and monodialectal straightjacket 
explains the hostile reaction to the proposals summed up so eloquently by, among others, Rosen. 
As proponents of the Critical Language Awareness [CLA] movement have more recently 
suggested, it is impossible to avoid the socio-political issues involved in teaching KAL. The choice 
of what aspects of language to draw children's attention to, from what perspective and how cannot 
be wished away, and there is some truth in Fairclough's (1992: 15) critique of the 'language 
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awareness' movement pioneered by Hawkins (1981, 1984) for ". passing on prestigious practices 
and values such as those of Standard English without developing a critical awareness of them". 9 
While it is true that attempts to integrate KAL into the curriculum have a socio-political dimension, 
however, it may also be argued that it is self-defeating to prioritise this to the extent that the 
crucially important socio-cognitive issues involved -- that is, the extent to which metalinguistic 
processing facilitates the extension of linguistic competence -- is sidelined or even ignored. The 
latter issue may be, as James and Garrett (1991: 17) argue, the "... most contentious and certainly 
the most crucial issue in LA philosophy", but it is only by addressing it directly that the 
socio-political controversy can be resolved or, at least, judged against a meaningful benchmark. In 
other words, it is only by clarifying the theoretical issues raised earlier in the research literature that 
it will be possible to determine accurately what children may need to 'know' at any stage in the 
extension of their linguistic repertoire and what methods may most usefully be employed for 
developing such 'knowledge'. Such an approach would have implications not only for the 
development of skills within a given modality (i.e. personal to impersonal discourse modes) but 
between modalities (i.e. spoken and written forms) and between languages (i.e. L1 and L2). 
Seeking to determine what children may need to 'know' about language in relation to such a process 
of functional differentiation would, in this sense, require a cross-curricular language policy similar 
to the notion of a 'semiotic apprenticeship' developed by Wells (1994, 1997) in which linguistic 
knowledge and skill are seen as symbiotically related. 19 
It is true, of course, that there still exists considerable controversy in the way in which competing 
theoretical approaches seek to deal with the issues raised by the research data. While such 
controversy exists, however, there would appear to be growing evidence that only a socio-cultural 
approach has the necessary 'explanatory power' to tease out the ways in which metalinguistic 
processing interacts with linguistic competence. Such a view is certainly the one adopted by the 
current thesis. Starting with a critical review of the main theoretical approaches that exist in the 
area of metacognitive processing, it seeks to highlight those aspects of a socio-cultural approach 
which allow it to plausibly explain the origins, function and development of metalinguistic 
awareness. By seeking to refine and elaborate the analysis by writers such as Vygotsky in the light of 
new theoretical developments in relevant fields. it further seeks to outline a model which can be 
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flexibly applied to the pedagogic process. Crucial to such a model is the notion that metalinguistic 
awareness functions as both a by-product of, and pre-requisite for, the child's expanding linguistic 
repertoire of secondary (or 'parasitic') skills. As such, it can serve to inform the elaboration of a 
'language curriculum' which includes: 
• guidelines for the incorporation of KAL into a process of diatypic and dialectal variation 
based on contrastive analysis procedures; 
• guidelines for the development of an appropriate pedagogy based upon the changing 
relationship between metalinguistic awareness and linguistic skill in differing contexts, i.e. 
both between first [L1] and second [L2] language acquisition/learning and within L2. 
Such an approach necessarily involves an historical critique of previous attempts at incorporating 
KAL into the curriculum and the resultant pedagogic practices in both L land L2. 
For reasons of economy and style, the masculine pronoun has been used throughout the thesis to 
refer to students/teachers of either gender. 
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Notes 
1. It is to be noted, however, that Cazden stresses the unequal distribution of metalinguistic awareness which 
is related to specific cognitive functions. As he puts it (ibid. 603), "Meta-linguistic awareness, the ability to 
make language forms opaque and attend to them in and for themselves, is a special kind of language 
performance, one which makes special cognitive demands, and seems to be less easily and less universally 
acquired than the language performances of speaking and listening". 
2. Bowey (1988: 17-21) provides a useful account of the debate on the extent to which early examples of 
metalinguistic behaviour can be seen as conscious and/or volitional in character and the implications of this for 
its functional role. 
3. Franklin and Buten (1988: 300-301) highlight the variety of research paths followed in recent years. "The 
investigation of metalinguistic functioning has followed several distinct paths since the field was delineated as 
an area of inquiry about ten years ago. Much of the early work was concerned with the child's ability to detect 
semantic and syntactic anomalies in sentences and to supply corrections. Other research was concerned 
specifically with the child's ability to analyse the flow of speech into syllables or words. Many verbal 
explication tasks have been interpreted as involving metalinguistic functioning. In addition, some researchers 
have seen the child's early play with language as related to awareness of language as a medium". 
4. As Titone (1997: 10) points out, the ongoing theoretical confusion is reflected at a terminological level 
where cognitively 'loaded' terms such as metalinguistic or epilinguistic 'awareness' rub shoulders with more 
cognitively neutral terms such as metalinguistic 'functioning', 'behaviour' or 'activity'. As he continues, "... 
writers frequently fall into ambiguities or haziness in using these terms, with great damage to the definition of 
research objectives and to the interpretation of results". 
5. Clark's (1978) view, for example, that early repair strategies involve conscious monitoring of language 
input and output, and that such strategies are crucial in the development of linguistic competence, would 
appear to challenge the nativist hypothesis advanced by writers such as Chomsky that competence is based 
upon tacit knowledge. 
6. Cameron and Bourne (1989: 23) quote Sampson, one of the Newbolt commissioners, as writing in his essay 
English for the English (1921): "There is no class in this country that does not need a full education in English. 
Possibly a common basis of education might do much to mitigate the class antagonism that is dangerously keen 
at the moment and shows no sign of losing its edge ... If we want that class antagonism to be mitigated, we 
must abandon our system of class education and fmd some kind of education common to the schools of all 
classes. A common school is, at present, quite impracticable ... But a common basis in education is not. The 
common basis of the common culture is the common tongue". 
7. As Roberts (1991: 7-8) was also to put it, "If standard English is seen as a symbol for what binds us 
together as a nation, then this implies that other languages spoken in Britain are 'alien'. While Welsh is 
omitted from this category because of the territorial base on which such a model of nationalism rests, 
community languages spoken in our inner city areas clearly are not". 
8. Cf. Rosen, H. 'Struck by a particular gap' in Learning me your language, Jones, M. and West, A. (eds.), 
Mary Glasgow Publications, 1988. 
9. It is interesting to note that, even when criticising the attempted socio-political neutrality of the 'language 
awareness' movement led by figures such as Hawkins, Fairclough (1992: 13) endorses, albeit reluctantly, such 
aims as "... making up for the lack of 'verbal learning tools' in the home, extending access to standard English 
to children whose homes do not give it to them" etc. 
10. While James and Garrett apparently question the functional role of metalinguistic awareness, it is 
noticeable that Fairclough (1992: 15-16) expresses the agreement that exists "... between LA and CLA that, as 
Hawkins puts it (1984: 73-4), 'awareness' affects 'competence' — or as I would prefer to put it, awareness 
affects language capabilities". 
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Chapter 1 
Metacognitive and metalinguistic processing 
15 
Chapter 1 
1.0. Metalinguistic awareness: terminological considerations 
The term `metalinguistic', as Gombert (1992: 1) suggests, is a relatively recent one which can 
probably be traced back to Jakobson's (1963) definition of one of the secondary functions of 
language, that is, the need to develop a language to 'talk about' language.' Jakobson's definition of 
the term did not necessarily imply knowledge of a complex (or technical) metalanguage but, rather, 
of what Gombert refers to as a "... reflexive attitude with regard to language objects and their 
manipulation", i.e. a capacity to switch attention from the communicative goals of language to the 
formal means of their expression. It is this distinction between the primary linguistic ability of 
`knowing' a language and the secondary (or `metalinguistic') ability of 'knowing that one knows' it 
which is common to the literature devoted to the topic and which, as Gombert (1992) has stressed, 
gives it its coherence as a field of study. It is expressed most graphically, perhaps, in the 
well-known transparent-opaque metaphor used initially by Luria (1988/1946), when comparing 
language to a pane of glass, and reformulated and refined more recently by writers such as Hakes 
(1980), Garton and Pratt (1989) and, most succinctly, Bowey (1988: 3): 2 
When language is used for comprehension and production of speech, attention is 
focused on meaning, on the goal of the communicative act, and the language system 
is 'transparent' (Cazden, 1975), with tacit knowledge being used to generate or com-
prehend utterances. In metalinguistic activity, however, language itself becomes the 
object of thought. This requires that the language become opaque, requiring meaning 
to be separated from, or subordinated to, the contemplation of language structure or 
form. 
Apart from the implication in such a metaphor that switching attention from the goals to the means 
of expression may be a function of communication failure -- a source of controversy in the literature 
Bowey's description of what constitutes the object of study in the domain of metalinguistic 
awareness would be shared by most in the field.' It highlights the same notions of 'reflexivity' and 
`control' that can be detected in Cazden (1975:607), who describes metalinguistic behaviour as that 
which enables us to "... treat [language] as an object of analysis and evaluation" or, somewhat 
earlier, in Benveniste (cit. Gombert, 1992: 2) who regarded it as affording "... the possibility of 
raising ourselves above language, of abstracting ourselves from it, contemplating it whilst making 
use of it in our reasoning and our observations". 
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If there would appear to be considerable agreement that metalinguistic awareness implies an 
ability to stand back and focus on language as a formal system, however, beyond this point 
consensus breaks down. Two broad areas of controversy have emerged. The first would appear to 
centre around what aspects of language (as a system) might legitimately be considered the object of 
metalinguistic awareness and the order in which they appear. One example of this is that of 
metapragmatics (or metacommunication) which, as Pratt and Nesdale (1984: 105) suggest, may be 
said to include awareness of both "... the relationships which obtain within the linguistic system... 
and the relationships that obtain between the linguistic system and the context in which the 
language is embedded". If Pratt and Nesdale are prepared to consider awareness of both linguistic 
and extra-linguistic features as constituting metapragmatic awareness, however, others such as 
Bruner and Hickmann (1983: 287) have argued strongly that only " ... an act of reference and 
representation which has as its object the use of signs themselves" should be allowed. They 
distinguish carefully, therefore, between intralinguistic and deictic relations and limit the study of 
metapragmatic awareness to the former. Controversy over what aspects of language may be said to 
constitute the object of study has been paralleled by a second, and even more far-reaching, debate 
over the cognitive processes involved in the ability to focus on the medium of language rather than 
the message it conveys. While most would agree that metalinguistic awareness implies a capacity to 
attend to the "nature and functions of language", as Pratt and Grieve (1984: 2) put it, considerable 
disagreement exists as to the extent to which such attention is conscious and/or intentional in 
nature, particularly in the case of young children. At one extreme, writers such as Levelt (1978) 
and Bowey (1988) include under the term 'metalinguistic' a continuum of activities spanning the 
cognitive divide from implicit, spontaneous self-monitoring in early childhood -- as in the case of 
self-repair strategies -- to explicit reflection on language. At the other extreme, writers such as 
Bredart and Rondel (1982), Chaudron (1983) and Gombert (1992) argue strongly for the need to 
differentiate between implicit and explicit processes which, they suggest, involve different degrees of 
consciousness and intentionality. As Gombert (1992: 9) points out: 
... we are of the opinion that it is necessary to distinguish between the skills observed in 
spontaneous behaviour on the one hand and, on the other, the abilities which are based 
on systematically represented knowledge and can be intentionally applied. More than a 
difference of degree, this is a qualitative difference in cognitive activity itself which 
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seems to us to delimit these two groups of behaviour. 
Almost inevitably, such differences in evaluation of the cognitive processes which are involved in 
metalinguistic awareness -- and the implications of such differences in terms of self-monitoring and 
self-regulating strategies -- find a reflection at the terminological level. It is no accident, for 
example, that Gombert seeks to retain the notion of 'metalinguistic awareness' only for consciously 
volitional activities whereas Bowey, in line with her acceptance of a continuum between 
sponanteous and deliberate activities, argues in favour of the more cognitively neutral term 
metalinguistic functioning' .4 
Differences relating to what constitutes metalinguistic awareness and to the epistemological 
status of that awareness have inevitably created uncertainty as to what role it plays in terms of 
children's ongoing linguistic and/or cognitive development. Whereas writers such as Clark (1978) 
or Bowey (1988) tend to see children's early (albeit spontaneous) ability to focus on language as 
playing an important functional role in their developing competence, others such as Hakes (1980), 
Tumner et al (1984) and Gombert (1992) view metalinguistic awareness as arising much later and 
playing a role only in relation to 'secondary' (or 'parasitic') skills such as reading and writing. 
Moreover, as James and Garrett (1991) point out, this confusion as to when metalinguistic 
processing 'kicks in' -- and whether or not it benefits skill development -- has been, in turn, 
reflected in the educational sphere where there has been considerable interest in recent years in 
`knowledge about language' [KALI, as reflected in the Kingman (1988), Cox (1989) and Harris 
(1990) reports for the National Curriculum.' Reasons advanced for the study of language vary 
considerably and reflect the same radically different concepts of the nature and function of 
metalinguistic awareness that can be found in the theoretical literature. Tinkel's (1984: 1) view that 
the study of language should seek to "... lead the students to a greater awareness of what they 
intuitively know already" would appear, like the recommendations of the Kingman Report, to 
involve quite different cognitive processes than those indicated by a writer such as Nicholas (1991: 
78) who, in the specific area of second language acquisition, seeks to utilize the "... awareness that 
learners have of language independently of conscious reflection", that is, implicit as opposed to 
explicit awareness. In the past, of course, both Sinclair (1984) and Rosen (1988), supporters of the 
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`language awareness' movement pioneered by the NCLE, sought to justify differences in the aims 
and content of KAL by suggesting it should meet the differentiated needs of learners. 6 While there 
may be some validity in this view, more often than not the differences observed seem to reflect an 
underlying uncertainty at the epistemological level as to what exactly is meant by the term 
metalinguistic (or linguistic) awareness and the function it serves. 
2. 0. Metacognitive strategies 
In many ways, the fact that there has been a blur surrounding the definition of metalinguistic 
awareness, at both the theoretical and applied levels, is hardly surprising. As Pratt and Grieve 
(1984: 2) point out, this is almost certainly a direct result of the fact that "... psychology, in common 
with other disciplines, has not been able to provide a well-articulated account of concepts such as 
`awareness' and 'consciousness' which are involved in the study of metalinguistic awareness". 
Valtin (1984: 208), in common with others such as Sinclair (1986: 611-2), echoes such a view 
although, he stresses, the blur arises not so much from a lack of precision in defining the term as 
from a lack of a wider theoretical framework in which to situate and make sense of it. It would, he 
argues, 
... be of little help in clarifying the vague concept of language awareness to offer a new 
definition for it in the absence of a theoretical framework that allows one to specify 
aspects of language awareness and to establish a developmental sequence. 
Such a theoretical framework, if it were to be useful, would clearly have to examine the notion of 
`awareness' as an integral part of cognitive growth, the different levels of awareness that arise and --
perhaps most importantly -- the functional, or potentially self-regulating, role that the latter play in 
skill development. Unfortunately, as Mandler (1985) has pointed out, behaviourist traditions in 
psychology have long tended to dismiss phenomena such as 'awareness' or 'consciousness' as, in 
Watson's (1924) eloquent if misguided phrase, the "soul of theology". It has only been in recent 
years, largely within the information-processing paradigm of cognitive psychology, that such 
phenomena have once again begun to be considered worthy of analysis, largely in terms of their 
function as metacognitive (or executive control) mechanisms. Writers such as Tallis (1991) or 
Lethbridge (1992: 9) are probably correct to draw attention to the bias implicit in this re-interest 
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which, in its treatment of cognitive functions, is "... at least as mechanistic as behaviourism despite 
its emphasis upon internal processes". 8 Insofar as such a re-interest has helped to identify many of 
the issues involved, however, it may be useful to review the broad consensus that has emerged in the 
literature in relation to three questions: what can be defined as 'awareness' (and how may it differ, if 
at all, from related notions such as 'consciousness'), what processes give rise to it and what relation 
does it have with self-monitoring and self-regulating strategies. Such questions, which involve the 
relationship between cognition and control mechanisms, tend to pivot around the notion of 
metacognition which, as Gombert (1992: 4-5) suggests, is centrally concerned with "... all 
knowledge which has as its object, or regulates any aspect of, any cognitive task". 
2. 1. 'awareness 1' and 'awareness 2' 
Part of the problem with seeking to explain the various ways in which we may be said to 'know' 
the world (and ourselves) is the terminology available. As writers such as Schmidt (1990) or 
Chalmers (1996: 6) suggest, terms such as 'awareness' or 'consciousness' can often serve to blur, 
rather than clarify, our understanding insofar as they can be defined in relation to a variety of factors 
such as cognitive capacity, introspection, attention and/or voluntary control mechanisms. Perhaps 
the most useful way of teasing out the potential ambiguity in their use is by exploring their shifting 
relationship with each other. In one sense, as Chalmers (1996) or Gennaro (1995: 5-6) point out, 
`awareness' and 'consciousness' can appear synonymous in everyday speech, as in such statements 
as 'I am aware/conscious that he is ill'. In both examples, it may be argued, the terms converge in 
implying not only that we know something but that we are able to explicitly represent to ourselves 
what we know. While there is an evident overlap in their use, however, Fromm (1993: 37) is not 
alone in detecting in the use of the term 'awareness' what he calls a greater sense of 'attention or 
`mindfulness' (aufmerksamkeit) than in 'consciousness'. Fromm's view that "... awareness is 
knowing or consciousness in a state of close attention" -- a view which he saw as applicable at both 
the individual and social class level -- is echoed by others writing in the field.' Dennett (1986: 115), 
in his discussion on the epistemological distinction between 'awareness' and 'consciousness', was 
likewise to detect in the former a greater sense of 'intentionality' than in the latter as, indeed, was 
Nunn (1996) or Tulving (1993: 290) who defined consciousness as a "general capacity that an 
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individual possesses" and awareness as a "particular manifestation of this general capacity", that is, 
as consciousness directed towards a given goal. 10 The notion that 'awareness' implies consciousness 
`of something' is taken slightly further by writers such as Dewart (1989) or Chalmers (1996) who 
perceive in its more active quality a behaviour-directing capacity. Whereas consciousness does not 
necessarily imply self-regulation, Chalmers (ibid. 28) was to suggest that awareness 
... can be broadly analyzed as a state wherein we have some information, and can use this 
information in the control of behaviour .... Awareness of information normally brings with 
it the ability to knowingly direct behaviour depending on that information. 
The idea that 'awareness' implies a more purposeful state than consciousness, i.e. that it is a 
metacognitive mechanism which utilizes information for regulating behaviour, would appear to be 
widespread in the literature. 
If awareness can be tentatively defined as the focused application of consciousness, one might be 
tempted to concur with Tulving (ibid. 291) that "... awareness presumes consciousness, but 
consciousness does not imply awareness". As Gennaro (1995) among others has pointed out, 
however, the converse is more likely to be true. The fact that awareness tends to be identified with a 
more active mechanism for regulating behaviour means that it can often be ambiguous in the extent 
to which it implies we are able to explicitly represent to ourselves what we might implicitly know. 11 
It is quite possible, for example, to say in everyday speech, in relation to driving from point A to 
point B, that 'I was not conscious of the bends en route but I must, in some sense, have been aware 
of them'. In other words, the term 'awareness' can be used to refer to non-reflective as well as 
reflective responses to events in a range of domain-specific skills as part of an ongoing process of 
self-regulation. Vygotsky (1962: 91) was to express this difference some time earlier as that between 
awareness of the world and what he called awareness "... of the activities of the mind" or the 
"consciousness of being conscious". In both cases, awareness may be described as an active, 
behaviour-regulating response to the environment but, in the latter, such behaviour is reportable 
(`awareness of being aware') whereas, in the former, it is often non-reportable or automatic. It is 
because of this ambiguity in the everyday use the term that writers such as Dewart (1989: 41) have 
argued that qualified expressions such as 'conscious awareness' (or 'unconscious awareness') are by 
no means tautological but necessary as, indeed, has Gennaro (1995: 5): 
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It is not contradictory to speak of being `nonconsciously aware' of something. Similarly, 
the expression 'consciously aware' is not redundant. We can and do make room for 
nonconscious awareness. 
Others, such as Reber (1993) or Donaldson (1993), equally concerned by the epistemological 
ambiguity at the heart of such terms, have argued somewhat more radically in favour of developing 
a new terminology to demarcate the different levels of explicitness with which we represent what we 
`know' to ourselves. 12  
The essential point made by writers such as Dewart or Chalmers -- that is, that 'behavioural 
awareness' does not entail 'conscious awareness' -- has been explored most explicitly perhaps in 
White's (1982: 7) distinction between what he refers to as the 'experiential' and 'epistemological' 
dimensions of 'knowing' or 'being aware'. While, he argues, it may be correct to assume that 
knowing something experientially implies knowing it epistemologically, it is incorrect to assume 
that the converse is true, that is, that knowing something epistemologically involves "knowing that 
one knows it". Indeed, he continues, referring to a wide range of domain-specific skills that we 
carry out without conscious self-monitoring, "... knowledge and concrete experience are logically 
discrete". A useful example of the latter is our use of language whose underlying generative system 
we know epistemologically without being fully aware of what we know, i.e. without being able to 
formulate aspects of it to ourselves experientially. The fact, White concludes, that terms such as 
`conscious' (or 'unconscious') awareness' are increasingly employed in the literature represents an 
attempt -- somewhat misguided in his view -- to overcome the ambiguity embodied in terms such as 
to 'know' or 'to be aware' which can be used in either an experiential or epistemological way. An 
identical point is made by Dennett (1986: 118-119) who was likewise concerned that the 
behaviour-regulating connotations of the term 'awareness' -- unlike 'consciousness' -- allowed it to 
be interpreted either implicitly or explicitly. Dennett's solution to the problem was to argue in 
favour of dividing the term into two distinct categories, 'awareness 1' and 'awareness 2', the first 
referring to reportable (i.e. explicit) knowledge and the second to non-reportable (i.e. implicit) 
knowledge.' Interestingly enough, an almost identical terminological distinction can be found in 
Rubin and McNeil (1983) or Reber (1993: 86) whose research into implicit learning processes 
likewise led him to draw a division between 'consciousness 1' and 'consciousness 2', between "... 
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consciousness that consists essentially of an 'awareness' of an external world and that is not one 
itself and a consciousness that carries an 'awareness' of, and the capacity to play a causal role in, the 
inner workings of oneself'. 
2. 1. 1. Cognition and metacognition 
Dennett's distinction at the philosophical level between 'awareness 1' and 'awareness 2' -- like 
Gennaro's between 'conscious' and `nonconscious' awareness -- has become well-established in the 
skills-based literature, albeit within an information-processing paradigm. 14 It maps relatively well, 
for example, onto Anderson's (1982, 1986) distinction between 'procedural' and 'declarative' 
processes or, somewhat earlier, onto Flavell's (1976, 1977) more influential one between 'cognitive' 
and `metacognitive' strategies. The term `metacognition' arose initially, of course, in the 
domain-specific area of memory retrieval systems (`metamemory') and has only gradually been 
extended to other domains of cognitive investigation, such as 'meta-attention', 'meta-learning' (and 
`meta-linguistics'). While the term still suffers from a certain ambiguity, what is crucial to its use in 
all such domains is the notion of 'reflectivity', that is, the individual's ability to consciously 
introspect, monitor and review the cognitive processes and products of those processes that are used 
in the resolution of any problem-solving activity. 15 Robinson (1983:106) was to put it somewhat 
differently when suggesting that metacognitive -- as opposed to cognitive -- strategies involve not 
simply using what we implicitly know but explicitly reflecting on what we know and what we do not 
know in order to successfully negotiate a task. In the area of metamemory, for example, this 
"knowing about knowing", as Brown (1978) put it, involves our ability to consciously and 
intentionally attend to the selection, control and co-ordination of the various strategies that we use to 
retrieve knowledge in pursuit of a given goal and to provide 'feedback' on the success or failure of 
such strategies. Indeed, as Underwood (1982: 130) points out, it is probably its role as an internal 
feedback mechanism which is one of its most important functions insofar as the conscious 
monitoring of our cognitive strategies is " ... an integral part of operant learning". 
To the extent that metacognition implies conscious feedback regarding one's own cognitive 
functions, it closely resembles Dennett's 'awareness 1' in also assuming a behaviour-regulating 
function. Feedback involves not simply monitoring or overseeing performance but also controlling 
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that performance. Indeed, the link between reflective thought and executive control processing was 
already implicit in Flavell (1976: 232) who defined metacognition as "...one's knowledge 
concerning one's own cognitive processes and products" insofar as it is relevant to the "... active 
monitoring and consequently regulation and orchestration of these processes in relation to the 
cognitive objects or data on which they bear ...". This dual nature of metacognition -- the ability to 
consciously monitor one's own cognitive strategies in order to be able to orchestrate them more 
effectively in pursuit of a given objective -- has since become central to the literature devoted to the 
topic. Brown's (1980: 453) research into metacognition, for example, has pivoted around its role as 
"deliberate conscious control of one's own cognitive actions" and a similar approach can be detected 
in Meichenbaum et al's (1985) treatment of it as an "executive decision-making process" or 
Robinson's (1983: 106) influential study of it as "awareness and ability to control" one's own 
cognitive processes. It is precisely this notion of awareness used in the service of control processing 
which informs the various taxonomies of metacognitive strategies that have emerged and which are 
typified by that of Brown and Deloache (1978: 14-15): 
The basic skills of metacognition include predicting the consequences of an action or 
event, checking the results of one's own action (did it work?), monitoring one's ongoing 
activity (how am I doing?), reality testing (does this make sense?), and a variety of 
other behaviours for co-ordinating and controlling deliberate attempts to learn and 
solve problems. 
Such strategies are particularly important in the area of deliberate learning -- that is, the accessing 
of new knowledge and/or skills -- because, as Brown and Deloache continue, "... conscious 
executive control of the routines available is the essence of intelligent activity". 
In his review of the literature, Gombert (1992: 6) was to question whether the 
cognitive-metacognitive distinction, insofar as it seeks to distinguish between differing levels of 
reflectivity and control, offers any new insights or whether, on the contrary, it simply reformulates 
more traditional distinctions such as that of Ryle (1949) between 'knowing how' and 'Icriowing 
that'. '6 The question is partly disingenuous in that, as Gombert himself points out, a major 
advantage of the more recent formulation is that it tends to avoid the ambiguity implicit in 
traditional terms such as to 'know' or 'be aware'. Insofar as the formulation seeks to distinguish 
`knowing something' from 'knowing that one knows it', however, there are obvious parallels with 
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Ryle's distinction between a practical knowledge that is known implicitly and a more theoretical 
knowledge that is known explicitly." Indeed, if there is a weakness in the more recent formulation, 
it may well stem from the somewhat over-restrictive view of the cognitive spectrum which it seems 
to inherit from earlier distinctions. Such a view may well have prompted more recent writers, such 
as Kitchener (1983), to seek to extend the two-stage model into a three-stage one which has many 
similarities with the more developmental approach of Bruner (1962) or, more specifically, Piaget. 18 
Within Kitchener's model, the ability to reflect upon our own cognitive processes is sub-divided into 
metacognitive functions, which are seen to correspond to the level of reflectivity implicit in concrete 
operational thinking, and meta-metacognitive processes (classified as 'epistemic') which are seen to 
correspond to the more deliberate and disembedded reflectivity implicit in formal operational 
thinking. A similar attempt to refine the nature of reflectivity -- our "awareness of being aware" --
can be found in Armstrong's (1988) distinction between 'reflex consciousness' and 'introspection', 
Gennaro's (1995) between 'momentary focused' and deliberate introspection' or that of Schmidt 
(1990) between 'noticing' (selective attention) and 'understanding' (figure 1): 
Degree of conscious control 	  
Flavell (1978) cognitive metacognitive 
[i.e. Dennett (1986) awareness 1 awareness 2 
Dewart (1989) behavioural conscious 
awareness awareness] 
Kitchener (1983) cognitive metacognitive epistemic 
Schmidt (1990) perceiving noticing understanding 
1 
1 1 
Armstrong (1988) minimal perceptual 	 introspective 
consciousness consciousness 	 consciousness 
• i  
reflex 	 introspection 
consciousness 	 proper 
Figure 1 
While important nuances can be found between such models, both in the way the cognitive spectrum 
is divided and in the terminology used to describe such a division, they all tend to view 
metacognitive processes as the highest point of a continuum of control mechanisms which, as Reber 
(1993: 133) put it, " ... has elements that are utterly opaque to consciousness at one end and elements 
that are utterly transparent at the other". 
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2. 2. Awareness and 'contextual orientation predictions' 
If what we 'know' is embodied in a "spectrum of cognitive functions" which differ in the extent to 
which they are open to conscious introspection, what exactly are the advantages of metacognitive 
over cognitive ones (Dennett's 'awareness 1' over 'awareness 2')? The question is hardly rhetorical 
in that many writers have noted that lower-order (or 'primary') processes -- that is, those which 
usually lie outside of conscious awareness and which seem more activated by stimuli in the 
environment than by conscious intent -- are much more efficient than higher-order (or 'secondary') 
ones. Neisser (1967), in particular, was to draw attention to the advantages of the former over the 
latter in his comparison of cognitive functions with computer programmes. To the extent that 
primary processes are automatic, he argued, they tend to be 'parallel' rather than 'serial' in nature 
and are, as a result, faster and capable of multi-tasking. As Greene (1975: 14) was to put it, when 
we rely upon automated responses to external stimuli, we can afford to engage in a range of 
activities simultaneously whereas "... only one can be the focus of our conscious attention at any one 
time". Other writers, such as Schneider and Fisk (1983) or Shiffrin and Dumais (1981), concerned 
particularly with the transfer of declarative into procedural knowledge, argue in a similar way when 
suggesting that declarative processes are "slow, effortful, generally serial in nature" precisely 
because they are conscious whereas procedural processes are "fast, parallel, obligatory" and make 
"low demands upon processing capacity" because they are unconscious or automated 'action 
schema'.19 Given the generally accepted greater efficiency of cognitive over metacognitive processes, 
what might be the value of the latter and what factors might help to activate them? 
Perhaps the most useful answer to such questions has been provided by Baars (1988) in his 
attempt to draw up a taxonomy of the functions carried out by metacognitive self-monitoring. The 
most important of these, he suggests, is the way in which our ability to consciously regulate our 
cognitive processes helps us adapt to new (and unfamiliar) situations where what he calls our 
"contextual orientation predictions" are no longer operable. What Baars refers to as 'predictions' 
are reminiscent of Kelly's (1955) 'constructs', Brandford's (1979) 'activated knowledge structures' 
or Mandler's (1985) 'action schemas', that is, largely procedural knowledge that has been 
developed through the automatization of declarative knowledge and which allows us to operate 
efficiently in familiar situations." If a new situation arises which makes demands upon us which 
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our 'contextual orientation predictions' cannot meet, that is, which require an alteration in our 
behavioural pattern, Baars continues, the resolution of the problem is passed up from primary to 
secondary processes or from what he calls domain-specific processes to the "global workstation". 
The task of the latter -- which is similar in function to Shallice's (1976) 'dominant action system' --
is to consciously examine and make choices among the range of behavioural schemas available for 
the solution of a given problem since, as Mandler (1985: 59) stresses, the " ... construction of 
complex action sequences and the acquisition and restructuring of knowledge requires conscious 
participation". An interesting example of the shift from cognitive to metacognitive processing as a 
function of contextual changes can be seen in our use of language. Language is, Baars suggests, 
inherently ambiguous at various levels -- from the phonological to the syntactic -- and our ability to 
resolve such ambiguity in our everyday interpretation of utterances depends upon the use of a range 
of extra-linguistic (contextual) clues including the assumptions that we, as speaker or hearer, bring 
to the communicative act.' When the context becomes unfamiliar, however, or when contextual 
clues generally tend to diminish, as in the case of reading, we are compelled to consciously consider 
the alternative meanings that are embodied in the language structure itself and make a deliberate 
choice. For Baars, metacognitive processing -- of which metalinguistic processing would be viewed 
as a domain-specific variant -- can be defined as the conscious evaluation of different behaviour 
potentials occasioned by the need to adapt existing behaviour to new contexts of use. 
The essentially adaptive role of metacognition. its use as a "... solution of problems of a 
non-routine kind", as Popper (1985: 281) noted, makes its role in learning particularly important. 22 
This is hardly surprising in that, as Baars argues, reflective processes tend to 'kick in' precisely 
when the individual is faced with choosing between different behavioural strategies for dealing with 
the 'unexpected' or 'unpredictable'. Learning is, he continues, essentially an ongoing process of 
adaptation to the unexpected in which the individual is continually required to monitor his 
performance and to make choices about which strategies will be the most effective in the mastering 
of a given skill or the resolution of a given problem. He himself proposes a three-stage model of the 
way in which metacognitive processes are applied to the learning process which he refers to as an 
`adaptation cycle'. The first stage (`context creation') involves passing from a state of uncertainty to 
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one which allows the individual to 'make sense' of the data; the second (`conscious information') 
involves narrowing down and selecting the strategies deemed most likely to achieve success, and the 
third (`redundancy') automatizing what has been learnt. What is interesting in Baars' model is the 
way in which, as Mandler (1985: 81) earlier noted, the integration of new knowledge into existing 
knowledge is seen as an ongoing process of self-monitoring and self-regulation in which conscious 
`feedback' plays a crucial role. Those without such a conscious feedback mechanism are, Mandler 
insists, controlled by, rather than in control of, the learning process in that they are inevitably more 
reliant on "trial and error behaviour". Baars' underlying assumption -- that knowledge of one's 
performance is required for successful learning -- has, of course, become widespread in the literature 
devoted to the study of metacognitive strategies in the learning process. It can be found in Flavell 
and Wellman's (1977) assertion that "... good learners monitor their own progress" to Tubb's (1980: 
122) description of such strategies as a "valuable impetus to self-improvement". Within such a 
perspective, numerous taxonomies have arisen as to what constitutes an effective learner, ranging 
from that of Brown and Deloache (1978) to that of Meadows (1993: 78-79) which seeks to elaborate 
a stage-related generic pattern for the solution of new problems: 
... analyzing and defining the character of the problem at hand; reflecting on one's own 
knowledge (and lack of knowledge) that may be required to solve the problem; devising 
a plan for attacking the problem; checking and monitoring how the plan helps in the 
problem-solving; revising plan (and perhaps the analysis of the problem) in the light of 
the monitoring; checking any solution reached ... 
Such taxonomies, it might be noted, also include domain-specific studies which, particularly in the 
USA, have centred, as in the work of Pressley et al (1992), around the development of literacy skills. 
2. 2. 1. Procedural and declarative knowledge 
Baars' view that conscious control processing emerges from the need to adapt behaviour to new 
contexts of use is echoed, albeit from a somewhat different perspective, in the work of Meadows 
(1993). Unlike Fitt (1964) or Anderson (1982, 1986), who are concerned with the process whereby 
declarative knowledge takes on procedural form, Meadows is more interested in the reverse process, 
that is, the way in which our initially implicit 'action-based' knowledge gradually becomes more 
explicit in nature. The thrust of her argument parallels that of Baars' in its focus upon the gradual 
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disembedding of 'action schemas'. When we use a skill, she suggests, it is intimately connected to 
the original context(s) in which it was acquired and can be seen as a formulaic response to a set of 
environmental stimuli. In order for such a skill to become more accessible to conscious scrutiny and 
control, it has to be disembedded from its familiar context(s) of use, that is, its "salient features" 
have to be identified, generalized and recombined in novel ways. As Brown et al (1983: 142) had 
put it somewhat earlier, when writing from within a similar perspective, "... development consists in 
part of going from a context-dependent state where resources are welded to the original learning 
situation to a relatively context-independent state where the learner extends the ways in which 
initially highly-constrained knowledge procedures are used". In other words, for Meadows as for 
Brown, 'knowing how' can become 'knowing that' through the transfer, generalization and novel 
combination of salient aspects of a given skill outside of its original context of use. Such a process 
tends to occur most clearly in the shift from the pre-school to the school context and it is no accident 
that Bruner (1975: 54-5), for example, was to adopt an identical stance to that of Meadows in his 
polemic with Dewey over the value of declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge in the 
educational sphere. It is, Bruner argued, precisely the "... process of reorganizing knowledge into 
formal systems" that frees it of its "functional fixedness" and allows the learner to achieve greater 
flexibility and choice in dealing with the new and unexpected. 23  
There are considerable differences between the respective viewpoints of writers such as Baars 
and Meadows in that they see the relation between implicit and explicit -- or procedural and 
declarative -- knowledge proceeding in opposite directions. 24 While this may be true, however, what 
they share in common is an emphasis upon the relationship between metacognitive processing and 
what might be called 'choice'. As already suggested, metacognitive strategies are seen to 'set in' 
when the novel features of a context invalidate routine 'action schemas' and necessitate the 
conscious interrogation of a range of behavioural strategies in order to select the most appropriate 
for the achievement of a given task. What is crucial in this process is the notion of 'selection', what 
Mandler (1985: 62) calls the running through of "... potential actions and choices, the coexistence 
of alternative outcomes, the changing of weightings of currently active schemas in the direction of 
one that promises greater likelihood of success ...". This emphasis upon selection (or choice) is 
important in that it tends to view metacognitive processes emerging, not only as a function of the 
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failure of existing action schemas to deal with the novel or unexpected, but also as a function of the 
greater freedom of action the range of alternative behaviour potentials opens up. Underwood (1982: 
111), in his study of the function of awareness in skill development, makes an identical point when 
stressing that: 
Consciousness ... is available for us to make choices, and if no decisions are to be 
made, we do not need to use feedback to help the assessment of alternatives, and we 
do not need to be aware of our performance. 
The freedom that is gained from the opportunity to select between differing behavioural strategies is 
manifested most clearly, perhaps, in the ability to elaborate more complex action-outcome 
possibilities or, as Mandler (1975: 59) was to put it, to "modify and interrogate long-term plans 
rather than immediate action alternatives" and to monitor the implementation of such plans in order 
to adapt them as and when necessary. 
2. 3. Awareness, intention and control 
The view that metacognitive strategies come into operation when automatic action schemas are 
no longer adequate in navigating new contexts has important implications in terms of 'intentional' 
or 'purposeful' behaviour. As Underwood (op.cit.) suggests, what we attend to is usually determined 
by environmental stimuli that activate automated domain-specific behavioural responses. When we 
are compelled to choose between alternative behavioural responses, however, what we attend to 
becomes less a function of external than of internal factors. Put another way, making choices means 
being able to direct our attention, which was previously involuntary (i.e. spontaneous), in a 
voluntary (i.e. deliberate) way which is less subject to environmental constraints and which is 
consequently more conducive to long-term planning. It is the important role played by voluntary 
(local' or 'selective') attention in the development of metacognitive processes which explains 
Mandler's (1985: 55) comment that what all theoretical models of the latter "... have in common is 
some implication of identity or overlap between consciousness and (focal) attention". Neisser 
(1967), for example, tended to see the shift from primary to secondary processes as being defined by 
the shift from what he called 'pre-attentive' to 'focal attentive' processes and Baars (1988: 301) is 
even more explicit. For him, it is the role of selective attention which transforms what he calls the 
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passive 'state' of consciousness into an active, goal-directed activity; a transformation which he 
argues is mirrored in the counterposition of a number of pairs of verbs, such as looking versus 
seeing, listening versus hearing or touching versus feeling. As he was to suggest, " ... in each case 
the primary sense of the first verb is more active, purposeful and attentional, while the second verb 
refers to the conscious experience itself'. The notion in Baars that metacognition is consciousness 
directed by voluntary attention towards a chosen goal is, of course, almost identical to Dennett's or 
Chalmer's view of 'conscious awareness'. In both cases, it is the ability to reflect upon, monitor and 
choose (i.e. selectively attend to and regulate) the strategies needed to achieve a given goal which 
allow the individual to deal with what Baars calls unexpected emergencies and opportunities. 
Insofar as metacognitive processing can be seen as consciousness directed towards some goal, of 
course, it tends to presuppose the notion of 'intention' or 'purpose', that is, of a course of action 
decided upon and planned in advance. It was Ceci and Howe (1982: 152), in their interesting study 
of the mechanics of metamemory, who were among the first to explore the relationship between 
intention and attention in metacognitive activity when suggesting that "... a person must intend to 
attend to an event, and be aware that memory of the event is the goal and deliberately, wilfully and 
voluntarily implement a plan of action to accomplish this goal".' This emphasis upon the 
purposeful nature of metacognitive activities recalls Miller et al's (1960) notion of `planfulness', 
Smirnov's (1973) of 'voluntary behaviour' or Chi's (1976) of 'strategic processing'. In all such 
cases, insofar as attention is voluntarily applied in accordance with a prior plan of action, the 
individual is seen as engaged in a process of intentional decision-making involving options at each 
stage of his interaction with his environment. Perhaps it was Atkinson (1993: 205) who, in his 
study of the various functions of consciousness, was to capture most acutely the sense of 
intentionality and purpose underlying metacognitive activity when suggesting that the latter allows 
the individual above all to represent "events that have not yet occurred" in the mind as "future 
possibilities" and, in seeking to achieve any one of these possibilities, to "envisage alternative 
`scenarios', make choices and initiate appropriate activities". The ability to conceive of varying 
action-outcome scenarios as a series of unrealized possibilities is, as others from Bruner (1975) to 
Donaldson (1993) have noted, crucial in terms of allowing the individual to move from 
environment-regulated to self-regulated behaviour. 26 An individual who is able to conceive of a 
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series of possible action-outcome scenarios, select the most appropriate, devise a plan to achieve it 
and monitor and revise that plan as and when needed is clearly, as Meadows (1993) suggests, a 
self-directing and self-determining being. 
To the extent that cognitive (or primary) processes are engaged by events in the environment and 
not by intentions, it is difficult, as Baars (1988) suggests, to talk of self-regulation in any serious 
way. The latter only arises when we are seeking to make our behaviour conform to a preconceived 
objective which, in turn, requires the conscious processing of a range of possible cognitive 
strategies. It would, of course, be incorrect to suggest that such a view of metacognitive processes 
as combining both consciousness and intentionality is universally accepted in the literature. 
Steinberg (1985: 33-4), in his review of Meichenbaum et al 's (1985) work on the problems involved 
in assessing metacognitive processing, argues that the term is unstable insofar as those studying it 
may be studying "... completely different things, for example, knowledge about knowledge on the 
one hand and control strategy on the other". There would appear to be some justification for this 
view in that writers, even as early as Flavell (1976), have occasionally been ambiguous in their 
definition of the term. Flavell was to describe metacognition as "... knowledge that takes as its 
object or regulates any aspect of cognitive behaviour" (emphasis added), for example, and others 
such as Brown and Deloache (1978: 13) have occasionally theorized this distinction: 
Most theories of human cognition and artificial intelligence also make a distinction 
between the knowledge and routines available to its system and the executive that 
monitors and controls the use of these data. 
The most well-known model in the area of metacognitive processing which attempts to treat 
representational and control processes as separate is, of course, that of Bialystock. Although that 
model has passed through successive reformulations and refinements (Bialystock, 1982, 1986, 1996; 
Bialystock and Ryan, 1985a, 1985b), it essentially views cognitive processing -- particularly that 
related to first and second language acquisition -- as proceeding along two distinct, if related, axes: 
those of 'analysis' and 'control'. 	 The first axis refers to the individual's degree of 
self-consciousness in terms of his ability to explicitly represent to himself what he 'knows' 
linguistically and the second refers to the degree of intentionality in the use of that knowledge for 
linguistic processing. While it may be argued, as does Bialystock, that consciousness and control 
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mechanisms are logically discrete, may have differing origins and undergo separate paths of 
evolution, however, it would seem difficult to deny that they are inevitably inter-related at a given 
stage in the child's development when a conscious control of strategies is required to adapt 
(linguistic) behaviour to new and unfamiliar contexts of use. Writers such as Menyuk (1985) or 
Hulstijn (1990) may err in seeking to criticize Bialystock from a narrow information-processing 
point of view, but their assertion that consciousness and intentionality (i.e. selective attention) are 
inseparably related in goal-directed behaviour would seem difficult to refute. 27 Awareness of the 
structural properties of (a) language, for example, would appear to be a pre-requisite for their 
intentional application in language-processing activities or, as Menyuk (1985: 256) was to succinctly 
put it, "we cannot use knowledge that we do not have". 
3.0. Paradigmatic approaches 
While there is by no means unanimity in the relevant literature, current views on the nature and 
purpose of metacognitive processing reveal a surprising degree of consensus. The latter is widely 
seen to emerge out of the need to adapt behaviour to new (and unfamiliar) contexts of use and — 
insofar as such adaptation is based on the selection of relevant cognitive strategies and the 
monitoring of their implementation in pursuit of a given goal — involve both consciousness and 
intentional (i.e. voluntary) 
control 
A 
unfamiliar 
contexts 
Figure 2: metacognitive processing as a behaviour-regulating mechanism 
33 
intentionality. The principal features of this consensus can be seen in figure 2 -- a modified version 
of Bialystock's (1985) model -- where the 'implicit-explicit' axis refers to the extent to which the 
child is able to consciously treat his cognitive strategies as a range of behaviour potentials and the 
`non-intentional-intentional' axis refers to the extent to which the child is able to deliberately assign 
attentional resources to these strategies in the service of a particular goal. 
Within such a framework, it might appear reasonable to view metalinguistic awareness as simply 
the concrete application of metacognitive control processing in the domain-specific area of language 
acquisition/use, that is, the conscious selection and monitoring of language as a medium in order to 
regulate its use in novel (or more decontextualized) settings. While such a view is possible and, 
indeed, advocated by writers such as Hakes (1980) or Tunmer et al (1984), it fails to address a range 
of important and, as yet, unresolved theoretical issues concerning the relationship between cognitive 
and metacognitive processes which can be summarized as follows: 
• does metacognitive/metalinguistic processing emerge gradually out of an ongoing process 
of cognitive restructuring or, on the contrary, does it play an important functional role in 
that restructuring from a relatively early stage; 
• whenever metacognitive/metalinguistic processing 'sets in', does it emerge as a general, 
stage-related phenomenon or does the ability to reflect upon and regulate cognitive 
processes emerge differentially in domain-specific areas; and 
• does metacognitive/metalinguistic processing, whether it operates at a global or domain-
specific level, emerge as a result of maturational development or socio-cognitive 
interaction. 
Such questions are hardly unimportant. On the contrary, it is only by teasing out answers to them 
that it is possible to develop a framework in which the relationship between metacognitive and 
metalinguistic activities and, equally important, the functional role that metalinguistic activities may 
(or may not) play in the development of linguistic competence, can be understood. Within the field 
of psychology, three broad approaches to these questions can be detected which merit close analysis 
insofar as they have determined the shape and focus of the debate on metalinguistic awareness, both 
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in terms of theoretical assumptions and interpretation of available data, that will be analyzed in 
Chapter 2. 
3. 1. Linear models 
As already suggested, cognitive psychology has largely developed within an information-
processing paradigm which is instinctively hostile to the developmental approach of a Piaget or 
Vygotsky where children's competence is viewed as emerging out of a complex process of cognitive 
restructuring. Within this paradigm, as Meadows (1993: 218) notes, basic cognitive capacities such 
as the ability to scan for information, to co-ordinate different modalities, to integrate information 
and, above all, to categorize are seen as part of the child's 'hard wiring' and hardly expected to 
change. All, she points out, can be observed in young children and, over the years, merely show "... 
experience-related changes in speed, exhaustiveness and flexibility". The non-developmental 
approach of the information-processing paradigm has meant that those writing within it have been 
particularly susceptible to the influence of nativist ideas, such as those emerging from within the 
sphere of linguistics, which have tended to see young children as 'preset' with severe restrictions on 
what can (and cannot) be learnt.' As Chomsky (1968: 91) was to suggest, in relation to the 
language acquisition process: 
Corresponding to the present case, it seems that knowledge of a language — a grammar 
-- can be acquired only by an organism that is 'preset' with a severe restriction on the 
form of grammar. This innate restriction is a precondition, in the Kantian sense, for 
linguistic experience and it appears to be the critical factor in determining the course and 
result of language learning. 
Chomsky's approach, as Sincoff and Steinberg (1989) note, has played an important role in 
furthering non-developmental views within the field of cognitive psychology, particularly in those 
models seeking to deal with metacognitive processing, such as Keil's (1988: 85) 'early competence 
model' -- which explicitly admits its debt to Chomsky in its "constraints-oriented view of cognitive 
development" -- or Chi's (1978) slightly earlier and highly influential 'novice-expert' 
While such models share with the others the general view that metacognitive processes aid the child 
in adapting behaviour to new contexts of use, the timing of their emergence, their relationship with 
cognitive processes and their domain-specific nature imply a strong nativist hypothesis. There are 
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three aspects of this approach which it may be useful to explore. 
3.1.1. Implications of the 'novice-expert' continuum 
In the first place, as indicated, cognitive capacities in these models are seen to be limited by a 
priori constraints which serve to undermine any sense of development or, as Keil (1988: 91) was to 
put it, the "... basic properties of knowledge are the same throughout development". What this 
means in practice can be seen in, for example, Quinn and Eimas' (1987: 152) treatment of the 
notions of categorization in children which, as in Fodor (1981), are described as "... quite similar in 
their functional characteristics to those processes that serve the categorization of information in 
maturity". In other words, children do not undergo any conceptual development, as argued in the 
work of a Piaget or Vygotsky, but are viewed as being 'preset' with the same conceptual framework 
as the adult. A similar approach can be found in Light's (1988) treatment of 'reasoning' or Bullock 
et al's (1982: 251) study of causal understanding in young children which likewise argues that the 
difference between the child and adult is "... more a process of learning where, when and how to 
apply the rules of reasoning than figuring out what these rules might be". What changes in the 
development of the child into an adult, such writers would claim, is not so much the child's mental 
representation as the efficiency with which such representation can be applied in the achievement 
of a given task. As Brown and Deloache (1988: 139-140) were to put it, in their evaluation of Chi's 
novice-expert model, any changes that occur seem to take place not in the cognitive but in the 
metacognitive (i.e. conscious control) processing which is seen to become increasingly efficient 
through use: 
Novices often fail to perform efficiently, not only because they may lack certain skills but 
because they are deficient in terms of self-conscious participation and intelligent self-
regulation of their actions. The novice tends to know much less about either his capabilities 
on a new task or the techniques necessary to perform efficiently; he may even have 
have difficulty determining what goals are desirable, let alone what steps are required to 
get there. 
Insofar as cognitive processes are seen to remain static, Brown and Deloache continue, what 
differentiates the child-novice from the adult-expert is the degree of sophisticated metacognitive 
processing which allows him to reflect upon, monitor and evaluate his performance in an 
increasingly efficient and systematic way. 
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In the second place, if the link between novice and expert is a linear one in which what changes 
is not the cognitive structures themselves but merely the degree of efficient self-regulation in their 
use, development is inevitably viewed as quantitative rather than qualitative in nature. This helps to 
explain the emphasis within such models on the notion of 'experience' as typified by a writer such 
as Wood (1988: 72-73) who can note that, if younger children appear more limited than older ones 
in terms of their ability to attend, memorize and regulate their behaviour, this is "... not because they 
lack 'logic' but because they do not possess the necessary experience and expertise". The notion of 
experience plays a crucial role in the development of the child-novice into the adult-expert because 
it is only through familiarity with a given task that the child can gain the efficiency necessary to 
regulate his own behaviour, that is, to refine and automate the metacognitive processes which -- in 
the initial stages -- tend to be slow and laborious. Brown and Deloache (1978; 14), interestingly 
enough, were to divide the novice-expert continuum into three stages whereby increases in 
intelligent self-regulation are seen to correspond to the movement from conscious to unconscious 
(i.e. automated) control processing. In the first stage, the novice is seen as showing "little or no 
intelligent self-regulation" but, as he becomes familiar with the "necessary rules and sub-processes", 
he moves to the second stage which is defined as an "active period of self-regulation". The third 
stage, that of the expert, is seen as the most efficient insofar as the sub-processes "... have been 
overlearned to the point where they are relatively automatic". What is interesting in such an 
approach is its similarity with other skill-based models, such as those of Fitt (1964) or Anderson 
(1982, 1986) which, likewise, describe the transfer from declarative to procedural knowledge as a 
function of the automatization of initially conscious cognitive processes. In both, the child-novice's 
initial approach to a task is, as Reber (op. cit.) puts it, "slow, laborious, conscious and 
overtly-controlled" and only gives way to the "smooth, unconscious and covertly-controlled" 
approach of the adult-expert through experience. An interesting domain-specific application of such 
an approach can be found in Campbell's (1986: 46-8) view of language acquisition in which 
initially phenic (i.e. conscious) representation of linguistic units become cryptic (i.e. unconscious) as 
a result of frequent use.' 
In the third place, if development is seen to consist of a process of more efficient self-regulation, 
this is less likely to occur as a function of general 'stages' than as a function of the experience 
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within domain-specific areas. The idea that metacognitive processes develop differentially within 
domains rather than globally across domains was already implicit, of course, in Flavell's (1976) 
pioneering work in the area of metamemory. It received growing support, however, as the influence 
of Chomsky's nativist assumptions, particularly those concerning the discrete nature of linguistic 
competence, became more widespread and were incorporated into the work of writers such as Keil 
(1988) or Carey (1988). 32 Keil (1988: 98), in particular, does not deny that there exists a range of 
cognitive features, such as short-term memory or limitations in the concept-forming process, which 
are common to and underpin all knowledge domains. While accepting this, however, he stresses 
that any major development in behaviour "... is always restricted to specific knowledge domains" 
since " ... there are no general stages in cognitive development constituting across-the-board shifts 
in representation or manner of thinking". In other words, the ability to progress in any domain (e.g. 
the development of literacy skills) is not dependent upon a general level of cognitive growth but only 
upon the specific level of knowledge within that domain and a corresponding level of intelligent 
regulation in the service of a given task. Such a notion implies, as Wood (1988: 34) notes, that 
children's development can vary considerably from domain to domain depending upon the 
experience respective to each: 
Children's ability in one area may not reflect their abilities in others if their expertise in 
different subjects and activities varies. This view makes no use of concepts of stages 
of development... 
Carey (1988: 123) was to provide an interesting example of this in relation to the development of 
literacy skills. In order to access written texts, she suggests, children need to have developed some 
rudimentary concepts such as the term 'word'. Developing such a metalinguistic concept, however, 
she continues, is not related to (or dependent upon) the development of generalized metacognitive 
skills but is "... garden-variety domain-specific learning where the domain is in this case language". 
Carey does not deny that the development of metaconcepts such as 'word' can have an impact upon 
related domains -- such as that of logic -- but, she insists (ibid. 133), even if some domains of 
knowledge do interact with others, "... the acquisition and reorganization of strictly domain-specific 
knowledge ... probably accounts for most of the cognitive differences between 3-year olds and 
adults". 
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The implications of nativist-inspired models, such as those of Keil or Chi, for the development of 
metacognitive processes, and for the relation of such processes to metalinguistic ones, are 
far-reaching in three respects: 
• First, if metacognitive processes tend to develop on a domain-specific basis, i.e. are not 
related to global changes in cognitive development, there will be no necessary link between 
metalinguistic and other metacognitive processes which may develop differentially 
• Second, if metacognitive processes are seen to play a crucial functional role in skill 
development from an early age, metalinguistic processes are likely to play an equally 
crucial role in the development of (domain-specific) linguistic competence; 
• Third, metalinguistic and metacognitive processes will develop in a linear way (from less to 
more efficient) as a function of the experience specific to a given domain. 
All of these implications do, indeed, permeate a considerable body of the literature devoted to 
metalinguistic awareness, particularly the work of Clark (1978) and Bowey (1988). The latter tend 
to see metalinguistic awareness as playing an important functional role in the development of 
linguistic competence from a very early stage as, indeed, Keil and Chi generally tend to see 
metacognitive processes playing a similar role in the child's cognitive development. 
3. 2. Cognitive construct models 
The nativist views of a Keil or Carey tended to emerge, in many ways, as part of a reaction 
against the stage-related nature of Piaget's earlier 'cognitive construct' model. The notion in Piaget 
that cognition is, as Meadows (1983: 10-11) put it, 'constructed' rather than 'given' as part of the 
child's hard wiring and passes through a series of well-defined global stages, was the target of 
increasingly sharp criticism. "[Y]oung children", Keil (1988: 83-84) was to write, "are not 
qualitatively different from older ones" and there is, therefore, no need for a model that posits 
"qualitative changes in either mode of representation or of processing". There is a sense in which 
such criticism is justified in that, as Bruner (1986: 67) was to note, there would appear to be an 
incompatibility between the notion of 'global stages' in cognitive growth and, for example, the data 
relating to metacognition which suggests that the latter is "... very unevenly distributed, varies 
39 
according to cultural background, and perhaps most important, can be taught successfully as a 
skill". While Bruner is no doubt correct to raise the difficulty of reconciling the inbuilt maturational 
logic of Piaget's model with the differentiation in metacognitive skills that exists between children, 
the latter's model is somewhat more sophisticated than that of his nativist critics in addressing the 
complex questions of the relationship between metacognitive and cognitive processes. There are 
perhaps three aspects of such a model which warrant particular attention. 
3.2.1. Decentering and self-regulation 
In the first place, as Piatelli-Palmarini (1980: 3) suggests, the guiding ontological principle 
(rhypothese directrice) of Piaget's work concerns the relation between cognitive processes and 
self-regulation. Piaget (1980: 4) was himself to stress this relation in his well-known polemic with 
Chomsky when arguing that cognitive processes can be seen at one and the same time as "... the 
outcome of organic auto-regulation" and "... the most highly differentiated organs of this regulation 
at the core of interactions with the environment". Implicit in such a view is a highly dynamic 
concept of cognitive development which proceeds according to the well-known principles of 
`assimilation' and 'accommodation'. It is by the constant restructuring of the internal system of 
representation to reach a new stage of 'equilibrium' -- what Meadows (1983: 10) was to refer to as a 
new "system of knowledge" -- that the child gradually learns to decentre his thinking and subject his 
interaction with his surroundings to ever more conscious and voluntary control. This link between 
cognitive restructuring and cognitive decentering is crucial to Piaget's model and is reflected most 
obviously, perhaps, in the child's changing use of language. As Hickmann (1986; 17) suggests, 
decentering underlies a 
decontextualisation of children's speech, allowing them, for example, to speak of 
displaced entities, events and relations among them which are not part of the here-
and-now and/or to take into account the perspective of their listeners 
It is as part of this process of decentering on the child's part -- that is, the disembedding of thinking 
as it passes from simple 'action schemas' to 'representational schemas', using symbols and words --
that metacognitive processes have to be understood. Conscious control processing is not viewed, as 
in the nativist models of writers such as Keil, as playing a functional role in the early cognitive 
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development of the child but, on the contrary, as emerging only gradually out of a long process of 
cognitive restructuring in which the child's thought becomes increasingly reflective and able to be 
directed inwardly, as well as outwardly, as a regulative tool. Although Piaget himself did not use 
the term `metacogMtive', it would appear to correspond reasonably closely, as Gombert (1992; 6) 
suggests, to his definition of 'operational knowledge' which develops in middle childhood, that is, 
with children's ability to "... transform their own knowledge to conform to the requirements of the 
task with which they are confronted". 33  
In the second place, Piaget's model contains within it a clear mechanism for explaining changes 
in the process of cognitive decentering the child passes through which emphasizes their qualitative 
rather than quantitative nature. Meadows (1983: 12), it is true, suggests that Piaget's notion of 
`equilibrium' is inadequate in that it doesn't clarify the degree of disequilibrium that is required to 
prompt the child at any stage to set into motion once again the assimilation-accommodation 
mechanism. There may be some validity in this but the criticism is somewhat disingenuous in that, 
for Piaget, the need for a new "system of knowledge" arises clearly out of 'negative feedback', that 
is, out of the inadequacy of the existing one to resolve a given range of problem-solving tasks. As 
Boden (1982: 9) was to put it, it is the "... failure of the system in its earlier form" to make 
appropriate (assimilatory and/or accommodatory) adjustments that initiates self-development. This 
is true for the movement between all the stages (macro and micro) in the Piagetian model and, in 
particular, for that between pre-operational and operational thinking where, it is suggested, 
metacognitive processing 'sets in'. As Robinson (1983: 130-2) points out, in reviewing the research 
carried out by Marshall and Morton (1978), the development of conscious control processing at this 
stage would appear to be as an error-detecting and error-correcting device, that is, as a device which 
emerges out of the inadequacy of implicit strategies to achieve a given outcome and out of the need 
to substitute alternative strategies based on an explicit review of behaviour potential. As she was to 
put it: 
... children first become aware of the intended outcome of their actions, and of discrep-
ancies between that and actual outcomes. Subsequently, children become increasingly 
aware of the actions themselves, and also of the ways their actions react with the 
physical world. At this stage, actions can be the result of prior hypotheses, and them-
selves lead to subsequent hypotheses ... 
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Such a view, in which the occurrence of errors is seen as providing the incentive for deliberate 
planning, tends to reverse the relationship between metacognitive and cognitive processes in nativist 
models. In the latter, as indicated, intelligent self-regulation is seen to emerge out of the 
automatization of initially conscious cognitive processes which set in very early in the child's 
development. In Piaget, however, it is not conscious that give way to unconscious processes but, on 
the contrary, initially unconscious (implicit) processes that become ever more conscious (explicit) as 
their inability to achieve desired outcomes becomes more evident and they become more subject to 
critical review. As Robinson (op. cit.) was to suggest, it is the growing need to switch attention 
from the goals of behaviour to behaviour itself which is the source of metacognitive processing. 34  
In the third place. the cognitive decentering which is at the heart of Piaget's model, and which 
reaches its climax in what Meadows (1993: 79) describes as "'reflective abstraction', a sort of 
pondering about cognition", operates at a general rather than a domain-specific level. The 
movement from the internalization of simple 'action schemas' to the development of operational 
thinking takes place, in Piaget, as a series of sharply-defined global stages (and sub-stages), each of 
which heralds a major restructuring of the representational system. This is particularly true in the 
transfer from pre-operational (or 'intuitive') to operational thinking where, as Beard (1969: 98) 
confirms, the young child begins to be able to make assumptions and form testable hypotheses, 
thereby becoming " ... conscious of his own thinking, reflecting on it to provide logical justification 
for judgments he makes". An interesting example of the child's ability to attend to his own 
cognitive processes can be seen in the development of literacy skills which, it is widely accepted, 
coincide with the onset of concrete operational thinking. Brown (1980: 457), for example, seeks to 
draw up a taxonomy of those 'debugging' strategies which are crucial for accessing written texts and 
which include, among others, the ability to direct attention towards major 'content areas' rather than 
towards 'trivia', to monitor one's own activity to ensure comprehension is occurring, to review one's 
strategies in order to achieve maximum efficiency and to take corrective action when it is not. What 
is interesting about such metacognitive processes, however, is that within a Piagetian as opposed to 
a nativist framework, they are seen as by no means unique to literacy skill development but as a 
domain-specific application of broader stage-related processes that operate on a cross- domain basis. 
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As Brown was to show, such strategies are closely related to those identified in the problem-solving 
literature which include, for example, 
• selectively attending to given aspects of a task in order to predict the outcome of a 
chosen strategy utilization (Brown and Lawton, 1977); 
• monitoring the implementation of a given strategy in order to assess its relative 
degree of success/failure (Brown and Campione, 1977); 
• recognizing the need to change processing strategies in relation to an increase in 
difficulty of the task posed (Brown 1975). 35  
The fact that the strategies applied in any given area are merely a domain-specific application of 
global strategies has important implications, of course, for the relationship between metacognitive 
and metalinguistic processing. In nativist models, where metacognitive processes develop on a 
domain-specific basis according to the degree of 'familiarity' with the tasks at hand, it is possible 
that metalinguistic and metacognitive process can emerge and develop differentially. In Piaget's 
model, however, where metacognitive processes arise as global stage-related phenomena, 
metalinguistic processing is inevitably conceived as dependent on, and a domain-specific application 
of, such phenomena. 
Both Piagetian and nativist models concur in viewing metacognition as arising out of the need to 
adapt behaviour to new contexts of use. While sharing this common perspective, however, the 
insistence in Piaget's model that metacognition arises out of a long process of cognitive 
restructuring, which passes through global stages, has a number of important implications both for 
the relationship between metacognitive and metalinguistic processing and for the role of the latter in 
the development of linguistic competence: 
• First, if metacognitive processes arise out of a global restructuring of cognitive processes in 
middle childhood, metalinguistic awareness will tend to represent little more than a 
domain-specific application of them and will have no autonomy in development or use; 
• Second, if metalinguistic processing arises as a sub-domain of metacognitive processing, it 
is unlikely that it will play any functional role in the development of (primary) linguistic 
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competence insofar as the latter is generally recognized to be complete by the concrete 
operational stage; and 
• Third, if metalinguistic processing is a domain-specific application of metacognitive 
processes, changes in the latter -- as between concrete and formal operational thinking --
may well be reflected in the nature of metalinguistic processing and the aspects of 
language the child is able to attend to. 
Such implications have had an important impact, within the literature devoted to metalinguistic 
awareness, on the Australian school represented by writers such as Hakes (1980) or Tumner et al 
(1984) and, in a more complex way, Bredart and Rondel (1982), Chaudron (1983) and Gombert 
(1992). The former, in particular, have sought to analyze the general links between concrete 
operational thinking and the onset of metalinguistic processing and the way in which changes in 
such thinking can be detected in the shifts from metaphonological to metasyntactic and 
metapragmatic processing. 
3. 3. Socio-cultural models 
The third influential current of thought on the development of metacognitive and metalinguistic 
processes can be found in the work of social psychologists such as Vygotsky (1962, 1978) and his 
followers. Vygotsky (1988: 62), it should be stressed, shared Piaget's opposition to nativist 
approaches to cognitive development which he dismissed as a "... regrettable vestige of pre-scientific 
thought". 3, He empathized with Piaget's more dynamic approach which viewed higher (i.e. meta-) 
cognitive functions as arising out of an ongoing process of cognitive restructuring as the child seeks 
to refine his interaction with his surroundings. As Brown (1980: 453) notes, for Vygotsky as for 
Piaget, the development of knowledge appears to have two stages, its "automatic, unconscious 
acquisition" being followed by "gradual increases in conscious control over that knowledge" or, as 
Vygotsky (1962: 90) was himself to put it, "... consciousness and control appear only at a late stage 
in the development of a function, after it has been used and practised unconsciously and 
spontaneously. In order to subject a function to intellectual and volitional control, we must first 
possess it". While sharing Piaget's developmental approach, however, Vygotsky argued strongly 
that the Achilles' heel of the latter lay in the fact that it ignored the essentially social roots of this 
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shift from the first to second stage, from implicit to explicit processing. In particular, he argued, 
insofar as it viewed cognitive development as essentially maturational in nature, it tended to 
downplay (or ignore) the crucial role played by language (as a form of social semiotic) in the 
transfer from lower to higher mental processes. It is around the role played by language in the 
emergence of what he calls the "awareness of the activity of the mind" that differences between the 
two approaches are most clearly defined. 
As Hickmann (1986: 10-11) argues, for Piaget, the dynamic mechanisms that move cognitive 
development forward are the processes of 'adaptation' which are clearly independent of language 
and which constitute explanatory principles ultimately defined in biological terms. These processes 
-- namely those of assimilation and accommodation -- allow the child to interact with his 
environment by an ongoing process of adjustment of his cognitive organization and result in a 
gradual `decentering' of thought. The emergence of language is, she points out, "... relatively 
peripheral to this theory, both as a content area in its own right ... and in terms of the principal 
explanatory mechanisms from which cognitive development emerges". At most, language is seen 
as one semiotic form among others which is useful for expressing the development of abstract (i.e. 
disembedded) thought but which is subordinate to the cognitive processes giving rise to that thought. 
While Vygotsky gives a complementary account of child development during the sensori-motor 
stage, however, the emergence of language in his work is treated as a major source of discontinuity, 
rather than continuity, in the child's cognitive growth. It is at this time, Vygotsky argues, that the 
biological line of development converges with the social -- insofar as language is a social semiotic --
and this convergence holds the potential for radically reshaping the child's cognitive development 
and laying the basis for the emergence of higher metacognitive processes. 38 As Hickmann (ibid. 11) 
was to continue, if language is relatively peripheral for Piaget, for Vygotsky it is 
... the principal motor of development, as it mediates the child's participation in both 
the intellectual and social life surrounding him. That is, the principles and mechanisms 
of cognitive development are not independent from the signs, particularly the linguistic 
signs, which the child confronts in his interaction with the world. 
The emphasis placed by Hickmann on the role of semiotic mediation in Vygotsky's approach to 
cognitive development is crucial. In internalizing language, the child is seen to internalize a system 
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of signs which allows him to re-organize his behaviour according to a social (as opposed to a 
natural) type, that is, which allows him to transform a direct response to environmental stimuli into 
a more complex, indirect and reflective one. Moreover, as Lethbridge (1992: 71) points out, if 
language increasingly acts to mediate the child's "interaction with the world", it also acts to 
restructure his cognitive processes and thereby becomes "... the objective force that gave rise to 
consciousness". 
The difference between Piaget's and Vygotsky's attitude to the role that semiotic mediation plays 
in the development of cognitive processes can be seen most fruitfully, of course, in their respective 
views on the role and nature of egocentric speech. Piaget's study of the latter had led him to 
conclude that such speech could best be defined as a transitional stage between what Zivin (1979: 
19) was to call 'a-communicative' and 'communicative' speech and simply mirrored the general 
process of cognitive decentering underway in the child. 39 For Vygotsky, on the other hand, what 
was generally termed 'egocentric' speech represented a transitional phenomenon moving in the 
opposite direction, that is, social speech that was gradually becoming internalized as 'inner speech' 
(or 'verbal thought'). It was, he suggested, the internalization of social speech, which was the main 
impetus in the restructuring of the child's cognitive system and in developing what Lethbridge 
(1992: 78) defines as a " ... new form of mind, a qualitatively distinct form of mentality specific to 
social humanity", that is, "self-aware volitional consciousness". For Vygotsky, the ability of 
language to have such a revolutionary impact upon the child's cognitive growth resides in its dual 
function as both a 'referential' and 'regulatory' tool. It is the interaction between these two 
functions, as language is internalized, that gives rise to the possibility of metacognitive (i.e. 
conscious self-regulating) activity. 
• Referential function 
In the first place, as Sapir (1963) noted, the fact that words have generalized meanings -- that is, 
refer not to an object or event but to classes of objects or events -- has a powerful disembedding 
effect on children's thought. 40 It allows them to move rapidly beyond the immediacy of the 
environment, to talk about, reflect on and draw comparisons between objects and events distant in 
time and space. Moreover, the fact that word meanings can be defined not only by relating a given 
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sign to its referent but to other signs, within a wider network of signs, has important long-term 
implications for conceptual thought. As Wertsch (1985: 103) points out, if a child can define a 
`table', a 'chair' or 'furniture' not only by relating the sign to the object to which it refers but to 
other signs, this would suggest that he can begin to "...operate on statements of logical equivalence, 
nonequivalence, entailment and the like, such as 'All tables are furniture'." In other words, the 
generalization embodied in word meanings -- and the fact that such meanings "organize things into 
systems", as Luria (1981: 31) put it -- allows the child gradually to disembed his thinking and 
develop a more abstract and logical view of his environment. Such a process does not occur 
overnight, of course, but undergoes a complex evolution. While there may be agreement early on 
between child and adult on the referent of a given word -- a necessary precondition for 
communication -- there is no such agreement on word meaning. On the contrary, for the young 
child the meaning of a word undergoes an ongoing process of redefinition as it becomes more and 
more disembedded from its context, that is, as it passes from a 'complex' to a true 'concept'. As 
Vygotsky (1962: 83) himself expressed it: 
... word meanings evolve. When a new word has been learned by the child, its dev-
elopment is barely starting; the word at first is a generalization of the most primitive 
type; as the child's intellect develops, it is replaced by generalizations of a higher 
and higher type -- a process that leads in the end to the formation of true concepts. 
Such a process only reaches its conclusion, as Vygotsky suggests, in the scientific concepts of formal 
schooling which are mediated through other concepts with their internal hierarchical system of 
interrelationships. Interestingly enough, Volosinov (1973: 13) was to echo Vygotsky's view on the 
relationship between the development of higher cognitive functions and the evolution of word 
meaning when he insisted that "The individual consciousness is nurtured on signs; it derives its 
growth from them; it reflects their laws and logic". 
• Regulatory function 
In the second place, if the referential function of language allows the child to gradually disembed 
his thinking, the regulatory function allows him to direct this thinking towards himself and to 
develop new dimensions of intelligent self-control. Initially, as Vygotsky pointed out, children's 
behaviour is regulated largely through others' use of language. As the child internalizes social 
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speech, however, he is increasingly able to apply to himself the method of behaviour that was 
previously applied to him, thus organizing his own behaviour according to a social type. As 
Lethbridge (1992: 73) was to put it, "Language, once internalized as inner speech, is a system which 
permits the control and organization of one's own activities as language exteriorized as vocal speech 
permits the control and organization of others". 41 It is important to remember, however, that the 
ability of the child to consciously regulate his own behaviour is enmeshed with, and dependent 
upon, the development of conceptual thought. The more the child is able to move beyond the 
confines of the here-and-now, the more he is able to develop goals for the future which require 
planning, hypothesis-formation, monitoring and evaluation of the strategies adopted. 42 In other 
words, it is the disembedding of thinking which allows the child's behaviour to change from being a 
spontaneous reaction to the regulation of others to a deliberate form of self-regulation. "The 
internalization of social speech", Lethbridge (ibid. 73) continues, "permits the individual to plan 
behaviour before it occurs, to examine it from a multiplicity of points of view, to inhibit behaviour or 
to encourage it, in short to treat it objectively". If inner speech gives rise to higher mental functions 
(i.e. consciousness), it also gives rise to those mechanisms which allow that consciousness to be 
directed towards one's own behaviour in order to regulate it more effectively. 
3.3.1. `decontextualisation of mediational means' 
For Vygotsky, it is the convergence between the referential and regulatory functions of social 
speech, as the latter becomes internalized as inner speech, which creates the potential for 
metacognitive activity. Within such a perspective, there is no divorce between consciousness and 
control processing since it is precisely the inter-relation between the two which is seen to constitute 
higher mental functions. It is important to note, however, that the development of metacognitive 
activity is by no means seen as automatic but dependent upon what Wertsch (1985: 32-3) was to 
pertinently term the "decontextualisation of mediational means". Language may have inbuilt into it 
the potential to develop conscious self-regulation but the ability of the child to realize this potential 
depends ultimately upon the extent to which he has been aided to disembed language from its initial 
"... dependence on the perceived conditions under which it is uttered and heard, and from the 
behaviour which accompanies it", as Bruner (1975: 107) put it. In other words, it is only insofar as 
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the child has been encouraged to realize that meaning is dependent more upon intra- than 
extralinguistic relationships, that is, when language is treated as a self-referring system of signs, 
that he can truly develop what Vygotsky (ibid. 91) called "self-reflective awareness". 43 Hickmann 
(1986: 25), in her comparative study of Piaget and Vygotsky, was to express this somewhat 
differently when pointing out that the more the child is able to disembed language, the more he is 
able to disembed his thinking which is so crucial to problem solving activities. It is, she suggests, 
... the ability to use language as its own context, minimally, the ability to establish 
relationships among the utterances of continuing discourse ... [which] should have a 
great impact on both the cognitive and the social competence of children. 
The idea that metalinguistic awareness -- the ability to reflect upon language as a symbolic system 
in its own right -- precedes metacognitive growth is central to Vygotsky's approach. It represents a 
fundamental reversal of Piaget's viewpoint insofar as the latter tends to view metalinguistic 
awareness as simply a domain-specific application of general metacognitive processes that emerge at 
a given stage in cognitive development. For Vygotsky, on the contrary, the ability to attend to 
language is not a by-product of metacognitive growth but a pre-requisite for it. 
The importance of the `decontextualisation of mediational means' in the child's cognitive 
restructuring has featured extensively in the literature developed within the Vygotskyan tradition. 
Writers such as Wells (1981, 1986) or Donaldson (1978, 1992), for example, have long argued that 
the ability of the child to disembed language from its role as an accompaniment to action is crucial 
in terms of enabling him to deal with the cognitive (i.e. problem-solving) demands of formal 
schooling. The first step the child has to take in dealing with these demands, Donaldson (1978: 89) 
suggests, is "... the step of conceptualizing language" that is, "becoming aware of it as a separate 
structure, freeing it from its embededness in events". For Donaldson, as for Goody and Watt 
(1972), Olsen and Torrence (1983) or Olsen (1984), the major opportunity for the child to 
`disembed' language occurs during the acquisition of literacy skills and it is no accident that, at both 
the ontogenetic and phylogenetic levels, the symbiotic relationship between literacy skills and 
cognitive functioning has been observed. Olsen and Torrence (1983: 145), for example, argue 
strongly that the onset of literacy skills heralds a "conceptual transformation" in the child based 
upon a new orientation to language, that is, an "... attention to and competence with the structure of 
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language per se as opposed to competence with the contents, intentions and messages expressed by 
language". What Olsen and Torrence note at the ontogenetic level had already been explored at 
the phylogenetic level by writers such as Goody and Watt (1972) or Wells (1981: 243), who stresses 
that 
... with the acquisition of literacy comes a more detached and reflective attitude to 
experience and this, in turn, promotes higher levels of cognitive functioning that are 
not readily available in cultures that are restricted to purely oral communication. 
Attempts to provide such assertions with an empirical basis had already led Vygotsky and his 
colleague Luria (1976) to conduct experiments, in the USSR of the 1930s, among the collectivized 
and non-collectivized rural population of Uzbekistan. 45 It is true that the positive correlation they 
found between literacy and higher mental functioning in such studies has been questioned more 
recently by, among others, Scribner and Cole (1981,1988) whose own research among the Vai in 
Africa convinced them that there is no evidence for the view " ... that reading and writing entail 
`cognitive restructuring' that controls intellectual performance in other domains". What Scribner 
and Cole seem to be suggesting, however, is that it is not literacy skills per se that promote reflective 
awareness but only literacy skills within a culture which, itself, values and encourages disembedded 
thinking. 46 
A major advantage of Vygotsky's attempt to view higher mental processes as a function of 
semiotic mediation is that it highlights the socio-cultural roots of the former. As already suggested, 
one of the weaknesses of Piaget's approach was that, in arguing in favour of 'global' stages of 
cognitive development which operate cross-culturally, it is unable to explain the uneven distribution 
of metacognitive (and metalinguistic) processing in children between different socio-cultural groups 
and between individuals within the same socio-cultural group. Vygotsky's view that higher mental 
processes emerge as a function of semiotic mediation helps to offset this weakness precisely because 
it denies the possibility of 'global stages'. As Sincoff and Steinberg (1989: 22) point out, for 
Vygotsky "... such universality is impossible because development reflects the dynamic relations 
between the child and his or her particular environment or culture, which varies among individuals 
as well as across time for the same individual". In particular, as in the case of literacy skill 
development, it will be the extent to which a given culture (or sub-culture) values and encourages 
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the decontextualized use of language that will determine the child's access to it and success with it. 
Such a view, of course, has important implications for the relationship between metalinguistic and 
metacognitive functioning which can be summarized as follows: 
• First, if cognitive development is a function of what Wertsch calls the "decontextualisation 
of mediational means", metalinguistic awareness will play a functional role in the 
development of metacognitive processes and not vice versa, as suggested by Piaget; 
• Second, if the valorization of and access to given language activities are culturally 
determined, there can be no 'general stages' in the development of metalinguistic 
awareness which will be unevenly distributed between and within socio-cultural groups; 
• Third, if metalinguistic awareness emerges as a function of disembedded language use, it 
will tend to play a role less in the acquisition of context-embedded social speech and more 
in the learning of context-independent written language. 
Such implications have played an important -- if, possibly, less coherent -- role in the work of 
writers from Donaldson (1978, 1992) to Hickmann (1986) or Karmiloff-Smith (1979) as a third 
viewpoint in the debate on metalinguistic awareness. 
4.0. Summary 
While there is a consensus that metalinguistic awareness involves the ability to switch attention 
from language function to form, considerable disagreement exists around (a) those aspects of 
language that might be considered the object of such reflection, and (b) the cognitive status of the 
`awareness' involved. Such a blur stems largely from the fact that behaviourist traditions in 
psychology have tended to marginalize the study of notions such as 'awareness' or 'consciousness'. 
More recent work in the area of metacognition, while limited within an information-processing 
paradigm, has been useful in re-examining these notions and developing a consensus as to their 
function as tools to aid the adaptation of behaviour to new contexts of use via a process of conscious 
and purposeful self-regulation. While a consensus exists around the definition and function of 
metacognitive skills, however, considerable differences continue to exist as to the relationship 
between metacognitive and metalinguistic processes, whether such processes are maturational or 
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socially interactive in origin and whether they are domain-specific or general. Nativist, 'cognitive 
construct' and socio-cognitive traditions provide radically different answers to these questions which 
are crucial for situating the debate on metalinguistic awareness explored in Chapter 2. 
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Notes 
1. As Gombert notes (1992: 2), Jakobson's primary function concerned the exchange of meaning between 
speaker/listener and the secondary functions included the phatic, the ludic and poetic and finally the 
metalinguistic "... which is concerned with the activity of speaking about words, the linguistic activity which 
takes language itself as its object". 
2 As Luria (1988/1946: 61) suggests: "The first major step in children's development is characterized by the 
fact that, while they actually use grammatical speech and designate objects and actions by the corresponding 
words, they still cannot focus attention on the word and verbal relations themselves. During this period, the 
word may be likened to a pane of glass, through which the child views the surrounding world. He or she is not 
conscious of the word itself; nor does he or she suspect that it has a life of its own or a characteristic 
structure". 
3. Bowey herself (1988: 4-5) is particularly useful in exploring the issues raised by writers such as Clark 
(1978), Clark and Anderson (1979), Kaserman and Foppa (1981) and Tunmer and Herriman (1984) as to 
whether the child's early correction procedures represent conscious metalinguistic self-monitoring or, on the 
contrary, an 'automatic monitoring device'. 
4. Because of the association of 'awareness' with notions of intentionality, Bowey (1988: 19) argues, "... it 
might be appropriate to abandon the term linguistic awareness altogether and instead to use the terms 
metalinguistic functioning (Franklin, 1979) and metalinguistic performance. Such terminology retains the 
notion that attention must focus on form rather than on meaning but avoids any reference to notions like 
`consciousness' and 'intentionality' ...". 
5. As Candlin (1991: xii) points out, uncertainty regarding what is meant by linguistic awareness and its role 
in child development, raises a range of questions that have scarcely been answered, such as "How can one 
relate being aware about language to improvements in language performance? How can one relate awareness of 
language to a greater understanding of the determining role of language in social life? Does being more aware 
about language translate into ameliorating many of the interpersonal conflicts that have language issues at their 
roots? What is the role of learning strategy to awareness gains?". 
6. Sinclair (1984: 33) was to stress that the "... creative untidiness of the actual content of language awareness 
courses is in fact unrelated to the fuzziness of the cover term" and due primarily to the different needs of 
different groups of pupils. Rosen (1988: 8), in his polemic with the Kingman Committee Report, was to 
unfavourably contrast its advocacy of a 'single model of language' with the diversity of language awareness 
courses that Sinclair had already noted. 
7. As Pratt and Grieve (1984: 2-11) argue, the debate is primarily around the role of consciousness in skill 
acquisition. If consciousness does help in the accessing of new skills, then metalinguistic awareness will tend 
to be central in the development of linguistic competence from the start. 
8. As Tanis (1991: 141) suggests, "The biological (causal) and computational theories of consciousness have 
the common outcome of reducing mind to a set of input/output relations ...". 
9. Fromm's view of the "liberating effects of awareness" was linked to Marx's notion that social emancipation 
required the working class to overcome false consciousness and " ... become aware of itself " as a class with 
specific interests as a class. 
10. Nunn (1996: 1) pointed out that "... intentionality, which simply means that consciousness is always about 
something, probably is inseparable from awareness even if the content in question may very occasionally be 
nothing more than awareness of being aware". 
11. Because of the ambiguity embedded in the term 'awareness', Chalmers (1996: 28-29) draws the opposite 
conclusion from Tulving when he argues that "Consciousness is always accompanied by awareness, but 
awareness ... need not be accompanied by consciousness. One can be aware of a fact without any particular 
associated phenomenal experience, for example". 
12. Interestingly enough, in her study of the various ways of 'knowing' the world, Donaldson (1992: 23) 
argues that the distinction made in Middle English between 'acknowledge' (implying explicit knowledge) and 
`knowledge' (implying implicit knowledge) might usefully be reintroduced as a way of overcoming the current 
ambiguity in the term 'knowledge' which oscillates confusingly between the two. 
13. As Damen (1986: 118) suggests, "These two notions of awareness are entirely distinct in spite of their 
customary merger; what one can report directly, infallibly, and without speculation or interference is one thing, 
and what serves, or is relied upon, to direct behavioural responses is another". 
14. Meadows (1993: 215) is quite explicit in arguing that most of the two-stage models that have emerged in 
cognitive psychology have their roots in the division, in information-processing, between "automatic 
processing" which is seen to be fast and makes little demand upon resources, and "controlled processing" 
which is slower and "uses up many more attentional resources ...". She fails, however, to make any value 
judgement on such a comparison. 
15. As Livingstone (Metacognition: an overview, 1997: 1) suggests, although the term has long been in use in 
educational psychology in particular, "... there is much debate over exactly what metacognition is. One reason 
for this confusion is the fact that there are several terms currently used to describe the same basic phenomenon 
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(e.g. self-regulation, executive control), or an aspect of that phenomenon (e.g. meta-memory), and these terms 
are often used interchangeably in the literature". 
16. After comparing the term metacognition with Piaget's notion of 'operational knowledge', he asks "... is the 
concept of metacognition of any real use ... or is it simply a change in terminology without any heuristic 
import?". 
17. Reber (1993:16), it might be noted, drew a clear parallel between Anderson's (1982) distinction and that of 
Ryle (1949) when writing that "... Anderson's key distinction is that between declarative knowledge which is 
knowledge that we are aware of and can articulate, and procedural knowledge, which is knowledge that guides 
action and decision-making but typically lies outside the scope of consciousness". 
18. It is interesting to note the extent to which a more differentiated approach, such as that of Kitchener, maps 
onto a range of traditional three-stage models, such as that of Bruner (enactive, iconic and symbolic), Piaget 
(sensori-motor, concrete and formal operational) and Pavlov (unconditioned reflex, conditioned reflex and 
mediation). 
19. Cf. Colley, A. M. and Beech, J. R. (eds.) Acquisition and performance of cognitive skills, 1988: 5, John 
Wiley and Sons. 
20. As Mandler (1985: 45) puts it: "The distinction between action schemas and their secondary representation 
maps directly onto the distinction between procedural and declarative knowledge alluded to earlier. Actions 
are, by definition, procedures and procedural knowledge, just like an action system, is frequently not 
accessible to conscious knowledge ...". 
21. Typical examples, according to Baars (1988: 147) operate at the syntactic level, as in the case of the 
surface-deep structure ambiguities of Chomskyan theory, eg. 'Flying planes can be dangerous' or 'They are 
eating apples'. 
22. As Popper was to continue (1985: 282), "... the role of consciousness is perhaps clearest when an aim or 
purpose ... can be achieved by alternative means, and when two or more means are tried out, after 
deliberation". 
23. Dewey, it should be remembered, had criticized the emphasis upon declarative as opposed to procedural 
knowledge (i.e. 'knowing that' as opposed to 'knowing how') in schools in that it tended to penalise 
underprivileged children whose "cultural deprivation" was seen as an impediment to achievement. Bruner 
(1975: 54-5) responded that such an approach was " ... too simple, for in fact there is a great power inherent in 
decontextualised knowledge — knowledge represented in a form that is relatively free from the uses to which it 
is to be put or has been put in the past. It is not too serious an oversimplification to say that it is precisely 
such a process of reorganising knowledge into formal systems that frees it of its functional fixedness". 
24. Briars' approach is largely within an information-processing paradigm which sees skill development as a 
function of initially declarative knowledge becoming procedural, whereas Meadows, operating within a 
neo-Piagetian tradition, is more concerned with the opposite process. 
25. "Metamemory skills," they were to add (ibid. 148), "are present whenever someone consciously and 
intentionally controls and executes the processing operations necessary for remembering" and, as such, are 
similar to Wellman's (1974) notion of 'executive routine' or Yussen and Bird's (1979) notion of 'voluntary 
behaviour'. 
26. Donaldson (1992: 52), in particular, was to draw attention to the role of the 'possible' in helping the 
individual child to decontextualize his thinking. "A sense of options", she writes, "whether compatible or 
incompatible with one another, implies some ability to contemplate that which is not yet — that which only may 
be. Since, by definition, that which is not yet presents no stimulus to the senses, it can be contemplated only 
by a mind capable of calling it up". 
27. Hulstijn's critique addresses not only the separation of cognitive and control processes in Bialystock's 
model but, equally important, the problems inherent in the latter's treatment of the relationship between first 
language acquisition and second language learning, i.e. its tendency to see second language learning replicating 
first language acquisition in terms of starting with low analysed knowledge and low control processing, even in 
an instructed context. 
28. As Reber (1993: 5) was to note, "Along with the de-emphasising of learning, there has been a clear 
resurgence in nativist theorizing exemplified most notably in the work of people such as Chomsky (1980, 
1986) and Fodor (1983) ...". 
29. While both Keil's and Chi's model reflect the influence of nativist ideas, Keil's is more forthright in 
admitting its ideological pedigree. "Throughout development", he (1988: 85) points out, "the child is guided 
by a set of constraints that represent a kind of competence that is always present, namely, the set of possible, or 
natural, knowledge structures in a domain". 
30. It is interesting to note that the influence of nativist ideas within the area of cognitive psychology became 
so widespread that even developmentalists' such as Bruner began to accommodate to them. In his 
examination of the development of metacognitive skills, for example, Bruner (1988: 264) was to accept that the 
difference between the older and younger child was not due to qualitative differences in thinking but merely to 
the fact that "... the older child tends to be more explicit, has a better grasp of how to access and manipulate 
structures and routines in order to get a job done or a problem solved" whereas the younger child "...does not 
know explicitly enough what he knows, to tell whether he is being consistent or not in organising information". 
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31. Campbell (1986: 47) was not unaware of the unusual nature of his claim in regard to language acquisition 
but, he was to argue, "I can think of nothing that rules out the possibility that (a) in the early stages of 
acquisition, word selection and articulation are deliberate processes guided by the phenic contents of the 
concept associated with the word ... and that (b) in later stages, word selection and articulation become 
automatic processes guided cryptically, leaving the learner free to concentrate on higher-level tasks". 
32. Smith and Wilson (1979: 33) outline most clearly, perhaps, the implications of a nativist case for the 
domain-specificity of language. "Language may", they say, "be sui generis different in kind from other 
cognitive systems, requiring different learning strategies and different genetic programming. The two claims 
reinforce each other: if linguistic knowledge is different in kind from non-linguistic knowledge, then it is more 
likely that we need special programming to learn it; and if we have special programming, then it is more likely 
that the results of language learning will be different in kind from other systems not so programmed". 
33. As Brown (1988: 457) was to put it, in relation to Piaget, the latter might not have used the term 
"metacognition' but "The problem of self awareness and conscious control of one's own activities is of central 
concern to those interested in any aspect of the child's problem-solving capacities (Piaget, 1928)". 
34. It is interesting to note that, as Robinson (1983: 108) also points out, the notion of 'self-awareness' in 
Piaget has a social as well as cognitive origin. "There is one aspect of Piagetian theory in which it seems clear 
that awareness is held to play a significant role in development; that is, the account of how children are found 
to take into account other points of view through contact with peers (Piaget 1928, 1932)". 
35. Brown does not suggest that these strategies are widespread among children at the concrete operational 
stage but that, as in the case of learning to read, they begin to become accessible in terms of the degree of 
decentering such a stage presupposes. 
36. As he was to argue in The Genesis of Higher Mental Functions (in The Concept of Activity in Soviet 
Psychology, Wertsch, J. V. (ed.) 1981: 144), "In spite of the fact that we long ago rejected the view that 
children are distinguished from adults only by the properties of their bodies ... the idea continues to exist in 
subtle form in child psychology". 
37. As Wertsch (1985: 44) points out, the fact that Vygotsky tends to accept Piaget's view of child 
development during the sensori-motor stage may constitute one of the weaknesses of his approach. By arguing 
that the 'natural' line becomes intersected by the 'social' line only at about the age of 2, Wertsch suggests, he 
ignores the social interaction that occurs before this date and which has been increasingly reflected in 
pragmatic accounts of early language acquisition. 
38. Vygotsky (1962: 43) situated the crucial change from the 'natural' to 'social' line of development at the 
age of 2. "This crucial instant, when speech begins to serve intellect, and thought begins to be spoken, is 
indicated by two unmistakable objective symptoms: (1) the child's sudden, active curiosity about words, his 
questions about every new thing, 'What is this?', and (2) the resulting rapid, saccadic increases in his 
vocabulary". 
39. As Zivin (1979: 20-23) ) correctly points out, the disagreement between Piaget and Vygotsky on the notion 
of 'egocentric' speech stemmed from the fact that both examined it from differing theoretical perspectives. For 
Piaget she argues, it represented a speech form which mirrored the process of cognitive decentering whereas, 
for Vygotsky, it represented the internalisation of a tool for self-regulation whose primary role was in the 
planning function. 
40. Vygotsky was highly influenced by Sapir (1963: 12-13) and by his view that "The world of experience 
must be enormously simplified and generalized before it is possible to make a symbolic inventory of all our 
experiences of things and relations, and this inventory is imperative before we can convey ideas. The elements 
of language, the symbols that ticket off experience, must therefore be associated with whole groups, delimited 
classes of experience rather than with the single experiences themselves ...". 
41. As Vygotsky (1988: 73) was himself to express it when explaining the social roots of cognitive 
development: "Any function in the child's cultural development appears twice or on two planes. First it 
appears on the social plane, and then on the psychological plane. First it appears between people as an 
interpsychological category, and then within the child as an intrapsychological category. This is equally true 
with regard to voluntary attention, logical memory, the formation of concepts, and the development of 
volition". 
42. The generalised nature of word meaning allows the child, as Luria (1956: 22) was to put it, to "... organize 
his behaviour, not according to the visually perceived situation but according to a deeper 'categorized' reflection 
of the world". 
43. For Vygotsky (1962: 92) , of course, the ability of the child to treat language as a "self-referring system 
of signs" is synonymous with being able to handle scientific (as opposed to spontaneous) concepts. "Scientific 
concepts, with their hierarchical system of interrelationships, seem to be the medium through which awareness 
and mastery first develop ... Reflective consciousness comes to the child through the portals of scientific 
concepts". 
44 Olsen (1984: 222-223) in particular, was to stress the cognitive implications of the written word. "Written 
language", he argues, "is often overlooked by the mistaken assumption that writing is merely speech 'put 
down'. Written language, by virtue of its demands for explicitness of meaning, its permanence as a visible 
artifact compatible with repeated scrutiny and reflection, and its realignment of social and logical functions, 
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serves the intellect in several ways. It is an essential means for the formation of abstract true statements that 
constitute objective knowledge; it is critical to the particular mental achievements we designate as conceptual 
intelligence; and it is the predominant instrument of formal learning". 
45. Vygotsky and Luria's (1976: 77) experiment focused on illustrating the `situational' (as opposed to 
`conceptual') thinking of illiterate peasants in a number of problem-solving activities, such as grouping objects 
according to given categories. As they concluded, "... different psychological processes" determined their 
manner of grouping which "hinged on concrete, situational thinking rather than abstract operations which 
entail the generalising function of language". 
46. As Wertsch (1985: 39) summarizes, the findings of Scribner and Cole do not invalidate the results of 
Vygotsky and Luria's experiment but merely show that the link between literacy skills and conceptual thought 
cannot be generalized to all societies. Higher mental functions probably do, he argues, depend upon the 
decontextualisation of mediational means but it is only insofar as literacy in a given culture promotes such 
decontextualisation that there is likely to be a link between it and cognition. 
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Chapter 2 
Metalinguistic processing and language development 
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Chapter 2 
1.0. The parameters of the debate 
As Sinclair (1986: 612-613) suggests, the literature devoted to first/second language acquisition 
has long been rich in anecdotal evidence of young children's metalinguistic behaviour. From as 
early as 18 months, the latter have been known to correct their own articulation (spontaneous and 
prompted repairs, Clark 1978); to ask questions about word meanings (Barton 1986); to practise the 
articulation of difficult words and/or phrases in a seemingly conscious way (Slobin 1984); to 
comment spontaneously on aspects of their -- and others' -- performance (de Villiers and de Villiers 
1979) and to delight in playing with language (Chukovsky 1963, Cazden 1975).' What is 
interesting in such anecdotal literature is the underlying assumption that the behaviour described is 
not gratuitous but plays a quasi-functional role in the development of linguistic competence. This 
can be seen most clearly, perhaps, in the attitude adopted towards the pre-sleep monologues 
recorded by writers from Weir (1962, 1966) to Kuczaj (1983). In pre-sleep monologues -- or 'crib 
speech' -- young children supposedly benefit from the release of communicative restraints to explore 
the sounds of the language and its capacity for 'rhythmic rhyming'. As Weir (1975/1962: 610) 
suggests, what appears to be random play, however, may in fact have a more serious function as a 
"systematic linguistic exercise", that is, as a form of practice useful in assimilating new linguistic 
data. Weir herself was to draw attention to the extent to which paradigmatic selection in such sound 
games seems to resemble the substitution exercises to be found in second language instruction 
programmes, as in the case of pronominal substitution below: 
- I go up there (2x) 
-Igo 
- She go up there 
The notion that young children's play with language has a serious purpose -- that it facilitates the 
integration of new into existing linguistic knowledge -- would seem to suggest that it is, at least 
potentially, conscious in nature. Certainly, there is a widespread tendency in the literature to 
associate such practice with a conscious approach on the part of young children. Chao (1951), for 
example, was to suggest that there is an "occasional intentional playing with language" and a 
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similar view underpins a range of case studies from Jespersen (1922) 2 to von Raffler Essen (1973), 
Slobin (1984) or Weir (1975/1962: 616) herself who describes her child's manipulation of verbal 
patterns in pre-sleep monologues as "... consciously practised, just as are other grammatical 
combinations and selections"... 
1.1. Anecdotal and experimental data 
The tendency in the anecdotal literature to view metalinguistic behaviour as playing a functional 
role in the acquisition of primary skills is based on the assumption that, as Barton (1986: 70) put it, 
"... one cannot really disentangle language use and language awareness" insofar as the child is 
continually monitoring production to ensure comprehension. While such a view remains influential, 
however, it has increasingly been challenged by the findings of more systematic research into the 
early manifestations of what has been claimed as 'conscious' control processing. Such research, 
undertaken as part of a wider interest in meta-processes, has focused on testing children's ability to 
segment the flow of speech into words and/or phonemes, to gauge the syntactic or semantic 
appropriateness of utterances via acceptability judgements and to separate the linguistic sign from 
its referent. There is little doubt, as Nesdale and Tunmer (1984: 36) note, that differences in 
research techniques and the over-reliance on cross-sectional (as opposed to longitudinal) studies 
have resulted in conflicting findings regarding the 'onset' of metalinguistic processing, both within 
a domain (e.g. metaphonological) and between domains (e.g. metasyntactic and metasemantic).5 
While such conflicts exist, however, they pale in comparison with the challenge that such findings 
pose, at both the empirical and theoretical level, to those of the earlier anecdotal literature. Whereas 
the latter tend to assume that metalinguistic behaviour plays a functional role in language 
acquisition from a relatively early stage, the research data suggests that children's ability to 
consciously attend to language form is a process which only 'sets in' between the ages of 4 and 7, 
that is, between Piaget's pre-operational and concrete operational stages. Boutet et al (1983: 226) 
summarize the more recent evidence as follows: 
L'attitude metalinguistique, c'est-A-dire, la capacite de prendre de la distance par rapport 
A la langue, se confirme avec l'age, en meme temps que regesse une attitude non-
metalinguistique par laquelle les sujets tendent A confondre les unites linguistiques avec 
les objets ou evenements auxquels elles referent.' 
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In other words, it is only very gradually that the child is able to divorce language from its referents 
and become aware of it -- whether at the phonological, lexical or syntactic level -- as an object in its 
own right.' Two examples of the disparity between anecdotal and experimental evidence are worth 
exploring as indicative of the problem. 
1.1.1. Metaphonological awareness 
Children's awareness of phonemes as units of speech has probably been the most studied aspect of 
metalinguistic awareness primarily because of its role in the development of literacy skills. As 
Content (1985: 73) suggests, it is important to distinguish here between children's early-acquired 
and unconscious ability to discriminate between sounds in order to communicate and their ability to 
attend to such sounds in order to consciously discriminate one from another. Although it is only the 
latter that can be called metaphonological, there are numerous examples in the anecdotal literature 
of such a process developing at an early age. Weir (1962: 612), for example, is not alone in 
recording the sound "substitution exercises" of her two and a half year old child in pre-sleep 
monologues. Chukovsky (1963) likewise provides numerous examples of children's obsession with 
`rhythmic rhyming' and the case studies of a Clark (1978) or Slobin (1984) lay particular stress on 
the child's apparently intentional attempts at phonemic self-correction and/or correction of others. 
While such examples proliferate, they are sharply contradicted by reviews of the more recent 
experimental data in this area. As Gombert (1986: 88) was to put it, examples of children focusing 
on the sounds of language 
souvent attestes dans les observations du langage oral spontane, ne semblent pourtant 
pas pouvoir etre provoques, lorsque le formalisme de la situation oblige a la manipulation 
decontextualisee du seul language. 
Gombert's observation was based on a review of a wide range of experimental findings, including 
Wallach et al's (1977)8 phoneme discrimination study, Liberman (1973) and Liberman et al's 
(1974) 'tapping tests' for syllable and phoneme identification and, most recently in relation to 
literacy skill development, Bradley and Bryant's (1983) phonemic comparison tests.' While there 
are different emphases in these studies, what they all tend to suggest is that young children before 
the age of 4-7 seem unable to understand that words are made up of separate sounds let alone that 
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such sounds can be identified and/or consciously manipulated. Some writers, such as Hakes (1980: 
34), dismiss the anecdotal literature as simply confusing unconscious with conscious processing 
mechanisms but others, such as de Villiers and de Villiers (1979: 90), seem genuinely perplexed 
that young children, who seem able to attend to the sounds of language in their play, are "... unable 
to bring those playful skills to bear on the task of reflecting about sounds". 
1.1.2. Metasyntactic awareness 
An even more pronounced disparity between the anecdotal and research data exists in the area of 
metasyntactic or metamorphological awareness, that is, the ability to make valid judgements 
regarding the appropriateness of sentence and/or word structure. As Bowey (1988: 17) stresses, 
anecdotal data suggest that children spontaneously reflect on, and comment about, language 
structure from a relatively early age. Clark (1978), Foppa (1978) and Kasermann and Foppa (1981), 
for example, see speech repairs as spontaneous grammaticality judgements and give numerous 
examples of children as young as 2 correcting the morphological and syntactic forms of their own 
utterances. Such evidence would seem to be corroborated even in experimental studies. Gleitman et 
al (1972: 93), in their attempt to assess two and a half year olds' appreciation of word order in 
imperatives (e.g. 'bring me the ball', 'ball the me bring' etc), found that, even if "... the children's 
criteria for accepting sentences appeared to be more lax than those of adults", their scores were too 
high to be random. While the anecdotal evidence for an early ability to attend to language structure 
appears widespread, however, more recent research has again tended to query such findings and to 
assert that young children before the age of 5 have great difficulty switching attention from the 
meaning (whether semantic or pragmatic) of an utterance to its form. As Hamilton (1986: 82) was 
to put it: 
Young children up to the age of five or so are extremely poor at producing messages which 
can be unambiguously understood by a listener ... In other words, they are not good at 
sorting out what is useful to the listener from what is irrelevant or misleading. 
Hamilton's point is reiterated by De Villiers and de Villiers (1979: 91) who, in their review of 
research findings, queried the results of Gleitman and Gleitman's earlier study and argued that "... 
awareness of grammatical rules is also a late skill" which, itself, passes through a number of 
61 
intermediary stages.' Tunmer and Grieve (1984: 99-100) were to suggest that three broad age-
related stages can be distinguished. In the first stage (up to age 3), they argue, children's 
acceptability judgements depend simply on whether or not a given utterance makes sense to them 
(i.e. whether or not they can understand it). In the second stage (between 4 and 5 years), such 
judgements are oriented towards the content of the utterance and only in the third stage (between 6 
and 7 years) are they based upon the separation of form and content There exist differences in the 
literature as to the relative length of each stage but a broad consensus on the underlying process of a 
gradual transfer of attention from the pragmatic meaning of an utterance via its semantic content to 
its structural form. 
1.2. Theoretical issues 
Differences between the anecdotal and research literature extend to all areas of metalinguistic 
processing, including the ability to segment utterances into words and the ability to separate words 
from their referents (metalexical awareness). Whereas the former tends to suggest that children are 
able to attend to language form from a relatively early age, the latter views such ability as a late skill 
which passes, as does metasyntactic processing, through various `disembedding' stages. The 
difference between the two sets of data does not only concern the onset of metalinguistic processes, 
however, but raises much broader issues relating to the role such processes play in the development 
of linguistic competence and the order in which they appear. Whereas the anecdotal literature, for 
example, suggests that metalinguistic processing starts with a conscious focus on what Bowey 
(1988: 40) calls the "phonemic form of their [i.e. children's] own articulation", as in crib speech, 
the experimental literature adopts a radically different stance. As Rozin and Gleitman (1972: 194) 
were to suggest somewhat earlier, not only is it seen to occur later but 
... the lower the level of language feature, the later its accessibility to the language learning 
child. Semantics is easier to access than syntax and syntax easier than phonology. With 
phonology, again, global syllables are easier to access than phonemes and phonetic 
features. 
nfronted with such differences in the timing, function and order of metalinguistic processes, 
many have been tempted to resolve the problem simply by dismissing the anecdotal literature as 
`pre-scientific'. As Bowey (1988: 7) has argued, however, in her critique of the approach of Hakes 
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(1980) and Tunmer et al (1984), ignoring such a well-established and widespread source of data is 
unhelpful since the latter can act as what she calls an "informed baseline" against which to measure 
the findings of more recent research." Bowey's point is valid in that any serious model of 
metalinguistic awareness cannot afford to ignore important conflicts in the data, insofar as the latter 
imply quite different views as to what metalinguistic processing is. On the contrary, it has to 
grapple with these conflicts and tensions in an attempt to provide a comprehensive rather than 
one-sided approach to the issue. 
If any theoretical model of metalinguistic awareness has to address the conflict between anecdotal 
and research data, it also has to address the highly uneven distribution of such awareness regardless 
of when it is seen to 'set in' and the relative order of the meta-processes involved. Sinclair (1986: 
614), for example, was to note that many researchers have been struck by the "high inter-subject 
variability" of the results of empirical studies which are often "difficult to organise ... into phases or 
stages" and which, when the latter do emerge, "are not strongly related to age". Chaudron (1983: 
370) was to make a similar point when suggesting that "... metalinguistic judgements seem to be 
derived from linguistic development and experience in very idiosyncratic ways" as, indeed, were 
Simons and Murphy (1986: 193), Cazden (1975: 603) and, particularly in relation to literacy skill 
development, Mattingly and Kavanagh (1972: 140).12 The "considerable individual variation" that 
the latter note in relation to beginning readers contrasts markedly, they stress, with the relative 
consistency from person to person with which primary linguistic activity is performed. If a 
theoretical model of metalinguistic awareness is to have any 'explanatory power', in this sense, it 
has to explain not only conflicts in the data concerning the onset of metalinguistic processing but 
also the high inter-subject variability of such processing at different age-related levels. 
2.0. Alternative hypotheses 
In her review of the literature, Sinclair (op. cit. 615) was to suggest that two basic theoretical 
approaches exist to the development of metalinguistic processing: that which assumes it plays a 
functional role in L1 acquisition (the 'interaction' hypothesis) and that which assumes, as Marshall 
and Morton (1978: 277) put it, that it is "... completely disconnected from the mechanisms 
responsible for the acquisition of linguistic skill" (the 'autonomy' hypothesis).' Tunmer and 
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Herriman (1984: 12-35), in their conceptual overview of the field, basically accept Sinclair's 
alternatives but add a third. The theoretical spectrum, they suggest, can more usefully be divided 
into three broad approaches: the first which sees metalinguistic awareness as playing a functional 
role in the development of linguistic competence, the second which views it as a domain-specific 
application of general metacognitive processes in middle childhood and the third which views it as 
stemming from the decontextualisation of language use itself, primarily through literacy skill 
development. Garton and Pratt (1989: 128), in their review of the literature, divide the theoretical 
spectrum in a similar way as, indeed, does Gombert (1992: 175-177). While differences exist 
between such writers as to the merits of the various approaches, what is interesting is the consensus 
that appears in the division of the theoretical spectrum and the extent to which such a division maps 
onto that examined in Chapter 1 regarding the emergence of metacognitive processes. 
2.1. The 'interaction' hypothesis 
The first approach, or what Sinclair refers to as the 'interaction' hypothesis, is most explicitly 
developed in the work of writers such as Marshall and Morton (1978), Clark (1978), Clark and 
Anderson (1979) and Bowey (1988). What tends to characterise this approach is the assumption that 
metalinguistic and linguistic processes are enmeshed from a very early age since, as Barton (1986: 
70) puts it, "... part of using language as communication consists of using it appropriately, 
monitoring one's listener and making sure one is understood". In order to communicate, Barton 
argues, the speaker-hearer is constantly forced to reflect upon and adapt the language that he uses in 
order to match it to context, purpose and audience. If the young child is to become linguistically 
competent, he must therefore learn from his earliest communicative interaction not only to speak 
but to monitor his production in order to be able to use it in an ever more efficient way to realise his 
goals. This is not to suggest, Barton (ibid. 70) stresses, that very early monitoring is necessarily 
conscious but rather that there rapidly emerges a "... continuum from unconscious monitoring to 
explicit, reflective activity" within the communicative process itself. Metalinguistic awareness is 
not, in this sense, 'parasitical' on emerging competence but, as Smith and Tager-Flusberg (1982: 
451) were to observe, evolves with it in a symbiotic relationship, influencing and in turn being 
influenced by the child's growing skill in speech production and reception." The similarity between 
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such a view and the information- processing approach to skill development, as typified in Chi's 
`novice-expert' model, would appear to be self-evident. As in the latter, the development of 
competence is seen as a process of ever-more efficient domain-specific self-regulation, that is, one in 
which the conscious mastery of lower-level skills gradually gives way to automated processing 
which, in turn, frees attention to focus upon higher level decision-making. 
2.1.1. Restructuring of linguistic competence 
For Barton. metalinguistic processing 'sets in' relatively early as a monitoring device helping the 
child to adapt language to new contexts of use. A similar approach can be found in the more 
influential work of Clark (1978) and Clark and Anderson (1979) who view it more as a form of 
`negative feedback' from within the speech act itself. Communication, Clark suggests, is largely a 
matter of knowing what to say and when/where to say it and this is progressively clarified for the 
child through the errors -- and the correction of errors -- that he makes. It is when the child 
becomes aware of 'communication errors' that he is compelled to switch attention from function to 
form, detect and correct the 'error' in what is being said and, in so doing, lay the basis for 
reorganising his linguistic knowledge at a higher level. In the early stages, the child's attention may 
focus upon the phonemic form of his own articulation but this gradually gives way to more complex 
questions involving morphological and syntactic choices. As Clark (1978: 36) points out, children 
"... start out with a very 
	  elementary version of language and, to move to the next stage, must 
realise that it is inadequate or `wrong'..". Language acquisition, within this perspective, can be seen 
largely as a two-fold process in which negative feedback from communicative interaction provides 
the impetus to expand and reorganise competence into a more complex representational system. 
Perhaps the most controversial feature of this process can be seen in the treatment of early speech 
repairs, that is, young children's spontaneous attempts to correct their own output. Clark and 
Anderson (1979) single out three self-repair stratagems as illustrative of early self-monitoring: 
morphological (e.g. 'she want -- she wants to go out'), lexical (e.g. 'you have to squeak -- squeak --
scrape it') and syntactic (`The kitty-cat is ... de de spider's kissing the kitty-cat'). The fact that 
young children tend to correct their production in the interests of being better understood -- whether 
it be the pronunciation of words, word endings or the word order of an utterance -- is not, in itself, 
65 
controversial. Researchers such as Kaserman and Foppa (1981) have long shown that such 
self-repair processes, starting at the phonological and moving to the morphological and syntactic, 
are relatively systematic in children by the age of 18-24 months. What is controversial is Clark and 
Anderson's assertion that such early repairs are evidence of conscious control processing which 
represents a crucial feature of linguistic development. Contrary to the long established view that 
monitoring an utterance for errors is an automatic process, they were to argue (1979: 11-12) that 
... for children in the early years of acquiring a language, to realise that their elementary 
version of language is inadequate, they must become aware of when their language fails. 
When such failure occurs, the child must reflect on his utterance in order to repair it... 
Without the ability to monitor, check and then repair one's utterances, it is unclear how 
children go about changing a rudimentary system into a more elaborate one. 
It is true that, as Garton and Pratt (1989: 129) point out, Clark's views on the conscious nature of 
self-repair stratagems are sometimes more ambiguously formulated along the lines of those of Levelt 
(1978) who defines such stratagems as existing "at the border of awareness". 15 It is difficult to 
reconcile such ambiguity, however, with the notion that children must become, as she argues, 
`aware' of linguistic failure and 'reflect' on it in order to overcome it. 
The fact that Clark tends to see early self-repair stratagems as conscious would seem to confirm 
Gombert's (1992: 176) comment that metalinguistic processing in her model is "...  
contemporaneous with the emergence of language and constitutes an intentional management 
component within it". While there is no doubt that Clark sees such self-repair stratagems as crucial 
in promoting linguistic competence, however, she is only too aware that they constitute only one --
and the most simple -- source of conscious control processing. Her elaboration of a more complex 
taxonomy of the potential sources of such processing seeks to situate self-repairs within a 
hierarchical model based on differences in the level of analytic reflectivity involved: 
1. monitoring of ongoing utterances (e.g. spontaneous correction of own pronunciation etc); 
2. checking the results of an utterance (e.g. noticing the use of dialect, style, volume etc. on 
others); 
3. testing for reality (e.g. checking whether a listener understands a given word or phrase); 
4. deliberately trying to learn (e.g. practising new words and sounds); 
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5. predicting the consequences of an utterance; and 
6. reflecting on production. 
As indicated, it would be incorrect to see such categories -- which are similar to those outlined in the 
taxonomies of a Slobin (1984) or Barton (1986) -- as emerging synchronously or, indeed, as 
representing identical levels of reflectivity. 16 As Barton (ibid. 70) was to suggest, the categories can 
be seen to represent "increasing degrees of disengagement from the speech signal" and, to this 
extent, 'set in' at different stages in the development of linguistic competence and involve differing 
degrees of conscious self-monitoring. In particular, as Clark herself seems to suggest, categories 1-4 
are more likely to accompany the mastery of speech, while categories 5-6 -- which might involve, 
for example, an acceptability judgement out of context and a justification for the use of a given 
phrase rather than another -- are related more specifically to literacy skill development. As Clark 
(1978: 37) was to admit, "... judgements of appropriateness, complexity and form are next to 
impossible to elicit from very young children and therefore tell us too little too late". 
Whereas, for Clark, metalinguistic processing arises out of the negative feedback in the 
communication process, for others writing within the 'interaction' hypothesis, such as Kuczaj 
(1983), it emerges more in situations where the child has the opportunity to focus on form free of 
communicative pressures, as in 'crib speech' (i.e. Clark's category 4). Kuczaj agrees with Clark 
that language acquisition can most usefully be seen as a two-fold process in which the child's 
linguistic competence is subject to continual expansion and reorganisation into a more complex 
representational system. The advantage of language practice implicit in such activities as 'crib 
speech', however, he argues, is that it allows "postinitial processing", that is, it affords the child the 
opportunity to focus on those aspects of language of his choice and particularly those where there 
might exist discrepancies between old and new linguistic information that might need to be 
resolved. As Bowey (1988: 39) was to suggest, in her evaluation of the Kuczaj model, crib speech is 
seen by the latter to allow children to "... engage in behaviours of their own choosing" and to "have 
complete control over what is said". Kuczaj's review of the anecdotal literature on 'crib speech' 
combined with his own quantitative study led him to suggest that the practice young children engage 
in can be divided into two kinds corresponding to the expansion/reorganisation hypothesis. The 
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first set of activities, which he labelled 'imitation/repetition', involve the partial reproduction of a 
preceding model utterance and the second set, which he labelled 'modification', involve the 
alteration of a model utterance via the 'substitution drills' already highlighted by Weir or via what 
he calls 'build ups' or 'breakdowns'. The latter, in particular, insofar as they imply the addition of 
linguistic elements to, or deletion from, a model utterance, were the most likely in Kuczaj's view to 
facilitate the reorganisation of linguistic knowledge. It should be pointed out that Kuczaj is not 
suggesting that the language practice implicit in pre-sleep monologues constitutes the sole form of 
intentional self-monitoring by the young child. The fact that it allows the child to focus on those 
aspects of language of his own choice, however, suggests that it is one of the earliest and most useful 
forms of metalinguistic processing. 
2.1.2. The 'spontaneous-deliberate' continuum 
According to Bowey (1988: ix), the views of writers such as Clark or Kuczaj have to be taken 
seriously since, if examples of early self-monitoring are not considered metalinguistic in nature, one 
is left with "... the default argument that metalinguistic activity has no role in language acquisition". 
One of the weaknesses of the work of such writers, however, is that it is restricted almost exclusively 
to data from anecdotal sources. Clark may assert, for example, that self-repair stratagems are 
conscious but makes no attempt to reconcile such an assertion with more recent research findings 
which suggest that young children before the ages of 4-7 are unaware that words can be segmented 
into sounds or that such sounds can be identified and/or manipulated. Partly in an attempt to 
overcome such a weakness, writers such as Garton and Pratt (1989: 133-135) have more recently 
tended to reject Clark's 'strong' version of the 'interaction' hypothesis in favour of a 'weak' one. 
While not disputing that young children are able to consciously switch attention from language 
function to form (as in speech repairs), they suggest that such attention is in the early stages largely 
spontaneous (i.e. involuntary) in nature and only becomes deliberate (i.e. voluntary) through 
experience. As in Chi's novice-expert model, they do not question the ability of the young child to 
consciously focus on language but, rather, the degree of intelligent self-regulation with which that 
consciousness is directed. The reason why young children in the anecdotal literature are seemingly 
able to focus on aspects of language form which they cannot do in more controlled tests, they 
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suggest, is simply a function of the fact that, in the latter, they have not yet mastered the degree of 
self-regulation required of them to operate deliberately in a decontextualised setting. 17 
An example of Garton and Pratt's (ibid. 134) more nuanced approach can be seen in their 
treatment of speech repairs. In the early stages, they suggest, such repairs probably occur 
unconsciously but, on occasion, it is possible that a given speech repair may itself give rise to 
spontaneous reflection on the aspect of language being corrected. What is important is to realise 
that, in the latter case, it is the speech error which has " ... triggered the reflection rather than the 
child deliberately focusing attention on the language for intrinsic interest". Other examples in 
which metalinguistic reflection may be seen to arise out of the intrinsic properties of language itself 
might be errors of mispronunciation in the speech of others, words that are difficult to pronounce, 
words that rhyme and/or unexpected uses of register. 18 The ability to reflect on language can, 
Garton and Pratt (ibid. 135) continue, emerge out of any of these activities and it is only gradually --
through experience -- that the child learns to regulate his behaviour so that the initially spontaneous 
attention to language forms becomes more deliberate and controlled. This process, they suggest 
alongside others such as Donaldson (1978), will largely be accelerated by the role played by literacy 
skills in the child's development: 
As the child further masters the different forms involved in language use, then increased 
levels of reflection will develop. The spontaneously triggered reflections will provide a 
basis for more controlled reflection. Consequently the child will make a gradual shift to 
reflecting deliberately on aspects of language [which] ... will be enhanced by the develop-
ing mastery of the written language ... 
Garton and Pratt accept, as does Clark, that language acquisition can be defined as a process of 
expansion and reorganisation of linguistic knowledge in which metalinguistic processing plays a 
functional role from an early stage. Where they differ from the 'strong' version of the 'interaction' 
hypothesis is in their severance of the link, at least initially, between consciousness and 
intentionality. Whereas, for Clark, both appear evident in the early stages, Garton and Pratt are 
more circumspect in suggesting that it is only gradually that the involuntary transfer of attention 
from function to form becomes voluntary. 
Garton and Pratt's distinction between spontaneous and deliberate monitoring of language on the 
part of the child is clearly designed to overcome the apparent contradiction between anecdotal and 
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research data. Concern with this conflict is equally central to the work of Bowey (1988) which 
offers an even more sophisticated solution within the interaction hypothesis. Bowey (ibid. 19) not 
only argues that "... there is clear evidence that children can reflect on language structure from an 
early age" but that it is possible to discern a clear succession of stages within the self-monitoring 
process. Building in particular on the work of Kuczaj on 'crib speech', she suggests that it is 
through the initial monitoring of his articulatory output that the child discovers those phonemic 
regularities onto which morphological and syntactic ones may be 'mapped' at a later stage in the 
expansion and reorganisation of linguistic knowledge. 19 Bowey is only too aware, however, that the 
notion that young children deliberately attend to their speech output is contradicted by later research 
findings and she, like Bialystock (1985a, 1985b), seeks to resolve the contradiction by severing 
consciousness from intentionality in metalinguistic processing. As she was to put it (ibid. 36-37), in 
her review of the literature on 'crib speech', there would appear to be clear evidence that the child is 
involved in sound substitution exercises in which his 
... attention is focused on language form, rather than on language meaning. Since the central 
aspect of metalinguistic functioning is an attentional focus on form rather than meaning, such 
monologues come within the area or language function defined as metalinguistic. At the same 
time, we are not in any position to infer intention from the child's crib speech monologues; 
we cannot say that the child has chosen to focus on form rather than meaning ... 
What changes for Bowey between early and later examples of metalinguistic processing is not so 
much the degree of consciousness involved as the extent to which such consciousness is subject to 
volitional control, i.e. the extent to which the child intends to attend. As she was to suggest, there is 
no doubt that the deliberate control processing which is widely recognised to emerge in middle 
childhood has an important role to play in such decontextualised activities as reading and/or second 
language learning. What is dangerous, she asserts, is to limit the definition of metalinguistic 
awareness to deliberate reflection upon language when this only serves to exclude earlier (i.e. 
spontaneous) reflection, as in crib speech, and downplay the continuity that exists between the two.' 
Perhaps more than others writing within the Interaction' paradigm, Bowey (1988: 19) has been 
highly critical in her evaluation of those who, like Karmiloff-Smith (1979, 1986) or Tunmer and 
Herriman (1984), have sought to define metalinguistic processing in terms of intentional 
self-monitoring within the Piagetian and/or Vygotskyan tradition. If, she argues, an 'intentionality 
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requirement' is insisted upon, it has to be accepted that metalinguistic processing plays no role in 
primary linguistic skills since there is no evidence that very young children do, as in 'crib speech', 
intend to attend to their output. In order to combat such a view -- and to stress the continuity 
between early and later forms of such processing -- she argues in favour of abandoning such terms 
as 'awareness' altogether, on account of their association with notions of 'volition' and 'intent', and 
adopting more cognitively neutral ones such as `metalinguistic functioning'. Bowey's attempt to 
develop cognitively neutral terms to define metalinguistic activities, i.e. ones that downplay the 
changing relation between attention and intention, is partly indebted to Franklin's (1979) earlier 
model on metalinguistic functioning. The latter sought to adopt what Bowey (Ibid. 20) refers to as a 
strictly "performance-oriented" perspective on metalinguistic awareness that was defined as "... 
reflective performance in the sphere of language". Franklin's model, which sought to enumerate 
behaviourally the procedures that might make up such a performance, was if anything even more 
cognitively neutral than Bowey's in that it ignored, not only the question of intentionality, but also 
the differing degrees of analytic reflection involved. 
2.1.3. Spontaneous and deliberate metaphor 
The division between spontaneous and deliberate reflection on language, which underpins Garton 
and Pratt's or Bowey's approach to metalinguistic awareness, has become widespread among those 
writing within the 'interaction' hypothesis. Young children, it is assumed, are quite capable of 
reflecting spontaneously on various aspects of language form and, if they are unable to do so in 
`decontextualised' tasks, it is because they lack the necessary self-regulation which develops only 
through experience. This view has assumed possibly its most controversial expression in the 
treatment of metaphor production and comprehension which, as Franklin and Buten (1988: 299) 
note, constitutes an important theme in more recent research. A metaphor, as Winner, Rosenstiel 
and Gardner (1988: 303) suggest, can be defined as "... a figure of speech that illuminates one 
dimension of a particular object by drawing attention to its similarity to an object from another 
realm of experience that normally is viewed as dissimilar". Producing (and understanding) a 
metaphor requires, in terms of such a definition, the ability to establish a relation between two 
objects otherwise regarded as dissimilar. Traditionally, as Billow (1988: 314-315) correctly argues, 
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this ability was seen to emerge relatively late in children's development since, as writers such as 
Vygotsky had pointed out, their early tendency to link dissimilar objects could be understood more 
easily in terms of over-extensions or category errors that transgress conceptual boundaries of which 
they are not aware. As Matters and Davies (1975: 322) were to put it: 
In early stages of language acquisition, children produce categorical errors and mistakes that 
can be taken as metaphorical expressions but are not. The child is in the process of learning 
to recognise and correct perceptual, cognitive and conceptual 'error' ... 
Within such a framework, metaphor was seen as the intentional transgressing of boundaries only 
after such boundaries had been established as an integral part of cognitive growth. Even writers 
such as Chukovsky (1963: 25), who were to applaud children's inventive use of language, tended to 
see category transgressions as based on accident, unintentional errors in fact, word usage or (faulty) 
analogy, requiring not so much indulgence as correction. If, however, as is a central premise of the 
`interaction' hypothesis, children's conceptual ability is viewed as 'preset' rather than as an ongoing 
process of development, early examples of category transgressions tend to be viewed in an entirely 
different light. They cease being errors to be corrected and become, rather, spontaneous examples of 
a figurative use of language which is to be welcomed. 
Support for viewing children's early category transgressions as spontaneous metaphor can be 
found in writers such as Winner et al (1976, 1988). The latter's work is situated within a growing 
consensus of researchers, such as Pollio and Pollio (1974), Gardner (1974) and Billow (1975), who 
posit a broad three-stage approach in the development of mature metaphoric understanding. As 
Winner et al (1988: 313) were to put it, "... spontaneous production [of figurative language] occurs 
first, followed by comprehension and then by the ability to explain the rationale of a metaphor". 21  
While such a model still retains a developmental framework, what is noticeable is that early 
category transgressions are seen not as semantic or grammatical overgeneralisations but, rather, as 
embryonic forms of later more mature metaphoric thinking. The difference between the two, within 
such a process, is limited to the fact that, whereas the former tend to be spontaneous in nature, that 
is, "... most often visual comparisons prompted by stimuli in the environment", the latter are viewed 
as more deliberate or intentional. Writers such as Vosniardou et al (1988: 329) tend to adopt an 
even 'stronger' position when arguing against even the need to posit a stages theory to connect 
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initial (spontaneous) with later (deliberate) use of metaphor. The fact that young children are 
capable of producing figurative language, they argue, implies a degree of consciousness in its use 
which does not require comprehension -- or the ability to verbalise such comprehension -- to be 
retained to a later stage in the process. Other writers such as Billow (1988) are equally insistent that 
young children's production of figurative language is not only conscious but also deliberate in 
nature. As he points out (ibid. 324) in a review of more recent research findings, children between 
the ages of 3 and 6 appear able to make a "consistent use of metaphoric language" which cannot be 
explained away as the result of "linguistic accident, that is, by faulty or immature understanding of 
semantic or grammatical principles". On the contrary, he suggests, in a manner similar to a Barton 
or Clark, it would seem that 
... the very young child deliberately rather than accidentally uses words and objects to stand 
for quite different objects, and that the use involves a dimension of similarity which is clear 
and fitting. 
Billow's views may appear highly controversial but they are shared by others writing within the 
same paradigm, such as Gardner (1973: 145) who likewise asserts that over one half of his 
daughter's category transgressions can be interpreted as a "... deliberate effort to play with a word's 
sound or reference to achieve a desired meaning or effect". 
2.1.4. Critique 
There can be little doubt that the 'interaction' hypothesis, particularly in its 'weak' version, seeks 
to reconcile the potentially conflicting findings of the anecdotal and research literature in a coherent 
model of metalinguistic development. While comprehensive in scope, however, it suffers from a 
range of problems inherent in the non-developmental information-processing paradigm in which it 
is lodged. Three stand out. 
In the first place, it asserts that metalinguistic processes 'set in' at an early stage -- as do 
metacognitive processes generally -- and play an important functional role in the development of 
primary linguistic skills. Such a view is problematic, however, in that even writers such as Bowey 
(1988: 39) admit that there exist "large individual differences" in the overt processing of linguistic 
data recorded between one child and another. Since it is generally accepted that most children, by 
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the age of 5, develop comparable levels of linguistic competence, there would seem to be no 
evidence directly relating metalinguistic processing with language acquisition. Sinclair (1986: 617) 
is quite adamant in this respect when arguing that, while self-monitoring may be useful in 
improving verbal performance, "... we have no direct evidence of some metalinguistic knowledge or 
capacity influencing performance (and/or vice versa) during early childhood". 
In the second place, the view that early self-monitoring of linguistic performance is conscious is 
asserted rather than proven. Clark or Bowey may argue, for example, that speech repairs reflect a 
switch of attention from language function to form but there is little direct evidence that the young 
child is aware that that is what he is doing. As Tunmer and Herriman (1984: 20-22) have pointed 
out, in dealing with speech repair mechanisms, it may well be that the child becomes aware not so 
much of the errors in his production as of a failure to communicate -- based upon the listener's 
behavioural response -- which acts to set into motion 'error-detection mechanisms' which are 
largely automatic in character. The difference between awareness of communication failure and 
awareness of language failure is crucial to the viewpoint of Tunmer and Herriman who argue that it 
is automatic rather than conscious monitoring processes that are activated when the child's output 
"... fails to correspond to his intended meaning or fails to achieve the desired results". zz  
In the third place, the view that there is no qualitative difference -- except in the degree of control 
processing -- between early (spontaneous) and later (deliberate) reflection on language is highly 
problematic. Such a view seriously misinterprets Vygotsky's argument (1962: 92) from which the 
distinction was originally drawn. For Vygotsky, the transfer from spontaneous to deliberate involves 
a major change in conceptual thinking as well as intentional self-regulation since the second is not 
seen as autonomous from, but dependent upon, the first. If, in the interaction hypothesis, all that is 
involved is a change from involuntary to voluntary regulation of static cognitive structures, this 
tends to downplay the differences involved in accessing primary, as opposed to secondary, language 
skills. The emphasis, in such an approach, is upon the continuity between the two processes rather 
than, as in a Vygotskyan or a Piagetian framework, the radical discontinuity between them in terms 
of the level of conscious control processing involved. As such, of course, it would find difficulty in 
explaining the relative uniformity in competence achieved by children in primary skills, as opposed 
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to the variability in competence in secondary skills, as Mattingly (1972: 139-140), among others, 
has observed. 
2.2. The 'autonomy' hypothesis 
The second theoretical approach (the 'autonomy' hypothesis) is, according to Smith and 
Tager-Flusberg (1982: 450), one in which the child's "... initial acquisition of basic comprehension 
and production processes proceeds essentially independently of the development of metalinguistic 
awareness". Smith and Tager-Flusberg's definition is somewhat misleading in that the thrust of the 
second hypothesis is not that metalinguistic awareness plays no functional role in language 
development but that -- as a form of conscious self-monitoring -- it simply does not emerge until a 
general restructuring of cognitive processes in middle childhood. Such a view is strictly within the 
Piagetian paradigm in which the child's ability to consciously reflect upon and regulate behaviour --
including linguistic behaviour -- is seen as a function of the onset of concrete operational thinking. 
As Hakes (1980: 2) was to put it, "... metalinguistic abilities show their greatest development during 
middle childhood" and their emergence is "... the linguistic manifestation of the cognitive 
developmental change which Piaget has characterised as the emergence of concrete operational 
thought". Perhaps the foremost advocates of this approach can be found in the Australian school 
represented by Hakes (1980), Tunmer and Herriman (1984) and Grieve and Pratt (1984). While 
there are nuanced differences between such writers, Hakes (ibid. 26) being more prepared, for 
example, to admit that a "nascent metalinguistic ability" can be detected in the early years, what 
they share is agreement that metalinguistic awareness involves conscious control processing and 
that the latter emerges as a domain-specific application of general metacognitive processes in 
middle childhood. 
2.2.1. `decentering' and metalinguistic awareness 
While Hakes views metalinguistic awareness as reflecting a general shift in cognitive processing, 
however, he is prepared to admit that this reflection is not so direct as at earlier stages. 23 For him, 
as for others, the central importance of the onset of concrete operational thinking lies in the more 
general decentering of attention and cognitive flexibility that this permits. Mastery of processes 
involving 'compensation', 'identity' and 'reversibility' allow the child to stand back and reflect 
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upon behaviour in a more analytical way than before and to develop correspondingly more efficient 
control processing. 	 It is this ability to stand back, to "... act and think deliberately and, 
concomitantly, to place oneself mentally at a distance from a situation and to reflect on it" which, in 
his opinion (ibid. 38), characterises the child's new approach to language. In the first place, as 
Sinclair (1986: 612-613) observes, it allows the child to detach meaning (either the meaning of a 
particular word or of an utterance or a group of utterances) from the context in which it is 
embedded, thereby permitting synonymy judgements (Beilin and Spontak, 1969). In the second 
place, it allows the child not only to separate semantic from pragmatic meaning but to separate 
language, as a formal system, from both pragmatic and semantic meanings, thereby permitting 
acceptability judgements. The notion of reversibility, as van Kleeck (1982, 1984) observes, is held 
to play a particularly important role here in allowing the child to consider language as a separate 
structure in its own right as well as a means of communication. This has important implications, in 
turn, for children's ability to control linguistic input/output in situations where, as in learning to 
read and write, extra-linguistic clues to meaning are sharply reduced. 
The notion that there is a correlation between the cognitive decentering that occurs in middle 
childhood and the gradual disembedding of language from its communicative context would seem to 
find considerable support in the research literature. Sinclair (ibid. 613) was to note, for example, 
that it is at this stage that the child "... begins to be able to examine the sound structure of phrases 
words and syllables" and, by separating sound and meaning, "... consider rhyme, manipulate sonoric 
language material, and make comparisons and conclusions concerning sound structure". Moreover, 
if the child begins to segment utterances on the basis of units of sound (metaphonological 
processing), he also -- as Tunmer and Grieve (1984: 103) suggest -- begins to be able to dissociate 
words from their referents (metalexical processing) and to judge the acceptability of a given 
utterance on grounds of form rather than meaning (metasyntactic processing). 24 Hakes (1980: 87), 
in particular, was to develop a useful three-stage model in which the child's ability to switch from 
pragmatic/semantic to linguistic criteria in judging the acceptability of utterances is clearly linked 
with the onset of concrete operational thinking: 
• Stage 1: between the ages of 2-3, such judgements appear to be based solely on whether 
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or not the child has understood the utterance in question; 
• Stage 2: between the ages of 4-5, the criteria shift from understanding the sentence to 
whether or not the content 'makes sense' in terms of the child's opinion and/or beliefs; 
• Stage 3: between the ages of 6-7, the criteria shift again and the child begins to separate 
the form of a sentence from its content and base his judgement on linguistic criteria. 
The shift in attention from the pragmatic meaning to the linguistic form of an utterance (via its 
semantic content) clearly reflects a gradual disembedding of language based upon changes in 
cognitive processing which many have sought to extend to all domains of metalinguistic 
processing.." It is interesting to note that the order of meta-processes involved in such a model 
corresponds closely to the views of Rozin and Gleitman (1977), who suggested that children's 
metalinguistic awareness would follow a fixed sequence as a function of the 'level' of linguistic 
representation involved. According to this view, as already indicated, 'deep' representations (i.e. 
pragmatic and semantic) would be easier to access than 'surface' representations (i.e. syntactic, 
lexical and phonological). 26 
The qualitative shift in the child's approach to language that begins with the onset of concrete 
operational thinking is seen, within the 'autonomy' hypothesis, as critical to the development of 
literacy skills. It is by standing back and reflecting upon the structural features of the spoken 
language that the child is able to negotiate the transition from context-dependent to context-
independent uses of language which are characteristic of written texts. Tunmer and Bowey (1984: 
152) were to stress this point when seeking to develop a taxonomy of metalinguistic skills --
including the detection of structural and lexical ambiguity -- which are involved in helping the child 
to access text-related uses of language. While they acknowledge that such skills may undergo a 
`sequential ordering' during the reading process itself, however, they are clear that the development 
of a minimum level of metalinguistic processing is, in itself, a prerequisite for learning to read. As 
they were to put it: 
The metalinguistic ability to reflect on language should ... be an important prerequisite for 
being able to learn to read, since without this ability the child would not be able to discover 
the properties of spoken language that are central to a correspondences between its written 
and spoken forms. 
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Such a view is at odds with the 'interaction' approach of writers such as Wray (1994: 29) who, 
following Ehri (1979), argue that meta- skills such as phonological processing are as much a 
consequence as a prerequisite for learning to read. While Tunmer and Bowey do not deny the 
possibility that reading itself will contribute to the development of metalinguistic processing, their 
view is much closer to the 'reading readiness' approach popularised by Downing and Thackray 
(1975), that is, that a 'threshold' has to be reached in metalinguistic processing, as a 
domain-specific refraction of metacognitive processing, if the transfer from spoken to written word 
is to be successfully achieved. 27 
2.2.2. 'communicative' or 'linguistic' failure? 
The notion that metalinguistic processing emerges only in middle childhood as a consequence of 
a wider cognitive reorganisation raises important questions about the status of anecdotal data. 
While a writer such as Flakes (1980: 105) is occasionally ambiguous in his attitude towards such 
data, he insists that "... it seems intuitively clear that children's early metalinguistic performances 
differ considerably from those of which they are capable later.' Indeed, what separates those 
writing within the 'autonomy' hypothesis from a Bowey or a Clark is precisely the view that the 
latter tend to confuse two cognitively distinct processes which may be related but which are 
qualitatively different. As Gombert (1992: 9) argues, the definition of metalinguistic processing 
given by Clark (1978) or Levelt (1978), based on a review of anecdotal sources, would appear to 
include 
... both the phenomena they situate at the limits of consciousness (such as spontaneous 
self-repairs performed by the young child) and other phenomena which are clearly the result 
of real, explicit reflection on language. 
Gombert does not deny that the young child, either in terms of self-repair stratagems or pre-sleep 
monologues, is involved in a process of self-monitoring as a basis for reorganising and extending his 
linguistic competence. What he does deny is the notion that such monitoring is conscious and/or 
intentional in character. A typical example of the confusion in 'interaction' accounts of early 
metalinguistic processing involves the sound 'substitution exercises' recorded in 'crib speech' by 
writers from Weir (1962) to Gleitman et al (1977). Such children, Gombert (ibid. 22) argues, may 
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well have been involved in phonological manipulation but "... there is nothing to show that this is 
not just a case of the simple manipulations of sounds comparable to other manipulations of a 
non-linguistic character". It was essentially to stress the discontinuity (rather than continuity) 
between earlier non-conscious and later conscious monitoring of linguistic form that was to prompt 
Gombert (ibid. 13), following the French linguist Culioli (1968), to argue for a distinction to be 
made between `epilinguistic' and metalinguistic' processing. The former, he claims, involves 
automatic monitoring devices whereas the latter involves children's ability "... intentionally to 
monitor and plan their own methods of linguistic processing (in both comprehension and 
production)". 
In seeking to explain the evidence provided by anecdotal sources, particular attention has been 
paid to the `self-repair' stratagems in that the latter are claimed by Clark (1978) or Levelt (1978) to 
be the earliest examples of 'conscious' self-monitoring. Writers such as Tunmer and Herriman 
(1984: 20-22) do not dispute the fact that the child is involved in an ongoing process of 
self-monitoring during communicative interaction and that this monitoring leads to error detection 
and correction. The weakness in the interaction hypothesis, they stress, lies in an inability to 
distinguish between what they call the child's awareness of communication failure and awareness 
of language failure. For Tunmer and Herriman, writing self-consciously within the Piagetian 
tradition, awareness emerges in young children out of a clash between the aim and the result of any 
intended action. The child is deemed to become consciously 'aware' in terms of measuring the 
outcome of a given action (success, partial success or failure) against the intended goal. Insofar as 
young children's speech acts can be considered intentional, they contend, it is logical to assume that 
any 'awareness' that arises will be an awareness of the extent to which the meaning has been 
conveyed rather than an awareness of language per se. As they put it: 
... since producing an utterance is an intentional act, the child is aware of the goal of the 
act, which is to convey an intended meaning. However, while young children are aware of 
the content of what they wish to convey in normal language production, they are not aware 
of the linguistic structures by which this content is conveyed. Only the latter type of aware-
ness which emerges later in development, is metalinguistic. 
The error committed by writers within the 'interaction' tradition in relation to speech repairs in 
particular, Tunmer and Herriman maintain, is that they confuse children's awareness of their failure 
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to communicate with their awareness of language. A child may become aware that he has not 
successfully conveyed a message, they continue, but the repair stratagems used to remedy that failure 
tend to be unconscious rather than conscious, that is, part of an automatic self-monitoring system. 
The difference between the younger and older child is not so much, therefore, a question of more 
efficient self-regulation, as claimed by writers such as Clark (1978) or Bowey (1988), as of a gradual 
shift of awareness from the message to the medium that conveys it, which is only achieved in middle 
childhood as part of a wider cognitive restructuring. 29 A similar viewpoint can, interestingly 
enough, be found in Bruner (1988:265) who argues that the earliest manifestation of metalinguistic 
processing is evoked not so much by errors in form as by errors in the behaviour produced by the 
incorrect speech act form, that is, when "... we see through the other's actions that our message has 
failed to convey its intended meaning". 
It is interesting to note that the distinction drawn by Tunmer and Herriman between awareness of 
communication failure and awareness of language is very similar to that of Bialystock and Ryan 
(1985a, 1985b) between `metaconununicative' and metalinguistic' processing. In her response to 
high cognitive control 
low cognitive control 
Figure 1: shift from metacommunicative to metalinguistic processing. 
Hulstijn's (1990) critique of her model for its anti information-processing bias, Bialystock argued 
that her work should more logically be seen as a critique of Piaget's 'cognitive construct' approach. 
Such a view would seem to be supported by the fact that, whereas, in Piaget, consciousness and 
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control processing are seen as developing interdependently in a linear fashion, Bialystock posits 
them in her model as two separate axes (from unanalyzed to analyzed knowledge and from 
non-intentional to intentional processing) which interact in different ways in different contexts 
(figure 1). While such differences exist, however, Bialystock's model is similar to that of Piaget -- as 
interpreted by Tunmer and Herriman (1984) -- at least in the way in which it suggests that differing 
degrees of conscious control processing are required in context-embedded (mainly oral) as opposed 
to context-disembedded (mainly written) situations. In the former, Bialystock argues, the high level 
of contextual clues means that only low levels of analyzed knowledge and control are required, i.e. 
`metacormnunicative' processes which limit themselves to monitoring communicative intentions 
and their outcome. In the latter, however, where there are no contextual clues to meaning, high 
levels of analyzed knowledge and control are seen as necessary, i.e. `metalinguistic' processes which 
involve a monitoring of the formal aspects of language itself. For Bialystock, as for Tunmer and 
Herriman, therefore, there is a transfer between the metacommunicative (i.e. awareness of 
communication failure) and metalinguistic (awareness of language failure), between younger and 
older children, which those writing within the 'interaction' paradigm are disinclined to take into 
account. 30  
For writers supporting the 'autonomy' hypothesis, it is important to stress, metalinguistic 
awareness arises out of a gradual process of linguistic disembedding that begins at the concrete 
operational stage. Beyond this point, what the child is able to attend to depends on ongoing 
changes in cognitive processing, particularly that between concrete and formal operational thinking. 
The relation between changes in cognitive processing and the expansion of metalinguistic awareness 
is illustrated most usefully, perhaps, in those models of reading which have sought to base 
themselves on Piaget's 'cognitive construct' approach, notably, Marsh's (1980) four stage and 
Frith's (1985) slightly modified three-stage model. Marsh's stage 3 and Frith's stage 2 both 
correspond to the concrete operations period and involve the ability, among others, to use 
`combinatorial rules' in order to segment words into phonemes and to use grapheme-phoneme 
correspondences to decode new words. Marsh's stage 4 and Frith's stage 3, which correspond more 
to the formal operations period, involve 'higher order' rules which, as Goswami and Bryant (1990: 
143) point out, include 'conditional' rules such as "the letter 'c' is pronounced /s/ when followed by 
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e and y" and the use of analogy which Piaget himself suggested involved a form of reasoning that 
only appeared after the age of 10.  
2.2.3. (Meta-) linguistic humour 
One of the areas where the Piagetian view on the relation between metacognitive and 
metalinguistic processing appears vindicated is in the area of linguistic humour. Many forms of 
humour, as is generally acknowledged, depend upon the perception of linguistic ambiguity which, in 
turn, implies an ability to disembed language from its communicative context and to reflect upon the 
potential meanings that a given structure might encode. The ability to appreciate linguistic humour, 
such as puns, riddles and verbal jokes, would therefore appear to imply a certain level of 
metalinguistic awareness. Writers such as Shultz and Pilon (1973), Fowles and Glanz (1977) or 
McGhee (1979), working within the Piagetian cognitive perspective, have indeed sought to place the 
appreciation of humour rooted in linguistic ambiguity within a developmental model in which the 
onset of concrete operational thinking is seen as critical. McGhee's model, in particular, can be 
divided into three stages which correspond to changes in cognitive development after the 
sensori-motor stage: 
• Stage 1: between 1.5 and 2 years, children are able to represent things to themselves 
which leads to let's pretend' games (i.e. where the object is used to stand for another). A 
similar pattern of behaviour emerges, slightly later, in the sphere of language where 
inappropriate names are applied to objects/events; 
• Stage 2: between 3 and 4 years, children become aware of conceptual incongruities, i.e. 
they deconstruct objects into their attributes (such as shapes and colours) and recombine 
them in a way which violates categories (e.g. a 'bike with square wheels' etc.). Again, a 
similar pattern of behaviour emerges in the sphere of language where the child takes 
pleasure in distorting the phonological pattern of words; and 
• Stage 3: at approximately 7 years, adult humour develops whereby the child is able to 
laugh at what McGhee (op. cit. 115) calls the "deliberate manipulation of ambiguities" 
which is based upon the development of operational thought. 
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Shultz and Robillard (1980), in their review of the literature relating to child humour at stage 3, 
seem to confirm that it is based upon the ability to identify and explain violations of phonological, 
syllabic, lexical and/or syntactic patterns. Shultz and Pilon (1977: 732), in a well-known earlier 
study, concur and argue for a hierarchy of difficulty in such humour -- puns, riddles and verbal 
jokes based on the detection of phonological ambiguity appearing first, between the ages of 6 and 9; 
those based on lexical ambiguity following (e.g. the two meanings of the word watch), and those 
based on syntactic ambiguity (e.g. The shooting of the hunters was atrocious) not appearing until 
much later, often not until the age of 12. 
De Villiers and de Villiers (1979: 92 ) were particularly concerned with the relation between the 
onset of metalinguistic skills in middle childhood and the appreciation of humour in that, as they 
were to argue, "... it stands to reason that if a child cannot reflect on language, he will fail to notice 
ambiguity". One of their areas of interest was, however, the recorded evidence of children's 
appreciation of puns and other verbal games in the anecdotal literature which appeared to contradict 
the hypothesis that it is linked to the onset of concrete operational thinking. Horgan (1988: 
342-343), for example, draws up a typology of the sources of 'spontaneous humour' detected in her 
daughter between the ages of 1.4 and 4.0 years which includes such categories as violation of 
semantic categories (using a word inappropriately to refer to something else, implying an awareness 
of classes of objects if the violation is to be appreciated); phonetic pattern games (altering the sound 
pattern of a word to fit a rhyme, thereby implying a rudimentary understanding of the arbitrary 
nature of the sign); and riddle-like-questions (implying an ability to use 'stylised games with rules' 
as in the formula How does a frog/cat/horse etc. go?). Horgan admits that such categories are not 
dissimilar from those highlighted by McGhee but insists that they can, as in the case of her 
daughter, appear much earlier and are clear evidence of an early development of metalinguistic 
skills. As de Villiers and de Villiers (1979: 94) argue, however, in a similar way to Tunmer and 
Herriman, it is important to distinguish between children's awareness of the social context and their 
awareness of language. Children may laugh at verbal humour, they suggest, not because "... they see 
the distinction between ordinary language, for communicating messages, and play with language as 
in jokes and riddles" but because they realise that jokes are "socially valuable", that is, an important 
form of social interaction. Research shows, they claim, that children often cannot explain the 
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rationale behind a riddle they have laughed at and, if asked to repeat a joke, paraphrase it in a way 
that suggests that the ambiguity on which the verbal humour was built was simply unnoticed. 31 As 
they conclude, young children tend to see humour as residing in the situation rather than in the 
language and it is only gradually -- as they learn to switch attention from context to language -- that 
they begin to appreciate verbal ambiguity and/or incongruity. 
2.2.4. Critique 
Comparing the 'interaction' and the 'autonomy' hypothesis, Sinclair (1986: 617) notes that, 
while the former is theoretically more appealing, there is considerably less empirical evidence to 
support it than the latter. Indeed, while many have found the Piagetian explanation of the 
emergence of metalinguistic awareness oversimplified, it can in many ways be held to be both more 
complex and subtle than the 'interaction' hypothesis on account of its developmental nature. 
Whereas writers such as Bowey or Clark seek to blur the cognitive differences between earlier and 
later linguistic processing, for example, Gombert, Hakes or Tunmer and Herriman insist upon such 
differences as reflecting important shifts in the child's conception of language. It is by insisting on 
such differences that they are better placed to explain the difficulty children often experience in 
making a transition from context-embedded to context-disembedded situations, that is, from ones 
where, in Bialystock's terms, low levels of analyzed knowledge and control are needed to others 
where high levels of analyzed knowledge are control are required. While the 'autonomy' hypothesis 
has many advantages, however, it also embodies certain self-evident weaknesses. 
In the first place, the view that metalinguistic awareness is merely a domain-specific application 
of stage-related cognitive changes is problematic. An important contradiction would appear to exist 
between the maturational way in which such stages are conceived and what is known regarding the 
highly variable distribution of metalinguistic skills among children of comparable ages. This is most 
evident, as Mattingly (1972) notes, in the problems that many children experience in seeking to 
develop literacy skills. 
In the second place, as Garton and Pratt (1989: 133) suggest, the view of metalinguistic 
awareness as tied to a given stage in the development of cognitive processes renders the model too 
rigid and inflexible in its treatment of much of the anecdotal literature. It may well be correct to 
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argue that most early examples of linguistic monitoring, as in the case of speech repairs, are 
`pre-conscious' rather than 'conscious' in nature and cannot therefore strictly be viewed as 
examples of metalinguistic processing. There are other examples, however, such as those recorded 
in case studies from a Jespersen (1922) to a Slobin (1984), which seem to provide clear evidence of 
conscious reflection on language form which simply do not fit easily into a such a stage-related 
model. 32 
In the third place, although it is widely accepted -- even by writers within the 'interaction' 
tradition -- that children's attitude to language does begin to change qualitatively in middle 
childhood, there would seem to be little research into the ways in which the features of concrete 
operational thinking are reflected in the different ways in which children attend to language or the 
order in which these features appear. As already indicated, Rozin and Gleitman (1977) tend to see 
metalinguistic processes arising a-synchronously (from the metapragmatic to metaphonological), 
which appears well suited to a Piagetian model of a transfer from context-embedded to 
context-disembedded thinking. As Tunmer and Herriman (1984) admit, however, little real research 
has been conducted in this area and suggestions are somewhat speculative. 
2.3. The socio-cultural hypothesis 
The third theoretical approach to the origins and function of metalinguistic processing is more 
complex than is often acknowledged. Tunmer and Herriman, for example, attribute it to writers 
such as Calfee (1973) or Donaldson (1978) who, they suggest, view such processing as arising out of 
the transfer from spoken to written word in the early years of schooling. The notion that the ability 
of the child to reflect on language is a by-product of learning to read is also attributed to Donaldson 
by Pratt and Grieve (1984), Garton and Pratt (1989) and, most recently, Gombert (1992). Largely 
because of the uni-directional relation between reading and reflection perceived in Donaldson's 
work, the latter has been widely criticised as being incompatible with what is known about 
preliterate children's ability to focus on language as an object of study. Tunmer et al (1984: 152), in 
particular, relying upon the research of Mattingly (1972), have argued that metalinguistic 
processing is considerably more likely to be a prerequisite of learning to read than a by-product of it 
since "... without this ability, the child would not be able to discover the properties of spoken 
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language that are central to the correspondence between the written and spoken form". 33 Such a 
criticism of Donaldson's view is, however, somewhat one-sided. While the causal relation between 
reading and reflection may be central to her argument -- as it was to that of Vygotsky -- it would be 
an error to see the latter emerging solely out of the former. On the contrary, as Donaldson herself 
implies, metalinguistic processing emerges out of a range of new functional uses to which language 
is put and which require, on the part of the child, an increasing ability to disembed the forms of 
semiotic mediation, that is, to treat meaning less as a function of extra-linguistic than of linguistic 
encoding. Reading, insofar as it requires the child to transfer attention from the pragmatic 
(context-embedded) to the semantic (context-reduced) dimension of language, may represent a 
crucially important new functional use but it is still only one such use in a process that can, and 
usually does, begin before formal schooling. 
2.3.1. 'intended' meanings and 'sentence' meanings 
A useful way of exploring Donaldson's views in more detail is by comparing them with those of 
writers within the Piagetian tradition, such as Tunmer et al (1984). Donaldson would appear to 
share the latter's rejection of the 'interaction' hypothesis in relation to the acquisition of primary 
linguistic skills. The child's gradual mastery of the production and comprehension of the spoken 
word is viewed largely as an unconscious process in which the conscious ability to focus on 
linguistic form plays little (or no) functional role. As Donaldson (1978: 88) was to point out, 
echoing Vygotsky, the child "... acquires these skills before he becomes aware of them. The child's 
awareness of what he talks about -- the things out there to which the language refers -- normally 
takes precedence over his awareness of what he talks with -- the words that he uses". This lack of 
awareness of language as a system in its own right is for Donaldson, as for Tunmer, a function of 
the context-embeddedness of early semiotic mediation. The spoken word, she suggests, emerges as 
an accompaniment to social interaction in which children are initially more concerned with making 
sense of what people mean when they talk, rather than with what their utterances, qua utterances, 
mean. Indeed, she argues alongside others such as Bialystock (1985), the 'shared knowledge' that 
characterises most forms of interaction between child and adult -- and which includes the beliefs 
and intentions of the participants -- obviates to a considerable degree the need of the child to pay 
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attention to the explicitly linguistic formulation of the message. n In the early stages of child 
development, she points out (1978: 88) 
... language is embedded for [the child] in the flow of events which accompany it. So long 
as this is the case, the child does not interpret words in isolation — he interprets situations. 
He is more concerned to make sense of what people do when they talk and act than to decide 
what words mean. 
The fact that the young child uses a range of pragmatic procedures to interpret utterances implies 
that the focus of his attention is initially upon the communicative goals of interaction rather than on 
the linguistic means of achieving these goals. Moreover, as Tunmer et al (1984) suggest, the 
self-repair stratagems that he employs from a relatively early age are more likely than not to 
constitute, within this paradigm, evidence of his awareness of the failure to achieve these goals than 
an awareness of language per se. 
While Donaldson would seem to share Tunmer's views that the 'shared knowledge' implicit in 
early communication obviates the need to attend to language form, she differs sharply from him on 
the origins and development of metalinguistic processing. As indicated, for those writing within the 
Piagetian tradition, the ability to separate speech from action -- and reflect consciously on the 
former -- develops as a domain-specific application of concrete operational thinking and plays an 
important facilitating role in the child's access to the spoken word. For Donaldson, however, it is 
not the emergence of general metacognitive processes which allow the child to disembed language 
but, rather, the new functional uses to which language is put which require, on his part, an ability to 
extract meaning less from the extra-linguistic context and more from the linguistic system itself. 
This progressive freeing of speech from the 'here and now', as Bruner (1975: 52) put it, involves the 
child in mastery of a range of intramodal discourse types that move from the context-embedded to 
context-disembedded along a number of taxonomic channels (such as structure, topic and function). 
It is, as Rubin (1980) in particular suggests, the child's production and understanding of 
increasingly decontextualised intramodal discourse types 	 -- those where, for example, 
extralinguistic gives way to intralinguistic referencing -- that prepares him for the important 
intermodal transfer involved in accessing written texts. While there are important differences in 
changes at the intra- and intermodal levels, what underlies the general process is a growing 
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awareness that meaning is embodied less in the intentions and beliefs of people as they act and more 
in the structure of their utterances. Grice (1957: 148-149), interestingly enough, was to express the 
importance of this process some time earlier in what Olsen and Torrence (1983: 148) refer to as his 
intentionalist theory' of meaning, when suggesting that the child has to move from awareness of 
`intended' to 'sentence' meanings: 
In a sense, children already implicitly know about sentences and meanings in that they 
successfully use the former in the service of the latter. What he or she apparently fails 
to do is to differentiate the two and pay attention to the latter. Alternatively expressed, 
the child uses sentence meanings to express or compute intended meanings but ... the 
sentence meaning remains implicit and, hence, transparent. What he or she begins to 
do ... is to become aware of, to make explicit, the sentence meaning. 
It is interesting to note that Grice tended to see this transition occurring particularly in relation to 
the acquisition of literacy skills since, in written texts, meaning is embodied almost entirely in 
`sentences' rather than in the 'intentions' of the speakers who utter them. 
The distinction between 'sentence' and intended' meanings -- that is, between what a sentence 
means and what a speaker may mean by uttering it -- recalls that of Halliday (1978) between the 
inathetic' and 'pragmatic' function of language or that of Austin (1960) and Searle (1969), in 
speech act theory, between an utterance's 'propositional content' and its Illocutionary force'. As 
Searle suggests, it is quite possible that a given utterance, which has only one propositional (i.e. 
semantic) content, has a range of quite distinct illocutionary (i.e. pragmatic) meanings depending 
upon the interplay between the intention of the speaker and the context in which the utterance 
occurs. 36  In the early years, Searle infers, when language is an accompaniment to (or replacement 
for) action, the child tends to use and interpret utterances more in terms of their illocutionary force 
because, as Halliday (1975: 10) was to put it, he "... knows what language is because he knows what 
language does". " It is only gradually, he continues, largely as a function of the decontextualisation 
of intramodal discourse types, that his attention begins to shift to the underlying propositional 
content, that is, that he becomes aware that, as Olsen and Torrence (1983: 152) put it, "... what 
sentences mean may both be discrepant from what we as speakers mean by them and what we as 
listeners expect others to mean by them". Such a transfer does not take place overnight but is, as 
already suggested, a prolonged process in which the child learns to disembed language, to become 
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aware that it is (explicit) choices made in the linguistic encoding of the message -- rather than the 
(implicit) intentions of the speaker or expectations of the listener -- that determine meaning. This 
process receives its most powerful impetus in the transfer from the spoken to written word since the 
intersubjectivity between reader and writer of a text is radically reduced and since interpretation of 
the latter can depend almost uniquely on attention to the ways in which the different levels of the 
language system encode meaning. 
An interesting dimension of this shift from illocutionary to propositional meanings is the 
corresponding expansion of, and change in, the child's use of metalanguage. As Olsen and 
Torrence (1983) suggest, the process by which the child learns to treat language as an object -- to 
disembed it from the speaker's intentions and listener's expectations -- is accompanied by the 
development of a language to refer not to the world but to language itself. In this respect, they 
suggest, following Lucy (1993: 9), the child is fortunate in that language is intrinsically reflective in 
its capacity to "... use language to communicate about the activity of using language". The reflective 
potential of language encompasses a range of activities from reporting on language (e.g. say, shout, 
whisper), categorising various aspects of language structure (e.g. syllable, word, sentence) and genre 
(e.g. speech, essay, letter) to guiding listeners in the interpretation of meaning. 38 In the early years 
of child development, when language is still primarily an accompaniment to action, the use of 
metalanguage is inevitably limited and refers more to the speech act than to language itself. If the 
early use of metalanguage is more concerned with the pragmatic than semantic aspect of language, 
this is largely because, as Silverstein (1975, 1985) notes, young children are more concerned with 
the functional use of language in context than with its formal features. As the child begins to 
divorce language from action, however, he is increasingly compelled to expand his repertoire of 
metalinguistic terms and/or adapt his existing ones in order to talk about language itself and the way 
in which it encodes meaning. Olsen and Torrence (1983: 145) focus, in particular, on the way in 
which the development of literacy skills is reflected in, and consolidated by, corresponding changes 
in the child's use of metalanguage. Not only, they argue, does child metalanguage expand to 
encompass new forms (e.g. syllable, word) but existing terminology undergoes an internal transition 
from what might be called the metapragmatic to the metasemantic. This shift in awareness of what 
the speaker intends to say to awareness of what he actually does say is typified, they claim, in the 
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change in the use of a metalinguistic term such as mean which occurs in children between the ages 
of 4 and 7, as below: 
(a) Teacher: what's a bicycle? 
Pupil: bicycle's got three wheels, I mean, two wheels 
(b) J: dads are supposed to be strong but my dad's puny. Do you know what puny means? 
L: yes 
J: it means scrawny. 
In the case of (a), it is the child who 'means' whereas in the case of (b) it is the linguistic term itself 
which 'means' scrawny. This shift in the use of the term represents for Olsen and Torrence an 
important step forward by the child in being able to separate 'intended' from 'sentence' meanings 
and to attend exclusively to language as an object in its own right. 
2.3.2. Intralingual referencing and metalinguistic processing 
For Donaldson, as for Olsen and Torrence, the ability of the child to distinguish 'sentence' from 
`intended' meanings receives its greatest impetus in the development of literacy skills. This is not to 
suggest -- as Tunmer hints -- that she downplays the earlier `disembedding' process or fails to 
appreciate its importance in facilitating access to written texts. The fact, Donaldson (1978: 89) 
notes, that in some homes "... parents talk about words to their children", that is, develop with them 
a metalanguage for 'nominating' language, places these children at an "... enormous initial 
advantage" in the transition from the spoken to written word. 39 While the child's ability to 
disembed aspects of the spoken word is widely seen as a prerequisite for learning to read, however, 
it is even more true that, for writers such as Donaldson (1978) or Ehri (1979), it is the act of 
learning to read itself which, in turn, seems to provide a qualitative step forward in the process. As 
Sinclair (1986: 619) was to recognise, there would appear to be a wide consensus that 
... the child's conception of phonemes, words, and his ability to segment into or otherwise 
manipulate linguistic units undergo dramatic changes around the age of 6, once he begins 
instruction in reading and writing. 
The crucial role played by literacy skills in the development of metalinguistic awareness can 
probably be attributed to two factors. In the first place, as Olsen and Torrence (1993: 146) remark, 
90 
written texts carry the disembedding process implicit in earlier intramodal changes to a higher level 
where language becomes almost exclusively its own context. The only way the child can 'make 
sense' of what he reads, at least in an alphabetic culture, is by mapping the written onto the spoken 
forms which, in turn, require analyzing the linguistic features common to both and developing a 
language to talk about them (e.g. sound, letter, word etc.). In the second place, as Wells (1998: 6) 
shrewdly observes, insofar as written texts embody what he calls a "permanent representation of 
meaning", that is, function as 'product' rather than 'process', as 'artefact' rather than 'tool', they 
thereby offer the child a unique opportunity for this "analysis and naming" activity which the more 
ephemeral and linear spoken word denies him. 4° 
More recent research by writers such as Karmiloff-Smith (1979, 1981, 1986) and Hickmann 
(1982, 1985, 1986) has sought to analyze still further the impact of literacy on children's 
metalinguistic processing. What is interesting in their work is their concern less with what the 
written and spoken texts have in common and more with what distinguishes them particularly in 
terms of indexical referencing. For Karmiloff-Smith (1986), the distinctive quality of written texts 
lies precisely in the fact that -- as extended spans of discourse -- they inevitably involve a transfer on 
the child's part from extra- to intralinguistic referencing. Ordinarily, she argues, the meaning of a 
sign for the preliterate child (as in the case of determiners such as a and the) is a function of its 
relation to an item or event in the extra-linguistic context. As the child makes the transition from 
the sentence-referencing of speech to the discourse referencing of texts, however, the meaning of the 
sign is conveyed, less by its relation to the extralinguistic context, and more by its relation to other 
signs within a series of related systems. Her study of the use of French/English determiners by 
children aged between 4 and 8 years, that is, both preliterate and literate, tended to confirm the 
dramatic effects of the switch from extra- to intralinguistic referencing on metalinguistic awareness. 
41 Preliterate children, when asked questions based on a narrative read to them, she points out 
(1986: 467), tended to answer using such terms deictically (i.e. in reference to the extralinguistic 
context): 
8a. I knew you were talking to the boy because he's only got one book. 
8b. There are no apples left because there was only one in the basket at the beginning. 
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whereas older, literate children tended to respond by using such terms anophorically (i.e. in 
reference to other linguistic terms): 
8c. I know you're talking to the boy because you said 'lend me the book', and if you'd been talking to the 
girl, you would have said 'lend me a book'. 
8d. In the story there was only one, because you were precise, you said 'the apple', and if there had been 
several of them you could have said 'one of the apples'. 
The importance of intralinguistic referencing in the development of metalinguistic awareness -- or 
what Halliday (1986) was to refer to as endophoric, as opposed to exophoric, referencing -- is 
reflected not only in Karmiloff-Smith's work on determiners but also that on pronouns in terms of 
maintaining reference in extended narratives. 42 In both, the written text acts to prompt what she 
calls (1979: 226) an "essential linguistic development" in the child which allows him to make a 
"more abstract analysis" of language without the support of extralinguistic clues. 
Interestingly enough, Hickmann has sought to carry the latter line of enquiry further in her 
research on a second form of intralinguistic referencing, that on pronominal use in the area of 
reported speech. As she suggests (1985:241), the use of speech in one situation to refer to speech 
uttered in another, is a prominent feature of written texts. Her research sought to establish how soon 
children aged between 4 and 10 years (i.e. preliterate and literate) were able to master this second 
form of intralingual referencing by asking them to narrate back a short filmstrip which involved the 
appropriate pronominal shift from first and second to third person use. Hickmann found that most 
young children before the age of 6 had considerable difficulty employing an appropriate linguistic 
(as opposed to extra-linguistic) frame of reference. This was evident both in the way they tended to 
focus on the filmstrip narrative rather than on the speech of the characters and, when they did attend 
to the latter's speech, in the way they tended to use an incorrect and/or inconsistent system of 
referencing in pronominal use (e.g. "The donkey is angry ... because 'I put my toys in the box"). 
What is interesting in Hicicmann's work, as in that of Karmiloff-Smith, is that, not only did children 
appear to overcome such problems as inconsistent use of pronominal forms as they became older, 
but also that, when questioned about aspects of the filmstrip, they were able to consciously employ 
linguistic as opposed to extra-linguistic evidence to support their interpretation of the narrative. As 
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Wertsch (1985: 150) suggests, the results of her and Karmiloff-Smith's research would seem to 
indicate that "... mastery of pragmatic presupposition based on intralingual indexical referencing is 
a late developer" and directly related to literacy skill development. 
2.3.3. Metalinguistic processing and cognition 
The important role played by reading in the socio-cultural hypothesis cannot be limited, however, 
to the fact that it encourages the child, as Hickmann (1986: 25) puts it, to " ... use language as its 
own context" on the basis of establishing relations among the utterances of continuing discourse. 
On the contrary, for Hickmann as for Karmiloff-Smith, it is the implications of this disembedding 
process on the child's cognitive development that are so important. As already indicated, within the 
Vygotskyan paradigm, it is the internalisation of language -- as the primary means of semiotic 
mediation -- which creates the potential for symbolic representation. If language is the tool of 
thought, however, the ability of the child to disembed language, reflect upon it and use it in a more 
controlled way in the achievement of intended goals, implies equally an ability to disembed his own 
thinking, reflect upon it and use it in a more deliberate fashion. Donaldson (1978: 95) was, of 
course, acutely aware of this when writing that "... those very features of the written word which 
encourage awareness of language may also encourage awareness of one's own thinking and be 
relevant to the development of intellectual self-control ...". Of particular interest for Donaldson, as 
for Hickmann and Karmiloff-Smith, was the importance of metalinguistic awareness in developing 
the type of disembedded (i.e. conceptual) thinking that tends to characterise formal learning. 
Understanding and using new (i.e. scientific) concepts cannot be achieved, she implies, by relating 
signs to their referents in the extra-linguistic context but only by relating them to, and interpreting 
them through, other concepts as part of an ever-expanding network of concepts. The ability of the 
child to handle such disembedded thinking in which concepts can only be understood in terms of 
other concepts, however, depends upon the ability to treat language as its own context, that is, to use 
signs in a context defined by language itself, as in the case of intralingual indexical referencing. 
Indeed, as Wertsch (1985: 153) was to point out, it is only by mastering the linguistic devices 
involved in intralingual indexical referencing that the child is able to take the "... first step in the 
development of sign-sign relationships that culminates in genuine concepts". 
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Wertsch's view that referentiality in discourse has important implications for conceptual 
development is shared to a large extent by Silverstein (1985) in his work on functional stratification 
in language development. 	 Both tend to view the development of endophoric to metasemantic 
referencing -- that is, the ability of the child to use signs to refer to, define and interpret other signs 
-- as a process whereby language becomes increasingly its own context. The point is not necessarily 
a new one as Caton (1993: 326) reminds us in his retrospective study of the social psychologist 
George Mead's analysis of the role of 'reflexivity' in language use at the turn of the century. 
According to Mead (1927), Caton argues, the ability to relate a sign to its referent in the 
extra-linguistic environment is never truly conceptual because the child treats it as an association 
rather than as a relationship to be reflected upon between sign and object. a5 As he was to put it: 
... the word 'flame' is still not meaningful to the child until he can say what a flame is when 
asked by someone like his mother to 'define' it. In the first instance, the symbol is only in the 
consciousness of the child; there is an association between a sign and the idea of, or at the 
very least images of, an object. In the second instance, the child is self-conscious of the 
symbol -- that is, it is reflecting on the relationship between the object and the response it 
elicits. 
The reason why literacy development is seen as so important in the socio-cultural approach is 
precisely because, in allowing the child to use language to refer to and define language on a more 
systematic basis, it helps him to move from what Caton refers to as 'associative' to 'conceptual' 
thinking. 
2.3.4. Critique 
The socio-cultural approach to the origins/function of metalinguistic awareness differs radically 
from both the 'interaction' and 'autonomy' hypotheses. In some ways, it may appear to be less 
`cohesive' than the latter in that it sees such awareness arising out of the semiotic activity of the 
child which can differ dramatically both between socio-cultural groups and within the same 
socio-cultural group. It is, however, precisely this flexibility which allows it to avoid the dangers of 
schematicism implicit in the latter as they seek to reconcile the conflicting data from anecdotal and 
experimental sources. There are two main advantages in its approach. 
In the first place, insofar as metalinguistic processing is seen as arising out of the disembedding 
of speech, such a process is likely to be a gradual one that passes through various stages. The 
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implications of such an approach are that, unlike the 'interaction' or 'autonomy' hypotheses which 
view early examples of linguistic self-monitoring as either conscious or unconscious, the 
socio-cultural approach tends to see them more as intermediary stages between pre-conceptual and 
conceptual thinking. 	 A useful example of this is the pre-sleep monologues, recorded by writers 
such as Weir (1962), as illustrated below: 
- Put on a blanket 
- White blanket 
- And yellow blanket 
- Where's yellow blanket? 47  
While it would appear simplistic to dismiss such examples, as do Tunmer et al (1984), as evidence 
of an 'automatic monitoring device', it would appear equally simplistic to view them, as does Clark 
(1978), as an early example of the young child's conscious practice of new linguistic items. A more 
balanced approach might well be to view such monologues as typical examples of what Vygotsky 
himself referred to as a 'chain complex', that is, as a pre-conceptual or 'associative' form of 
thinking in which "... the decisive attribute keeps changing" and in which "... there is no 
consistency in the type of bonds or the manner in which a link in the chain is joined with the one 
that precedes it or the one that follows it". It is interesting that Weir (1962: 617), commenting in a 
somewhat contradictory way upon 'crib speech', tended to see the notion of 'chain complexes' as 
"most descriptive of our data" as, indeed, did Chukovsky (1963: 24) somewhat earlier when noting 
that such inventive play with language could best be described as "... an association through 
simultaneity or an association through resemblance". 	 The notion that much preliterate attention 
to language can be viewed as illustrating various levels of pre-conceptual (and therefore 
`spontaneous') thought seems more illustrative of the data than the somewhat schematic stances 
adopted by both the 'interaction' and 'autonomy' hypotheses. 
In the second place, while writers such as Donaldson view metalinguistic awareness as passing 
through various stages, such a process is by no means automatic or uniform. On the contrary, for 
her as for others, the extent to which children are encouraged to attend to 'sentence' as opposed to 
`intended' meanings can differ radically between socio-cultural groups and within the same group 
according to the discourse modes to which they are exposed. As Donaldson (1978: 91) herself was 
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to argue, whereas in some homes " ... parents talk about words with their children", in others they 
"... talk only with words" so that "... many children come to school not even aware that separate 
words exist -- that the flow of speech can be broken up into these units". Unlike the tendency in 
both `interaction' and 'autonomy' hypotheses to posit global age-related stages in the development 
of metalinguistic processing, therefore, the emphasis in Donaldson is upon the considerable 
variability that exists between children often of the same age. Such an approach would certainly 
seem more in tune with the fact that, as Sinclair (1986: 614) points out, in reference to both the 
anecdotal and research findings, it is ".. often difficult to organise the results into phases or stages 
...". Moreover, the notion that metalinguistic awareness is a function of the pre-school child's 
semiotic experience would seem to explain the precocious way in which some children, as recorded 
in the anecdotal literature, are apparently able to disembed and reflect on language at a very early 
age. The ability of Slobin's (1984) daughter, for example, to ask explicit questions about speech 
implies a degree of conscious attention to linguistic form stemming from the specific bilingual 
context she was raised in which cannot adequately be explained within the `autonomy' hypotheses 
of a Hakes or Timmer. 
3.0. Summary 
While there exists a considerable amount of data relating to metalinguistic awareness, both 
anecdotal and experimental, its interpretation in terms of explaining the origins and function of 
young children's ability to `disembed' language is hotly contested. Three main theoretical 
approaches exist which correspond to the broad schools in psychology outlined in Chapter 1. The 
`interactive' hypothesis, which is highly indebted to information-processing models, views 
metalinguistic awareness as playing a crucial functional role in the acquisition of primary linguistic 
skills from an early age but has difficulties reconciling the variable distribution of such awareness 
among children with relatively uniform patterns of linguistic competence. The `autonomy' 
hypothesis, which has its roots in the `cognitive construct' tradition epitomised by Piaget, tends to 
view metalinguistic awareness as a domain-specific application of general metacognitive strategies 
which `set in' in middle childhood. While more subtle than the `interactive' hypothesis, it has 
similar difficulties in terms of reconciling its maturationist, stage-related approach to what is known 
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about the high inter-subject variability of metalinguistic awareness among children which is not 
related to age. The third, or socio-cultural' approach, which is rooted in the Vygotskyan paradigm, 
tends to see metalinguistic awareness arising out of the gradual decontextualisation of language 
which knows both micro (intra-modal) and macro (inter-modal) functional changes. Because it 
tends to see metalinguistic awareness as being dependent on the child's semiotic experience, it is 
more able to make sense of the existing data in terms of explaining the different levels at which such 
awareness operates and the variability that exists between socio-cultural groups and between 
individuals in the same group. 
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Notes 
1. Sinclair was to stress the seemingly conscious nature of these activities, despite their heterogeneity, when 
pointing out that "Even very young children (aged 2, 3 and 4) may be said to be aware in some way (or of 
some of the aspects) of language, of verbal communication, and of their language performance". 
2. Reflecting on his child's [2.9] practice of morphological patterns in pre-sleep monologues, Jespersen (1922: 
131) was to note that "... now and then one notices something which shows that at an early age they [i.e. young 
children] think about points of grammar a good deal". Jespersen was, of course, to generalise from such 
examples and suggest that, as in any skill-based activity, the acquisition of language leads from conscious to 
unconscious (i.e. automated) routines. 
3. Von Ranier Essen's study (1973: 156) concerns early examples of young children's conscious awareness of 
articulatory problems and focuses on the case of her own child learning Italian. "He would often pause briefly 
before a word containing an initial In or before this phoneme in word medial position. When he was 3 years 
and 5 months old, I asked him to pronounce better the word `ragazza' (` girl' ) which he had rendered as 
lagatsa. In response, first, he gave me a challenging look and then with an impish smile he said: bambina 
(another word for ' girl' )". 
4. While Slobin' s (1984: 171) case study of his daughter Heida in a bilingual context is more cautious than 
others, it can still assert that her early questions [3.2] regarding the name of objects "... at least suggest that a 
child at this age is able to reflect on the sound-meaning relationship". 
5. As Tunmer and Nesdale (1984: 36-54) specify, one major source of contention is whether metalinguistic 
processes develop synchronously but differ in their rate of development (Tunmer and Herriman (1984), as in 
their relation to literacy skill development, or whether they arise a-synchronously (Rozin and Gleitman 1977, 
Flavell and Wellman 1977). 
6. De Villiers and de Villiers (1979: 89) were similarly to stress the gradual development of metalinguistic 
abilities when writing that "Children learn language as a medium of communication, but as it becomes less and 
less bound by circumstances and more and more flexible, its properties seem to become available for conscious 
inspection. Language becomes an object of awareness instead of a transparent vehicle of meaning". 
7. For Luria (1988/1944: 95), as for others writing within the Vygotskyan tradition, it is only through 
conscious schooling that young children make the transfer from viewing language as a means of communication 
to an object of study. "... children", he was to write, "experience considerable difficulty in making the 
grammatical structure of speech an object of awareness. This problem arises from the fact that, in the preschool 
stage, children's attention is chiefly concentrated on the objects named by the spoken words. But, when 
children start formal schooling, they are required to study grammar and the word itself as part of a system of 
language". 
8. Wallach et al's (1977) study was based on the administration of two tests to two groups of children aged 
5-6 years, the first involving phonemic discrimination skills only and the second requiring conscious 
identification of given phonemes in various word positions. While all children scored highly on the first test, 
less than 50% were successful on the second even though already involved in reading schemes. 
9. Liberman (1973) and Liberman et al's (1974) studies involved children aged between 5 and 7 years 
tapping to identify the phonemes in a given set of words. The weak results prompted the researchers to 
conclude (1974: 21) that even the simple task of counting the number of phonemes "... seems to be possible 
only at a relatively late age". 
10. De Villiers and de Villiers (1974: 94) responded to Gleitman and Gleitman's study with a similar, if more 
thorough, one of their own with children aged between 28 and 45 months. Their results led them to a radically 
different conclusion from that of the original study, viz. that "... semantic factors predominated in determining 
children's judgements, and that the young children could not make correct judgements of grammatical 
acceptability". Similar conclusions were reached by Bever (1970), de Villiers and de Villiers (1973) and 
Maratsos (1974). 
11. For Bowey (1988: 17), the tendency of writers such as Tunmer and Herriman (1984) to dismiss the 
anecdotal literature as 'pre-scientific' is based upon an "... implicit assumption that experimental tasks were 
the best means of assessing metasyntactic abilities in children". As she points out, however, what is clear in 
the discrepancy between anecdotal and experimental sources is that "... different tasks produce varying 
estimates of the age in which children's ability to reflect on grammatical well-formedness first emerges". It is 
a valid point. 
12. As Cazden (1975: 603) puts it, "Meta-linguistic awareness, the ability to make language forms opaque 
and attend to them in and for themselves, is a special kind of language performance, one which makes special 
cognitive demands, and seems to be less easily and less universally acquired than the language performance of 
speaking and listening". 
13. It is important to note, as does Sinclair (ibid. 615), that this hypothesis concerns only the acquisition of 
oral (i.e. 'primary' linguistic) skills since it is widely accepted that some ability to attend to, and reflect upon, 
language plays an important role in the acquisition of written (or `secondary' linguistic) skills. 
98 
14. As Smith and Tager-Flusberg (1982: 451) were to put it, "The child's acquisition of basic comprehension 
and production is influenced by the development of metalinguistic awareness, and, conversely, metalinguistic 
development is influenced by linguistic development". 
15. Indeed, Bruner (1988: 265) seems to see Clark's review of the anecdotal literature as being somewhat 
inconclusive as to the level of conscious reflection that lies behind self-repair stratagems. As he puts it, "The 
literature has been reviewed recently by Clark (1978) and it is simply not clear as to what extent linguistic 
awareness is an accompaniment of or a factor in language acquisition". 
16. Barton's (1986: 70) taxonomy was based upon a study of his own two and a half year old child who was 
recorded as: asking for names of objects; asking for clarification regarding word use; recognising different 
intonation patterns; complaining if spoken to in a foreign language; spontaneously correcting his own 
pronunciation and practising the pronunciation of new words; using specific registers, e.g. normal, a 'baby 
voice' to gain attention and a 'deep voice' to express anger, and role-playing. 
17. As Garton and Pratt (1989: 134) put it, "This spontaneously triggered reflection on language, which is at a 
conscious level, will occur before deliberate reflection that requires high levels of control processing. The 
latter type, involving control processing, is required in the myriad of experimental tasks presented to children 
to determine their metalinguistic abilities. In these tasks, rather than some intrinsic property of a piece of 
language capturing the child's attention spontaneously, the experimenter expects the child to focus attention 
on a particular aspect at her request". 
18. An example of spontaneous reflection by a child aged three and a half given by Garton and Pratt (1989: 
134) is as follows: "Kate was sitting at the table when she said 'Can I have a bit of cheese, please? — cheese 
please — that's a rhyme'. Here the sounds of the words were sufficiently salient to lead Kate to comment on 
them. There is no doubt that underlying Kate's comment is a conscious reflection on one aspect of language. 
This did not require a deliberate and controlled focus of attention to bring it to a conscious level, though, as it 
arose spontaneously". 
19. "... we have argued", writes Bowey (1988: 41), "that the earliest type of metalinguistic functioning that 
we can identify is children's monitoring of their articulatory output ... Reflections on the phonemic form of 
output might directly assist in the discovery of morphological and syntactic regularities". 
20. "The ability to control metalinguistic functioning represents an important achievement", Bowey (1988: 
19) notes. "Nevertheless, the extension of cognitive control processes to the metalinguistic domain should not 
be confused with the development of metalinguistic functioning per se. We have seen that there is clear 
evidence that children can reflect on language structure at an early age. What emerges in middle childhood is 
the ability to control that aspect of linguistic functioning". 
21. Winner et al (1988: 313) were to explain the differences between the stages as shaped by cognitive 
growth. "The spontaneous metaphors produced by young children are most often visual counterparts prompted 
by stimuli in the environment. In contrast, the comprehension of another's metaphor typically demands not 
only that both terms be imagined but also that properties other than perceptual ones be taken into account. 
Finally, the ability to explicate the workings of a metaphor involve a distance from the processes of both 
metaphoric production and comprehension as well as that metalinguistic awareness that only arises in 
preadolescence". 
22. As Tunmer and Herriman (1984) continue, to suggest (as does Clark) that it is conscious error-detection 
and correction that explains linguistic development is unlikely for an obvious reason: "When a child who is 
still in the process of acquiring language fails to comprehend an utterance addressed to him — that is, when the 
goal of communication is not met — the child relies on the context of the utterance to figure out what the 
speaker means, rather than reflecting on the structure of the utterance". 
23. Hakes (1980: 15) traces, for example, the impact of sensori-motor and pre-operational cognitive stages on 
language development in some detail but notes, in relation to the onset of concrete operational thinking, that 
"... it appears that there is no parallel change in children's use of language compared, say, with the way they 
approach conservation and other tasks". 
24. As Tunmer and Herriman (1984: 30) were to put it, "The abilities to separate a word from its referent, 
dissociate the meaning of a sentence from its form, abstract oneself from normal uses of language in order to 
focus attention upon its structural features all sound very familiar to what Piaget calls the ability to `decentee, 
or mentally stand back from a situation in order to think about the relationships involved". 
25. Another example of this process might be the child's ability to separate the word from its referent, that is, 
to become aware of the arbitrary nature of the relationship, which has been the source of extensive research by 
Berthoud-Popandropolou (1978, 1980). What her work revealed was that young children seem initially (stage 
1) to consider the word as an attribute of the object to which it refers and only gradually are able to detach it 
from its referent, first as a 'conventional' (stage 2) and secondly as an 'arbitrary' (stage 3) label. 
26. Such a process assumes, of course, that `metapragmatic' awareness is viewed as referring to the 
relationship between language and the extra-linguistic context of use rather than, as in Bruner and Hickmann 
(op. cit.) to the relationship between language items within an exclusively linguistic context. 
27. Downing and Thackray's (1975: 50) definition of reading readiness encompasses a range of features —
intellectual, social and affective — but tends to focus around "the development of new concepts of linguistic 
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elements, such as 'word', 'phoneme', 'letter' etc." and "reasoning and problem-solving operations in 
developing the skill of decoding the written form of language back onto its previously spoken form". 
28. Hakes' observation is based upon a review, in particular, of the work of Brown and Bellugi (1964), 
Gleitman et al (1972), de Villiers and de Villiers (1972) and Bohannon et al (1975). 
29. Timmer and Herriman' s (1984) argument that proponents of the 'interaction' hypothesis confuse 
awareness of communication failure with awareness of language is premised upon a highly developmental view 
of the 'stages' of awareness conceived within a Piagetian framework. As they point out (1984: 24), "According 
to Piaget' s theory ... awareness of failure to achieve the goals of intentional acts (speech acts, in this instance) 
is only the first step in 'becoming aware'. Conscious awareness (and control) of other aspects of the language 
system should therefore not appear until later in development". 
30. One of the problems with this model, however, is that the same process is described by Bialystock and 
Ryan (1985a: 208) as operating not only in first but also in second language learning: "The developmental 
characteristic of the framework manifests itself in the claim that first and second language learning develop 
unidirectionally along each dimension: from unanalyzed to analyzed knowledge, and from low to high control". 
As Hulstijn (1990: 42) suggests, however, in his critique of Bialystock' s approach, in an instructed second 
language context, the process is necessary reversed and children will need to start with high analysed 
knowledge and control to overcome the 'poverty of the stimulus'. 
31. De Villiers and de Villiers (1979: 93) give the interesting example of a child who was asked to retell the 
following joke he had laughed at: 'Why is the man in the fish market stingynecause his job makes him sell 
fish [selfish]'. The fact that he had utterly failed to appreciate the verbal ambiguity on which the joke was 
based could be detected in his rendition of it as 'Why is the man in the fish market stingy?/Because he sells 
fish' 
32. An interesting example is Slobin's (1984: 173) account of his daughter's question, after some confusion in 
the use of words such as before and after, 'What does before mean?' Even though only 3.3. years old, such 
questions would appear to indicate a conscious and intentional focus on language which the Piagetian approach 
has difficulty in explaining. 
33. Pratt and Grieve (1984: 141) go even further in their criticism of the third approach when arguing that "If 
learning to read is seen as essential for the development of metalinguistic awareness, then presumably this 
would imply that preliterate children have no metalinguistic awareness; that illiterate adults have no 
metalinguistic awareness; and that nonliterate societies lack metalinguistic awareness". 
34. Lee (1985: 80) was to echo this view, which he attributes directly to Vygotsky, when suggesting that "... 
action and speech are, for the very young child, undifferentiated parts of the same psychological function that is 
directed towards fulfilling some ongoing and context-specific goal-related activity. Speech is a mere component 
of the means to instrumental ends". 
35. According to Donaldson (1978: 63-64), the subordination of language to contextual expectations is what 
differentiates the child from the adult. "One way to describe the difference between the child and adult would 
then be to say that it lies in the amount of weight that is given to sheer linguistic form. The question seems to 
be whether the meaning of the language carries enough weight to over-ride the meaning of the situation". 
36. Vygotsky (1962: 127) had noticed the discrepancy between sentence (grammatical) and intended 
(psychological) meaning some time before in examining the various interpretations of an utterance such as The 
clock fell': "Any part of a sentence may become the psychological predicate, the carrier of topical emphasis; on 
the other hand, entirely different meanings may lie hidden behind one grammatical structure. Accord between 
syntactical and psychological organisation is not as prevalent as we tend to assume — rather, it is a requirement 
that is seldom met". 
37. As Searle (1969: 24) was to note, it is the fact that language operates simultaneously at two levels which 
makes "... the formal study [of language] necessarily incomplete. It would be as if baseball were studied only 
as a formal system of rules and not as a game". 
38. It is interesting to note that Reisenbach (1975: 9-17) suggests that the various forms of metalanguage can 
be organised into a hierarchy dependent on the degree of generality they embody. Within such a hierarchy, 
simple reported speech (e.g. He said/agued/suggested ) would occupy the lowest rung while statements such 
as 'A noun is ....' would occupy the higher ones. Such a hierarchy would also seem premised on the degree of 
conscious attention to language involved although Reisenbach does not explicitly motivate the hierarchy on 
cognitive considerations. 
39. Ehri's (1979) research was likewise important in combating over-simplistic views in this area and 
suggesting the reciprocal relation between reading and metalinguistic reflectivity. As Barton (1990: 75) was to 
put it, "The two seemingly opposed views — that awareness is a pre-requisite for literacy and that literacy 
provides awareness — do not really conflict: one does not preclude the other. In fact, the position generally now 
taken ... is that learning to read and the development of awareness interact (see Ehri 1979, Barker 1985)". 
40. Olsen and Torrence (1983: 146) suggest that writing in particular tends to "invite naming and analysis" 
largely because of its physical structure. 
41. As Kanniloff-Smith (1979: 226) put it, "Small children ... rely more heavily on extralinguistic features to 
clarify reference. It is not until the second phase" (roughly from five to eight years) "that, in cases of 
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ambiguity, children endeavour to make use of intralinguistic means, first by overmarking and fmally, in the 
third phase" (roughly from eight to twelve years)" by using the adult system". 
42. See in particular Karmiloff-Smith, A. 'Language development after age 5' in Fletcher, P. and Garman, M. 
(eds.) Language Acquisition, Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
43. As Hickmann (1985: 25) hypothesises, " ... even if we postulate some underlying cognitive competence 
which allows the development of this" [i.e. metalinguistic] "ability, once it is acquired, it should affect how the 
child plans and organises his own use of signs in problem-solving and/or social-interactive contexts". 
44. Silverstein (1985: 229) was, like Wertsch, to see the metapragmatic dimension of language operating at 
three distinct if inter-related levels: that of intralinguistic indexical referencing, that of 'indexical denotation' 
(involving speech reporting on speech) and, fmally, of metasemantics (involving the use of signs to explain, 
define and interpret other signs). 
45. As Caton (1993: 326) was otherwise to put it, "Meaning means, according to Mead (1964/1927: 129), a 
self-conscious reflection upon the structure of the act, understood as a statement on the connection between a 
stimulus and a response". 
46. An interesting example of this can be found in Donaldson's (1978: 92-93) treatment of two year old 
children's request for names of objects. Clearly, such requests cannot be dismissed as 'unconscious', as 
proponents of the 'autonomy' hypothesis suggest. On the other hand, however, they equally cannot be 
accepted as examples of a conscious ability to treat language as an object since, as Donaldson argues, the 
young child treats the names as mere attributes of the objects they refer to (like their colour or shape). A more 
useful approach, overcoming the schematicism of the earlier two, would be to view such activities as examples 
of pre-conceptual (or 'complex') thinking, as Vygotsky suggested. 
47. See Weir, R. (1975/1962: 613). 
48. Weir's account of her child's pre-sleep play with language is contradictory. On the one hand she appears to 
argue that the word play is "deliberate" (ibid. 610) and involves a range of syntagmatic substitution exercises 
that are "consciously practised". On the other hand she suggests that what is practised is governed either by 
sound or meaning associations in that it resembles the 'chain complex' described by Vygotsky as typical of 
non-conceptual (i.e. non-deliberate) thought. 
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Chapter 3 
1.0. Towards a model of metalinguistic awareness: theoretical considerations 
The socio-cultural hypothesis, as indicated, appears more flexible than its alternatives in 
explaining differences in both the onset and distribution of metalinguistic skills among children, as 
reflected in the 'anecdotal' and 'experimental' literature. While it may be more useful in setting a 
framework in which the origin and function of metalinguistic awareness can be explored, however, 
it remains underdeveloped in several important respects. As Gombert (1992: 175) points out, apart 
from the work of Bialystock (1985a, 1985b) and Karmiloff-Smith (1979, 1986), which seeks to 
situate the development of such awareness as a function of intralingual referencing in extended 
discourse, the number of comprehensive models is `low'.' Considerable attention, it is true, has been 
paid in recent years to the role played by metalinguistic awareness in discrete areas of language 
development, particularly that played by metaphonological processing in literacy skill development, 
but little attempt has been made to situate such studies within a longer-term developmental model 
which seeks to explain the interaction between metalinguistic awareness and the extension of the 
child's linguistic repertoire.' Vygotsky's work offers an invaluable paradigmatic framework for 
elaborating such a model, but needs to be enriched by taking into account more recent theoretical 
and empirical findings in a range of relevant fields, particularly that of metapragmatics. The 
integration of data from such sources might usefully seek to: 
• explain the relationship between metalinguistic awareness and skill development in 
relation to functional differentiation in language acquisition/learning; 
• establish a taxonomy of those metalinguistic skills relevant at given stages in skill 
development, notably the shift from spoken to written and from L I to L2 learning; and 
o analyze the interaction between cognitive and affective factors in the development and 
application of metalinguistic awareness and its implications for skill development. 
Such a model would have important implications, of course, for the educational sphere since what 
Wells (1994) refers to as the child's "semiotic apprenticeship" consists precisely in widening his 
repertoire of linguistic skills, principally by negotiating a transfer from spoken to written texts -- 
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including the new intramodal functions such texts embody -- and from first language acquisition to 
second language learning. 
2. 0. Functional differentiation 
As Hicicmann (1986: 16-18) observes, unlike Piaget, Vygotsky tends to view language less as a 
formal system of signs in the Saussurian tradition than as a range of functions acquired in relation 
to given needs. Within this perspective, the child's mastery of the primary linguistic activity of 
speech is not so much mastery of a 'system of sounds' as of various ways of 'making meaning' 
which encompass ever more complex and differentiated forms of discourse related to changing 
contexts of use. As speech is used to mediate the solution of new problems, the cultural meaning 
potential of the language system is modified and developed to meet the new functional demands 
placed upon it. This emphasis upon the acquisition of speech in relation to socially determined 
functional goals is central, of course, to the views of writers such as Halliday (1975, 1986) or Wells 
(1981, 1986) who, likewise, tend to see the child's linguistic development in terms of an extension 
of a functional repertoire. It is, as Halliday (1975: 33) asserts, primarily 
... through the gradual extension of his meaning potential into new functions that the child's 
linguistic horizons become enlarged... The social functions which language is serving in 
the life of the child determine both the options which he creates for himself and their real-
isation in structure. 
The process of functional differentiation that both Wells and Halliday refer to operates not only 
intramodally, in terms of the way speech changes allow the child to 'realize' his intentions, but also 
intermodally. As Wood (1988: 162) points out, in her perceptive study on the relationship between 
metalinguistic awareness and literacy skills, the latter arc not simply speech written down but "new 
functions of language", that is, ones which "... involve ways of communicating that transform the 
nature of children's knowledge of language and lead to more analytical ways of thinking". The 
development of literacy skills, within this framework, is not distinct from but adds a new dimension 
to the process of functional differentiation already underway, allowing new functions to develop, 
some of which are closely related to, and some quite distinct from, speech forms. 
If language development can be seen largely as an extension of a functional repertoire, however, 
what tends to underpin such a process is what Wells (1981: 243) refers to as the "... detachment of 
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language from its context of immediate experience". As new linguistic functions are mastered in 
relation to new socially-determined needs, meaning becomes increasingly independent of the unique 
spatio-temporal context in which language is used. This `decontextualisation of mediational means', 
as Wertsch (1985: 33) otherwise put it, would appear to 'set in' relatively early on. Bruner (1975: 
52), following Vygotsky, argues that the process has its roots in the initial freeing of speech from the 
`context of action', that is, the separation of the representational from the regulatory function.' It is 
this divorce between the two principal functions of language that opens up the possibility for the 
child -- as he 'bootstraps' himself up through the various levels of abstraction embedded in word 
meaning -- to represent experience (including linguistic experience) to himself in an ever more 
generalized way and to subject it to ever more reflective control.' The process of what might be 
termed 'representational disembedding' can, as de Villiers and de Villiers (1979: 84-94) imply, be 
plotted along three principal axes: 
• first, a movement from the 'here and now' as the child learns to represent to himself 
objects and events displaced in space and time, that is, to 'remember', 'imagine', 'predict' 
etc.; 
• second, a tendency to be more explicit in the encoding of messages as the child begins to 
rely less upon an assumption of 'shared knowledge' with other speakers/hearers in 
communicative interaction; and 
• third, a tendency to make increasing use of metapragmatic and intralinguistic referencing 
as language is used more to refer to the linguistic rather than the extralinguistic context. 
As the same writers suggest, these three axes -- freedom from the 'here and now' in the selection of 
topics, from an automatic assumption of 'shared knowledge' between speaker-hearer and from 
extra- to intralinguistic referencing -- may be logically discrete but are, in practice, inter-related. It 
is the socially-induced need of the child to talk about events/objects distant in space and time which 
prompts him to focus more on the way linguistic (rather than extra-linguistic) factors encode 
meaning and it is the latter which, in turn, encourages him to treat language as its own context and 
to develop a language for 'talking about' language. In other words, as Hicicmann (1985: 25) 
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suggests, metalinguistic awareness emerges as a by-product of the shift from an undifferentiated to 
an ever more differentiated use of language from a functional point of view. 
In more recent years, there has been considerable research undertaken into the relationship 
between changes in discourse modes characterized by a decrease in intersubjectivity and the 
corresponding changes at the linguistic level in such areas as ellipsis and anaphoric/cataphoric 
referencing. Snow's (1977, 1986) earlier studies of mother-child dialogues, for example, examined 
the impact of changes in the degree of 'shared knowledge' on the transfer from deictic to anaphoric 
referencing and related aspects of this process can be found in Dore (1977), Nelson and Guendel 
(1979) and/or Fine's (1978) study on cohesion maintenance in child conversation. Perhaps one of 
the more useful studies in this area can be found in Rubin (1980) who, in his critical review of the 
literature, has sought to develop a taxonomy of discourse modes at the intra- and intermodal levels 
which illustrate the relationship between contextual `disembedding' and intralingual referencing. 
Rubin examines the relationship along a continuum in which the movement from, at one end, a 
casual conversation to, at the other end, the reading of fictional texts, may be graded according to a 
range of 'dimensions' such as modality, interaction, involvement, spatial communality, temporal 
communality, concreteness of reference and reparability of character (Cf. Appendix 1). While he 
views some speech activities (e.g. hearing the report of a conversation) as possibly being more 
`disembedded' than some written activities (e.g. reading a story with pictures) -- that is, as requiring 
more extensive use of anaphoric referencing etc. -- in general his model would suggest that it is the 
gradual intramodal changes in speech which afford the child the necessary 'apprenticeship' for 
successfully coping with the transfer to what Olsen (1984: 222) refers to as the "explicitness of 
meaning" embedded in written texts.' Indeed, as Simons and Murphy (1986: 185) insist, in a similar 
taxonomy of the differences between the spoken and written word, however `disembedded' speech 
may be, it always remains 'multi-channeled', i.e. uses interaction, paralinguistic and other 
non-verbal modes of transmission in addition to the lexical-semantic- syntactic one, whereas the 
written word is uniformly unimodal and relies exclusively on the latter.' 
One of the interesting aspects of the literature devoted to functional differentiation in language 
use, as in the case of Rubin's model, is the assumption that the `disembedding' of language at any 
given stage is both the by-product of earlier linguistic functions and the pre-requisite for the mastery 
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of new (and even more decontextualized) ones. Such an assumption would certainly seem to be 
shared by writers such as Halliday (1986) or Donaldson (1993: 126) who, in her more recent work, 
tends to view the axes defined by de Villiers and de Villiers as a sequence of temporal modes, 
ranging from the 'point' to the 'transcendent' mode, in which "... each mode achieves some new 
measure of disembedding, some reduction of contextual binding by comparison with its 
predecessor" .7 For Donaldson, it is the gradual disembedding of language through intra-modal 
changes in spoken discourse which prepares the child for the intermodal change from spoken to 
written word and it is the latter which, in turn, prepares him to handle the new and more reflexive 
forms of semiotic mediation associated with formal schooling. Within such a dialectical process, 
mastery of the written word assumes a pivotal role since it operates at the interface between the 
implicit disembedding of meaning in spoken discourse and the increasingly explicit disembedding of 
meaning that is required to handle extended texts and the internal relations and consistency between 
parts of such texts (what Fayol (1985) or Karmiloff-Smith (1985) refers to as suprasential 
`coherence' and `cohesion'). Wells (1981: 243) was to make the same point somewhat earlier when 
suggesting that 
... the attempt to make the organisation of the written text act as the autonomous and explicit 
representation of intended meanings leads to the development of greater awareness of the 
abstract relationship between language and experience and a greater willingness to exploit 
the symbolic possibilities inherent in language. 
The latter understanding is, of course, crucial for the child in terms of being able to monitor his 
linguistic input and output, to plan its use and to develop a language for talking about language, 
which is a pre-requisite for handling the new linguistic functions the child encounters in formal 
schooling, chief amongst which is, perhaps, that of second/foreign language learning. 
The gradual disembedding of language through functional differentiation at both the micro 
(intramodal) and macro (intermodal) levels has been variously described by Bruner (1986) as a shift 
from the 'narrative' to 'paradigmatic', by Halliday (1993) as a shift from the 'dynamic' to the 
`synoptic' and by Wells (1994), most recently, as a shift from the use of language as 'tool' to that as 
`artifact' .8 While the terminology may change from writer to writer, what is common to them all is 
an attempt to define a process whereby, as Vygotsky (1962: 100) put it, language moves through 
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context-embedded 
primary ling. activities 
[unconscious, involuntary, 
implicit] 
adaptation to ever more decontextualised functions from a "spontaneous unconscious activity" to an 
"abstract, deliberate activity" which is characteristic, above all, of the written word (cf. Figure 1): 
functional differentiation: 
high 
secondary ling. activities: 
[conscious, voluntary, 
explicit] 
context-reduced 
functional differentiation: 
low 
Figure 1: relationship between metalinguistic processing and functional differentiation. 
Within this process, it is changes that occur at the level of spoken discourse -- the gradual ability to 
attend to 'sentence' as opposed to 'intended' meanings in the Gricean sense -- which prepares the 
child for the 'abstract' nature of written discourse and it is the latter which, in turn, prepares him for 
further 'parasitic' language activities which require an even more reflexive approach. Put another 
way, metalinguistic processing can most usefully be seen as the rendering explicit of implicit 
strategies used in communicative interaction as the pre-requisite for handling new, and more 
disembedded, linguistic functions. It may be useful to examine this particularly in terms of the 
relationship between reading and learning a foreign language which constitute the two major 
`parasitic' functions the child is expected to master but which are usually treated as discrete 
processes. 
2.1. situation and text-dependent uses of language 
As Gombert (1992: 160) notes, following Barron (1986) and Content et al (1986), there has 
traditionally tended to be two approaches to the relationship between the spoken and the written 
word which have important pedagogic implications, the 'direct access' and 'indirect access' 
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procedures.' The first, represented by writers such as Goodman (1968) and Smith (1979), has 
tended to see reading as a `psycholinguistic guessing game' in which the child supposedly uses the 
same 'top down' strategies to make sense of the written word as he did to make sense of the spoken 
word, that is, uses what Widdowson (1991) refers to as 'schematic' knowledge to form and test 
hypotheses about the meaning of a given text. Learning to read and learning to speak are, in this 
sense, treated as essentially similar processes since, as Smith (1979: 29) argues, "... many of the 
skills employed by a child in learning the regularities of spoken language may also be employed to 
learn reading". If the first tradition stresses the continuity between the two processes, however, the 
second is more inclined to stress their discontinuity. As Mattingly (1972) has argued most 
forcefully, perhaps, the first tradition -- which is heavily influenced by information-processing 
models of learning -- is flawed in two major respects. In the first place, learning to read cannot be 
seen as simply learning to associate visual signals with meaning since -- at least in an alphabetic 
culture -- such an association is initially mediated through an already existing set of auditory 
signals. The written word does not constitute, in this sense, a symbolic system in its own right, as 
does speech, but a secondary symbolic system which is at one stage removed from meaning and 
which, in the early stages, requires the conscious mapping of one set of signals upon another to 
access that meaning. In the second place, the fact that reading/writing are secondary symbolic 
systems means that they are inevitably more `decontextualized' than speech and that the use of top 
down strategies -- i.e. of various forms of extra-linguistic or 'real world' cues -- to access textual 
meaning is bound to be insufficient. 
It is precisely the decontextualization of the written word -- as a "second degree of symbolization" 
-- that Vygotsky (1962: 99) was to draw attention to when exploring the impact of literacy skill 
development on the child's concept of language. The written word lacks not only what he refers to 
as the "sensory aspects of speech" but, even more importantly, a range of extra-linguistic clues to 
meaning that pivot around the intersubjectivity implicit in communicative interaction, that is, the 
`shared expectations' of the participants. 1° In accessing the written word, the child is compelled, as 
Perfetti (1985: 7-8) recently put it, to pay much more attention to meaning as a function of the text 
rather than as a "... joint venture, with context providing as much information concerning message 
interpretation as speech itself'. This decrease in the opportunity of the child to negotiate meaning 
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within a framework of shared knowledge is even more marked in the case of writing than reading. 
Unlike in face to face conversations, where responsibility for mutual understanding is shared 
between speaker and listener -- and where one can sympathetically 'scaffold' the other -- solitary 
writing requires that the child assumes all burden of responsibility for making what he is trying to 
say intelligible and accessible. The fact that he has to anticipate likely sources of misunderstanding 
when he may not know his potential audience makes his motives for writing, as Vygotsky (1962: 99) 
suggests, much "more abstract, more intellectualised" than speech and implies the need for a highly 
conscious and deliberate approach to language generally. As Vygotsky was to continue, writing --
unlike speech -- involves "deliberate analytic action on the part of the child" which operates from 
the very beginning at a variety of levels, from the most simple, such as reproducing the sound 
structure of words in alphabetic symbols, to the most complex, such as planning a text and 
monitoring its thematic cohesion. 
2. 1. 1. Pre-reading awareness 
If literacy skill development requires a shift in the perception of language from that of 'process' 
to 'product', as Wells (1997) put it, what processing strategies does the child need to negotiate the 
transfer between the two? Perhaps the most well-known (if controversial) attempt to define what the 
child needs to 'know' to access written texts is the 'cognitive clarity' hypothesis advanced by 
Downing (1979) and Downing and Thackray (1975). While such a hypothesis has both a 'strong' 
and 'weak' version, as Wray (1994: 86) implies, its basic premise is that children need to have 
developed a given 'threshold' in their ability to attend to language as a symbolic system in its own 
right." Downing's model postulates two categories of such 'knowledge' as pre-requisites for reading 
success in an alphabetic culture: the first (`functional concepts') implies awareness of the 
communicative function of reading/writing, as single-channel modes of transmission, and the 
second (`featural concepts') implies a more practical awareness of the relation between the written 
and spoken form or, as Gough and Hillinger (1979: 17) put it, "... the child must recognize that the 
printed message is an encoded version of the spoken one". The division in the types of knowledge 
that the pre-reader needs to access written texts has more recently been reflected in a number of 
similar distinctions, such as that in the work of Perfetti (1985: 7) or Wood (1988: 162-166), between 
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`decontextualization' and 'decoding' strategies, that in Smith (1986: 475) and Gombert (1992: 152), 
between 'declarative' and 'procedural' knowledge and, more controversially, that in Bialystock and 
Ryan (1985a, 1985b) between 'analysis' and 'control' (i.e. selective attention).12 While the 
terminology may vary from writer to writer, there would appear to be a wide consensus that, in order 
to make the transition from language as 'process' to 'product', the child needs to be able to 'make 
sense of (i.e. conceptualize) the way meaning is conveyed in the new visual process and to 
practically decode the written form of language back onto the previously spoken form at a variety of 
levels. Moreover, insofar as reading is a metacognitive skill, such a consensus would also seem to 
imply a clear sequencing in these prior forms of knowledge since, as Anderson (1982, 1986) argued 
in his model of cognitive skill development, conceptualizing a task (i.e. declarative knowledge) 
usually acts as a pre-requisite for mastering and automating decoding strategies (i.e. procedural 
knowledge). It may be worthwhile examining each step in more detail. 
2. 1. 1. 1. `decontextualization strategies' 
The notion that the child has first of all to 'make sense' of a task if he is to master it in practice, 
that is, to develop what Wray (1994: 20) calls 'task awareness', is a vital component of the 
`cognitive clarity' hypothesis. 13 In the area of literacy skill development, this involves on his part 
an awareness of the greater 'autonomy' of written language compared with spoken language, a 
realization as Kay (1977) put it, that the former is 
... minimally dependent upon simultaneous transmission over other channels, such as the 
paralinguistic, postural or gestural, and [that] it is minimally dependent on the contribution of 
background information on the part of the hearer". 
The child who is to successfully negotiate the shift from spoken to written word has, in other words, 
to be at least implicitly aware from the outset that meaning can be encoded in the linguistic rather 
than extra-linguistic features of a message and that his task is to attend to the former rather than the 
latter. Simon and Murphy (1986: 188-9) argue that this ability to shift from 'situation-dependency' 
to 'text-dependency' -- or what Anderson and Lynch (1988: 13) refer to as 'schematic' to 'systemic' 
knowledge -- depends in large measure on the extent to which, in terms of normal communicative 
interaction, the child has been encouraged to adopt oral discourse styles which take into account 
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varying states of 'shared knowledge' between speaker and listener, i.e. which focus upon making the 
meaning more linguistically explicit than implicit when necessary. Such a process, they suggest, 
can often occur in the child's pre-school discourse modes or in the transfer from pre-school to 
school where he learns, as Collins and Michaels (1986: 207-208) put it, "... to shift from his or her 
home-based conversational discourse strategies, which depend on multi-level linguistic inference, to 
the more discursive strategies preparatory to written expository prose". It is problems in such a 
transition, such writers continue, which explain why the child can often, in the early stages of 
reading, fail to 'make sense' of what the activity is about and which leads him to remain beset by 
what Vernon (1957: 71) some time earlier referred to as "cognitive confusion". 
In his study of the types of prior knowledge required for reading success, Smith (1986: 493) 
suggests that the child's ability to attend to the linguistic (rather than extra-linguistic) encoding of 
meaning is a "disappointingly imprecise concept" of linguistic maturity. As indicated in the work of 
Simons and Murphy, however, a body of evidence has been built up which tentatively supports the 
hypothesis that the ability of the child to transfer from what they call the "multi-channel signaling" 
of speech to the "single-channel signaling" of writing is rooted in his implicit ability to handle more 
decontextualized oral discourse modes. Simons and Murphy (1986: 205) themselves argue strongly, 
on the basis of their research, that children whose home experience is more situation-dependent than 
others can be locked into a 'verbal style' which makes them less able to profit from classroom-based 
discourse modes which are implicitly or explicitly designed to facilitate the transition to 
text-dependent language use. 14 Such children appear to have, they suggest (1986: 192), considerable 
difficulty handling the shift from exophoric to endophoric referencing in oral narratives, which is 
crucial for maintaining coherence in written texts. 
When learning to read, children must learn to create a context for reference when one is not 
provided in the narrative, and to interpret the text in terms of it. When a verbal context is 
created, as in quoted dialogue, children must learn to interpret deictic terms endophorically, 
from the perspective of the speaker of the quoted sentence. Both of these tasks require that 
children become less dependent upon the immediate situational context in their use of 
language. 
An identical point is made by Michaels (1986: 102-3) who, although denying a direct relationship 
between discourse style and reading success, points to quantifiable differences between children who 
adopt what she calls a 'topic-centred' approach and those who adopt a 'topic-associating' approach. 
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The former, she argues, who engage in tightly structured discourse "centering on a single topic or a 
series of closely related topics, with thematic development accomplished through lexical cohesion", 
are more prepared to handle the explicit nature of meaning in expository prose than the latter whose 
style, on the contrary, consists more of "... a series of segments or episodes which are implicitly 
linked in highlighting some person or theme". The differences in the extent to which children are 
able to handle meaning explicitly in their discourse modes -- and the relation of these differences to 
reading success -- is also noted in the work of writers such as Brown (1982: 77) or Czerniewska 
(1992: 17).15 While the latter is anxious, like Michaels, to avoid any notion that there is a direct 
link between discourse style and reading success, she does argue that children who are weak at 
information-giving, "a special and demanding form of narrative", i.e. those who fail to master what 
she refers to as the "bridge into literacy", are inevitably those who have problems learning to read. 
2. 1. 1. 2. 'decoding strategies' 
In addition to understanding that the written word is a single rather than multi-channel means of 
communication, the beginning reader also has to realize that accessing 'meaning' involves -- at least 
in the initial stages -- mapping the visual signals on the page onto the auditory ones that he already 
`knows'. As Smith (1986: 475) was to put it, the first "key insight" for the child involves 
understanding that "... speech consists of units of various size ... and, second, that some of these 
units are in reasonably close correspondence with units in the writing system the child is attempting 
to read". In determining what units speech can be segmented into and at what levels, a crucial role 
will, of course, be played by the specific orthography that the child is seeking to master. Whereas in 
some orthographies the syllable (Japanese kana) or the word (Japanese kanji) is the central unit, in 
alphabetic systems it is the phoneme, that is, a unit of speech which matches a unit in the 
orthography (the letter) even though larger units, such as the word, are also identifiable. The close 
correlation that exists in alphabetic cultures between morphophonological segmentation skills and 
reading skills has long been noted.'" Savin (1972: 321), for example, was to note in an early study 
that the inability to analyze syllables into phonemes was associated with poor reading skills and 
such a link has underpinned much of the research into under-achievement in literacy skill 
development, as in Liberman and Shankweiler (1975), Wallach and Wallach (1976), Rozin and 
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Gleitman (1977) and Venezky (1978).' In all such work, phonological segmentation skills are seen 
as a vital factor in extended reading achievement and Entwhisle (1979: 150) ) is not alone in 
suggesting that they are not only predictive of success but a pre-requisite for it. To learn to read, she 
suggests, " ... the child must have some notion that different marks on a page have systematic 
relations with sounds he already knows." In a review of the more recent research of Bryant and 
Bradley (1985) and Goswami and Bryant (1990) into the relation between the child's conscious 
phonological segmentation skills and reading success, Meadows (1993: 12) points, even more 
firmly, to the consensus that appears to exist in the research literature on the "...causal association 
between insensitivity to phonemic differences and difficulties in learning to read". 
While the ability of the child to segment words into phonemes may play a crucial role in reading 
success, however, this is not to suggest that it arises spontaneously in the course of normal 
communicative interaction, that is, prior to the reading process. On the contrary, as writers from 
Perfetti (1985) to Goswami and Bryant (1990: 26) have stressed, there is no evidence that pre-
readers are consciously sensitive to phonemic discrimination since their spontaneous attempts to 
segment speech do not appear to coincide with units such as 'word' or 'phoneme'. "Children", the 
latter note 
... are not particularly sensitive to the existence of phonemes in words at the time when they 
first begin to read, and if they do not learn an alphabetic script, they continue to be insensitive 
to those phonological forms for some time. 
Support for the latter assertion would appear to stem from the fact that illiterate adults in an 
alphabetic culture do not develop phonemic segmentation skills any more than do those literate in a 
non-alphabetic (i.e. logographic) script, as revealed in cross-cultural studies of Chinese or Koreans 
learning to read.' Phonological awareness would appear, in this sense, to be a secondary (i.e. 
metalinguistic) activity which emerges out of the act of learning to read itself, that is, out of the 
training the child receives in consciously linking alphabetic symbols with their acoustic counterpart 
in order to access meaning. This is not to deny that such phonemic segmentation skills play a 
crucial role in the reading process but, rather, that they initially arise out of that process and enter 
subsequently into a symbiotic relationship with it. As Ehri (1979: 84) was to put it, in her 
pioneering critique of Ryan et al's (1977) analysis of the role of phonemic (and lexical) awareness 
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in literacy skill development, the latter tends to "... interact with the reading acquisition process, 
existing both as a consequence of what has occurred and as a cause facilitating further progress".19 
Smith (1986: 479) was to put this in a somewhat different way when arguing that children's 
awareness of speech units and their ability to identify and exploit corresponding units in print is a 
reciprocal process in which "morphophonological awareness aids reading, and reading aids 
morphophonological awareness". 
If morphophonological awareness arises out of the reading process in which it plays a crucial 
`facilitating' role, however, what exactly are the processing skills which the child needs to have 
mastered in order to access what Smith (1986: 483-484) refers to as "knowledge about the segmental 
structure of language"? Increasing evidence would seem to suggest that mastery of phonemic 
segmentation skills is rooted in the aural discrimination skills that the child implicitly builds up in 
communicative interaction and, in particular, in the sensitivity the child develops towards syllable 
and intra-syllable (i.e.. onset and rime) recognition.2° Goswami and Bryant (1990: 147), for example, 
suggest that it is children's implicit ability to break up syllables into onsets and rimes -- as in their 
experience of playing with contrasting sounds in nursery rhymes and pre-sleep monologues -- which 
provides the important apprenticeship for the emergence of phonemic awareness as a facilitating 
factor in reading achievement. As they suggest, children who are sensitive to intra-syllabic 
recognition seem eventually to do much better at reading than those who are not and this, in itself, 
would seem to suggest " ... a link between children's awareness of rhyme and alliteration and their 
progress in reading" (figure 2): 
Syllable 	 onset and rime 	 phoneme 
cat 	 c - at 	 c - a - t 
string 	 str - Mg 	 s - t - r- i - n- g 
wig-warn 	 w - ig - w - am 	 w-i-g-w-a-m 
/V-- pre-reading 
 
	0,. 41--- reading 
--O. 
 
Figure 2: stages in the development of metaphonological processing. 
A similar view is adopted by Morais et al (1987), Wood (1988) and Wray (1994: 35-6) who, in 
reviewing the recent literature, suggests that "phonemic awareness seems ... to develop through 
learning to read, but some awareness of onset and rime seems to be already present before reading 
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begins". It should be noted, however, that controversy continues to exist as to whether syllabic 
awareness feeds directly into phonemic awareness or whether, on the contrary, it feeds into reading 
itself which, in turn, promotes phonemic awareness as part of an interactive process. 21  
2. 1. 2. Post-reading or imetatextuar awareness 
If the metalinguistic awareness needed to make sense of and decode written texts is based upon 
rendering explicit skills built up implicitly in the pre-reading period -- such as those of aural 
discrimination -- the process of reading itself acts to deepen and extend such awareness. Becoming 
literate has, as Olsen and Torrence (1983), Bialystock (1991) or Donaldson (1993) observe, a 
profound effect upon the child's concept of language and his conscious control of it. In the initial 
stages, the act of mapping visual onto auditory symbols to access the meaning of written texts 
compels the child to become conscious of those units of speech which he had previously used 
unconsciously in the service of communicative interaction. The development of morphophonological 
awareness that results allows the child to develop concepts of language which -- in an alphabetic 
culture -- link the spoken and written forms and facilitate the transfer of the first to the second. As 
the child's mastery of the written word develops, however, and as the latter increasingly diverges 
both in function and structure from the former, the child's awareness of language gradually assumes 
new dimensions. Perhaps the most important of these operates at the level of syntax. Kroll and Vann 
(1981) and Kress (1982) have explored in detail, for example, how the "loosely co-ordinated causal 
complexes" of speech are increasingly replaced by the more "hierarchically structured sentences" of 
written discourse. 22 Perera (1986) is not alone in seeing in this shift from a less to more complex 
grammatical structure -- what Chafe (1982, 1985) was otherwise to call the greater 'integration' of 
written as opposed to oral discourse -- a growing awareness of the way in which syntax encodes 
meaning. 23 Moreover, to the extent that in written discourse language becomes increasingly its own 
context, metapragmatic awareness inevitably accompanies greater metasyntactic awareness. The 
child is compelled to operate `metatextually', as Gombert (1992: 121) puts it, that is, not only with 
sentences but with sentences as part of extended discourse in which cohesion in the way linguistic 
markers refer to each other (i.e. organize and structure a text) facilitates coherence at the level of 
representation of ideas. 
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If literacy skill development gives rise to an expanding taxonomy of metalinguistic skills -- from 
the morphophonological to the syntactic or pragmatic -- such a process has an eminently functional 
role in facilitating the child's ability to deal with the new linguistic functions and/or registers that 
confront him. This is particularly true in terms of writing where the ability to plan, monitor and 
amend texts involves making complex linguistic decisions at various levels to meet the changing 
constraints of context, purpose and audience. As Wood (1988: 163) put it, to communicate through 
texts means being able to reflect on what one has written and amend it linguistically in order to 
maintain intelligibility and accessibility for the reader. Such amendments might include, for 
example, determining the appropriateness of lexical items in given registers (metamorphological 
processing); deciding upon the most effective way of signaling speech activity (metasyntactic 
processing); and/or 'chunking' information to highlight certain parts and background others and 
signaling topic shifts (metapragmatic processing). It is no accident that, within this framework, 
increasing attention has been placed upon the role played by 'editing' in the writing process as a 
stage which requires the most complex forms of metalinguistic awareness and control. As Nold 
(1979: 105-106) has pointed out, it is in the process of editing (or 'revising') what has been written 
that the child is forced to develop the most detached attitude towards the language used to express 
his ideas and towards those ideas themselves. Revision, he stresses, involves "... changing the 
meaning of a text in response to the realization that the original intended meaning is somehow 
faulty or weak" and such a change means making a number of conscious choices in terms of the 
language used at a variety of levels from the morphophonological to the pragmatic. A similar 
viewpoint has been expressed more recently in the influential work of Fayol (1986) or Bereiter and 
Scardomalia (1987: 87) on the role of revision in composition. "Conscious access seems to play a 
larger role in revision than in original composition", the latter claim, because the child has to 
deliberately bring alternatives to mind and make choices between them in relation to their intended 
goal. 
2. 2. Metalinguistic awareness and L2 
If literacy skill development gives rise to an expanding taxonomy of metalinguistic skills which 
are critical in processing new linguistic functions, this is nowhere more applicable than in the area 
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of foreign language learning. As Hawkins (1981, 1984) or Skehan (1985, 1988) have stressed, in an 
acquisition-poor environment it is impossible for L2 form to be acquired unconsciously, as in L1, as 
a by-product of communicative interaction. Writers such as Bialystock (1991:63) are, in this sense, 
seriously mistaken in asserting that "second language acquisition ... is an extension of first language 
acquisition in that the development of proficiency depends upon the same type of cognitive 
processes", i.e. from low to high analyzed knowledge and control. On the contrary, the fact that 
there are virtually no extra-linguistic clues to meaning that can scaffold that interaction while the 
language is being acquired means that the L2 learner has no alternative but to focus consciously and 
deliberately upon language form from the initial stages. Focusing on form means, however, knowing 
exactly what aspects of form to focus upon and this -- in turn -- is largely determined by the range of 
metalinguistic strategies developed through the L I reading process. It is what the child brings with 
him to the L2 learning process that is crucial in allowing him to identify those 'significant 
generalizations' that encode meaning and, thereby, to turn 'input' into 'intake'. As Hawkins (1984: 
181) was to point out, if reading in L I is 'parasitic' upon primary linguistic activities. "... learning 
the foreign language under school conditions is ... parasitic upon the learned skill of reading and 
writing and matching sounds to symbols". It is true that writers such as Bowey (1988: 71) argue 
that there is little (or no) direct evidence for the hypothesis " ... that metalinguistic ability predicts 
subsequent second language acquisition" but, in an acquisition-poor environment, it is difficult to 
determine what the learner should attend to in the target language [TL] input if it is not the way in 
which language structure encodes meaning. As Vygotsky (1935: 48) was to put it, it is the fact that 
the L2 learner has to pay attention initially to form rather than function that reverses the process of 
Ll acquisition since 
... if the development of the native language begins with free, spontaneous use of 
speech and culminates in the conscious realization of linguistic forms and their 
mastery, then the development of a foreign language begins with the conscious 
realization of language and arbitrary command of it and culminates in spontaneous 
free speech. 
It is, for Vygotsky, only as a result of controlled practice that the L2 learner is able to internalize the 
`linguistic forms' to an extent where he can use it for 'spontaneous free speech' in communicative 
interaction. 24 
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It has been objected, of course, that while Vygotsky's emphasis upon the initially conscious 
attention to L2 form may be valid in a foreign language context, it is less so in a second language 
one where the learner has greater access to communicative interaction on a regular basis and where 
such interaction can be sustained through a higher level of 'shared knowledge' (or 
intersubjectivity).25 There is no doubt, as Smith (1997) has argued, that there are important 
differences between foreign and second language processes in terms of the extent to which the 
learner is compelled to rely upon linguistic (as opposed to extra-linguistic) clues to meaning. While 
this may be true, however, as Skehan (1985: 17) or Tunmer and Myhill (1984: 183-184) point out, 
this does not invalidate the point that even second language learning processes are considerably 
more dependent on the metalinguistic strategies developed in L I than writers like Bowey (1988) 
would appear to acknowledge." A second language learner, for example, may develop 
communicative competence based upon daily interaction in the L2 but it is unlikely that he will be 
able to extend that competence to analytic competence -- involving literacy skill use - without 
having developed a minimal level of metalinguistic processing in the L1 which can be transferred to 
the L2. This is, after all, the basis of Cummins' (1979) 'threshold hypothesis' involving the relation 
between BICS (basic interpersonal communication skills) and CALP (cognitive/academic language 
proficiency) in relation to the achievement of bilingual pupils. While, Cummins argues, a child can 
pick up 'surface fluency' in the L2 based on interaction in the host community, he will not be able to 
develop 'academic proficiency' unless he has first developed it in L1 since "... LI and L2 CALP are 
manifestations of the same underlying dimension" and since "... previous learning of literacy-related 
functions of language (in L1) will predict future learning of these functions in L2". 27 The 
importance of Cummins' argument is that, even in contexts where the learner has considerable 
access to the TL through interaction in the host community, he is still reliant upon the 
metalinguistic strategies which he developed through L1 literacy if he wishes to move beyond 
communicative to analytic competence in the L2. 
2.2.1. Pre-L2 awareness and 'aptitude' 
While writers such as Hawkins have drawn attention to the importance of metalinguistic skills as 
a pre-requisite for L2 learning, however, less attention has been devoted to developing a taxonomy 
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of such skills than in the case of the transfer from spoken to written word in L I. Perhaps the most 
useful body of empirical evidence to emerge can be found in that pioneered by Pimsleur (1966) and 
Carroll/Sapon (1967) into the notion of 'linguistic aptitude'. In her review of Carroll/Sapon's (1967) 
Modern Language Aptitude Test, Bowey (1988: 74) notes that three of the four sub-tests designed to 
predict future L2 performance "... can be viewed as written tests of metalinguistic skills" in that they 
attempt to measure phonemic coding ability, inductive language-learning ability (i.e. the capacity to 
infer patterns in a corpus of material and generalize from them) and grammatical sensitivity.' 
Hawkins (1981: 219) was to make the same point somewhat earlier when suggesting that, despite 
superficial differences between the MLAT of Pimsleur and that of Carroll/Sapon, there seemed to be 
agreement that linguistic 'aptitude' comprises three principal metalinguistic elements -- if one 
omitted reference to 'associative memory' -- which pivot around the notion of 'insight into 
pattern/induction of pattern rules'. Clearly, the typology of metalinguistic skills identified in aptitude 
tests as predictive of future L2 success -- and later incorporated by writers from Hawkins (1984) to 
Naiman et al (1978) or Rubin and Wenden (1992) into intensive pre-L2 training courses -- would 
appear to be those which are dependent upon, and emerge through, literacy skill development in L 1 . 
What is important to note, however, is that the apparent ability of the L2 learner to use such 
strategies for rapid on-line processing of the TL allows him both to 'conceptualize' the L2 learning 
process and 'decode' the TL, back onto the mother tongue at a variety of levels in order to access 
meaning. It may be worth examining these in greater detail. 
The primary task confronting the L2 learner is, as already indicated, to 'make sense' of the 
activity he is involved in. This requires, as McMeniman (1996: 21-6) suggests, understanding that 
meaning is a function of the linguistic rather than extra-linguistic encoding of the message and that 
such encoding may be culturally different, that is, suffer from what Hawkins (1981: 53) refers to as 
"inter-language interference problems". Coming to grips with the decontextualised nature of the L2 
process may appear to be similar to coming to grips with that of the LI written word -- in terms of 
what the learner has to attend to -- but it differs from it in one important respect. In learning to 
read, the child is able to reflect at leisure upon the way in which phonemes make up words and 
words make up sentences because of what Olsen (op cit. 222) refers to as the "permanent" nature of 
the visual symbol which lends itself to "repeated scrutiny and reflection". In learning a foreign 
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language, however, the L2 learner must realize that it is not only the written but also the spoken 
word which needs to be processed using solely linguistic information and -- largely due to the linear 
and ephemeral character of the latter -- this can impose a much greater burden upon his processing 
skills, including short-term memory skills.' If he has not learnt to become highly proficient in 
rapid online processing through L 1 literacy skill development, at a variety of levels, his ability to 
handle such tasks orally in the TL in 'real time' can become increasingly inadequate. In other 
words, as Skehan (1985: 17) was to note in his analysis of the notion of language aptitude, the L2 
learner's ability to handle the `decontextualised material' of the L2 both at the oral and written level 
depends upon a highly efficient use of those processing strategies developed through L 1 literacy 
skills which enable him to identify, analyze and generalize from relevant aspects of the TL 
In addition to understanding that meaning in L2 is a function of the (culturally induced) 
structuring of the message at both oral and written levels, the second task facing the L2 learner is to 
apply an appropriate range of 'decoding' strategies. While such skills may arise at differing stages 
of the reading process -- phonological and morphological processing appearing earlier, for example, 
than pragmatic processing -- it is evident that the ability of the L2 learner to access the target 
language depends upon utilizing all these strategies simultaneously from a very early stage. This is 
particularly true of syntactic or pragmatic processing -- what Gombert (1992: 127) calls the 
monitoring of "intertextual coherence" -- which is often overlooked in the literature. The L2 learner 
has to relatively rapidly deal with highly structured sentences and with the way such sentences 
change in terms of their relationship with each other as part of extended spans of discourse at the 
spoken or written level. An interesting example of the highly complex metalinguistic processing 
skills that the L2 learner needs, even at an early stage, can be seen in the area of 
question-and-answer work use as an input procedure to introduce simple structures in the TL such 
as (in French) alter + infinitive. A typical graded sequence of questions prompting the learner to 
identify and use such structures as it/elle va au/a la ... might include the following: 
(a) Q; Jean/Annette va auth la ... 
A: Oui/non. 
(b) Q: Jean/Annette va au/a la ou 
A: [11/elle val au/a la ... 
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(c) Q: Jean/Annette va au/a la ... 
A: Non, il/elle va au/a la ... 
(d) Q: Ou va Jean/Annette? 
A: 11/elle va au/a la ... 
What is interesting about such an exchange is that the ability of the learner to identify the pattern 
and its meaning -- the aim of the activity -- depends upon the simultaneous processing of the input 
at at least three levels. In the first place, the learner has to be able to perceive a given phonological 
sequence which can be broken down into lexis by the identification of word boundaries. In the 
second place, he has to be able to detect the sequence of such words as part of a pattern 
differentiated by gender (au/a la) and, finally, he needs to be able to modify the use of the pattern 
according to the precise linguistic context provided by the question, that is, to modify the answer 
according to metapragmatic factors that include intralingual referencing.' The fact that these 
processing strategies take place simultaneously in the accessing of a new structure implies that the 
child has to bring a highly sophisticated level of metalinguistic processing to the initial stages of L2 
study. If he has problems dealing with syntactic processing in L1, for example, and/or finds 
difficulty in adapting syntactic patterns to their linguistic (as opposed to extra-linguistic) context, he 
is more than likely to replicate such difficulty in L2 where accuracy in intra-linguistic referencing 
can become increasingly complex in highly inflected and gendered languages such as French or 
German." 
2.2.2. Post-L2 awareness 
If the child's ability to access an L2 is dependent upon the metalinguistic skills developed through 
Ll literacy development, in what way does the L2 (in turn) help to extend such skills? In one sense, 
as Katcham (1986: 679) has argued, there is no automatic answer to this question since any 
potential metalinguistic benefits that may accrue through L2 learning depend upon what she refers 
to as the 'threshold levels of competence' that the child brings to the learning. Cummins (1978: 
679) was to put this another way when arguing that "... the level of second language competence 
which the ... child attains is partly a function of the type of competence the child developed in L1 at 
a time when ... exposure to language 2 begins". Assuming that the child's metalinguistic skills 
meet the 'threshold level' required by the L2 learning process, however, the internalization of the 
122 
L2 itself can act, as Vygotsky (1962:110) put it, to prompt the learner to "... see his language as one 
particular system among many, to view its phenomena under more general categories". In other 
words, if learning to read allows the child to become aware of the relationship between the spoken 
and written word, learning an L2 can allow the child to become more aware of -- and verbalize --
the relationship between the L 1 and L2, to reflect upon the categories that are common to both in 
the conveying of meaning and the culturally-based differences that exist within such categories. 
Hawkins (1981: 47) was to refer to this widening of linguistic horizons as an 'escape from the 
monoglot's prison' and Hornsey (1989) was to see in the learner's growing awareness of the 
arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign an understanding that 'difference' does not necessarily mean 
`inferiority'. 33 
 Such conclusions are reminiscent of the considerable body of evidence -- from 
Feldman and Shen (1971) to Ben-Zeev (1977) or Tunmer and Myhill (1984) -- that exists in relation 
to the supposed benefits of bilingualism and which pivot around what Katcham (1986: 672) refers to 
as "the arbitrary nature of the word/referent relationship". 
While there would appear to be a clear link between the competence developed through learning 
to read in the LI and successful second language acquisition/learning, however, such a relationship 
is by no means unidirectional. It should be recalled that, as Cole and Scribner (1981) pointed out, it 
is not so much the process of learning to read in itself which is important in developing 
metalinguistic skills as any activity that can prompt the child to consciously reflect upon what they 
have learnt to unconsciously implement in practice. The validity of this view would seem to be 
confirmed in more recent research seeking to explore a reversal in the relationship between learning 
to read and learning/acquiring an L2, that is, seeking to trace the impact of early exposure to a 
second language on the reading process itself. Precisely because early exposure to L2 is seen to 
promote an awareness of the arbitrary nature of the word/referent relationship, writers such as 
Tunmer and Myhill (1984) -- as Katcham (1986: 674) points out -- argue that it can result in "... 
increased metalinguistic awareness which facilitates the acquisition of written skills". A similar 
view has more recently been adopted by Titone (1998: 5) in his summary of the results of empirical 
studies concerning the early introduction of a second language -- for children from the age of 3 -- in 
Italy and Spain.' After comparing the results of such programmes with those from the earlier 
immersion programmes in Canada, Titone argues that developing a relatively high level of bilingual 
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fluency in the L2 early on can " ... result in increased metacognitive/metalinguistic abilities which, in 
turn, facilitate reading acquisition" in both the L2 and the L 1 . Titone is, of course, referring to a 
second (rather than foreign language) context but it is interesting to note that the key variable in 
terms of expanding the child's linguistic repertoire is seen to be that of metalinguistic awareness. 
2.3. A taxonomy of metalinguistic skills 
Within the process of functional differentiation, metalinguistic awareness would appear to arise as 
both a by-product of, and pre-requisite for, skill extension. It is the implicit awareness developed 
through spoken discourse which lays the basis for the transition to written discourse and it is the 
explicit awareness that arises a-synchronously out of the latter -- from the metalexical to the 
metapragmatic -- which equips the child to access further linguistic functions, such as L2 learning in 
an acquisition-poor environment. The taxonomy of metalinguistic skills that emerges through such a 
process might usefully be seen in the modified version of Tunmer et al's (1984: 167) 'hypothesised 
stages of reading acquisition' (figure 3): 
preparatory 	 grapheme-phoneme 	 text 	 L2 learning 
phase 	 correspondence 	 organization 
whole word 	 sentence 
learning 	 organization 
pre-reader 	 beginning 	  skilled _0„. L2 learner 
reader 	 reader 
Figure 3: dependence of L2 learning on LI literacy skill development in terms of metalinguistic 
processing 
As can be seen, it is the a-synchronous development of metalinguistic skills which permit ever-more 
skilled literate practices -- particularly in the area of genre analysis -- and it is the synchronous 
application of such skills to the second/foreign language process which permits the efficient learning 
of the target language in an acquisition-poor environment. 
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3. 0. Awareness and system 
The importance of functional differentiation as a 'spur' to the development of metalinguistic 
awareness is widely accepted by those writing within the Vygotsky-Piaget paradigm. While widely 
accepted, however, there would appear to be less consensus regarding the precise ways in which 
changes in the functional use of language affect the child's conception of it. For those influenced by 
Piaget, in particular, the link between the two might best be described as one of 'negative causality' 
or, as Marshall and Morton (1978) were otherwise to put it, of "negative feedback". Following 
Piaget's thinking -- which was, itself, highly indebted to the research of earlier writers such as 
Clarapede -- awareness is seen as emerging out of the 'failure' the child experiences in using 
familiar cognitive strategies to cope with the progressively unfamiliar demands placed upon him.' 
It is his failure to respond adequately to such demands which is seen as crucial in prompting him to 
switch attention from the goal of behaviour to the strategies used for achieving that goal, i.e. to 
monitoring, evaluating and (if necessary) amending those strategies. As Kanniloff-Smith (1986) 
notes in her reference to the 'failure-driven' models of a Marshall and Morton (1978) or Tunmer et 
al (1984), this is as true for metalinguistic awareness as for any other kind of metacognitive skill. It 
is the child's attempt to get beyond the 'errors' made in seeking to cope with decontextualised uses 
of language -- as in reading or second/foreign language learning -- which is regarded as the 
principal 'motor' of his linguistic development and of his awareness of such development. 
Vygotsky, it should be pointed out, does not entirely reject the Piagetian view that the transfer of 
attention from the goal of behaviour to the means for achieving it arises out of the failure to cope 
with new cognitive/linguistic tasks. While accepting the validity of this view, however, he argued 
that the emergence of reflective consciousness cannot be reduced to such a 'failure-driven' approach 
which appears to view cognitive/linguistic progress as arising out of what a child cannot (as opposed 
to can) do. It may well be, he suggested, that failure to accomplish a new task compels the child to 
switch attention to behavioural strategies but his ability to consciously control those strategies in the 
solution of such a task depends upon his ability to view them as what Karmiloff-Smith (1979: 238) 
calls a "system of relevant options". The notion of 'system' is, indeed, crucial to Vygotsky's view of 
the emergence of awareness in general and metalinguistic awareness in particular.' It is, he argues, 
only by being able to view cognitive or linguistic strategies as a system of behaviour potentials that 
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the child can monitor, evaluate and finally select the most appropriate ones in the solution of a new 
task. System is, he points out (1962: 92), crucial to the notion of 'choice' which is, in turn, crucial 
to reflective consciousness and control. lf, however, the child is able to see what he 'knows' as a 
system of relevant options from which he can make conscious choices, he must already have 
mastered that system in practice beforehand. Metacognitive strategies -- that is, the ability to 
monitor and control one's own behaviour -- can be seen, in this sense, as making explicit in terms of 
a system of options what had previously been mastered implicitly and used in the normal process of 
skill-based activities. Put another way, metacognitive and/or metalinguistic processing involves 
rendering 'procedural' knowledge 'declarative' for the purpose of accessing (`making sense of) new 
skills. 
In his discussion on the emergence of awareness [as 'reflective consciousness'], Vygotsky only 
briefly referred to its implications for language development as such. It would seem clear, however, 
that the child's ability to negotiate macro changes in functional use -- as in the case of the transfer 
from spoken to written word -- can be explained less in terms of 'negative feedback' and more in 
terms of his growing perception of the systematic nature of language. It may be true, as indicated, 
that it is the 'abstract' nature of the written word which prompts the child to attend consciously to 
what he had previously used unconsciously in the service of communicative interaction. If such 
attention is to be productive, however, if it is to serve as a key for 'opening up' the written word, it 
has to focus upon the systematic nature of speech and the various levels -- from the phonological to 
the pragmatic -- at which such a system operates to structure meaning. It is only when the child has 
become aware of the various levels at which the language system operates that he is able to 
consciously use them as processing strategies, selecting the most appropriate, as and when 
necessary, to promote the development of fluent reading/writing. What is evidently true of the 
process from the spoken to written word is also true, of course, of other macro changes in functional 
use such as that between non-standard and standard dialect or between first and second language 
learning. In all such examples, the ability of the child to make sense of and access a new language 
function would appear to be dependent upon his ability to render explicit the implicit knowledge 
that he already possesses in terms of its systematic nature. 
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3. 1. 'system' and 'function' 
The importance of the notion of 'system' in the development of metalinguistic awareness has been 
highlighted in a range of models compatible with the Vygotskyan paradigm, such as that of Halliday 
(1975), Karmiloff-Smith (1979, 1986), Berman (1986) and Gombert (1992). Such models, which 
seek to account for changes in the internal representation of linguistic knowledge in child 
acquisition/learning, have generally tended to posit a three-stage approach in which a pre-systematic 
period of language is followed by the development of an implicit system (what Karmiloff-Smith 
refers to as an 'utterance grammar') which only becomes explicit in the switch from context to 
text-dependency. 37 As Karmiloff-Smith (1986: 474) was to put it: 
... after the prelinguistic and presystemic periods of language acquisition, children first 
seem to concentrate on building up what might be termed an 'utterance grammar'. This 
seems to be mastered around the age of 5. They then go on, until 8 years or beyond, 
to reorganize its components and to acquire procedures for operating on spans of 
cohesively related utterances, thereby changing the functions of their earlier assumed 
categories. This involves fundamental changes in children's underlying representations. 
What is interesting about such models is that, as in the case of Vygotsky, they tend to reject any 
notion that metalinguistic awareness is a by-product of the 'negative feedback' the child receives 
from being initially unable to access a new function. On the contrary, such awareness is seen as 
emerging out of the child's ability to reflect upon the functions he has already mastered at an earlier 
stage and which guarantee him a low level of failure in his linguistic undertakings. It is by 
disembedding and reflecting on what he can (as opposed to can't) do that the child is able to 
establish a repertoire of processing strategies which can be used to 'make sense of and 'decode' 
new functional variants. While the work of Gombert, Karmiloff-Smith and others are characterized 
by significant differences, it may be worthwhile examining what the stages they posit share in 
common. 
Stage 1: implicit knowledge . The first stage is concerned with the young child's acquisition of 
language in which the internalized linguistic items are viewed as having a distinct one-to-one 
correspondence with their context of use but only a random relation with each other. For Halliday 
(1978: 34), for example, the initial utterances of the child are 'functionally simple' since he has no 
appreciation of any underlying system, particularly at the morphological or syntactic level, that 
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might link them together.' What Halliday refers to as a set of "fairly discrete functional 
components each with its own meaning potential' is echoed in the work of both Gombert and 
Karmiloff-Smith who also claim that, in the early stages, linguistic items are stored separately in 
memory even when the two forms are identical but refer to different contexts or when they share 
common elements in terms of belonging to the same linguistic system. As Karmiloff-Smith (1983: 
36) was to put it in an earlier essay , children are concerned at this stage with 
... achieving a successful one-to-one mapping between specific linguistic forms and the 
particular extralinguistic/pragmatic context to which each form most suitably refers. When 
one form refers to different contexts, they are first stored as independent form-function 
pairs. 
It is presumably because such items are stored randomly and 'activated' by extra-linguistic factors 
that the child is unable to analyze them or represent them consciously to himself. 
Stage 2: epilinguistic knowledge. The second stage is marked, in such models, by an internal 
reorganization of the linguistic items internalized in stage 1 so that they are no longer randomly 
connected but interlinked around their shared elements as part of a system. As in Halliday's model, 
this involves a tendency to substitute multifunctional forms for the initial mass of unifunctional 
form-function pairs and a simplification of the system that emerges. As Karmiloff-Smith (1983: 36) 
was to put it, " , once the procedures for mapping [linguistic forms and extralinguistic context] 
function efficiently, and have become automatized, the child then works metaprocedurally on the 
forms themselves". The view that the second stage involves metaprocedures should not be taken to 
imply that the child is in any way consciously aware of the processes underway. On the contrary, 
Karmiloff-Smith specifically refers to such metaprocedures as 'unconscious' and Gombert (1992: 
188-9), in his variant on her three-stage model, likewise argues that such activity is epilinguistic' in 
nature, that is, involves implicit rather than explicit awareness. "The general process at work 
during this phase", he was to suggest, "is an internal linking of the implicit knowledge which leads 
to a functional (i.e. unreflected) awareness of a system". What is interesting particularly in 
Gombert's approach is its tendency to link changes in the internal representation of linguistic data --
particularly its tacit reorganization at this stage into an embryonic system -- with changes in the 
extralinguistic context. Gombert (1992: 188) sees the increase in the range of discourse modes to 
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which the child is exposed as helping him to begin the process of disassociating linguistic items 
from their context of use and grouping them around their common elements which, in turn, provides 
the child with the flexibility to operate in ever-more unfamiliar contexts.' 
Stage 3: explicit knowledge. The third stage in such models is concerned with the processes 
whereby the child's embryonic system becomes accessible to consciousness and can often be 
verbalized linguistically, that is, with the emergence of metalinguistic awareness itself. For 
Karmiloff-Smith, the ability of the child to move from an implicit to explicit awareness of system 
would appear to be dependent almost entirely upon the shift from the extra-linguistic to a linguistic 
structuring of meaning which occurs particularly -- as has been seen -- in the handling of extended 
spans of written discourse. It is because in written discourse language items relate to other language 
items rather than to extra-linguistic items that the child is compelled to explicitly consider the 
relationship of linguistic items to each other as part of a system and to verbalize, if necessary, such 
relationships. Gombert (1992: 190) is even more explicit in situating the shift from epilinguistic to 
metalinguistic processing in the role played by the handling of written texts although, he points out, 
there are two aspects about this shift which warrant emphasis. The first is that the ability of the 
child to handle the decontextualised nature of the written word depends upon having built up an 
implicit [epilinguistici awareness of system at an earlier stage which can be accessed consciously in 
the development of literary skills. As he was to put it, the "absolute pre-requisite for this 
consciousness is epilinguistic control" which emerges at stage two. The second is that the extent 
and form of metalinguistic awareness that arises will depend not only upon the quality of 
epilinguistic control that already exists but upon the types of new linguistic functions with which the 
child is confronted. Metalinguistic awareness, in this sense, is not uniform across cultures (or 
sub-cultures) and does not necessarily develop in any given sequence since the child . 
... becomes aware in a 'meta' (i.e. conscious) sense only of those aspects of language 
which have to be apprehended in such a way if the new linguistic tasks demanded of him 
or her are to be accomplished. 
Such a view would seem to correlate with the conclusion in Section 2 (above) that the a-synchronous 
appearance of different forms of metalinguistic processing -- from the phonological to the pragmatic 
-- does not depend upon maturation but is simply a function of the types of implicit knowledge the 
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child needs to make explicit in order to master new (and socially valorized) linguistic skills, such as 
reading and writing. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1981, 1986), in particular, has sought to concretize this three-stage model in 
her research into the evolution of children's use of determiners (in French and English) from 
unifunctional homonyms into plurifunctional markers. As she notes (1986: 462-463), the French 
plural les marks both pluralization in opposition to le/la and totalization in opposition to des. Up to 
the age of 5, children use the term simply as a plural marker in response to items in the immediate 
context (deictic referencing) without, apparently, been aware of its second function. About the age of 
5, however, they appear to become implicitly aware that it can have two functions by introducing an 
additional morpheme (tous) to indicate totalization.' As she argues, awareness of a second function 
tempts them to "... create temporarily a new form to cover one of the functions, retaining the 
original form for the other". This `overmarking' reflects a shift from deictic to anaphoric 
referencing in that the child is clearly trying to distinguish between two functions by linguistic 
rather than extra-linguistic means. Overmarking may be said to represent, in this sense, an 
intermediate stage between presystemic (unifunctional) and systemic (plurifunctional) use of 
determiners although this process is still epilinguistic, i e. not open to conscious scrutiny. Only 
when the division is firmly established in practice, about the ages 6-8, do children seem to drop the 
unnecessary overmarker and use the term plurifunctionally. The ability of children at this stage to 
organize determiners into a 'system of relevant options' coincides, she argues, with a further 
movement towards anaphoric referencing which is necessary to master extended written texts. It is 
the link between the systematic use of determiners which have become entirely detached from the 
contexts of their use which, in turn, allow children to consciously reflect upon their use. 
3. 2. `decalage' of levels 
The three-stage approach of writers such as Karmiloff-Smith and Gombert is clearly useful in 
terms of updating and concretizing the Vygotskyan approach to the emergence of metalinguistic 
awareness. It demonstrates that the child's ability to consciously reflect upon and regulate language 
stems from an ongoing process of internal reorganization of linguistic data into a "system of 
relevant options". It is only when that system has been mastered implicitly -- that is, subjected to 
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what Gombert (1992) refers to as `epilinguistic control' -- that the child is capable of explicitly 
representing it to himself in response to external changes, principally the transition from context to 
text-dependency. Karmiloff-Smith sought to illustrate this process in her study of the evolution of 
determiners into a plurifunctional system, arguing that initial (epilinguistic) control is crucial for the 
emergence of the metapragmatic awareness needed later to handle intralinguistic referencing in 
extended texts. There is no reason within such a theoretical framework, however, why similar 
processes cannot be found in other manifestations of metalinguistic awareness -- such as 
metaphonological or metasyntactic -- which tend to arise earlier than metapragmatic awareness in 
the process of literacy skill development. A particularly useful example of this would appear to be to 
the relation existing between aural discrimination skills and phonological processing skills which, 
as Perfetti (1985) suggests, are widely accepted as crucial in the early stages of reading. As writers 
such as Goswami and Bryant (1990) note, in their review of the literature, there would appear to be 
a strong correlation between children who develop phonological awareness in the process of 
learning to read and those who, previously, demonstrated an implicit (epilinguistic) control over the 
sound system as revealed in their ability to handle such aural discrimination skills as the detection 
of 'onset' and 'rime'. 4' 
Karmiloff-Smith's or Gombert's three-stage approach is valuable not only in showing how 
metalinguistic awareness arises out of a process of the systematic reorganization of linguistic data 
but also in explaining why such awareness can -- and often does -- arise differentially. It is 
important to note, as Gombert (1992: 185) reminds us, that the three stages in his or 
Karmiloff-Smith's model are not three global stages in linguistic development but, rather, what he 
refers to as "...recursive cycles of processes which repeat themselves for each aspect of the linguistic 
system ...". The fact that different aspects of the system undergo a discrete process of development 
in relation to the extra-linguistic demands placed upon the child means that, as he continues, 
different sub-systems can at any time be at quite different levels of conscious representation and 
control. This would seem to correspond to the differentiation that has been widely noted to emerge 
in metalinguistic awareness in two senses. First, it would seem to explain the a-synchronous 
emergence in children of various meta-processes, such as that between metaphonological and 
metasyntactic, and, secondly, it would seem to explain the differing levels of awareness and control 
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that arise between children within each process and/or sub-process. The flexibility inbuilt into such 
models in these respects place them more within a Vygotskyan than a Piagetian paradigm in that the 
former views metalinguistic awareness emerging, not out of a process of maturation, but out of two 
inter-related factors, the type of linguistic input to which the child has been exposed and the types of 
linguistic demands placed upon him which require him to become conscious of what he implicitly 
`knows'. 
4. 0.. Metalinguistic awareness and valorization 
As indicated, the value of models such as those of Karmiloff-Smith and Gombert (1992: 188) is 
that they seek to explain the child's ability to reflect upon language as a function of socio-cultural 
factors, that is, of "... the extralinguistic context of the processing performed by the child". It is, 
they suggest, the type of discourse to which the child has been exposed which aids -- or hinders --
the transfer from epi- to metalinguistic processing and which explains the ease with which he is able 
to access text- (as opposed to situation-) dependent uses of language. While such models are 
valuable in allowing us to understand the socio-cultural origins of changes in the child's internal 
representation of language, however, they tend to concentrate on the cognitive side of the process to 
the detriment of affective factors. The value of Vygotsky's approach, however, was that it not only 
allows us to explain the child's cognitive processing skills as a function of his previous semiotic 
activity but, equally important, that it allows us to explain the child's attitude to such processing --
his valorization of it -- as a function of the same activity. As Widdowson (1991: 112) was to 
pertinently note, insofar as the need of the child to master ever more decontextualized linguistic 
functions requires a major increase in conscious processing, the child has to be convinced, at any 
given stage, that the new function is "worth the processing effort". The extension of the child's 
linguistic repertoire depends, in this sense, not only upon cognitive but affective factors, upon his 
attitude towards the function in question, which can in turn be considered a refraction of the 
socio-cultural values of the wider community of which he is a member. 
The question of the child's valorization of a new linguistic function is hardly a factor in the 
acquisition of primary language skills. As Halliday (1975: 10) suggests, early language is for the 
child "... a rich and adaptable instrument for the realization of intentions" and, since it serves him 
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as an instrument both to interact with, and 'make sense of (i.e. categorize) his environment, he is 
unconsciously motivated to internalize the socio-cultural values that it embodies. 42 It is only with 
the emergence of secondary (or parasitic) functions that the question of valorization is posed insofar 
as those functions -- which objectively serve to extend the child's repertoire -- may or may not stem 
from, or appear relevant to, the forms of semiotic mediation experienced at the primary stage. If the 
child is to access these new functions, it is necessary, not only that his earlier semiotic experience 
should prepare him for the higher levels of cognitive processing involved, but also that the 
socio-cultural values implicit in such experience should prompt him to valorize such functions and 
consider the extra effort involved in their mastery as 'worthwhile'. As Hamers and Blanc (1982: 33) 
were to put it: 
For a child to develop overall language competence, he must valorize language, i.e. 
attribute a certain positive value to language as a functional tool, that is, as an 
instrument which will facilitate the fulfilment of social and cognitive functioning. 
Hamers and Blanc were referring specifically to the acquisition of a second language in a bilingual 
context but the underlying premise is applicable to all stages of functional differentiation. In 
particular, insofar as all parasitic activities require the ability to process language consciously and 
intentionally, it is important that the new metacognitive skill should be positively regarded within 
the child's own socio-cultural community, that is, that it should be "... valorized first in his 
community and then by the child himself'. The ability to master secondary skills inevitably implies 
therefore what Hamers and Blanc (1982: 34) elsewhere refer to as an "affective dimension" which 
plays the role of "an important mediator in the process of language development" alongside the 
cognitive dimension. 
4.1. Affective and cognitive factors 
The question of the child's valorization of new linguistic functions has been discussed most 
frequently, perhaps, in terms of the transfer from the spoken to the written word which often 
involves simultaneously a transfer from a non-standard to standard dialect. This is not surprising in 
that the accessing of literacy skills involves the accessing of a function which, for the first time, no 
longer corresponds to the child's immediate communicative needs and which requires a 
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considerable increase in cognitive processing. As Vygotsky (1962: 99) put it, "In conversation, every 
sentence is prompted by a motive" whereas, in learning to read and write, the motives are "... more 
abstract, more intellectualized, further removed from immediate needs". If the child is to master this 
transfer from the multi-channeled nature of speech to the single-channeled nature of the written 
word, he will need to be, not only cognitively, but affectively prepared for it, i.e. persuaded of the 
value of this new text-dependent mode of communication in terms of the socio-cultural practice of 
the community to which he belongs. This may not always be the case since, if that community places 
greater emphasis in communicative interaction on the 'shared knowledge' of the participants than 
upon the explicit linguistic structuring of the message, this can create not only a cognitive but an 
affective barrier for the child. Gumperz (1986) and Simons and Murphy (1986: 205), in particular, 
have explored this question in relation to the apparent difficulty that some socio-cultural groups --
such as those using Black English -- appear to have in making the transition to reading. 43 The fact 
that members of such groups use "... more situation-dependent language as part of a verbal style", 
they suggest, may make it harder for them to "profit from those language activities ... which are 
designed to facilitate the transition to text-dependent language use". In other words, the 
context-bound nature of discourse, as refracted in a range of stylistic options and choices, can create 
a 'model' of language which can serve as an affective barrier to mastering new functional uses 
which are perceived to have, in contrast, low status. 
Perhaps an even more important area where affective factors play a mediating role in the 
development of new functional uses is in the transition from first to foreign language learning. As 
Hamers and Blanc (1982: 235) suggest, the attitudes of the learner can comprise "... the second most 
important set of variables for predicting achievement in L2 after aptitude (Carroll, 1962)". Such a 
view is hardly surprising. In an acquisition-poor environment, where the learner has no natural 
`intention to mean' or opportunities for communicative interaction, learning a foreign language is 
inevitably a long-term process which -- as already indicated -- demands even higher metalinguistic 
processing than does literacy skill development in the Ll. The learner's attention is focused almost 
exclusively upon the linguistic structuring of the message, both oral and written, and it is only very 
gradually that he is able to internalize the language sufficiently to use it as a functional tool in 
interaction with others. If the learner is to engage in such cognitive processing over an extended 
134 
period, however, he inevitably has to be persuaded that an activity with so little immediate 'pay-off', 
as Roberts (1991) puts it, is valorized in terms of the socio-cultural group with which he 
empathizes. 	 While differences continue to exist regarding the relative superiority of integrative 
over instrumental motivation -- particularly in a foreign as opposed to second language context -- it 
would seem, as Lambert (1967) suggests, that learners who enjoy some form of extrinsic motivation 
will be more inclined to transfer from L1 the necessary cognitive processing skills over a period of 
time and, indeed, to persevere even when these skills are underdeveloped. 45 Learners, on the other 
hand, who seem to lack any form of extrinsic motivation and who are subject, in particular, to 
ethnocentric pressures from their own community are more likely to underachieve in the target 
language even when they possess the requisite processing skills. 
If affective factors can either facilitate or hinder the transfer of cognitive processing skills from 
first to foreign language, the picture is somewhat more complex in the area of second language 
acquisition. The fact that, in the latter the child interacts communicatively with two 
cultural-linguistic groupings -- that of his L1 and his L2 -- inevitably means that, as Hamers and 
Blanc (1989: 79) suggest, the child's valorization of the two languages can differ considerably and 
this can have important consequences for " ... the internalization of each language" and for "the 
cognitive consequences of this internalization". Three broad possibilities stand out. 
• In the first, where both languages are valorized -- that is, where the child is willing to "identify 
with the cultural group speaking the other language as L I" without abandoning his own cultural 
identity -- he should have little problem mastering new cognitive functions in both languages and in 
developing what Hamers and Blanc (1989: 78) refer to as an "additive form of bilinguality". 
Affective factors in this situation help to promote the development of metalinguistic processing to 
such an extent that 'breakdowns' in one language can be compensated for by transfer from the other. 
As Lambert (1967: 108) had put it much earlier in his study of French-American adolescents, it was 
those who expressed an "... open-minded, non-ethnocentric view of people in general" who "... 
profited fully from their language-learning opportunities and became skilled in both languages". 
• In the second, where the L2 is valorized much less than the L 1 -- that is, where the child feels 
neither integratively nor instrumentally motivated to learn it -- he can experience what Lambert 
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(1967: 91) called "major conflicts of values and allegiances" than can often lead to a fear of 
assimilation and loss of identity, to a sense of alienation and isolation that is often termed 'anomie'. 
A description of the ethnocentric pressures acting on the individual to inhibit L2 acquisition can be 
found in Schumann's (1978: 34) acculturation model which is premised on the view that "the 
degree to which a learner acculturates to the TL group will control the degree to which he acquires 
the second language", particularly the functions of such a language requiring metalinguistic 
processing. Problems arising in the acculturation process do not prevent the child developing 
metalinguistic processing in the L 1 but may act to prevent him transferring such processing to the 
L2, that is, beyond the level of primary skill acquisition (`communicative competence'). 
• In the third, where the L2 is valorized more by the child (and his sub-group) than the L1, the 
relation between affective and cognitive factors is even more complex. It is unlikely that the child 
will develop the necessary metalinguistic processing through his L I to transfer to his L2 and, even 
if he manages to develop such processing through the latter, he is unlikely to transfer it to his L I 
because of the 'low status' it enjoys in his and his sub-group's eyes. This is the case, of course, as 
Hamers and Blanc (1989: 79) point out, with a child from a "socially disadvantageous subordinate 
group" who is "schooled through a prestigious L2 while the school system tends to ignore or 
denigrate his mother tongue". The result, as Cummins (1986) has persuasively argued, is that either 
the child is assimilated into the majority language and culture or, more likely, that he underachieves 
in both languages where affective factors objectively block the development and/or transfer of 
metalinguistic processing. 
The inter-relation between cognitive and affective factors in second language acquisition is complex 
and involves a greater number of variables than in the transfer from first to foreign language 
learning. While such differences should not be downplayed, however, it is important to stress that 
the shift from first to foreign/second language are similar insofar as the transfer of cognitive skills 
needed to access analytic competence is a function of the child's valorization of the two languages. 
4.2. Metalinguistic and metacultural awareness 
The development of new linguistic functions, either intra- or intermodally, cannot be explained 
away, as Gombert (1992) stresses, simply as changes in the internal representation of language. It is 
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certainly such changes which render the development of new functions possible but it is the 
valorization of such functions which determines the extent to which they are internalized and used. 
This can be expressed somewhat differently in the idea that, while the child certainly needs to 
become aware of the systematic nature of language to access a new function, he also needs to 
appreciate that that system is arbitrary and relates differently to the functions he has mastered than 
to that which he is in the process of mastering. A useful example of this is the transfer from 
non-standard to standard dialect and/or spoken to written form. There is no doubt, as already 
indicated, that reading is dependent upon the child's growing awareness of the systematic nature of 
speech from the metaphonological to the metapragmatic level. While the child needs to develop 
such an awareness of system, that is, to shift from epi- to metalinguistic processing, he has also to 
appreciate that this system is arbitrary and relates in an increasingly divergent way to the spoken 
and written word. The child has, in other words, to accept that we do not speak as we write, that the 
system he has become 'aware of applies differentially to two language functions - the spoken and 
written -- particularly in terms of the relation between syntactic structure and textual organization. 
46 This process is even more true in the transfer from first to second/foreign language learning. 
Awareness of the systematic nature of L1 may be necessary to access the L2 but, at the same time, 
such awareness has to be accompanied by an acceptance that that system is arbitrary and operates 
differentially in the two languages. A child learning a second/foreign language not only needs to 
recognize, for example, that syntactic operations govern meaning in French or German, as they do 
in English, but that the concrete application of such rules is socio-culturally based and discrete to 
each particular language. As Katcham (1986: 671-672) points out, in her review of the controversial 
findings regarding bilingual development, one area on which there would seem to be some 
consensus -- from Feldman and Shen (1971) to Tunmer and Myhill (1984: 174) -- is that those 
children who seem to benefit from it are precisely those who evince a greater ability both to "treat 
sentence structure analytically" and to appreciate the "arbitrary nature of word/referent 
relationships". 
The notion that successfully negotiating new language functions involves a conscious awareness, 
not only of the systematic, but also the arbitrary nature of language is not, of course, new. Both 
Piaget (1929) and Vygotsky (1962: 128) noted that the pre-school child was unable to appreciate 
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that the word-referent relationship was an arbitrary one -- dictated by convention -- and tended to 
see the word as an "integral part of the object it denotes ...". This tendency to see the word as an 
attribute of the object or event, in a similar way to its colour, shape or size, has since been confirmed 
in a range of studies designed to probe the child's appreciation of the word-referent relationship, 
such as that of Gleitman and Gleitman (1978) or of Smith and Tager-Flusberg (1982). While it is 
true that some bilingual children do evince an ability to dissociate the word from its referent 
somewhat earlier, as Bowey and Tunmer (1984) note in their review of the literature, most 
pre-school monolingual children find such a process difficult and, at most, seem capable of detecting 
a certain degree of lexical ambiguity. The tendency for the young child to see the word as part of the 
object or event it denotes is another way of saying, of course, that he is inclined to view the language 
of the home as 'natural' and/or 'inevitable' rather than as an arbitrary convention that can be 
altered. If the young child is to master the new functional uses of language, however, he has to 
overcome what Vygotsky (1962: 129) called this stage of " ... primitive linguistic consciousness" 
and become aware that the ways in which his own language structures meaning -- whether at the 
phonological, lexical or syntactic level -- are essentially arbitrary. Learning to move from one 
channel of communication to another (i.e. spoken to written), one dialect to another and/or from one 
language to another are stages, in this sense, in a long-term process in which the child is required to 
develop, not only metalinguistic, but metacultural awareness, the ability to understand that language 
forms vary and are appropriate to varying contexts of use. Put another way, the extension of the 
child's linguistic repertoire involves developing what Hawkins (1984) called a sense of 'linguistic 
relativity', knowledge not only of what to say but of when, where and with whom to say it. 
5. O. Summary 
The value of the socio-cognitive approach to the development of metalinguistic awareness is that it 
is the most flexible in explaining the intersubject variability in such awareness widely recognized in 
the literature. While it may offer the most useful paradigm, however, it requires considerable 
elaboration in terms of the research findings and theoretical models that have emerged in recent 
years. Perhaps the most useful way of approaching the development of the child's ability to reflect 
on language is to view it as a product of functional differentiation in which the increasingly 
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decontextualized uses of language require the child to switch attention from the extra-linguistic to 
the linguistic structuring of meaning. The child's ability to attend consciously and intentionally to 
language can, in this sense, be viewed dialectically as both a by-product of the mastery of earlier 
linguistic functions and a pre-requisite for the accessing of new ones. This is particularly true in 
terms of macro shills in code processing such as the transfer from the spoken to written word or 
from L1 to L2 which are symbiotically linked. While metalinguistic awareness can be seen as a 
function of the linguistic demands placed upon the child, however, the ability to move from an 
unconscious and automatic to conscious and voluntary approach to language has both a cognitive 
and affective dimension. In the first place, it depends upon the internal reorganization of linguistic 
data into a system which is initially implicit (i.e. procedural) before becoming explicit (i.e. 
declarative). In the second place, it depends upon the ability to recognize that the systematic nature 
of language is, itself, arbitrary and will operate differentially according to the socio-cultural shaping 
of the new linguistic function. Metalinguistic awareness is, in this sense, intertwined with 
metacultural awareness from the earliest stages of functional differentiation. 
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Notes 
1. Gombert suggests that the paucity of models seeking to explain the development of metalinguistic 
awareness is a function of two factors: the "relatively recent emergence" of the former as a field of study and 
what he calls the "variable nature of the field", that is, the fact that there exists very little consensus in 
interpreting the empirical evidence in terms of a defmition of metalinguistic awareness, let alone its origins 
and/or function. 
2. Bertelson (1987: 9) observes, for example, in his review of the literature devoted to the relationship 
between metalinguistic awareness and literacy skills, that the "... phonological awareness hypothesis has 
stimulated an extremely active line of developmental investigations" which has tended to demonstrate "... a 
robust correlation between speech analysis and reading performance". 
3. As Bruner was to put it, "... though language springs from and aids action, it quickly becomes self-
contained and free of the context of action. It is a device, moreover, that frees its possessor from the 
immediacy of the environment, not only by pre-emption of attention during language use but by its capacity 
to direct attention towards those aspects of the environment that are singled out by language". 
4. In his interesting essay contrasting Vygotsky' s and Wittgenstein's approach to language development, 
Shotter (1998) notes that the former stresses the "... bootstrap function of this kind of talk in our cultural 
development; the way in which it can shift us from an unaware, spontaneous usage of words in a practical 
context, to a deliberate, selfconscious use of them in a solely intralinguistic (or disciplinary) context". 
5. Olsen (1984: 223) was, interesting enough, to draw upon James (1907) in relating different language 
modes with different cognitive demands insofar as the spoken language is associated with "commonsense 
knowledge" and the written language with "scientific knowledge and philosophical knowledge". 
6. It may well be true, as Simons and Murphy (1986: 187) point out, that even written language requires that 
a "... context exist or be envisioned for interpretation" but, as they acknowledge, such a context is a linguistic 
rather than extra-linguistic one, that is, one where language items refer endophorically to other language items 
rather than exophorically to the real world. 
7. Donaldson's (1993: 268-269) model views the `modes', which are defined as global stages in the process 
of linguistic (and cognitive) decontextualisation, as the 'point' mode (dealing with the 'here and now' ); the 
`line' mode (dealing with the 'then and there' ); the 'construct' mode (dealing with unspecified times and 
places); and the 'transcendent' mode (dealing with abstract notions outside of space and time). It is interesting 
to note that — as in Piaget's model of cognitive decentering — it is only when the child reaches the 'construct 
mode' that "the achieving of some measure of separation between thinking and emotion becomes possible". 
8. While there are observable differences in the three approaches, as Wells (1997: 8-10) notes, they are 
similar insofar as they stress the crucial role played by written texts in altering the child's conceptualization of 
experience, i.e. in allowing him to reflect on and objectify that experience as a 'product' rather than an ongoing 
`process'. The idea is expressed most clearly, perhaps, in Halliday's (1993: 111) division between the 
`dynamic' nature of speech and the 'synoptic' nature of written texts which operates at both the onto- and 
phylogenetic levels. "A written text is itself a static object", he writes, "it is language to be processed 
synoptically. Hence it projects a synoptic perspective onto reality; it tells us to view experience like a text, so 
to speak. In this way, writing changed the analogy between language and other domains of experience; it 
foregrounded the synoptic aspect, reality as object, rather than its dynamic aspect, reality as process, as the 
spoken language does". 
9. In fact, Gombert (ibid. 161) suggests that the debate between supporters of the two traditions is somewhat 
arid in that, as Vygotsky argues, the child may in the initial stages use the indirect access procedures as a 
transitional stage in order to move, at a later one, to direct access procedures which no longer require "... the 
establishment of a correspondence between the spoken and written". 
10. Vygotsky (1962: 98-99) was to view the need to link the visual and auditory in order to access meaning as 
the basis of the decontextualised nature of the written word. As he put it, "Speech that is merely imagined and 
that requires symbolization of the sound image in written signs (i.e. a second degree of symbolization) 
naturally must be as much harder than oral speech for the child as algebra is harder than arithmetic. Our 
studies show that it is the abstract quality of written language that is the main stumbling block, not the 
underdevelopment of small muscles or any other mechanical device". 
11. As Wray (1994: 17) suggests, the debate between the 'strong' and 'weak' versions essentially involves "... 
the questioning of whether awareness precedes, and is a cause of, necessarily learning to read, or whether it is 
itself a product of this learning", i.e. emerges in the process of reading itself even if it, in turn, contributes to 
the reading process. It must be pointed out that Downing (1979: 20-21), while a `strong' advocate of the 
`cognitive clarity' approach, occasionally entertains the latter view as when he argues that "... children develop 
increasing cognitive clarity about the functions and features of language through reading itself'. 
12. While Bialystock and Ryan's model sees the analysis and control of language (via selective attention) as 
developing along different axes, the convergence between the two is seen as crucial for the emergence of 
metalinguistic processing and the earliest example of such a convergure appears in the area of reading 
comprehension. 
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13. Vernon (1957: 71) was to suggest relatively early, for example, that "... the fundamental and basic 
characteristic of reading disability appears to be cognitive confusion". It was in response to Vernon's work on 
`cognitive confusion', of course, that Downing advanced his 'cognitive clarity' hypothesis. 
14. It should be noted, however, that the assumption that that there is often a clash between children's 
home-based discourse modes and those of formal schooling — and that such a clash is responsible for problems 
in the transition to literacy — is by no means generally accepted. MacLure (1981: 227), for example, argues 
against such an assumption, on which Bernstein's code theory was partly based, by stressing that in terms of 
questioning strategies in particular "... children most certainly do not enter a culture of unfamiliar interactional 
routines when they enter school". 
15. Brown argues that speech shifts between what she refers to as listener-oriented' and 'message-oriented' 
functions which differ primarily in the degree of 'shared knowledge' they presuppose. In order to facilitate the 
transfer to written texts, she suggests (1982: 81), it is important to encourage pupils to move from the first to 
the second which "represents a very complex skill" insofar as it involves "... the ability to produce and 
understand highly structured speech, with information relatively densely packed ...". 
16. As Simons and Murphy (1986: 194-5) put it, "Instead of focusing on the content or meaning of the 
language, they [i.e. children learning to read] must focus on its form, particularly at the phonological level, in 
order to acquire decoding skills, and since most beginning reading programs focus on decoding to some degree, 
almost all children need to develop phonological awareness". 
17. Wallach and Wallach (1976: 66) were to assert, at a relatively early date, that "... the children who have 
difficulty understanding talk about sounds and about relations between sounds and letters seem to lack readily 
accessible, manipulative concepts of the kinds of sounds at issue, the sounds to which letters are related, or 
`phonemes'. While these children seem able to discriminate between words that differ in single closely-related 
phonemes ... they are unable to deal with phonemes in abstraction from their contexts (see Mattingly, 1972; 
Savin, 1972; Gleitman and Rozin, 1973; Venezky in press)". 
18. Reid et al (1987), researching into literate Chinese adults' awareness of phonemes, found that it was at 
the same low level as that of illiterate Portuguese adults in an alphabetic culture, as recorded in the earlier 
research by Morals, Cary, Alegria and Bertelson (1979). It was to prompt them to endorse Morais et al's 
(1979: 34) conclusion that "Awareness of speech as a sequence of phones is thus not attained spontaneously in 
the course of general cognitive growth, but demands some specific training, which for most persons is probably 
provided by learning to read in the alphabetic system". 
19. Ehri's (1979: 83) work was directed against the Piagetian hypothesis underpinning the work of Bereiter 
and Engelmann (1966) and Ryan (1979) that superior levels of metalexical and metaphonological awareness 
are a pre-requisite for learning to read rather than by-products of that process which enter into a symbiotic 
relation with it. As she was to argue, in relation to metalexical awareness, it is more likely that "... as a 
consequence of interacting with print, the beginner suddenly awakens to the fact that meaningful sentences are 
comprised of word units. Achieving word consciousness may be like turning on the light in his lexicon, 
rendering his implicit knowledge of words suddenly explicit and available for use". 
20. As Meadows (1993: 12) puts it, "Experience of playing with contrasting sounds, as in nursery rhymes and 
as in many of the 'poems' and monologues young children often create for themselves (Dudley and Bradley 
1985, Bryant et al 1989, 1990, Chukovsky 1976, Dowker 1989, Kirtley et al 1989 ... ), looks like a very 
possible facilitator of phonemic awareness and learning to read". 
21. Goswami and Bryant (1990: 18) , for example, are strongly of the opinion that it is children's syllabic 
awareness which facilitates reading and it is only in the course of reading itself, as Ehri (op. cit. ) suggests, that 
phonological awareness arises. Others, such as Downing (1979) tend to argue that the child's earlier awareness 
of syllables facilitates phonemic awareness which is itself a crucial pre-requisite for reading. The latter 
position is particularly associated with writers within the Soviet tradition, such as Egorev (1988/1953) or 
Elkonin (1988/1976: 416), who stress that the child has to be trained in " ... phonemic analysis, as opposed to 
phonemic perception", prior to reading itself. 
22. Perera (1986:: 517) summarizes the syntactic differences that emerge between speech and writing 
between the ages of 6 and 10 as threefold: first, a decrease in the number of 'mazes' (i.e. ungrammatical 
strings etc.), colloquial constructions and recapitulatory pronouns; second, a decrease in the number of 
co-ordinated main clauses and a corresponding increase in subordinate clauses; and third, an increase in some 
constructions that do not appear at all in spontaneous speech, such as relative clauses and/or non-finite nominal 
clauses used as subject. 
23. Chafe (1982, 1985) suggested that the difference between speech and writing lay along two axes: that of 
integration (i.e. the degree of syntactic complexity) and interaction (i.e. the extent to which the speaker/writer 
is detached from his linguistic production). 
24. As Dodson (1978: 48) was otherwise to express it, "The learner fmds it difficult to reach communicative 
competence ... if he is not allowed to pass through two levels of communication. The first level, which can be 
called 'medium-oriented communication', is the stage where for any activity the child's mind is focused mainly 
on the language itself. At the second level, which can be called 'message-oriented communication', the 
language tends to become a tool and gradually of secondary importance to the learner, whose main aim at that 
juncture is to communicate a message which is not about language". 
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25. Vera John-Steiner (1985: 350), although supporting Vygotsky's general approach to bilingual development, 
makes unwarranted concessions in this direction when suggesting that his emphasis upon the conscious aspect 
of L2 learning may be "exaggerated" on account of his treatment of it "exclusively in a school context". 
26. "Although Vygotsky was primarily concerned with foreign language learning in a school setting", they 
write, "his remarks would seem to apply to second language learning in non-school settings as well. Thus, 
becoming bilingual by whatever means can be viewed as a way of developing the child's metalinguistic 
awareness with consequent beneficial effects on the child's performance in both languages". 
27. As Cummins (1984: 108) was to otherwise put it, in relation to the underachievement of bilingual pupils, 
"In summary, the research findings clearly refute the assumption that bilingualism per se is a cause of minority 
students' academic difficulties. Rather, it is the failure to develop students' L 1 for conceptual and analytic 
thought that contributes to 'cognitive confusion'. When minority students' LI proficiency is strongly promoted 
by the school programme, the resulting additive bilingualism appears to entail some subtle linguistic and 
possibly cognitive benefits". 
28. While Bowey (1988: 74) is herself skeptical about any causal relation between metalinguistic awareness 
and second language acquisition/learning, she is prepared to admit that the conceptual similarity between 
aptitude tests and those used to measure metalinguistic awareness implies that "... metalinguistic ability is 
probably a useful predictor of at least formal aspects of second language attainment". 
29. It may be that the more the child is able to process input in the II simultaneously at various levels — i.e. 
from the metaphonological to metasyntactic or metapragmatic — the more he is able to overcome problems of 
short-term memory associated with the ephemeral nature of speech. 
30. Skehan (1998) is particularly useful in seeking to review the various theoretical approaches to the notion 
of 'aptitude' and correlate them with research fmdings. He, himself, partly follows Carroll (1965) in identifying 
the crucial components of aptitude as auditory ability, linguistic ability and memory ability which are viewed 
as a continuum of processing strategies predictive of future L2 performance. What is interesting about his 
approach, however, is the assumption of an information-processing paradigm which sees such processing skills 
as relevant not only for acquisition-poor environments but also acquisition-rich ones. As he had already argued 
(1985: 17) "... the analysis of aptitude presented here is general enough to be relevant not simply to formal 
learning situations, but also to more communicatively oriented classrooms as well as 'acquisition' settings". 
31. The response to an alternative question, for example, might well be a simple adverbial phrase (a la 
gare/au stade) whereas the response to a target question might well involve a verb plus adverbial phrase 
(il/elle va a la gare/au stade). The systematic variation of answer to question forms involves, in this sense, the 
metapragmatic ability to treat language in relation to the linguistic (rather than extra-linguistic) context of use 
from the beginning. 
32. Intralinguistic referencing in pronominal use can be difficult in English in an extended text, as illustrated 
in the work of Hickmann (1981, 1986). It can be even more difficult in oral/written discourse in L2 where 
pronominal use is complicated by culture-specific variations, e.g. the existence of two (French, Spanish) and 
three (German) genders. To make sense of two sentences in French such as II lui a donne la robe. Elle etait 
..., the child has to realise that elle can potentially refer linguistically as much to the preceding pronoun (lui) as 
to the noun (la robe). 
33. As Hawkins (1981: 44) argues, in relation to L2 study, "Only through a progressive apprenticeship in 
comparison can judgments be learnt and learning how to make fair judgments is the beginning of wisdom". 
34. Titone's (1998: 9) view is based on the somewhat dubious assumption, of course, that bilingualism is 
inherently more capable of developing metalinguistic awareness than monolingualism, that is, that it "... has 
the highest chance of providing food for thought, in that it can stimulate, spontaneously or systematically, 
analytic reflection over the structures and functions of the two languages and their cultures". 
35. Vygotsky (1962: 88) was to notice this indebtedness when writing, "Piaget uses Clarapede's law to explain 
the development of thinking that takes place between the seventh and twelfth year. During that period the 
child's mental operations repeatedly come in conflict with adult thinking. He suffers failures and defeats 
because of the deficiencies of his logic, and these painful experiences create the need to become aware of his 
concepts". 
36. "To us it seems obvious", he was to write (1962: 92), "that a concept can become subject to consciousness 
and deliberate control only when it is part of a system. If consciousness means generalization, generalization in 
turn means the formation of a superordinate concept that includes the given concept as a particular case. A 
superordinate concept implies the existence of a series of subordinate concepts of different levels of 
generality". 
37. In actual fact, ICarmiloff-Smith initially posed four levels in the process of cognitive representation of 
linguistic data (1979, 1981) although, in her more recent three-stage recursive model, she has tended to 
combine the two uppermost levels — 'secondary explicit knowledge' and 'tertiary explicit knowledge' — into 
one stage of metalinguistic awareness. Gombert's contribution is a variation of the latter's three-stage model. 
38. It is only gradually, Halliday argues, that such early unifunctional utterances are gradually subsumed into 
a more abstract, if simpler, system which is capable of multifunctional use. What we know as 'grammar', 
Halliday (1975: 40) concludes, is little more than this system which acts to hook together " ... the selection in 
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meanings which are derived from the various functions of language, and realizing them into a unified structural 
form" 
39. If anything, Gombert (1992: 188-189) is somewhat critical of Karmiloff-Smith in that she fails to stress 
sufficiently the importance of the 'extraling-uistic context' in terms of providing the impetus for changes in 
linguistic representation. As he puts it, the key task of the child during this stage may be to link discrete 
linguistic forms into an implicit system but "... this is determined by, and affects, the real and thus 
contextualised uses of these forms". Interestingly enough, Stevenson (1988: 100) is similarly critical of the 
lack of priority given to the social aspect of such development in Karmiloff-Smith. 
40. Kanniloff-Smith (1979: 224-225) was to note a similar process in the treatment of the French use of the 
determiner un/une which can mean both 'a' and 'one'. Initially, children tend to use each function discretely in 
relation to a given context but, at a certain stage, they seem to recognize implicitly that it can have two 
meanings and seek to distinguish them by overmarking, i.e. une voiture signifying 'a car' and une de voiture 
signifying 'one car'. Only later do they drop the overmarking and use the determiner pluriEurctiomlly. 
41. Discussing children's ability to divide a word into its onset and rime, and to categorize words which have 
the same onset or the same rime, Goswami and Bryant (1990: 147) note that "The effect of this skill on their 
progress is considerable both in a quantitative and in a qualitative sense. Children who are sensitive to rhyme 
eventually do much better at reading ... and children who are taught about rhyme are more successful at 
reading than those who are not given this training". 
42. As Wells (1981) was similarly to argue, in his critique of Bernstein's theory of codes, "... the way in 
which each individual child constructs his model of the world, and discovers his place and power of control 
within it, is most strongly influenced by the values and orientations that are encoded and transmitted in 
everyday conversations with his parents ...". 
43. It should be noted that Simons and Murphy, like Michaels (1986: 116), do not necessarily see the 
discourse style of those using Black English as the barrier to literacy skill development but rather as preventing 
them from profiting from the types of classroom-based teacher strategies which are most likely to help them 
make such a transition. 
44. As Roberts (1991: 22) was to put it, "The fact that traditionally so many British pupils abandon foreign 
language learning at the earliest opportunity is not so much ... the result of an insufficiently 'communicative' 
methodology as a lack of that awareness necessary to sustain motivation in an activity with so little immediate 
`payoff '". 
45. In his earlier studies. Lambert (1967: 103) argued that English-speaking "... students with an integrative 
orientation were more successful in learning French than those with an instrumental motivation", although 
Gardner (1985: 54) was to later challenge this assertion. 
46. As already indicated, changes in function prepare the way for — and are consolidated in — changes in 
structure. In the early stages, knowledge of the syntax of speech aids the processing of written texts but, as the 
latter diverge increasingly in function from the spoken word, so the syntactic knowledge necessary to process 
them changes in terms of its complexity and hierarchical organization, as Perera (op. cit.) notes. 
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Chapter Four 
1. 0. Problems of differentiation 
As suggested earlier, a major advantage of the socio-cultural approach is its ability to address not 
only the a-synchronous emergence of metalinguistic awareness in children -- as in the sequencing 
between, say, metaphonological and metapragmatic awareness -- but also its variable distribution 
among children. The latter point is of particular interest in that, while all children appear able to 
develop a comparable degree of linguistic competence in the primary skills of speaking/hearing, that 
is by no means so in the case of secondary (or 'parasitic') skills which involve the ability to 
consciously monitor linguistic input/output. As Mattingly (1972: 140) was to suggest, "synthesis of 
an utterance is one thing" but " ... the awareness of the process of synthesis quite another". 1 The 
most obvious area where such differentiation can be detected is in the intermodal transfer from 
spoken to written word which appears to require, as Mattingly (ibid. 144) continues, a "minimal 
level" of metalinguistic processing, particularly phonological processing, but where " ... not everyone 
is sufficiently aware of units in the phonological representation or can acquire this awareness by 
being taught". 2 Mattingly was, alongside Savin (1972), Wallach and Wallach (1976) or Venezky 
(1978), among the first to attribute problems in learning to read and write, not to such factors as 
insufficient motivation, inability to visually detect letters or to negotiate the transfer from non-
standard to standard dialect, but to the absence of this "minimal level" of awareness. 3 As Venezky 
(ibid. 10-11) was to put it, " ... the child's ability to treat language analytically ... has been identified 
as a crucial reading variable in a number of different cultures". While it would be incorrect to 
separate cognitive from affective factors, it would seem reasonable to suggest, as does Venezky or 
Gleitman and Rozin (1977: 3), that learning to read requires a "rather explicit and conscious 
discovery" about the structure of one's own language and, in particular, its sound structure. 
The link between underachievement in reading and lack of metalinguistic skills — or, rather, of 
epilinguistic skills that become metalinguistic in the act of reading itself — has long-term implications 
for the child's ability to negotiate the ever more complex linguistic demands of formal schooling. 
Mattingly (op.cit. 140), interestingly enough, was to touch upon this issue when drawing attention to 
the essentially active nature of metalinguistic awareness, that is, to the fact that "the speaker-hearer 
can use [it] to control, quite consciously, his linguistic activity". For Mattingly, lack of such 
awareness can not only impede the child's ability to access new linguistic functions, such as 
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second/foreign language learning, which involve the conscious monitoring of linguistic 
comprehension and production. Equally important, it can also hinder the child's ability to access and 
monitor the content of such production, that is, to be able to cognitively decentre', in the Piagetian 
sense, and to objectively evaluate his own thought processes. As he was to put it, in a way that 
anticipates Donaldson (1978) or Wood (1988), " ... without this active aspect of linguistic awareness, 
much of what we call thinking would be impossible" insofar as it is the ability to attend to the 
linguistic formulation of a message which allows us to sequence it intelligibly and express it 
unambiguously.4 The inability to attend consciously to the products of one's own mental activity is 
most clearly evidenced, of course, in problems associated with developing competence in writing 
where composing, monitoring and editing texts involves the simultaneous processing of linguistic 
form and semantic content, as indicated by Fayol (1985, 1986) or Baker (1985). To the extent that 
lack of metalinguistic skills can impede the child's ability to deal with the cognitive and linguistic 
demands of formal schooling, it is hardly surprising that writers such as Halliday (1975: 18) were to 
see educational failure as essentially 'language failure'. 5 
1.1. Semiotic experience and 'verbal style' 
The fact that metalinguistic awareness is so unevenly distributed among pre-school children is 
clearly a function of the quality of their prior semiotic experience, of whether or not the discourse 
modes (`verbal styles') to which they have been exposed aid or hinder their transition to the more 
reflexive discourse modes of formal schooling. Such a view is central to writers such as Donaldson 
(1978) or Wood (1988) who root the child's transfer from situation- to text-dependent language use in 
the extent to which child-parent interaction has encouraged him to reflect on language through a 
variety of metapragmatic activities. As the latter (in particular) argues, activities which involve using 
language to talk about language as in word play and language games can have " ... an important role 
6 in laying the foundations of literacy". A similar if somewhat more schematic attempt to identify the 
parental styles most conducive to the fostering of metalinguistic skills can be found in a range of other 
writers. Service (1984: 136), for example, suggests that parents can be divided into those who employ 
either `symbolic' or 'functional' styles, the former helping their children to represent language to 
themselves by making their "communicative intention very explicit" and the latter doing " ... little to 
allow [the] child the opportunity to decipher [his or her] intent". A similar distinction can be found 
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in Kagan et al's (1963) earlier division between parents who encourage 'reflective' as opposed to 
`impulsive' child language interaction, Witkin's (1967), between those who encourage 'field 
independent' rather than 'field dependent' discourse, and Nelson's (1973), between those who 
encourage 'referential' as opposed to 'expressive' language use. Such dichotomies, while clearly part 
of a continuum, are at least helpful in seeking to identify the type of semiotic experience that 
encourages the child to separate the ideational from the interpersonal function of language -- thereby 
creating the basis for linguistic self-representation -- and that which discourages such a process. As 
Service (1984: 139) was to argue, style 1 children can be seen as 
... good at analyzing the relation between the signs they use and the referents they relate 
to ... [and]style 2 children as incorporating communicative strategies in their entirety as 
`rules of thumb' without analyzing them as to their components nor how they work. 
Bates (1979), interestingly enough, has developed a useful taxonomy of the differences between 
parental styles and the emergence of embryonic epi- (or meta-) linguistic activity (cf. Appendix 3). 
While the attempt to distinguish between children's early semiotic experience based on caretakers' 
verbal style may be useful, however, it suffers from two limitations. In the first place, as Skehan 
(1998) or Wells (1986a: 118) have argued, such distinctions can be over-simplistic and imply a 
"reductionist strategy" which is simply not justified by "...the evidence actually available", 
particularly that accumulated during the Bristol Language Project.' In the second place, and 
somewhat more importantly, attempts to link the development of children's ability to reflect on 
language with parents' verbal style has limited 'explanatory power', i.e. does not identify those 
variables which incline parents towards one style rather than another. In other words, while the 
distinction between 'referential' and 'expressive' oriented children, as in the case of Nelson, may be 
a potentially useful one, it can appear somewhat random insofar as it is not rooted in, or enlightened 
by, a wider sociolinguistic framework. Other writers, such as Gumperz (1986), Michaels (1986) and 
Simons and Murphy (1986), have partly sought to overcome this limitation by arguing that parents' 
verbal styles represent a refraction of wider 'community' styles. Michaels, for example, suggests 
that the 'topic-associating' (as opposed to 'topic-associated') style of children speaking Black 
English represents not a random product of parent-child interaction but a systematic feature of a 
social group and its collective interaction as a group. If, she points out, such children find it difficult 
making the transition from the topic-associating form of oral discourse to the topic-associated form 
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of written discourse, it is not due to the 'random' verbal style of a given family but to that of the 
community to which the family belongs and which embodies a particular way of 'making meaning'. 
Educational success or failure, in the latter case, is no longer seen as simply a function of the 
`parental lottery', as Hawkins (1981: 215) was to define it, but, rather, of the relationship between the 
culture of the school and that of the social group -- or sub-group -- to which the child belongs and 
whose values he internalizes as part of the 'verbal style' of parent-child interaction. 8 
Perhaps the most influential and, indeed, complex exploration of the social variables which shape 
a child's early semiotic experience -- and which have a profound bearing on his ability to handle the 
linguistic demands of formal schooling -- is Bernstein's (1971, 1973) class-based notion of linguistic 
`codes'. Partly because his work has extended over such a long period of time and partly because, as 
Edwards (1989: 33) claims, his "theoretical stance has not always been completely clear", 
Bernstein's notion of codes has been the object of an ongoing and often acrimonious controversy. It 
has been claimed that the definition of 'class' on which the notion of 'code' is based is overly 
schematic (Wells, 1986a, 1986b); that the latter is not clearly distinguished from more traditional 
linguistic notions of 'dialect' and/or 'register' (Labov, 1972); and — most controversial of all — that 
the term 'code' confuses cognitive differences between children of varying socio-cultural 
backgrounds with cognitive deficit (Edwards 1976, Edwards 1989). There is no doubt that part of 
this criticism is justified insofar as it is rooted in the ambiguities and shifts in Bernstein's theoretical 
argument. 9 While partly justified, however, such criticism does not invalidate the central thrust of 
that argument, i.e. that the uneven distribution of metalinguistic skills is a function of the different 
`orders of meaning' that children from differing social classes are predisposed to generate. It is 
because Bernstein's theory seeks to provide a social class basis for the relationship between the 
variable distribution of metalinguistic skills and educational performance that it requires analysis in 
some detail. Such a re-analysis might usefully be approached in the light of more recent research into 
metapragmatic processing, undertaken by writers such as Hickmann and Karmiloff-Smith (op. cit.), 
which has tended to complement many of his assertions regarding the nature of 'codes'. 
2. 0. Class, codes and socialization 
As a sociologist, Bernstein was concerned with exploring the ways in which social structure 
shapes our behaviour primarily through semiotic mediation or, as Robinson (1984: 192) was to put it, 
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with specifying the "sociological conditions conducive to the development of different 
communication systems". He himself, in an interesting early essay, was to define the parameters of 
his approach in a polemic with the 'linguistic relativity' hypothesis of Sapir and Whorf. Whereas, he 
argued (1971: 122), the latter were interested in the way in which language acts to define and 
constrain "habitual and characteristic behaviour in the speakers", he was more interested in the 
reverse process, that is, in the ways in which social structure acts to define and constrain the 
functional uses to which we put speech. 10 As Bernstein (1971: 123) goes on to suggest, it is 
changes in the social structure which are the "major factors in shaping or changing a given culture 
through their effect on the consequences of fashions of speaking". Within such a perspective, 
language assumes a crucial mediating role between social structure and social behaviour. If the 
functional uses to which we put our communication systems are determined by social structure, those 
systems act, in turn, to shape our behaviour and ensure it is replicated across generations or, as 
Edwards (1989: 90) confirms, speech acts to " ... elicit, generalize and reinforce" the social 
relationships necessary for its continuation. Bernstein (1971: 122) himself was frequently to stress 
the important mediating role of speech that is both determined by the socialization process and, in 
turn, acts to reinforce and strengthen that process. It will be argued, he was to write, that 
... a number of fashions of speaking, frames of consistency, are possible in any given language 
and that these fashions of speaking, linguistic forms, or codes, are themselves a function of the 
form social relations take. According to this view, the form of the social relation or, more 
generally, the social structure generates distinct linguistic forms or codes and these codes 
essentially transmit the culture and so constrain behaviour. 
This view of speech as one whose functions are dependent on the social relationships of a given 
group and which acts, through the communicative interaction of that group, to reproduce these 
relationships implies, of course, that a variety of such speech 'fashions' or 'codes' are possible. 
Indeed, insofar as a given speech code will 'symbolize' the social relationships from which it stems, 
it will act to regulate the types of social interaction possible for members of that group and create for 
them what Bernstein (1976: 141) himself referred to as "different orders of relevance and relation" 
from members of another group. '1 
2. 1. 'modes of communication' and class 
For Bernstein, the social structure which impacts most profoundly upon communication systems 
(or speech codes) is that of class. The class system, he argued (1979/1971: 315), has " ... deeply 
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marked the distribution of knowledge in society" and it is "... naïve to believe that differences in 
knowledge ... would not affect the forms of control and innovation in the socializing procedures of 
different class societies". The focus upon class as the most important aspect of social structure 
shaping semiotic mediation was not, of course, original. Research underway in the USA had already 
drawn a correlation between social background, linguistic behaviour and orders of meaning. Fries 
(1940), for example, had purported to find, in his study of written texts, differences in the 
explicitness of meaning between lower working class (unskilled and semi-skilled) and professional 
workers. As Robinson (1984: 186-7) notes, on the basis of a taxonomy of lexical and grammatical 
differences, Fries sought to argue that there was an inclination in the texts of the lower working class 
towards "... leaving information less precise than it might be", whereas the professionals' use of 
linguistic features, such as prepositional and pronominal groups in particular, indicated a " ... greater 
concern to make meanings unambiguous and organized". The fact that the texts of the lower 
working class group presupposed a greater degree of 'shared knowledge' than the latter does not, it 
should be stressed, have any implications for underlying competence. It is interesting to note, as 
Edwards (1976: 87) points out, that Fries does not claim that there were any differences in the 
linguistic resources at the disposal of two groups, i.e. in knowledge of the tacit rule system, but 
merely in the use of these resources in that the language of the lower working class group appeared 
"poverty-stricken" in comparison. 12 
Similar results were to be found in the more elaborated research of Schatzman and Strauss (1955) 
which, as Bernstein admits, had a profound influence on his own concept of 'public' and 'formal' 
codes. Schatzman and Strauss' research involved the analysis of oral narratives provided by lower 
working class and professional adults based upon such categories as sense of perspective, 
correspondence of imagery in speaker and listener, classification used and framework and style of 
ordering in the description. The results, Robinson (1984: 187-188) suggests, once again revealed a 
difference, not so much in the linguistic items used by both groups, as in the extent to which the 
selection of some items rather than others appeared to correlate with the context-embeddedness of 
the narrative overall. Lower working class speakers, they suggested, were more likely to be reported 
as " ... retelling events from their own perspective only" which often "did not accommodate to the 
fact that the listener had not been present". Partly as a result of such a perspective, pronominal forms 
(`we', 'they') and persons' names were often used deictically rather than anaphorically, that is, 
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without any "explicit reference or formal identification". In general, the information provided was 
" ... concrete, referring to particular individuals rather than to roles, groups or organizations" and 
irrelevant or unconnected digressions were frequent. In contrast, the narratives of the professionals 
were reported as shifting the perspective from the narrator to that of the listener, as supplying the 
latter with "a context to set the stage for events to be related" and as anticipating "possible disbelief 
and misunderstanding". Moreover, the narratives as a whole were " ... tightly organized with 
considerable cohesion, digressions occurring but only as sub-plots to be followed by a return to the 
main theme". In summing up the principal differences between the two groups, Schatzman and 
Strauss (1955: 337) suggest that the narrative of the lower working class tends to be characteristic of 
someone who normally deals with "listeners with whom he shares a great deal of experience and 
symbolism" and where the "motives are implicit and terminal requiring neither elaboration nor 
explanation". '3 
On the basis of their research, Schatzman and Strauss tentatively drew the conclusion that there 
exist different "modes of communication" which arise out of the significantly different experiences 
of social interaction defined in class terms. It was this essential distinction that Bernstein was to 
inherit and which he was later to elaborate and refine by replacing the notion of "modes of 
communication" with that of 'codes'. As Adlam (1979: 277) suggests, Bernstein's premise is 
identical to that of Schactmann and Strauss in arguing that it is social class — defined in terms of its 
relation to the productive forces — which is crucial in determining the 'orders of meaning' that are 
developed in communicative interaction. More specifically, social background acts upon the 
symbolic systems used to determine the extent to which meaning is implicit in the shared knowledge 
that a speaker-hearer brings to such interaction or explicit in the verbal formulation of the message 
and these differences, in turn, determine the " ... semantic and linguistic choices which a speaker-
hearer makes in a range of situations". These two orders of meaning were initially encapsulated in 
the distinction Bernstein drew between 'public' and 'formal', and later reformulated in that between 
`restrictive' and 'elaborated' codes. 14 While there are nuanced differences between the two, as 
Edwards (1989) observes, it is important to note that they are identical in seeing the essential 
difference between the two orders of meaning — which he labeled as 'particularistic' and 
`universalistic' — in terms of context-dependency, that is, the extent to which speech is dependent 
upon a background of shared experience and shared definitions of that experience. As Bernstein 
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(1972: 163-4) was to put it, universalistic meanings are those "... in which principles and operations 
are made linguistically explicit" whereas particularistic meanings are those "... in which principles 
and operations are relatively linguistically implicit. If, he continued, 
... orders of meaning are universalistic, then the meanings are less tied to a given context. The 
metalanguage of public forms of thought as these apply to objects and persons realize meanings 
of a universalistic type. Where meanings have this characteristic, then individuals have access 
to the grounds of their experience and can change these grounds. Where orders of meaning are 
particularistic, where principles are linguistically implicit, then such meanings are less context-
independent and more context-bound. 
The notion underpinning Bernstein's view of codes that the more shared knowledge assumed, the 
more particularistic the meaning is, of course, by no means new. As he was to stress (1972: 165), 
such a premise had indeed been central to the writings of Vygotsky and Luria which argued, from 
differing points of view, that the greater the intersubjectivity between speaker and hearer, i.e. the 
greater the range of shared interests and assumptions, the less need there was to " ... render explicit 
through syntactic choices the logical structure of the communication". The originality of Bernstein 
was to link differences in the degree of metalinguistic processing involved in the formulation of 
meaning with social structure. 
While social class is seen as setting the broader framework in which communication systems 
emerge, however, it is the family which plays the crucial mediating role in regulating the linguistic 
options that children take up. Indeed, as he was to suggest (1971: 171-2), even if it is accepted that 
there is a link between social structure, systems of communication and the shaping of experience, it 
is important to examine how these elements are linked together in practice. It is the family that, in 
his opinion, assumes this important 'focusing and filtering' role as a microcosm of the macroscopic 
structure of society determining the distribution of different orders of meaning. As Adlam (1979: 
275) argues, the child's orientation to language is acquired initially within the family and is 
determined by the relations existing therein. "The communication patterns to which the child is 
exposed", she observes, "both reflect the social in the family and give a social base to his 
construction of the world". Insofar as the internal structure of the family is seen to mirror the wider 
social structure, Bernstein (1970: 79) posits the existence of two types of family, the 'positional' and 
`personal', and seeks to explore the socializing context that each provides along four axes: the 
regulative, instructional, interpersonal and imaginative. In position-oriented families, he suggests, 
speech " ... typically makes implicit or explicit reference to status requirements and the child acquires 
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a relatively communal and undifferentiated role" whereas, in person-oriented families, the individual 
motives and intentions of family members " ... are typically made more explicit and the child 
acquires a more differentiated identity". 15 In other words, the decontextualisation of mediational 
means', which Wertsch (op. cit.) sees as underpinning the process of functional differentiation 
examined in Chapter 3, is less encouraged in children in position-oriented than in person-oriented 
families in pre-school years. 
In arguing that there is a link between class and code, mediated through family type, it is important 
to be clear as to what Bernstein was, in fact, claiming. He was not claiming that there is an 
automatic relation between children in 'positional' (i.e. lower working class) families and a restricted 
code and children in 'personal' (i.e. middle class) families and an elaborated code. On the contrary, 
as Edwards (1976: 90) notes, the codes differ only in the extent to which, verbally, they help or 
hinder explicit statements of individualistic meaning and, linguistically, in the relative predictability 
of their vocabulary and syntax. A restricted code, in this sense, can be assumed to operate "wherever 
speech is refracted through a common cultural identity which reduces the need to be explicit" and, 
from a theoretical point of view, can be the preferred mode of expression of children from any class 
background. 16 If, in his model, the restricted code is particularly associated with children from lower 
working class backgrounds, it is only because the lifestyle of that sub-class is such that it is seen to 
limit its members to a certain (i.e. implicit) order of meaning. As Bernstein (1970: 28) was to put it, 
the accumulated features of that lifestyle — strong communal bonds, little variation in work relations 
and little exercise in decision-making, physical manipulation rather than symbolic organization and 
control etc — tend to generate a "particular form of communication" which shapes the intellectual and 
affective orientation of the children. This form of communication, while differing from child to 
child, will in general tend to emphasize "the communal rather than the individual, the concrete rather 
than the abstract ... the here and now rather than the exploration of motives and intentions, and 
positional rather than personalized forms of social control". 
2. 1. 1. Differentiation in code elaboration and use 
While Bernstein's link between class and functional differentiation in language use has a long 
pedigree, however, it is one of the aspects of his model which has been subjected to particular 
criticism even by those who otherwise detect some validity in his division of family types into 
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`positional' and 'personal' as a basis for explaining the transmission of knowledge and cultural 
values. Wells (1986a: 130-131), for example, argues in particular that the parameters used by 
Bernstein in his definition of class are both schematic and outdated and that empirical evidence, such 
as that emerging from the Bristol Language Project, may indicate a correlation between 
communication system and family but not social class background. As Wells (1986b: 143) was to 
conclude, 
On the basis of the evidence that we collected ... there is no justification for continuing to 
hold the stereotyped belief that there are strongly class-associated differences in the way in 
which parents talk with children. 
The attempt to divorce the notion of 'codes' from social structure fails to appreciate, however, the 
complex and relatively sophisticated notion of class that underpins Bernstein's model and which 
gives it its internal coherence. As Robinson (1984: 184) himself admits, Bernstein's notion of 'class' 
is not based on superficially measurable — and therefore changeable — indices of income or prestige 
but, rather, on the Marxist notion of the relation between a given social grouping and the productive 
forces which defines its 'power relationships' vis-à-vis other social groupings. 17  Insofar as Bernstein 
employs a Marxist framework, however, he is not unaware that the 'working class', as a class, is not 
homogeneous but composed of numerous strata whose relation to the productive forces inevitably 
varies as a result of the differential impact on them of changes in those productive forces. 18 Indeed, 
it was because Bernstein was aware of the heterogeneity of class composition that he sought, as 
Robinson (1986: 184) concedes, to focus attention on "... contrasting lower working class (semi-
skilled and unskilled) with the middle class", that is, a subgroup of the working class, because the 
former offered a degree of homogeneity which brought out the relation of social structure and codes 
most clearly. If Bernstein was concerned with contrasting the sub-group of one class with that of 
another, however, there was nothing in his model which prevented it from "generating any number of 
speech codes" corresponding to nuanced differences between what he called (1971: 62) these "two 
extreme social groups". 19 Indeed, if they are seen to differ simply in terms of the context-dependent 
way meaning is expressed, it is possible to envisage a continuum of such codes in which linguistic 
and semantic choices mirror infra-class, as well as inter-class, differences. Wells' (1986a: 130-131) 
view that Bernstein's two-code model replicates the `reductionist' tendency implicit in writers such 
as Nelson or Kagan is, in this sense, inaccurate in that such a model does not preclude considerable 
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differentiation in code elaboration and use as, indeed, writers from Hymes (1972: 468) to Hasan 
(1973: 285) have pointed out. 20 
If criticism of Bernstein's notion of class is often ill conceived, so too is the attempt to correlate 
the context-dependency of speech with the family as opposed to wider social structures. Both 
Robinson (1984) and Wells (1986a), for example, argue that the ability of the child to make the 
transfer from spoken to written word is a function of the values and orientations that are encoded and 
transmitted in the everyday conversations he has with his parents. Basing himself on the findings of 
the Bristol Language Study (Ellis and Wells, 1980), Wells in particular (1986a: 136-7) was to 
suggest that there are three variables (amongst others) in parental style which play an important role 
in facilitating this process: ensuring that the child's meaning intentions have been understood, 
responding in a way which encourages the child to extend his contribution to the construction of 
shared meanings and, finally, explicitly guiding the child to reflect upon and monitor his 
performance. 21 The latter point is seen as particularly important in that it involves the child in 
developing what Wells (1981) somewhat earlier was to refer to as 
... an awareness of the way in which language allows particular situations, problems and 
predicaments to be represented in symbolic categories and relations which can be com-
municated about and acted on independently of their particular context of origin ... 
The focus in Wells upon certain aspects of parents' verbal style is not dissimilar, in many respects, to 
that of Bernstein upon the characteristics attributed to 'person-oriented' families. Indeed, as Light 
(1993: 79-80) had already pointed out, Bernstein's distinction between 'positional' and 'person' 
oriented families was to have an important influence upon writers as diverse as Cook-Gumperz 
(1973) and Wells (1986a) in their analysis of parental techniques for social control and discipline in 
speech acquisition. 22 While often acknowledging their debt to Bernstein, however, the latter models 
represent in many ways a step backward rather than forward in their attempt to divorce the family 
structure — which is seen to shape the child's semiotic experience — from wider social structures. For 
Bernstein, as Edwards (1989: 107) notes, the family acts as a " ... microcosm of the macroscopic 
orderings of society" in that the language the child learns in the home embodies those functions 
which are necessary for dealing with the wider social environment. "The 'genes of social class' are", 
in this way, Edwards continues, "carried through modes of communication that social class itself 
promotes...". By seeking to sever the link between parental style and the wider social structures 
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which both justify and shape it, Wells and other writers necessarily run the risk of portraying the 
emerging differences in metalinguistic awareness between children as relatively arbitrary or random 
rather than causally determined. To the extent that this is so, their models have less explanatory 
power. 23  
2. 2. Code and 'planning procedures' 
For Bernstein, if social structure regulates the 'orders of meaning' a given code is capable of, the 
central task remains to trace the relation between these orders of meaning and the lexical and 
syntactic choices that 'realize' them. In other words, differences along the implicit-explicit 
continuum in the making of meaning should both determine and constrain the range of grammatical 
options from which a child makes a selection in any given context. Bernstein's initial attempt to 
draw up a taxonomy of the linguistic features that distinguish the codes — the `public' and 'formal 
codes' — was, in many ways, a reformulation of the pioneering work of Schatzman and Strauss (Cf. 
Appendix 4). Its listing of the relevant lexical and semantic features may indeed be seen 
linguistically, as Edwards (1989: 92) points out, as something of a `rag-bag' but it represented 
sociologically a serious attempt to detail the ways in which implicit (i.e. context-dependent) and 
explicit (i.e. context-independent) orders of meaning found expression. It was not long, however, 
before Bernstein began to distance himself from the somewhat naïve notion that it is possible to 
determine a one-to-one relationship between orders of meaning and linguistic features. In his later 
work, he argued that it was not possible to predict the precise lexical and syntactic features that a 
code would find expression in — e.g. the 'simple and repetitive' use of conjunctions etc. identified 
initially with the restricted code — but merely to suggest the general parameters that a background of 
`shared knowledge' will assume and which will find context-specific linguistic form. He was to 
formalize this shift in view in the distinction he drew (1973: 29-30) between speech 'codes' and 
speech 'variants', the former being defined as the "regulating principle controlling speech 
realization" and the latter as the sets of linguistic choices which are specific to a given context. 24 
Empirical data to support Bernstein's view of codes as `planning procedures', determining the 
semantic and pragmatic constraints within which linguistic choices can be made, are often meagre 
and difficult to evaluate. 25 Perhaps the most useful contribution was to be made by the Sociological 
Research Unit (SRU) in its study of the speech of London school children based upon the use of 
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Halliday's Scale-and-Category Grammar that provided a more standardized descriptive framework 
than had been applied before. The study sought to examine the extent to which implicit (as opposed 
to explicit) orders of meaning acted selectively on children's lexical and grammatical choices in the 
use of narrative, description and explanation. As Edwards (1989: 98) suggests, implicit meaning — 
i.e. meaning that is embedded in shared knowledge — will tend, by definition, to use fewer nouns than 
pronouns, fewer noun modifiers (the man, ten men) and qualifiers (the woman with the dog) and, 
finally, less infra- than extralinguistic referencing, particularly in pronominal use. In other words, 
implicit meanings will tend to result in discourse which is both less linguistically differentiated and 
internally cohesive than that of explicit meanings. As regards linguistic differentiation, evidence 
based on frequency counts certainly seemed to suggest a class-based difference. Hawkins' (1973: 
85-87) study of five-year olds' use of narrative seemed to reveal that lower working class children 
tended to use fewer nouns than pronouns and few noun modifiers or qualifiers whereas Henderson 
(1970: 47-8), in analyzing a range of descriptive and explanatory tasks, found conversely that middle 
class children appeared to show "... more concern to make explicit classification of persons and 
objects, and more precise ascription of attributes". 26 
As regards internal cohesion, an even more useful attempt to show the link between orders of 
meaning and linguistic choices was to be found in the area of indexical referencing. As Hasan 
(1973) pointed out, cohesion in oral or written extended texts is largely a function of intralinguistic 
referencing in pronominal use, either backwards (anaphoric) or forwards (cataphoric) to a noun, noun 
phrase (or another pronoun). Inability in cases of extended texts to treat language as its own context 
— that is, attempts to use pronouns extra- rather than intralinguistically in relation to some assumed 
common knowledge or some assumed common context — can result in verbal ambiguity. Hawkins' 
(1973) study requiring children to 'narrate' a set of pictures seemed to indicate that lower working 
class children found considerable difficulty in mastering intralinguistic referencing and, in their 
tendency to use pronouns to refer to the extralinguistic rather than linguistic context, often identified 
objects or persons in an ambiguous way. It has been objected, of course, that Hawkins' claim 
regarding the inability of lower working class children to handle intralinguistic referencing in 
relation to pronominal use fails to take into account problems in experimental design. 27 While such 
an objection is not invalid — and partly reinforced by Hawkins' own retrospective analysis of the 
findings -- the claims need to be considered in relation to a range of complementary studies which 
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have tended to replicate his results. Tough (1970: 156-67), for example, found in her study that 
`advantaged' children (as she put it) as early as nursery school tended to use a more differentiated 
vocabulary, more nouns and less extra-linguistic referencing than 'disadvantaged' children and 
similar results, albeit in a more diluted form, can be found in the research of Rackstraw and 
Robinson (1967), Robinson (1972) and Edwards (1976).28 Most interesting of all, Skehan's (1985) 
follow-up study to the Bristol Language Project tended to show a correlation between first language 
development, foreign language aptitude (i.e. the ability to handle 'decontextualised material') and 
certain family class indices. 
2. 2. 1. Code, dialect and 'style' 
Partly because of the limited and somewhat controversial evidence provided by Bernstein and his 
supporters to justify the link between function and structure in the use of codes, the latter has been 
increasingly challenged at the conceptual level. Trudgill (1976: 47), for example, argues that the 
paucity of evidence showing the link between different orders of meaning and linguistic choices 
simply does not justify the theoretical edifice which it is called upon to support. 29 Coulthard (1969: 
45) was to argue a similar point of view somewhat earlier when suggesting that the evidence 
available reveals merely a quantitative difference in the use of the same linguistic features rather 
than a qualitative difference in the selection of different linguistic features. As he puts it, the figures 
Bernstein provides 
... suggest that the linguistic performance of the working class boys, as a group, is depressed 
in relation to that of the middle class boys; they certainly do not show two distinct groups 
`differently oriented in their structural selections'. 
Others, such as Labov (1972) or Cook-Gumperz (1976), have gone even further in questioning the 
validity of the codes when suggesting that the limited differences in linguistic selection can be 
reduced to matters of 'verbal style'. As Labov (1972: 192) was to argue, the linguistic code of the 
middle-class, as defined by Bernstein, is not as "flexible, detailed and subtle" as he claims but merely 
an "... elaborated style, rather than a superior code or system". Such criticisms appear to carry some 
conviction insofar as the codes defined by Bernstein lack systematic linguistic realization but, in 
reality, it can be argued that they miss the point. Bernstein's model was not based upon — and did not 
start with — observations regarding systematic differences in linguistic choices. On the contrary, as a 
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model, it is primarily concerned with examining the ways in which social structure differentiates 
between different orders of meaning. The extent to which these orders of meaning are 'realized' 
through lexical and syntactic choices is primarily a feature of a specific context even if, as already 
indicated, general benchmarks such as linguistic differentiation and cohesion will be involved. 
Certainly, to suggest as does Labov that the concept of codes, which involve differences in the 
realization of meaning along an implicit-explicit axis, can be confused with verbal style is, as 
Edwards (1989: 92) reluctantly admits, a "travesty of the argument". 
Perhaps a more subtle if no less inaccurate criticism of Bernstein's model was the accusation that 
the notion of code lacked any independent status and was, in reality, little more than a synonym for 
social dialect. Labov (op. cit.), for example, was among the first to suggest that the linguistic features 
Bernstein outlines as being typical of restricted code are identical with those of non-standard English 
and, insofar as he attributes lower order (i.e. implicit) meanings to speakers of the former, implies 
that speakers of the latter are likewise incapable of higher-order thought. 30 Bernstein, it should be 
noted, never disagreed with Labov's claim that speakers of non-standard social dialects were as 
capable of high-order thinking as those of the standard form. He merely argued that, while there may 
appear to be an overlap between dialect and code, the former is conceptually different from the latter 
in two respects. In the first place, as Hasan (1973: 258) points out, whereas a dialect is defined 
principally in terms of its formal features, a code is defined in terms of its semantic properties whose 
realization in linguistic terms is much more indirect.31 It is, as Edwards (1989) suggests, more 
correct to see a code as a set of 'planning procedures' which guide linguistic choices than a set of 
formal features in themselves. Moreover, in the second place, whereas a dialect is only incidentally 
related to its context of use, a code is envisaged by Bernstein as being directly related to the latter in 
terms of the orders of meaning that are being expressed. In other words, as Adlam (1979: 296) put it: 
Coding orientation ... follows logically from the nature of the eliciting context itself while 
dialect, although it can be used in very subtle ways to define and redefine contexts, is only 
incidentally related to them. We might say that while coding orientation realizes the social 
context, dialect or variety is used to mark the social context. 
Contrary to Labov's criticism, it is quite possible, in terms of these distinctions, to envisage someone 
speaking a non-standard social dialect who is able to switch code — from restricted to elaborated — 
according to the social situation and the role relationships between speaker and hearer. Whereas the 
dialect he speaks is defined in terms of its formal features, the order of meaning it is required to carry 
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out will change in relation to a range of extra-linguistic variables. As Edwards (1989: 91) was to 
argue, there is nothing in a dialect to inhibit explicit statements of individual feeling or opinion. 
"While dialects are identified by their formal features, and by who their speakers are, codes are 
identified by the kinds of meaning they transmit and by what the words are used to do". 
2. 3. Cognitive 'deficit' and 'difference' 
Closely tied to the debate on the relation between code and dialect in Bernstein's work is a parallel 
debate which has, if anything, been conducted in an even more acrimonious way on account of its 
educational implications If, as Bernstein noted, different codes act as 'planning procedures' to 
regulate the order of meanings expressed, it would appear possible that those children using a 
restricted code — i.e. those locked into lower-order or 'implicit' meanings — will suffer a 
corresponding restriction in cognitive growth. In his early work, Bernstein (1971: 24) was indeed 
prepared to admit that there is a " ... relationship between the mode of cognitive expression and 
certain social classes" and that " ... the emotional and cognitive differentiation of the working class 
child is comparatively less developed" than that of the middle-class child. 32 Partly because of the 
criticism such assertions received, however, Bernstein gradually retreated from what might be called 
his 'strong' position by stressing that any cognitive differences between the codes related (in 
Chomsky's terms) to the area of performance rather than that of competence. As he was to suggest 
(1972: 158): 
Looking back with hindsight, I think I would have created less misunderstanding if I had 
written about sociolinguistic codes rather than linguistic codes. Through using only the 
latter concept it gave the impression that I was reifying syntax and at the cost of semantics. 
Working class children, he was to continue, internalize the same tacit rule system as middle-class 
children and differ from the latter — as, indeed, Fries had pointed out — simply in the selected use of 
parts of that system as opposed to others to convey a given order of meaning. The fact that 
Bernstein's views have appeared to equivocate, however, on the relation between the various 'orders 
of meaning' embedded in codes and children's cognitive growth has given rise to two broad schools 
of thought — the 'cognitive deficit' and 'cognitive difference' — both of which claim his work as 
seminal. It may be useful to explore the latter in greater detail both to tease out what Bernstein was, 
in fact, advocating as well as what he has often inaccurately been claimed to advocate. 
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2.3.1. 'orders of meaning' 
The 'cognitive deficit' viewpoint could, as indicated, be traced back to some of Bernstein's (1971: 
151) earlier and somewhat more crude statements that the 'order of meanings' in a restricted code 
demonstrated " ... a less complex conceptual hierarchy" and a "... lower order of causality" than 
those in an elaborated code. This view was to become a central plank of the 'compensatory 
education' movement in the USA which was represented by figures from Bereiter and Engelmann 
(1966) to Jensen (1968: 105) who argued that much of working class language consisted of a kind of 
" ... incidental 'emotional' accompaniment to the here and now". 33 Although writers such as Jensen 
represented an extreme version of this school of thought, there would appear to be a clear thread 
running through it that the context-dependency of working class children's speech — that is, their 
inability to consciously focus on form in the reception/production of messages — has cognitive 
implications. Lack of ability to deal with utterances as "sequences of meaningful parts" — the basis 
for making meanings explicit — is seen not as a difference in performance but as one in competence 
insofar as the child appears not to have internalized the underlying rule system. "The speech of the 
severely deprived children", wrote Bereiter and Engelmann (1966: 34), 
... seems to consist not of distinct words, as does the speech of middle class children of the 
same age, but rather of whole phrases or sentences that function like giant words. That is to 
say, these 'giant word" units cannot be taken apart by the child and re-combined. 
As Ehri (1979: 78) was to note in relation to Bereiter and Engelmann's work, the latter seem to 
accept that what distinguishes 'disadvantaged' from 'advantaged' children is their "inadequately 
developed knowledge about words as units of language" and that "this difference stems from 
differences in basic linguistic competence ...". 34 The first major consequence of this inability to 
attend to and segment speech into meaningful utterances is, according to Bereiter and Engelmann, 
manifested in a metacognitive activity such as learning to read. Both they and others writing within 
this tradition attribute underachievement among lower working class children in reading specifically 
to a lack of metalinguistic awareness which is seen as a deficit in basic linguistic competence. 35 
There can be little doubt that the link established between lack of metalinguistic awareness and 
reading difficulties in the 'cognitive deficit' school has similarities with Bernstein's views. The 
latter's central hypothesis, after all, was that it was the context-embedded or 'implicit' nature of 
meaning that undermined the need of lower working class children to attend to speech itself and, 
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through that, to the cognitive content of speech. The crucial difference between Bernstein, however, 
and those who claim his work as support for the 'cognitive deficit' hypothesis, is that he never 
suggested that differences in the nature of meaning involved differences in underlying competence. 
As Edwards (1976: 36) suggests, while Bernstein's work can, at a superficial level, be interpreted to 
bolster the 'deficit' hypothesis, he was consistently clear that such an interpretation was misguided. 
"At no time", he was to argue (1973: 70) in retrospect, "did I ever consider that I was concerned with 
differences between social groups at the level of competence, that is, differences ... which had their 
origin in the basic tacit understanding of the linguistic rule system". It may well be, he was to 
continue, that children's social background regulated the orders of meaning their speech conveyed 
but this was not due to differences in the internalization of the basic rule system but to the uses to 
which such a system was put. Such a difference with proponents of the 'deficit hypothesis' was to 
assume a practical dimension in his attitude towards the notion of 'compensatory' schooling. Writers 
such as Bereiter and Engelmann (1966), for example, were strong advocates of remedial programmes 
to help children overcome the supposed 'verbal deprivation' — particularly lack of segmentation 
skills -- necessary to master the transfer to reading/writing. Bernstein (1971: 192), on the other hand, 
argued strongly alongside Labov that the notion of verbal deprivation is "part of the myth of modern 
psychology" and that such schemes incorrectly laid the emphasis for underachievement upon the 
family that was unfairly viewed as a "little deficit system". Working class children may be more 
geared towards particularistic meanings in most contexts than their middle class peers, he was to 
argue, but the role of the school is not to challenge the use of such meanings which are appropriate 
for certain contexts but simply to help them develop universalistic meanings that are appropriate in 
other contexts. As he was to point out (Ibid. 197): 
It simply means there is a restriction on the contexts and on the conditions which will orient the 
child to universalistic orders of meanings ... It does not mean that the children cannot produce 
at any time elaborated speech in particular contexts... Because a code is restricted, it does not 
mean that a speaker will not in some contexts and under specific conditions not use a range of 
modifiers or subordination etc., but it does mean that where such choices are made they will be 
highly context-specific 
In other words, in a way similar to Trudgill's notion of `bi-dialecticism', Bernstein was arguing 
essentially for a kind of 'code switching' in which respect for orders of meaning appropriate in 
context-embedded situations is balanced by encouragement for the development of other (more 
explicit) orders of meaning appropriate in more context-disembedded situations. 36 
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It was largely in reaction to the 'cognitive deficit' hypothesis that what Edwards (1989:36-40) 
terms the 'cognitive difference' view emerged. Writers such as Labov (1972) or Cook-Gumperz 
(1986) did not reject the notion that there were differences in the functional use of speech between 
social groups but argued that such differences were simply "... manifestations of alternative ways of 
looking at, and reacting to, the world". The distinction between context-dependent and context-
independent uses of language becomes, within this framework, merely a distinction in the style used 
by varying socio-cultural groups to regulate their communication in everyday interaction and has 
little, or no, relation to referential meaning. The linguistic 'relativity' hypothesis can be seen most 
clearly, perhaps, in the work of writers such as Simons and Murphy (1986) or Michaels (1986) in 
relation to Black English. The fact that some children speak a language whose context-dependent 
style does not equip them for making the transition to the context-independent style of expository 
prose, such writers would insist, does not imply a limitation in the child's earlier semiotic experience 
but simply a clash between two different — and equally valid -- ways of 'making meaning'. As 
Gumperz (1986: 50) puts it, the difference between Black English and Standard English " ... can best 
be characterized as context-bound differences in usage and as markers of stylistic options and 
choices" and if such choices "carry pejorative connotations as deviant forms" within formal 
schooling, such an attitude is entirely unfounded. Unlike the 'cultural deficit' approach, the task is 
not to help the child to overcome the limitations in prior semiotic experience but, on the contrary, to 
see literacy itself as a social construct which needs to be adapted more to the experience and values 
of given social groups. 37  As Gumperz (1986: 50) was to continue, the clash between the culture of 
some social groups and that of formal schooling -- particularly in the area of metalinguistic 
awareness -- involves " ... differences in notions of what learning is about and differences in the 
criteria used to judge what has been learned and evaluate achievement". 
Clearly, there is much that is derived from Bernstein's model in the 'cognitive difference' 
hypothesis, particularly in their common objection to 'compensatory' schooling. While they overlap 
in many respects, however, Bernstein's views are no more synonymous with the 'cognitive 
difference' hypothesis than they are with the 'cognitive deficit' one. It is certainly true that Bernstein 
would agree that differences in the orders of meaning based on socialization patterns do not exist at 
the level of competence, i.e. do not determine the extent to which the child masters the tacit rule 
system. It is one thing to assert that children have a common 'potential', however, and quite another 
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to suggest that there are no conceptual differences in the way social structure acts upon the child to 
use that rule system to create different orders of meaning along the implicit-explicit axis. Indeed, the 
very essence of Bernstein's argument was that children limited to a restricted code are less able to 
verbalize their thinking and — to the extent that they cannot use signs to refer to, define and comment 
upon other signs — become locked within a "less complex conceptual hierarchy" than other children. 
A restricted code can, in this sense, be seen as a limitation on the child's natural 'potential' insofar as 
the 'orders of meaning' it imposes can hinder his access to abstract concepts where the ability to use 
language as its own context is crucial. To suggest that the different orders of meaning embedded in 
the codes, which have such important long-term consequences conceptually, are simply culturally-
induced and equally valid verbal 'styles' is as much a travesty of Bernstein's argument as was that of 
writers such as Bereiter and Engeltnann. The weakness of the 'cognitive difference' hypothesis is, of 
course, the a-historical approach it appears to have borrowed from the neighbouring fields of 
anthropology and linguistics. Differences in cultural or linguistic behaviour are seen as equally valid 
if discrete phenomena rather than as standing at a higher or lower level of a developmental process. 
38 Literacy, within this framework, is seen both at the ontogenetic and phylogenetic levels, not as a 
cultural phenomenon that implies a higher level of cognitive and linguistic processing than does 
speech, but simply as a different level of such processing. 
2. 3. 2. Metalinguistic awareness and code 
It has, perhaps, been the ambiguities in many of Bernstein's formulations, as he has sought to 
refine his theory under critical pressure, which has encouraged proponents of the cognitive 'deficit' 
and cognitive 'difference' schools of thought to claim it as their own. The debate that has arisen 
around the nature of codes has, in this sense, often been an unnecessarily polarized one which has 
tended to downplay, or ignore, Bernstein's rather more subtle and original argument which is firmly 
rooted within the Vygotsky-Luria tradition.39 For Bernstein, the different orders of meaning that 
arise in children's use of speech relative to their social background can neither be described as 
differences in cognitive potential nor dismissed simply as cognitively neutral 'verbal styles'. On the 
contrary, his view is much more developmental in nature than that of his critics and may most 
usefully be teased out in relation to more recent models on the development of metalinguistic 
processing, such as the three-stage model of a Berman (1986), Karmiloff-Smith (1986) or a Gombert 
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(1992). Bernstein's insistence that all children master the tacit rule system, that is, have the same 
underlying competence, corresponds with the first stage in that model where linguistic items are 
internalized in terms of a one-to-one relationship with their contexts of use. The extent to which the 
child's social background determines which aspects of that rule system are prioritized in the 
exchange of meaning — i.e. the extent to which meaning is made increasingly explicit rather than 
implicit in communicative interaction — may be said to occupy the second stage of the model. Those 
children who, in Bernstein's definition, operate within a restricted code of largely implicit meanings 
will have less opportunity to organize those linguistic items into a system of relevant options or, as 
Gombert otherwise put it, will be less likely to develop 'epilinguistic' awareness. Finally, if the child 
has not built up such a system of relevant options at the implicit level, he will have greater difficulty, 
in the third stage, in transforming epi- into metalinguistic awareness in the process of learning to read 
and this will have long-term implications, as Skehan (1985) notes, for his ability to access a range of 
secondary (or parasitic) linguistic functions. 4°  
While the focus of Bernstein's work has been seen to shift over the years, the central theme in the 
analysis and exploration of codes has been the implications of context-dependency in terms of the 
child's linguistic and cognitive growth. His work has, in this sense, anticipated the considerable 
interest that has developed in more recent years around the development of metacogmitive and 
metalinguistic processing as in the case of writers such as Hickmann and Karmiloff-Smith, and, on 
more than one occasion, he has stressed (1971: 134) that the essential difference between the codes 
lies precisely in this area: 
A child limited to a restricted code will tend to develop essentially through the regulation 
inherent in the code. For such a child, speech does not become the object of special 
perceptual activity, neither does a theoretical attitude develop towards the structural 
possibilities of sentence organization ... 
What has been important about his contribution to this debate, however, has been his willingness to 
explore the notion of metalinguistic processing in relation to social background, that is, to seek to 
deal with the most important feature of such processing, which is its variable distribution between 
socio-cultural groups and between sub-groups in the same grouping. It may well be that the way he 
has attempted to link metalinguistic processing with class has been highly contentious and that some 
of the accusations of schematicism -- in terms of his notion of two counterposed classes reflected in 
two counterposed codes — have some validity. It should be pointed out in Bernstein's defense, 
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however, that both his definition of class and codes were more subtle than is often acknowledged and 
that he did not rule out the possibility of a range of such codes mirroring intra- as well as inter-class 
differences. It might also be pointed out that his work at least seeks to anchor differences in 
metalinguistic processing in wider social structures — and the power relationships derived from these 
structures — rather than viewing them, as do his detractors, as the random (and non-explanatory) 
variables of parental 'verbal styles'. 
3. 0. Educational implications 
One of the causes of the controversy surrounding Bernstein's notions of codes was undoubtedly its 
implications in the area of educational achievement. The notion of code is, after all, premised on the 
view that there are differences in orientation of social groups towards the various functions of 
language in given contexts and that this gives rise to different 'orders of meaning'. If this is so, 
however, then these differences will manifest themselves in contexts which are crucial for the 
socialization process -- such as formal schooling -- and will determine the response of the child to 
such contexts which are inevitably premised upon the values and communication patterns of given 
sub-cultures. Insofar as the context of formal schooling involves the transmission of knowledge and 
skills, the dominant function in the discourse the child encounters will be a referential one in which 
there is much less emphasis upon 'shared knowledge' i.e. upon context-dependency in meaning 
making. Children oriented towards an elaborated code will find that the emphasis upon explicit 
meaning in the transmission of knowledge is "one of symbolic and social development", as Bernstein 
(1971: 144) was to put it, whereas children oriented towards a restricted code will need to develop an 
elaborated code if they are to succeed, that is, their experience of formal schooling will be "one of 
symbolic and social change". Underachievement in the educational system is, in this sense, one 
which is locked into the class structure of society since the social relations of working class children 
dictate an order of meaning opposed in varying degrees to that which predominates in formal 
schooling. Moreover, as Bernstein (1971: 35) was to continue, the attempt to substitute a different 
order of meaning and a different order of communication, that is, to orient more towards elaborated 
meanings, can in turn "... create[s] critical problems for the working class child as it is an attempt to 
change his basic system of perception, fundamentally the very means by which he has been 
socialized". 
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The problems facing children oriented towards more restricted meanings in formal schooling have 
featured as a central concern in the work of linguists such as Halliday (1975: 18) who was highly 
influenced by Bernstein's hypothesis. 41 For Halliday, difficulties encountered by children in terms of 
learning to read, or master the transfer from non-standard to standard dialect, are indicative of a " 
deeper and more general problem, a fundamental mismatch between the child's linguistic capabilities 
and the demands that are made on them". This mismatch, which Bernstein posed in terms of a clash 
of 'symbolic systems', pivot in Halliday around the fact that the functional demands required for 
interaction in his social context simply do not match the functional demands made on language in an 
institutionalized setting. Halliday (ibid. 19) was himself to target those functions which he saw as 
under-developed in children with an orientation towards a restricted code — and which have an 
increasingly important role within the context of formal schooling — as the 'personal' and the 
`heuristic'. These are, he suggests, the "... functions which are most crucial to his success in school" 
largely because they involve the ability of the child to consciously attend to language as a learning 
tool. The personal function, he suggests (ibid. 14-16), refers to the child's awareness of language as 
a "range of behavioural options" and the heuristic function refers to his awareness of "how to use 
language to learn" which, in turn, entails control over a relevant metalanguage (such as 'question', 
`answer' etc.). As Halliday argues, in learning to cope with the new demands placed upon him, the 
child needs to be aware that he is mastering new 'behavioural options' and, at the same time, to be 
able to analyze language and develop a language for talking about language. Whereas some children 
have already mastered such (metalinguistic) processing skills, he argues, when they arive in school, 
others have not and it is this difference which explains the success or failure of children in accessing 
the 'linguistic repertoire' of formal schooling. "Whether one calls it a failure of language", he (1973: 
19) was to suggest, "or a failure in the use of language is immaterial". What is important is that the 
child's prior semiotic experience be recognised as the crucial variable in shaping educational 
development. 
3.1. 'dual barrier' 
Perhaps the earliest and most obvious area where the clash between the child's prior semiotic 
experience and the linguistic demands of schooling emerges is, as indicated, in the transfer from oral 
to written discourse. Stubbs (1986: 228-9), in an interesting study on classroom modes of discourse, 
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suggests that the crucial differences in Bernstein's distinction between the codes — those of context-
dependency, planning, explicitness and unpredictability — are exactly the same differences that 
distinguish spoken from written forms. To say that a child with restricted code has difficulty adapting 
to a situation of formal schooling predicated upon an elaborated code, therefore, is simply another 
way of saying that he will have difficulties in transferring from spoken to written discourse. 42 
Although Bernstein was never to address the problems of literacy as such, considerable evidence 
emerged at the time that under-achievement in learning to read was predicated precisely upon the 
inability of children from lower social groups to cope with the decontextualisation of written 
discourse in terms of their own 'meaning making'. What is important about the written word, as 
Stubbs pertinently notes, is precisely the fact that in the absence of any 'shared knowledge', there is a 
much greater unpredictability about the information that is being transmitted and which requires a 
much greater attention to what the text 'says' rather than what the writer might be inferred to 'mean'. 
Children oriented towards a restricted code face a dual barrier in this sense in learning to read. Not 
only do they have to move from the predictable utterances of speech -- from what Bernstein (1971) 
portrays as condensed and stereotyped phrases often involving non-specific cliches -- to the 
unpredictable sentences of written texts but they also have to be able to segment those utterances into 
meaningful linguistic units. It is precisely in these two related areas that a range of writers from 
Savin (1972), Rozin and Gleitman (1973) to Wallach and Wallach (1976) have identified the 
difficulties experienced by children from lower social groups. 
Entwisle (1979: 154), in particular, is quite explicit in seeing the relation between children's social 
background and reading achievement as a function of differences in the context-dependency of their 
speech. While acknowledging that all spoken discourse tends to be more context-dependent than 
written discourse, she argues that " ... the middle class child probably hears speech that is less 
context-dependent than the speech heard by other children", that is, one which takes into account 
"alternative modes of action and alternative contexts". It is, Entwisle continues, through using and 
responding to speech of greater abstraction and complexity that the child begins to develop 
awareness of it and the ability to segment it into those meaningful units required for the transfer to 
reading. This is most obvious, she suggests, in the area of lexical awareness where middle-class 
children have little difficulty in identifying word boundaries but where lower working class children 
seem to be " ... confused about common word segmentation" and, as Bernstein had pointed out, often 
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tend to work at the linguistic level of the phrase which is used in an undifferentiated and 
stereotypical way. 43 Entwisle is not suggesting that there is a link between social background and an 
inadequate knowledge of the tacit rule system but, simply, that some working class children are less 
able to consciously use that rule system in the pursuit of a (new) linguistic task. A similar point is 
made by Wallach and Wallach (1976: 66) who argue that, if lower working class children seem to 
lack the phonological segmentation skills of more middle class children, this is not due to a 
"deficiency in auditory discrimination" but, rather, to a lack of the "readily accessible, manipulative 
concepts of the kinds of sounds at issue, the sounds to which letters are related, or 'phonemes—. It 
would, of course, be incorrect to over-generalize from such research particularly since, as Bernstein 
himself acknowledged, there are more nuanced differences corresponding to Ultra- as well as inter-
class variables. While this may be true, however, it would seem to argue in favour of a correlation 
between social experience and metalinguistic awareness which is crucial to educational success. 
Learning to read can be interpreted, in Bernstein's terminology, as the first stage of 'code-
switching' for many children, that is, the first stage in the transition from restricted to elaborated 
code use. The child has to learn to use language differently from that to which he is accustomed 
through socialization in everyday communicative interaction, to pay attention to meanings in the text 
rather than in the context, to be explicit rather than implicit in its production and comprehension. 
Learning to read is, however, only the first step in this process and if the child is to extend his 
linguistic repertoire still further, the ability to move towards more elaborated meanings — that is, to 
consciously process language production/reception — will become ever more important. As Halliday 
(1973: 20) was to put it, "The child's awareness of language cannot be separated from his awareness 
of language function" and it is this inter-relation between awareness and skill as he expands his 
linguistic repertoire that permits the elaboration of a "perspective that is educationally relevant". 
4,0. Summary 
A key feature of metalinguistic awareness is its variable distribution both between different socio-
cultural groupings and between individuals within the same grouping. Attempts to explain such 
differentiation has tended to focus around the variation in 'verbal styles' in child-parent interaction 
and/ or the relation of these to wider community discourse modes. Perhaps the most complex — and 
certainly controversial — attempt to explain the uneven distribution in metalinguistic processing can 
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be found in Bernstein's class-related notion of sociolinguistic codes. Bernstein's work essentially 
seeks to explore metalinguistic awareness — viewed as a given 'order of meaning' — as a function of 
the socialization of children in relation to class structure. Criticism has been directed at Bernstein in 
terms of the schematic definition of class in his work, the confusion between code and 
dialect/register and, perhaps most importantly, the implications of 'cognitive deficit' for educational 
development that appear to be embedded in his analysis of 'restricted' code. While some of these 
criticisms are valid -- particularly that in relation to his schematic and unnecessarily polarized 
description of codes -- they fail to understand the importance and continuing validity of his attempt 
to link the notion of metalinguistic awareness with wider social structures and to explain educational 
achievement and underachievement as a function of the two. 
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Notes 
1. As Mattingly (1972: 140) was to continue, "There appears to be considerable individual variation in linguistic 
awareness. Some speaker-hearers are not only very conscious of linguistic patterns but exploit this consciousness 
with obvious pleasure in verbal play (e.g. punning) or verbal work (e.g. linguistic analysis) ..." while others are 
not very aware or aware of words only. 
2. It is, as Mattingly (1972: 144) asserts, precisely the metacognitive aspect of reading which creates a problem 
for some children, i.e. the fact that it "... depends ultimately on linguistic awareness and the degree of this 
awareness varies considerably from person to person". 
3. Savin (1972), in particular, was to argue that it is impossible to attribute reading disability to such factors as 
non-standard dialect or lack of motivation insofar as it is well documented that many inner city 'disadvantaged' 
children who speak non-standard dialects and whose culture does not valorize reading do, in effect, become 
proficient readers. 
4. Donaldson (1978: 95) was to make the same point somewhat later when arguing that "... those very features 
of the written word which encourage awareness of language may also encourage awareness of one's own thinking 
and be relevant to the development of intellectual self-control, with incalculable consequences for the development 
of the kinds of thinking which are characteristic of logic, mathematics and the sciences". 
5. Halliday (1975: 18) was, in fact, referring to Bemstein's view of codes and the clash between cultures 
represented by children with restricted codes who enter formal schooling which is predicated upon elaborated code 
use. "Bernstein has shown", he points out, "that educational failure is often, in a very general and rather deep 
sense, language failure. The child who does not succeed in the school system may be one who is not using 
language in the ways required by the school". 
6. Like Donaldson, Entwisle (1979: 150) notes, for example, that "... some families directly or indirectly 
encourage a high degree of metalinguistic awareness in their children. Parents who make puns or poems easily, for 
example, consciously exploit the sounds and segments of language. Reciting nursery rhymes, reading aloud, 
listening to speech recordings, singing nursery songs and lullabies, or recording speech on tape or with movie 
cameras are all activities that foster linguistic awareness in children". 
7. Wells (1986: 112), in his presentation of the Bristol Language Project fmdings, argues in favour of a more 
complex model in which the interpersonal relations between parents and child constitute only one out of four 
factors influencing language development. The other three factors include 'inherited attributes', 'social 
background' and 'situation' (i.e. the setting, activity and status of participants). 
8. It is important to note that, for Michaels in particular, the fact that the verbal style of a given cultural grouping 
conflicts with that of the school does not in any way suggest the inferiority of the former in relation to the latter, 
since both are seen as equally valid social constructs. 
9. A useful example of this is the debate between cognitive 'deficit' and 'difference' that his work provoked. As 
Edwards (1976: 36) points out, "Bernstein himself now rejects the deficit viewpoint of lower-class language and, 
indeed, there are hints in his earliest work of this. However, one can also fmd statements that seem to show support 
for a language deficit point of view ...." and the result of such ambiguity is that he is often claimed simultaneously 
for quite opposed schools of thought. 
10. The view that speech reflects the socially conditioned behavioural patterns of speaker-hearers and, in turn, 
acts to reinforce those patterns is not of course new. It was firmly embedded in the work of Volosinov (1973: 20) 
who, in his call for a new approach to linguistic analysis, argued that the latter should be based upon defining the 
range of verbal contacts between people ('genres') and, in particular, the " ... repertoire of speech forms" specific 
to each social group at each given period. "A typology of these forms of utterance", he argued, "is one of the most 
urgent tasks of Marxism". 
11. "... language is", he was to write (1971: 173-174), "a set of rules to which all speech codes must comply, but 
which speech codes are realized is a function of the culture acting through social relationships in specific contexts. 
Different speech forms or codes symbolize the form of the social relationship, regulate the nature of the speech 
encounters and create for the speakers different orders of relevance and relation". 
12. "Over and over again", writes Edwards (1976: 87), " ... it appeared that the differences between the language 
of the educated and those with little education did not lie primarily in the fact that the former used one set of forms 
and the latter an entirely different set ... the actual deviation of the language of the uneducated from Standard 
English seemed much less than is usually assumed. The most striking difference lay in the fact that Vulgar English 
seems essentially poverty-stricken". 
13. In his analysis of the impact of Schatzmann and Strauss upon Bernstein, Edwards (1976: 88) was to suggest 
that it was precisely the formers' recognition of the inability of lower working class narratives to "... bridge the 
gulf in experience between themselves and their listener by providing explicit information" which was to reappear 
in the latter's definition of the restrictive code. 
14. It is important to note that, from the beginning, the codes were not abstractions from empirical data but, 
rather, constructs or "polar dimensions" towards which performance could usefully be seen as orienting. In this 
sense, it might have proved more useful if Bernstein had, as Gumperz and Hymes (1972: 468) point out, used the 
terms 'elaborated and restricted coding' as indicative of the various intermediate stages along the continuum 
between them. 
15. Bernstein was not unaware of the tendency, in the description of family types, to caricature differences 
between the classes and, in his later essays, such as a Socio-Linguistic Approach to Socialization (1971: 162), was 
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to denote the social changes post-war which were eroding the traditional communal-based working class family 
unit and creating the conditions for "... more individualized and less communalized relationships". 
16. Possible alternative groupings whose social relationships were such as to incline them towards the use of a 
restricted code were, as he notes (1971: 77), possibly ironically, " ... peer groups of children and adolescents, 
criminal sub cultures, combat units in the aimed forces, senior common rooms..." etc. 
17. Bernstein (1971: 172) is quite explicit in using the Marxist definition of class as determining the nature and 
use of symbolic codes because of the power relations built into it "Although Marx is less concerned with the ... 
process of transmission of symbolic systems", he was to write, "he does give us a key to their institutionalization 
and change. The key is given in terms of the social significance of society's productive system and the power 
relationships to which the productive system gives rise. Further, access to, control over, orientation of and change 
in its critical symbolic systems, according to the theory, is governed by power relationships as these are embodied 
in class structure". 
18. That he was only too aware of the heterogeneity of class structure can be seen in his integration of the 
division of labor into the explanatory model of code creation in Social Class, Language and Socialization (1971: 
187). It is, he argues, the division of labour which determines the codes and the class structure which affects their 
distribution through the family unit where parental occupation plays a crucial role. 
19. As he (1972: 161) was to put it, seeking to compare the relation between the tacit rule system and codes as 
that between Saussure's longue and parole," I shall take the view that the code which the linguist invents to 
explain the formal properties of the grammar is capable of generating any number of speech codes...". 
20. "In theory, at least, the possibility is allowed that social conditions may arise which would allow different re-
alignments of the factors. It is therefore possible that we may have an array of the varieties of restricted and 
elaborated codes rather than just two highly idealized ones". 
21. Analyzing the Bristol Language Project fmdings, Wells (1986b: 144) was to draw a clear correlation between 
reading age scores, educational achievement and family - rather than class - background. "This test, better than 
any other, predicted overall achievement at the age of 7; it was even a good indicator of achievement at age 10. 
Significantly, it was also the test that was most closely associated with family background. In fact, at all ages, all 
the measures concerned with literacy - tests and teachers' assessments - were significantly associated with family 
background". 
22. As Light (1993: 79-80) was to argue somewhat later, Bernstein's definition of different styles of family 
relationships and their impact upon the child's language also played an important role in the research of Klauss and 
Glucksberg (1969) which suggest that "the effectiveness of communication between mother and child may 
represent an important element in what the authors term the 'cognitive socialization of the child—. 
23. Wells' (1986a: 112) alternative model is a case in point. It may be true that the factors he indicates -
inherited attributes, social background, style of linguistic interaction and situation - interact to determine variation 
in children's linguistic development. Insofar as no indication is given of the determining relationships between 
these variables, however, it might be argued that the child's linguistic growth is the result of an eclectic and 
essentially random interaction between them. 
24. In a later essay (1973: 29-30), using Chomsky's distinction between surface and deep structures as an 
analogy, he was to define language variants as "surface structure" and codes as "transmitting the deep-meaning 
structure of the culture or the subculture". 
25. As Edwards (1989: 96-7) suggests, the scope of Bernstein's model was considerable and was based initially 
upon a theoretical construct rather than on a generalization from empirical data. Problems with obtaining such 
data arose in relation to the range of hypotheses to be tested - e.g. from the relation between class and language 
use to that between semantic content and linguistic form - and the unsystematic nature of much of the early 
research. 
26. Henderson's study, which was focused upon the role of speech in different parental regulation tasks, was 
particularly interesting in featuring a range of class-based differences which included, among others, greater 
explicitness in conveying messages, greater abstraction in definitions and greater willingness to respond to, rather 
than avoid, children's questions. The list is reminiscent in many ways of the taxonomy of favourable parental 
styles noted by Wells (1986). 
27. As Edwards (1989: 100) points out, the conclusions drawn from this well-known study have been put into 
considerable doubt by the fact that both child and experimenter were able to see the pictures involved. Since there 
was no need to be explicit insofar as the background information was available to both, the working class child's 
use of, for example, pronouns rather than nouns and extra- rather than intralinguistic referencing, may have been 
more (not less) appropriate than that of the middle class child. 
28. Robinson (1984: 214), in his later article, usefully reviews the range of areas in which the verbal styles of 
lower working class and middle class parents differ, particularly in the area of regulative mechanisms and the 
implications for children's affective and cognitive development. Like Cook's (1971) earlier study in the same area, 
he found that "MC children made more explicit reference to attributes of offenders and the effects on controllers; 
used intensifiers (e.g. very) to make more specific reference to states; and they offered fewer examples of implicit 
references marked by exophoric pronouns". 
29. As he was to put it, in a scathing if somewhat blinkered reference to Bernstein's work, the latter simply seeks 
to show "... that in situations more artificial and alien to them than to middle-class children, working class children 
use a higher degree of pronouns. Is this what it has all been about? ". 
30. Labov (1972: 183-4) centres his attack upon Bereiter and Engelmann (1966) in suggesting that their 
accusation that Black ghetto children speak the "language of culturally deprived children" is simply a confusion 
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between code and non-standard dialect. The fact that Labov then proceeds to devote an article to asserting that 
such expressions as Me got juice are as rule-governed as that of standard English may be correct — as Wells admits 
— but entirely misses the point. 
31. Hasan's (1973: 258) distinction between the two is worth quoting as a suitable rebuttal to Labov' s criticism of 
the notion of code. Firstly, he claims," ... while the extra-linguistic factors correlating with social dialects are 
incidental, those correlating with code are said to be causal....". And, secondly, "... while social dialect is defmed 
by reference to its distinctive formal properties, the code is defined by reference to its semantic properties ... that 
is to say, it can be argued that the semantic properties of the codes can be predicted from the elements of the social 
structure which, in fact, give rise to them". 
32. Other examples abound, as when he argues (1971: 33) that speech modes have an impact on conceptual 
thinking in that some produce "... a descriptive cognitive process, e.g. the recognition of events A, B, C, D as 
separate unconnected facts, or at best, crude causal connections". 
33. The notion of 'verbal deprivation' was used in Jensen's (1968) case, of course, as a fig-leaf to cover openly 
racist views based upon the so-called genetic inferiority of Black ghetto children in particular and the working 
class in general. 
34. Bereiter and Engelmann's claim was based, as Ehri (1979) notes, on limited empirical evidence. Moreover, 
students of Bereiter, such as Thomson (1968), who did subsequently carry out limited segmentation tests to verify 
their hypotheses, failed to observe any qualitative differences between children's lexical awareness based on social 
class lines. 
35. An example of the latter school can be found in Ryan, McNamara and Kenny (1977) who argue strongly that 
metalinguistic awareness — that is the ability to segment language into meaningful units — is a prerequisite for 
successfully accessing written texts and that lack of such segmentation ability is related to an inadequate 
internalization of the rule system. 
36. The comparison with the notion of bi-dialecticism may indicate a weakness in Bernstein's argument in this 
area. A dialect is defmed merely in terms of linguistic features and bi-dialectism merely involves altering the 
linguistic features in the exchange of meaning. A code, however, is defmed in terms of the orders of meaning it is 
able to carry out and it is by no means so simple to switch from one code to another when cognitive differences —
i.e. levels of meaning — are involved. 
37. Czerniewska (1992: 10) is a useful example of the latter approach when she argues that "... the concept we 
have of literacy as it is presented in schools is a culturally constructed one" and may penalize certain sub-groups 
whose approach to speech would be more compatible to the role of literacy in another culture. 
38. A useful critique of the cultural relativity hypothesis can be found in Hawkins' (1984) response to the 
assertion, fashionable in synchronic linguistics, that no language is more 'primitive' than another. As Hawkins 
argues, while all languages may have the same potential in terms of their generative capacity, the fact that 
historically some languages have evolved more than others in realizing that capacity can hardly be denied and 
hardly makes them 'equal' in practice. 
39. As Bernstein (1971: 122-123) was to put it, in seeking to compare his view of language with that of Whorf, 
the latter's "... psychology was influenced by the writings of the gestalt school of psychology whereas the thesis to 
be put forward here rests on the work of Vygotsky and Luria". 
40. Skehan's (1985) follow-up study to the Bristol Language Project sought to demonstrate the long-term effects 
of mother tongue development on foreign language learning in an acquisition-poor environment as predicted 
through aptitude tests 
41. As Halliday (1975: xv) was to put it, the fact that the education process is premised upon a certain set of 
cultural values means that " ... it creates for some children a continuity of culture between home and school which 
it largely denies to others". 
42. As Stubbs suggests, "Relative to spoken language, written language is highly planned, explicit, context-free 
and unpredictable. Spoken language is not planned in advance, less explicit, context-bound and more predictable. 
If the differences between written and spoken languages are formulated in this way, they come out sounding very 
similar to Bernstein's distinction between elaborated and restricted codes". 
43. Entwisle (1979: 150) recounts a word association test where she discovered that "...when asked to free 
associate to the word once, some lower class fifth graders wrote the word apone. At first, Entwisle classified apone 
as a nonsense word or error. Later she realized that apone probably meant upon a, as in the sequence once upon a 
time. The response clearly revealed that some lower-class fifth graders were confused about common word 
segmentation...". 
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Metalinguistic awareness and language planning 
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Chapter 5 
1. 0. Metalinguistic awareness and education: shifting rationales 
As Brumfit et al (1994) suggest, there has been a growing re-interest in recent years in the role 
played by metalinguistic awareness in children's educational development which has found its 
sharpest focus in the discussion surrounding National Curriculum reforms. Such a re-interest does 
not imply a consensus regarding the definition of the phenomenon — reformulated in the Kingman 
Committee report (1988) as 'knowledge about language' [KAL] — or the rationale for its inclusion in 
the curriculum which, as Brumfit et al (1994: 5) go on to say, has been " ... marked by considerable 
controversy and disagreement ...". The most important source of this disagreement has undoubtedly 
been the relationship between analytical knowledge and language performance or, rather, the 
conditions under which such a relationship might emerge. While the Kingman Committee report 
argued, albeit hesitantly, in favour of the explicit study of language as a means of improving 
linguistic performance in certain identifiable areas, such an argument has been widely contested 
elsewhere in the literature.' Carter (1990: 16), for example, in his influential introduction to the 
LINC Reader, claims that the relationship between knowledge about, and competence in, language 
remains a " ... major unanswered and unexplained question" and such a view is widespread among 
writers in the 'personal growth' tradition of English Mother Tongue [EMT] teaching who were 
initially antagonistic to the Kingman Committee report, such as Rosen (1988), Barnes (1988) or 
Richmond (1990). 2 It has largely been in the light of skepticism regarding the beneficial impact of 
analytic knowledge upon skill-based performance that a number of alternative rationales have 
emerged. These range, as Brumfit et al (1992) point out in an earlier review, from enhancing the 
motivation for foreign language study to 'sensitizing' pupils to the social meaning of linguistic 
variation or 'empowering' them in terms of understanding the potential [mis] uses of language as a 
tool of social control. There is no doubt that the advocates of Critical Language Awareness [CLA], 
such as Ivanic (1990) or Fairclough (1992), have played an important role in shifting the emphasis 
away from the cognitive to the affective or social rationales for the inclusion of explicit language 
study in the curriculum. 
While regretting the controversy surrounding the relation between reflection on language and 
competence in its use, Carter (1990: 16) argues that the issue can only be resolved, one way or 
another, on the basis of further empirical evidence..5 The notion that what is required to resolve the 
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issue is further evidence, however, is somewhat disingenuous in that there already exists a 
considerable body of data bearing on the issue, particularly in the crucial areas of the transfer from 
spoken to written and from first to foreign/second language. What appears to be required is not so 
much additional data as a theoretical framework which is capable of making sense of the data that 
already exists and drawing out its implications for language planning and pedagogy. 6 
 The advantage 
of the socio-cultural approach to language acquisition/learning lies precisely in this area, i.e. in its 
claim to demonstrate the enabling role that metalinguistic awareness plays in the child's expanding 
linguistic repertoire. It is, as has already been argued, mainly through being able to disembed and 
reflect upon what he implicitly knows that the child is able both to 'conceptualize' new linguistic 
functions and develop the decoding strategies necessary for accessing them in practice. The link 
between the child's ability to reflect on the 'known' in order to master the 'unknown' -- that is, the 
link between reflection and action -- cannot be dismissed, within this framework, as merely one 
potential rationale among many. On the contrary, it is by being encouraged to monitor, evaluate and 
amend his own use of language that the child develops the capacity to make sense of and master the 
range of secondary (or 'parasitic') practices which make up formal schooling. The fact that some 
children, as Bernstein points out, have little or no pre-school experience of such reflective activity, in 
terms of language reception/production, makes inclusion of it in the school curriculum from a very 
early date crucial in combating the underachievement which can stem from an impoverished 
linguistic repertoire. Such an approach, as Bernstein (1971) himself suggests, should not bring the 
child's home use of language into question but simply make him aware that changes in linguistic 
medium, context and audience (i.e. diatypic variation) require corresponding changes in the extent to 
which meaning is rendered explicit in linguistic structure. 
2. 0. Historic polarities 
Carter's (1990) assertion that there exists little or no evidence causally linking analytic knowledge 
with linguistic performance is part of a long tradition that can be traced back to writers such as 
Robinson (1960), Braddock et al (1963) or Elley (1975).7 Partly inspired by shifting attitudes 
towards the notion of 'grammar' within the sphere of linguistics, such writers sought to show that 
the 'prescriptive' model currently taught in UK schools, via such activities as parsing and clausal 
analysis, had little or no impact on children's written composition and/or correction of 'faulty usage'. 
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The assertion that there was a negligible link between analytical knowledge and performance 
received an even more negative formulation in writers such as Wilkinson (1971) who, in his 
summary of the research findings to date, argued that the study of grammar actually had a "harmful 
effect" on written composition insofar as it inhibited the child's expression of meaning. Wilkinson's 
conclusion that the analytic study of language form appeared to have little (or no) benefits in terms of 
skill development was rapidly to become an almost unquestioned assumption of the 'personal 
growth' tradition in EMT teaching that dominated practice for decades to come. 8 As Rosen and 
Stratta (1979: 29) were to argue, in their historical review of the shifting rationales for EMT 
teaching, the idea that knowledge about language improves performance has been "widely 
discredited" and the study of linguistic form "has been jettisoned" generally. While there is little 
reason to query the research findings on which these conclusions were based, however, it is 
important to situate the type of analytic activity that was found to be so ineffective in its socio-
cultural context or, as Carter (1990: 106) succinctly suggests, to deconstruct the "insidious 
connection between social forces and old-style grammar teaching...". 
2. 1. Grammar and the 'common culture' 
The prescriptive grammar that Wilkinson (among others) was to reject so forcefully was 
intimately linked with the introduction of Standard English [SE] in the curriculum and was, as such, 
deeply shaped both in terms of its rationale and pedagogic practice by the ideological connotations of 
the latter. Such connotations are complex. As Cameron and Bourne (1989: 19) point out, in their 
critical response to the Kingman Committee report, 'standard' is a weasel word that can be 
interpreted in at least two distinct (if related) senses: as normal as in 'standard weight' and as 
normative as in 'high standards'. 9 What serves as a symbol of inclusion, of belonging to a 'common 
culture', can equally serve as a symbol of exclusion, of demarcating boundaries based upon notions 
of superiority of that culture vis-à-vis other cultures. The role of Standard English in our schools 
has, at least since the time of the Newbolt Report, shifted uneasily between these two functions and 
has, as such, played a complex role in shaping the contribution of other language variants within the 
wider curriculum. 1° In the first sense, i.e. as the normal language of the nation, Standard English has 
played an important enabling role for many pupils, aiding the spread of literacy skills and — largely 
through this — giving access to a national and increasingly international culture of power and 
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prestige. In the second sense, however, insofar as Standard English has been associated with 
normative notions of culture, it has tended to embody an elitist and ethnocentric view of both non-
standard dialects and other languages spoken by indigenous or immigrant minorities. Inclusion in 
the 'common culture' advocated by Newbolt has historically carried a mono-dialectal and mono-
lingual price-tag. Skutnabb-Kangas and Philippson (1989) go so far as to talk of the 'paranoia 
ideology' of a country monolingual in an international language in which linguistic diversity is seen 
as, at best, irrelevant and, at worst, as a threat to social cohesion and/or national identity. 
	 While 
somewhat exaggerated, such a view usefully highlights the anti-pluralist assumptions that have 
historically acted to shape the language curriculum and which have led to the marginalization of non-
standard dialects and, more recently, minority languages on the spurious grounds that mother tongue 
maintenance might interfere with the acquisition of the language of the dominant culture. 12 As 
Rosen and Stratta (1979: 25) were to put it, the role of Standard English can be seen historically as 
inculcating a "bogus common culture" premised on the "deliberate oppression of the pupils' own 
language". 
Clearly, insofar as the language curriculum has been shaped historically by anti-pluralist 
assumptions — that is, by what may be called a 'cultural heritage' rather than a 'cultural analysis' 
perspective — the study of grammar that accompanied the teaching of Standard English had a 
narrowly explicit purpose. 13  Far from encouraging the child to reflect upon his (and others') use of 
language as a basis for extending his repertoire, it sought principally to inculcate a body of 'facts' 
about a prestigious variant mastery of which was seen as crucial in developing social cohesion and 
national identity. It was, after all, during this period that, as Cameron and Bourne (1989: 11) point 
out, grammar became increasingly identified with notions such as "hierarchy, tradition, order and 
rules". 	 Within such an ideological framework, the encouragement of reflective practice would 
simply have been counter-productive, i.e. would have helped the child to valorize rather than 
devalorize non-standard forms of the language and to question rather than accept anti-pluralist 
notions of a 'heritage culture'. The fact that the explicit study of grammar started not with reflection 
on the child's use of language but with a series of decontextualized 'facts' inevitably implied a 
prescriptive rather than descriptive view of language usage and reliance upon transmissive rather 
than exploratory or 'discovery' methods in mastering such usage. These were the hallmarks of the 
parsing and clausal analysis procedures that dominated the classroom and which constituted, as the 
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Kingman Committee Report (1988: 3) readily admits, a " ... rigid prescriptive code rather than a 
dynamic description of language in use". Considering that the activities typical of this approach to 
language study were not anchored in children's own competence — and very rarely led to the 
productive use of the forms analyzed — it is hardly surprising that little correlation was found in the 
range of empirical studies that emerged in the 1960s between proficiency in grammatical analysis 
and pupils' written composition. 
While writers such as Rosen and Stratta (1979) were doubtless correct to reject the anti-pluralist 
assumptions of prescriptive language study, however, there was from very early on a tendency in 
their approach to over-generalize the findings on which such a rejection was based. The fact that a 
particular study of linguistic form proved irrelevant and/or harmful to a particular form of language 
behaviour, notably written composition, was gradually taken to assume that any study of linguistic 
form was irrelevant and/or harmful to any aspect of the child's expanding skill repertoire. Doughty et 
al (1971: 10), interestingly enough, were to draw attention relatively early to this danger when 
suggesting that the debate over the relationship between grammatical analysis and performance was 
being trivialized and distorted by identifying the former exclusively with the " ... rudimentary and 
inadequate type of knowledge about language" traditionally in vogue. The danger noted by Doughty 
et al of a tendency to over-generalize the findings of research into prescriptive language study has 
been reiterated, more recently, by Stubbs (1991) or Carter (1990: 107) who, while recognizing the 
importance of questioning the misconceptions of the past, argues that many writers tended to take up 
an "... equally unsatisfactory counterposition". Such a tendency could be seen in the 'personal 
growth' model of English that was pioneered by figures such as Dixon (1968) or Rosen and Stratta 
(1979) where the self-realization of the child through mastery of a range of diatypic and dialectal 
variants was seen to occur independently of any conscious focus on the relation between function 
and form. 14 This is not to deny that children were to be encouraged, within this model, to reflect 
upon language but that such reflection was to be restricted to what Barnes (1988: 35) refers to as the 
`higher levels' of linguistic processing, i.e. the metapragmatic features relating language to purpose, 
audience and context of use. Reflection on differences in the social use of language, it was argued, 
rendered attention to the 'lower levels' of linguistic form, i.e. the metamorphological and 
metasyntactic, superfluous insofar as changes in the latter were triggered 'automatically' in the 
service of the 'higher level' choices. 15 
179 
The highly inductive approach followed by supporters of the 'personal growth' model was partly 
indebted, of course, to nativist views on language acquisition which stressed the importance of tacit 
knowledge in the development of competence at the expense of conscious monitoring of input or 
output. 16 The notion that the extension of the child's linguistic repertoire occurs simply through 'use' 
-- that is, through a planned exposure to linguistic variation alone -- can be traced up into the highly 
critical response of writers such as Dixon (1988) or Richmond (1990) to the Kingman Committee 
report. As Richmond (1990: 27) was to suggest, in criticizing the latter's argument that reflection on 
language form could play a positive role in many areas of skilled performance, notably that involved 
in the monitoring and editing of written texts: 
The most important kind of knowledge about language is implicit knowledge ... The most 
important job for the adults who care for the child is to help the child's implicit knowledge 
develop. For teachers, this means providing a classroom environment which supports the 
child's achievements while continually proposing activities which call forth greater powers 
of articulation and understanding. 
Richmond's argument is not necessarily incorrect in that the crucial task of the language curriculum 
may well be to develop pupils' competence - i.e. implicit knowledge - over a range of new dialectal 
and diatypic functions. What such an argument fails to take into account, however, is that mastery of 
secondary (as opposed to primary) skills starts with a conscious reflection on language form which 
only becomes unconscious to the extent that it becomes automated through use. To deny the initially 
conscious approach on the part of the child is to confuse the learning process with the acquisition 
process that precedes it where the relation between conscious and unconscious knowledge is 
reversed, that is, where implicit knowledge (Bruner's 'communicative competence') only gradually 
gives way to explicit knowledge (`analytic competence') through the intermediary of reflection. 
2. 2. 'Language education' 
Attempts to modify the highly inductive approach of mainstream EMT teaching within the 
`personal growth' model that was favoured were not slow to emerge. Writers from Robinson (1972) 
to Mittins (1981) drew attention to the "less than conclusive" evidence on which the new orthodoxy 
was built and Doughty et al (1971), in particular, were to complement their critique of existing 
practice with support for the more analytical approach embodied in Language in Use in which, they 
argued, "... the development of awareness in pupils will have a positive effect upon their 
competence, although this effect is likely to be indirect and may not show up immediately". 17 While 
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there was an ongoing attempt to re-shape the potential links between considered reflection and 
spontaneous use, however, little real progress was to be made before the emergence of the National 
Council for Language in Education (NCLE) and the pioneering work it was to inspire in the area 
defined as 'language awareness'. 18 The historical significance of the NCLE lay in the fact that it 
sought to develop a more coherent approach to the notion of a 'language curriculum' by synthesizing 
what was positive in the two counterposed traditions that had characterized both EMT and, 
incidentally, FL learning. 19 From one tradition, it drew on -- and extended -- the concept of 
language education as a repertoire of functions through which the individual child is able to 'realize 
himself culturally, socially and cognitively. Several reports were to focus specifically on examining 
the relation between EMT and FLL, both in terms of curriculum organization and pedagogic practice, 
as the basis for elaborating a "national policy on language in education". `0 From the second tradition, 
however, it also drew on the importance of clarifying what pupils might need to explicitly know to 
master this repertoire of skills in that, as the 1981 Resolution of the Language Awareness Working 
Party made clear, 'exposure' alone seemed to result in considerable underachievement at major 
points of the continuum, particularly the transfer from spoken to written and from first to foreign 
language use. It was mainly in response to the need to develop a more coherent and effective 
approach to linguistic pluralism that a writer such as Hawkins (1978, 1981, 1984), among others, was 
to advance the notion of a `triviiun' in which explicit language study was viewed as a way of 
developing the cognitive and affective skills needed to bridge the gap from first to foreign language 
study. 
To suggest that the NCLE sought to redefine the relationship between reflective analysis and 
performance does not imply, of course, that such a process was to occur without internal conflict and 
contradiction. On the contrary, the differing objectives, structure and content of the courses that 
were inspired by the NCLE Working Group on 'language awareness' would seem to reflect a 
considerable blur in the initial definition of the concept or, as James and Garrett (1991: 3) were to 
suggest, at least a "lack of clarity and consensus regarding its meaning". Such courses included, for 
example, those seeking to prepare pupils with the 'insight into pattern' deemed necessary to access 
foreign language learning, those seeking to 'sensitize' them to linguistic diversity in school and in 
society at large and yet others (`parenting' courses) whose emphasis was on developing an 
understanding of child language acquisition. As James and Garrett (1991: xii) were to note, 
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`awareness' in such variants might be defined cognitively, in terms of some heightened perception or 
salience, socio-psychologically, in terms of some attitude or evaluative judgement, or sociologically, 
in terms of connections to be made between language variation and the nature and function of social 
institutions. The "creative untidiness" of the movement, as Sinclair (1984: 1) put it — the fact that the 
rationale for course implementation ranged somewhat arbitrarily from the cognitive to social and/or 
affective — was seen by many as a strength rather than a weakness. Rosen (1988: 8), for example, 
was to see in such diversity an attempt to relate aims to the differentiated needs of pupils in much the 
same way as Quinn and Trounce (1984: 9) were, somewhat earlier, to seek to explain the "problems 
of self-definition and evolving clarification" faced by Australian language awareness courses. 21  
While there may be some validity in such a position, however, the 'untidiness' noted by Sinclair was 
possibly less a function of course writers' adaptation to pupil needs and more a case of the ambiguity 
that was embedded in the Working Group's initial definition of the term as it sought to grapple with 
the complex theoretical issues involved. 
Apart from the tautology apparent in the opening line, the Working Group's initial definition of 
the term, in a short paper advanced in 1982, would appear to be relatively precise in viewing 
`language awareness' as part of the child's reflective practice, that is, as part of more general 
metacognitive strategies involved in the monitoring and controlling of behaviour. 22 Language 
awareness involves, the report argues, 
... both making explicit and conscious the knowledge and skills pupils have themselves built 
up in the course of their experience of language and developing powers of observation and 
analysis of the language in their immediate environment and more widely in the world. 
On closer consideration, however, it becomes clear that, as Mittins (1991: 26) was to put it, such a 
definition opens up "a can of worms" or, as van Lier (1996: 79) was to suggest somewhat more 
delicately, that it " ... leaves itself open to an enormous variety of interpretations". It is not simply 
that the definition is vague in relation to the types of knowledge -- ranging from the 
metaphonological to metapragmatic — that might usefully be the object of such reflection at any 
given stage. More importantly, it is not clear from such a definition what the purpose of reflective 
practice is, that is, whether it involves primarily cognitive or affective goals such as 'shaping 
attitudes'. Donmall (1991: 2), some time later, was to suggest that the term 'awareness' did imply an 
affective dimension that is lacking in the Kingman Committee use of the term 'knowledge' but, in 
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the initial NCLE definition, this was still relatively unclear. 23 It is equally not evident from such a 
definition whether the emphasis in terms of reflective practice refers to the child's own use of 
language or to language use generally. There is, as Garrett and James (1991: 5-6) point out, a clear 
difference in this respect between courses which are designed to bridge the 'consciousness-gap' and 
those designed to bridge the 'information' or 'knowledge-gap', i.e. between those which are intended 
to render the child's own implicit knowledge of language explicit and those designed to impart new 
explicit knowledge to improve his understanding of various aspects of social usage. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, there is a lack of clarity as to whether the child's reflective practice — even 
if it is interpreted as focusing on his own use — is designed to refine his existing skills or to facilitate 
access to new ones. Prominent members of the NCLE Working Group were only too aware of such 
ambiguities or possible sources of misinterpretation and, on various subsequent occasions, sought to 
refine the initial definition although, as Quaiffe (1984: 28) notes, with little apparent success. The 
1983 NCLE report (p. 7), for example, was to conclude that possibly the only "... response to the 
difficulties of definition was to suggest that ambiguity in the term is inherent and not disturbing". 
While the NCLE definition of 'language awareness' is open to widely varied interpretations, 
however, -- or what Stubbs (1990: 5) rather negatively refers to as "incompatible educational 
philosophies" -- it would be incorrect to view its influence as entirely confusing. 24 On the contrary, 
as Garrett and James (1991: 4) acknowledge, certain strands of thought within the movement were 
more influential than others and served to advance the underlying theoretical debate in several 
respects. Perhaps the most important example of this was the contribution made by Eric Hawkins 
who had long advocated, in such essays as Language as a Curriculum Study (1978), the need for 
greater cross-curriculum collaboration in the study of "language as an aspect of human behaviour" in 
terms of easing the transfer from first to foreign language study. Quaife (1984: 29-30) argues that, 
while Hawkins' views tended to evolve over time, he is no more successful than others in the field in 
terms of clarifying the term he did so much to promote and that, even in his later work, he tends to 
substitute descriptions of course content for clarity in definition and/or rationale. 25 Such a view is 
somewhat disingenuous, however, in that Hawkins' "utilitarian approach", as Garrett and James 
(1991: 2) put it, simply addresses the key issues in a highly practical way. In the first place, insofar 
as he argues for a 'trivium' in which language study is seen to bridge the gap between first and 
foreign language learning, it is clear that he views 'language awareness' as process-oriented, that is, 
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as a functional tool in the child's expansion of a linguistic repertoire. As he was to suggest (1981: 
53), foreign language study 
... is obviously parasitic on a great deal of linguistic awareness learned in the acquisition of the 
mother tongue. It is a parasitic activity but at a further remove. It is dependent not only on 
analytic competence in the primary activity of listening/speaking, but also to a large extent on 
the secondary activity of reading an alphabetic script with added inter-language interference 
problems due to the learners having already learnt one method of mapping alphabetic symbols 
onto sounds. 
The fact that the awareness developed through reflection on earlier semiotic practice is seen to 
facilitate access to new practices is central, of course, to his notion of a vertical cross-curricular 
language policy. In the second place, it is clear in the description of course content he provides that 
the functional aspect of metalinguistic reflection has both a cognitive and an affective dimension, 
that it both helps the child to develop requisite decoding strategies (`insight into pattern') and respect 
for the validity of difference (`combating prejudice'). 26  Such an approach seemed to integrate the 
work on aptitude developed by Pimsleur (1966) and Carroll/Sapon (1967) with that on motivation by 
Gardner and Lambert (1972). In the third place, in arguing that the child should be encouraged to 
reflect upon what he already implicitly knows, he clearly sees language study as a form of 'reflective 
practice' in which competence precedes analysis. He may seem, in this respect, to share the same 
viewpoint of others within the 'language awareness' movement such as Tinkel (1991: 102) who 
argued that language study should be a " ... guided tour of something of whose functioning they [i.e. 
pupils] are, to a greater or lesser degree, unaware, but which they, nevertheless, intuitively know and 
act upon". Whereas Tinkel's objective appears to be to refine existing skills, however, for Hawkins 
`reflection' assumes validity only as part of a dynamic process of self-realization through mastery of 
new language functions. 
While Hawkins' work is not entirely consistent — and while his notion of a `trivium' tends to see 
language study as occupying a discrete place in the curriculum, rather than being integrated into the 
ongoing process of skill development — there is no doubt that it raised the debate to a higher and 
more productive level. The themes that run through his work — the notion of awareness as a form of 
metacognitive processing, as assuming a functional role in the mastery of new skills and as 
possessing both a cognitive and affective dimension — were to provide the 'baseline' in the 
discussions surrounding both the Cox (1990) and Harris (1990) Committee reports. There may well 
be, as Mitchell (1992) observes, a discontinuity in the way in which the two reports deal with some 
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of these themes, thereby undermining Hawkins' notion of a vertical curriculum in which modern 
languages is seen as "part of a continuous education in language". 27 	 This can be seen, for example, 
in the differing emphasis given to the balance between the cognitive and affective dimension of 
metalinguistic reflection. While both reports tend to view metalinguistic reflection as having a 
functional aspect, Harris appears more concerned with the affective dimension than Cox who focuses 
more around the importance of the cognitive dimension in evaluating and refining written 
composition. 28 If such differences exist, however, it is still important to note that Hawkins' work 
provides valuable insights into the role of metalinguistic awareness within the wider language 
curriculum and a basis on which a more comprehensive model can be built. 
3. 0. The language curriculum as 'semiotic apprenticeship' 
A useful starting point in developing such a model is to be found in Wells' (1994, 1997) view of 
education as a form of 'semiotic apprenticeship'. The metaphor of apprenticeship has been widely 
used in recent years to describe the learning process (Collins et al 1989, Rogoff 1990) and has 
particular advantages when applied to the language learning process. With its roots in traditional 
craft practices, it usefully stresses the socially interactive nature of the child's development, the fact 
that mastery of a range of functional variants is a collaborative process in which the learner's efforts 
are `scaffoldecl' by a more skilled practitioner. 29 While the socially interactive aspect of the 
metaphor is widely accepted, however, less attention is often paid to the nature of this 'scaffolding' 
and its function in the child's growing autonomy as language user. As Wells notes, the crucial role of 
the skilled practitioner is to help the child to make use of what he 'knows' in order to access what he 
doesn't 'know'. This means helping him at any given stage to disembed his existing semiotic 
experience, to reflect upon it and identify those elements which will help him to develop purposeful 
strategies for refining an existing, or mastering a new, diatypic or dialectal variant. Scaffolding is 
geared, in this sense, towards aiding the learner to reflect on what he (implicitly) knows in order to 
form hypotheses that can be (explicitly) tested in further practice. In the case of the beginning 
reader, for example, this can be interpreted to mean aiding the child to reflect upon his implicit 
knowledge of the sound structure of speech in order to explicitly identify those patterns that will aid 
in the process of grapheme-phoneme correspondences and word recognition. Within the 
apprenticeship metaphor, therefore, social interaction 'triggers' metalinguistic reflection which plays 
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a crucial mediating (i.e. self-regulating) role in the child's mastery of a range of (parasitic) semiotic 
practices (as in figure 1 below): 
Scaffolding 
linguistic competence metalinguistic reflection 
(e.g. analysis, discussion, 
(higher level) 	 criticism & explication) 
Deliberate control 
Figure 1: relationship between interaction and reflection in the mastery of semiotic practices. 
It is by rendering explicit what was previously implicit, i.e. by developing what Hall (1994: 53-85) 
refers to as a "collaborative-reflexive epistemological framework", that the child accumulates the 
knowledge needed to guide his action in a more purposeful and deliberate way in mastering a new 
skill The mediating role of reflection between past and future competence is at the heart of the 
apprenticeship metaphor. 
The notion of language development as a form of 'reflective practice' triggered by the interactive 
nature of the learning process is not, of course, unique to Wells. It is implicit in the work of many 
writers from Dewey's (1938) view of learning as a form of 'reflective activity' to Mezirow's (1981) 
or Kolb's (1986) more recent notion of it as a self-monitoring process linking (prior) experience and 
(future) action. 30 The latter's four-stage model is particularly interesting in the way that it seeks to 
refine the mediating role of reflection by dividing it into two separate learning activities, those of 
`perceiving' and 'processing'. The former (or 'critical reflective stage'), he was to argue, seeks to 
identify what in our implicit knowledge may help in accessing new knowledge and the second (or 
`abstract conceptualization' stage) seeks to formulate a course of action by selecting among viable 
options and forming hypotheses to be tested. In Kolb's model, it is the learner's ability to form and 
test out the differing hypotheses identified at the earlier stage of 'critical reflection' that allows him, 
as Boud (1987: 27) was to put it, to associate "new knowledge with that which he already possesses" 
and, thereby, integrate "this new knowledge into the learner's conceptual framework". Reflection 
performs, in this sense, a crucial metacognitive role in allowing the learner to perceive and 
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understand a domain-specific area of knowledge as part on an ongoing process of reinterpretation. 
Kenn is (1987: 141) was to put this somewhat differently when referring to the ambivalent nature of 
reflection, to the fact that it "... looks inward at our thoughts and thought processes, and outwards at 
the situation in which we find ourselves" and which acts to shape the relationship between the two. 
The notion of 'reflective practice' that is embedded in Wells' metaphor of a semiotic apprenticeship 
clearly has important implications for the role of metalinguistic awareness within the curriculum and 
its relation to language development. Primarily, it would suggest that developing such awareness is 
not a question of mastering a body of 'facts' about, or 'attitudes' to, language -- as in prescriptive 
grammar study -- but, on the contrary of, developing a 'mediating' tool in the acquisition of a range 
of functional variants. Put another way, developing metalinguistic awareness is not so much a 
question of what Garrett and James (1991: 5) refer to as bridging the 'information-gap' but, rather, of 
developing a reflective practice which allows the child to bridge the 'consciousness-gap', that is, to 
cultivate a level of self-critical awareness in language use which facilitates access to new linguistic 
functions. Insofar as metalinguistic awareness is seen as closely related to performance, it implies a 
process- rather than product-oriented approach, one that is concerned less with what a child 
consciously 'knows about' language at the end of a course and more with the functional uses to 
which that 'knowledge' has been put at various stages in the development of relevant new skills. This 
is not to counterpose 'process' and 'product' but to suggest that the aim of helping learners to move 
from spontaneous practice to deliberate reflection on language is as much to allow them to do new 
things with it -- to extend its uses as a communicative tool across a range of new 'parasitic' functions 
-- as to build up a set of decontextualized facts about it. 31 As Wray (1994: 9) was to put it: 
... the development of awareness does not entail the learning of a body of facts about language. 
It is a process by which pupils come to understand much more fully than before the nature of 
their own experience as users of language. The degree to which this understanding comes to be 
formulated explicitly in what they say and write about language depends upon their own 
capacities and the judgement of those who teach them ... 
The development of metalinguistic awareness can be seen, in this sense, as a cumulative process in 
which explicit knowledge is progressively constructed, applied and revised in the service of 
extending the learner's linguistic repertoire. If, at the end of the course, the learner is able to respond 
sensitively to the complex demands of a multilingual society -- if he is to be empowered to "see 
through language to the ways in which messages are mediated and ideologies encoded" (Carter 1990: 
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4) -- it is because he has learnt to apply that knowledge concretely in a range of new semiotic 
practices. 
To suggest that metalinguistic awareness plays a functional role in allowing the child to master 
new semiotic practices is not to suggest, of course, that such a process is either uniform or linear. It 
may be true, as Wells (1994) suggests, that the major shift in the child's use of language from 
interpersonal to ideational -- that is, from an accompaniment to action to reflection upon such action 
-- is occasioned by the transfer to formal schooling. Britton (1970) was to capture this shift in 
language use in the child's changing role from that of 'participant' to 'spectator'. 32 It is equally true, 
however, that within formal schooling itself, there are gradations in the extent to which language use 
is disembedded from action and in the extent of metalinguistic processing needed to access and 
master them. Halliday (1989) was himself to suggest that the continuum between language-as-action 
and language-as-reflection is characterized by a series of stages in the 'distancing' process, from 
language as a 'commentary' on action to language as 'reconstruction' of action and, finally, to 
language as 'construction' of action, that is, true analytic reflection where the child is required to " 
exploit the 'frozen' nature of the written mode as it invites us to play around with thoughts captured 
on paper". 33 This distancing process clearly operates both along the 'vertical' and 'horizontal' 
curriculum, to use Hawkins' analogy, i.e. both a-synchronously and synchronously. On the one hand, 
there are distinct differences in metalinguistic processing between, for example, young learners' 
reconstruction of a narrative in oral discourse and older learners' construction of a range of 
specialized written genres, what Wells (1994) calls the organization of the " ... information at their 
disposal in a rhetorical structure appropriate both to their own purpose and to the audience in view". 
On the other hand, as writers from Martin et al (1987) to Derewianka (1991) point out, there are 
equally clear differences in learners' use of language at any given stage in a subject-specific 
curriculum area as they shift between intermediary forms on the oral/active to written/reflective 
continuum. 34 
While metalinguistic processing operates both vertically and horizontally in the curriculum, 
however, it is important to view it as a constantly growing and flexible body of knowledge which 
changes in relation to the child's mastery of semiotic practices. This is hardly unusual in that, as 
Wells (1993) stresses, the process is a reciprocal one. If (metalinguistic) reflection allows the learner 
to access new semiotic practices, the power of reflection is in turn progressively shaped by the 
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cultural tools that he appropriates and the functions that those tools were designed to carry out. This 
is particularly true of literacy skill development, for example, which Vygotsky himself saw as central 
in allowing the child to bring under conscious and deliberate control the meaning-making capacities 
that he had, until that time, deployed spontaneously in oral speech. 35 As Halliday (1993: 111-112) 
points out, mastering the varied and specialized genres of written discourse allows the learner to 
develop a different, more abstract and analytic way of interpreting experience which he labeled 
`synoptic' as opposed to 'dynamic': 
In a written culture in which education is part of life, children learn to construe their 
experience in two complementary modes, the dynamic mode of the everyday common-
sense grammar and the synoptic mode of the elaborated written grammar. 
It is, as he put it, because written texts encourage the learner to view experience as 'product' rather 
than 'process' that they help the child in " ... symbolically managing the complexity and invariability 
of experience, allowing it to be reconstructed in abstract categories which can be systematically 
related in taxonomies". In other words, mastering disembedded semiotic practices acts, in turn, to 
progressively disembed the learner's thinking and promote the capacity for analytic thought since, as 
Moll (1990: 12) put it, " ... it is by mastering these techniques of representation and communication 
that individuals acquire the capacity, the means for 'higher level' intellectual activity". As already 
indicated, this is particularly in evidence in the learning of foreign languages where meaning can 
only be accessed via the 'abstract categories' that operate at different levels of the language system 
from the metaphonological to metasyntactic. 
Within Wells' notion of education as a semiotic apprenticeship, it is important to be aware of the 
interaction of these two processes at work, that of (metalinguistic) reflection as 'mediating' access to 
new semiotic practices and that of semiotic practices as refining the process of reflection. It is the 
interaction between these two processes which explains another feature of the apprenticeship 
metaphor, that is, the shift from dependence to autonomy in the learner's use of his linguistic 
repertoire. As Wells (1994) was to argue, the learner-apprentice not only has to reproduce what he 
has learnt but become a master-craftsman in his own right who " ... creates new artifacts and adds to 
the cultural resources". This shift from other- to self-regulation depends, in this sense, on the extent 
to which he is capable of reflecting upon his own semiotic behaviour and selecting appropriate 
strategies in further `meaning-making'. The efficient foreign language student, for example, is one 
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who is able to independently review and shift between a range of metalinguistic strategies in order to 
`make sense' of spoken or written input. Moreover, becoming aware of what one 'knows' in order to 
select appropriate strategies implies being aware of what one doesn't know -- and may need to know 
-- in the solution of a given task As Garrett and James (1991: 19) suggest, once we know what we 
know, "...we are able to identify what it is that we need to know. By the same token, realizing what 
we do not know helps us to see what we do know. It is in this way that skills improve when we raise 
implicit knowledge to awareness". 
3.1. Guidelines for curriculum implementation 
To suggest that metalinguistic awareness plays a functional role in the development of the child's 
linguistic repertoire may be valid but does not necessarily indicate how it might be incorporated into 
the wider language curriculum or how it might affect pedagogic practice. Quite varied approaches 
have emerged in response to these questions. Writers working within the NCLE tradition, for 
example, such as Hawkins (1978, 1981) or Tinkel (1981), have argued in favour of discrete courses 
seeking to develop specific attitudes or processing strategies for given curriculum areas. Others, 
writing more recently, have adopted a more integrative approach, as illustrated in Carter's (1990: 
118) view that the process of making the child's implicit knowledge explicit ... should not be 
imposed or engineered but rather fostered and supported as naturally as possible, as needed in 
specific contexts and in ways which reinforce the process as one of positive achievement with 
language". While different approaches to the problem of curriculum implementation have their 
respective merits, however, the fact that metalinguistic awareness is defined as having a mediating 
role in skill development would seem to suggest a broad set of guidelines for its inclusion in the 
wider language curriculum. Such guidelines partly overlap with many aspects of 'common practice', 
as enumerated by Stubbs (1990) or Carter (1991), and partly involve an informed critique of it.36 
3.1.1. 'implicit' and 'explicit' knowledge 
In the first place, insofar as mastery of new semiotic practices involves making the child's implicit 
knowledge explicit, competence will normally precede reflection upon it. 	 The notion that 
metalinguistic reflection involves introspection of one's own language behaviour rather than the 
mastery of a body of decontextualized facts is embedded in a long tradition which extends back to 
those writing within the NCLE paradigm, such as Tinkel (1981) or Davies (1986: 3-7). As the latter 
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suggests, the chief task of the teacher should be to find "practical ways" of building on those aspects 
of the (implicit) knowledge children bring with them into the classroom which will help them in the 
refinement of an existing skill and/or mastery of a new one. 37 Bains et al (1992: 10) were to put it 
succinctly when suggesting that metalinguistic reflection describes those "moments (or more 
sustained interludes)" in the learning process when the child is encouraged to stand back and 
consider his own production/reception. Such moments, they continue, 
... build upon what children already know about language, but shift the status of such under-
standing from the implicit to the explicit. Such explicit knowledge can then become a further 
powerful resource for shaping and controlling pupils' language performance and response. 
What is useful about such an approach is not only that it demonstrates the need to build upon the 
positive aspects of the child's language achievement but that it overcomes the dichotomy, as 
highlighted by writers such as Garrett and James (1991: 5-6) between approaches designed to bridge 
the 'consciousness-gap' and those designed to bridge the 'information-gap'. Clearly, insofar as the 
child is encouraged to reflect upon and render explicit aspects of his competence (` consciousness-
gap'), he is preparing to assimilate the new knowledge that is required to build upon and extend that 
competence (` information-gap'). In other words, rendering implicit knowledge explicit is not an end 
in itself but key to accessing and integrating new knowledge. Such a view is distinct from that 
developed by, among others, Carter (1990: 4-5) in the LINC Reader, which sees reflection on 
implicit knowledge as divorced from language performance and related solely to empowering pupils 
in their appreciation of language use and misuse. 38 
A considerable body of literature has been built up, particularly in the area of second language 
pedagogy, exploring the ways in which making implicit [LI or L2] knowledge explicit is crucial in 
the development of effective learner strategies. As Ringbom (1990: 172) suggests, the underlying 
theoretical basis of such literature is that "new learning is largely based on what the learner already 
knows", that is, that success in the L2 depends upon interlingual transfer from the LI and 
(increasingly) intralingual transfer within the L2. The important function of such prior knowledge 
is, as Gass (1990; 135) has pointed out, that it is an "activator of selective attention", i.e. that it 
allows the learner to identify and focus upon those systematic aspects of the L2 input that he needs at 
any given stage to improve productive/receptive skills.39 Gass herself has examined how explicit 
knowledge of relevant aspects of syntax in L1 may aid the L2 learner to deal with, for example, 
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relative clauses in EFL and others, such as Kellerman (1990), have examined the converse, that is, 
how absence of such explicit knowledge in the L I can lead to the development of inadequate or 
ineffective L2 learner strategies. 
3.1.2. 'reflection' and 'action' 
In the second place, if metalinguistic awareness is seen as playing a crucial functional role in the 
extension of the child's linguistic repertoire, it would tend to suggest that it should be fully integrated 
into the language curriculum rather than be organized separately from it, as was often the case with 
courses inspired by the NCLE. As Fairclough (1992: 16) points out, in a critical review of NCLE 
practice, the work carried out under the umbrella of 'language awareness' was often " ... isolated from 
other parts of language education as a separate element in the curriculum" rather than being "fully 
integrated with the development of practice and capabilities". Such an approach would seem to 
imply that what should be the object of metalinguistic reflection at any given stage should be dictated 
in large measure by the semiotic practice currently being mastered. Encouraging children to reflect 
on those aspects of their experience which allow them to 'make sense' of new practices is valid at 
both the intramodal, intermodal and interlingual levels and would seem to suggest a curriculum 
organization based on contrastive analysis. If such was the case, however, this would in turn imply 
the need to develop a cross-curricular language policy which, as van Lier (1996: 19) stresses, 
involves in particular "... cross-fertilization between native and foreign language Is] which is 
insufficiently exploited in the school". 
The dialectic that is set up between reflecting on competence in order to access the knowledge 
necessary to extend it also implies that the traditional dichotomy between 'prescriptive' and 
`descriptive' knowledge would tend to lose its validity. 40 Clearly, to the extent that such reflection 
starts from the child's (or others') 'language in use', the knowledge the child obtains will be largely 
descriptive in nature. As Stubbs (1990: 3) was to put it, in commenting on the Cox Committee 
recommendations, starting from the child's own use of language will allow him to develop a "... 
non-prescriptive, non-judgmental approach to language and its diversity". Such a viewpoint is 
somewhat one-sided, however, in that it overlooks the fact that using that knowledge to access new 
semiotic practices — up to and including a foreign language — also involves recognizing and 
conforming to the prescriptive conventions that govern the latter's use. The young child's reflection 
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on the way word order shapes meaning in a given register may well be descriptive in nature but the 
use of such knowledge to access new registers involves conforming to the prescriptive conventions 
that govern the use of those registers. Writers from the 'critical language awareness' movement such 
as Ivanic (1990: 127-8) may argue that what characterizes a "good language user" is "not just an 
accurate reproducer of patterns, nor someone who conforms to conventions of appropriacy" but 
someone who "understands how language is shaped by social force ... and acts accordingly". 
Certainly, the child should be encouraged to critically reflect on language use and, increasingly, 
exploration of choice of genre and sense of audience in speech and writing, for example, and the 
notion of reading as cultural practice, do raise issues of ideology and of power which pupils are 
aware of implicitly and which need to be made explicit. It is, however, difficult to see how a learner, 
as opposed to a user, can simply disregard the prescriptive conventions of the new semiotic practices 
he is seeking to master without abandoning the attempt to extend his repertoire entirely. The child 
seeking to make the transfer from spoken to written, or from first to foreign language use, is not free, 
as Ivanic suggests, to "choose between conforming to [the conventions of their use], reproducing the 
conventions as they are, or challenging them ..." if he wishes to become competent in either skill. 
3.1.3. 'inquiry' techniques and metalanguage 
In the third place, if metalinguistic reflection implies reflection upon language use rather than 
mastery of a body of decontextualized facts, it suggests a child-centred approach based on 
`exploratory' or 'inquiry' strategies rather than a transmissive method of teaching. Such a view can 
be traced from those working within the NCLE tradition such as Davies (1986: 4), who was to define 
language awareness pedagogy as " ... a commitment to involving pupils actively in their own 
learning", to more recent writers such as Stubbs (1990) or Bains et al (1992) who advocate the use of 
fieldwork techniques. This sense of 'discovery learning', in which children assume responsibility for 
monitoring and evaluating their own performance, is clearly part of the wider literature devoted to 
the theme of 'learner autonomy' and 'self-directed learning' represented by writers such as Holec 
(1980, 1981) and Brookfield (1985). It is important to be clear, however, what such terms mean 
within the language learning context since the notion of 'autonomy' may seem at odds with the 
notion of 'interaction' (or 'co-operation') with a more skilled practitioner that is central to the 
apprenticeship metaphor. In reality, such an opposition is more imaginary than real in that — as 
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Wells (1997) argues — the apprenticeship metaphor includes not only the notion of social interaction 
but also that of the gradual emancipation of the learner from such interaction in the use of semiotic 
tools. It may well be, for example, that the teacher will — particularly in the initial stages — 'scaffold' 
the learning process by guiding pupils towards the 'hypotheses' he wishes them to draw, helping 
them to crystallize such 'hypotheses' in an appropriate metalanguage and apply them to the mastery 
of a new semiotic practice. The more experienced the learner becomes, however, in reflecting on his 
knowledge — on what he knows, doesn't know and may need to know — the more independent he will 
become in formulating the learning goals, choosing and implementing appropriate learning strategies 
and evaluating learning outcomes. Put another way, the more the learner becomes aware of what he 
knows, the more he is able to use that knowledge independently to access new knowledge or, in this 
context, to expand his linguistic repertoire. Metalinguistic reflection can be said, in this sense, to 
occupy a crucial intermediary role between social interaction and autonomy in language learning/use, 
or between other- and self-regulation. 
Such a framework is useful for examining the controversial role of 'metalanguage' in the language 
learning process. The Cox Committee (1989) report, interestingly enough, argues strongly in favour 
of providing pupils with an appropriate terminology, a 'language to talk about language', in that it 
helps to "consolidate what is already known intuitively" (5.3). Rendering what is implicit explicit 
can then, the report continues, play a useful role in allowing the child to consciously reflect upon his 
own performance and discuss that performance with others, particularly in the area of written 
composition. While the report hints at the mediating role that metalanguage can have in the learning 
process, however, it fails to bring it out adequately. The value of metalanguage is, indeed, that it 
allows the child to corroborate a 'hypothesis' stemming from reflection on his own use or, as Cox 
(1989: 5. 9) puts it, to "crystallize a concept". Applying a label to a concept, however, not only 
brings the concept 'into existence' but allows the learner to use it in the extension of his linguistic 
repertoire by focusing attention on those areas of a new semiotic practice that require attention. In 
other words, metalanguage can play the role of a bridge between existing knowledge and new 
linguistic knowledge and, insofar as the child possesses it, it allows him to operate more 
autonomously in language learning/use. 41 A useful example of the potentially emancipating role of 
metalanguage is in the area of the transfer from first to foreign/second language learning. Learners 
who already possess a metalanguage built up through a process of contrastive analysis in the L1 will 
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be much more able to 'make sense' of what is involved in L2 learning and to direct their attention (as 
and when necessary) to pertinent features of the target language. Learners who, for example, are 
aware of such concepts as 'clause' or 'phrase' will be much more able to identify corresponding 
patterns in TL input than those who do not and they will, moreover, be more able to discuss 
differences between the way in which relative clauses are formed in German as compared to English 
as part of the wider 'contrastive analysis' process. 42 
4.0. Towards a cross-curricular syllabus 
If education can be seen as a process in which reflection plays a crucial mediating role in the 
extension of the child's linguistic repertoire, this has important implications for the development of a 
cross-curricular KAL syllabus. In the first place, as Hawkins (1978) has long argued, it implies that 
language development is viewed as a continuum in which mastery of new practices depends on the 
extent to which the child's metalinguistic reflection has provided him with the tools to 'make sense' of 
and 'decode' any such practices. This would suggest the adoption of a 'vertical' approach to language 
planning in which both intra- and interlingual changes are seen as part of a cumulative (if non-linear) 
process rather than as discrete areas in their own right. In the second place, insofar as the semiotic 
practices the child is required to master operate on a cross-curricular basis, it also implies that the 
`vertical' approach to language planning be complemented by a 'horizontal' one. The child's 
extension of his linguistic repertoire operates increasingly through subject-specific genres and, as 
such, subject areas have to understand their role in consolidating and extending semiotic practices 
and the analytic thinking embedded in them. As van Lier (1996: 18) was to argue, a wider approach 
to language planning cannot restrict language education to language lessons but needs " ... a more 
systematic in-depth approach to language education across the child's entire educational career, 
emphasizing the central institutional and social role of language all over school life". 
4.1. Contrastive analysis 
One of the dangers of integrating metalinguistic reflection into the mainstream language 
curriculum is that — as Stubbs (1990) has suggested, citing the HMI Report on Language Awareness 
Courses (DES 1990) — it could lead to a "fragmented experience" without any underlying coherence. 
43 If metalinguistic reflection is seen as playing a crucial role in skill development, however, in 
which the object of reflection is determined by the semiotic practice being mastered, there is no 
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reason why the organization of KAL should be any less coherent or systematic than the organization 
of the language curriculum itself. Indeed, as Stubbs (1990) has himself argued, the most useful way 
of integrating metalinguistic reflection is via a syllabus based on a contrastive analysis structure in 
which it is reflection on what the child 'knows' which leads — through analytic comparison — to what 
the child needs to 'know' at any given stage in time. Hudson (1992: 8), in his analysis of grammar 
teaching, was to explain the principle underpinning this approach when writing that the "ideas, 
concepts and terminology" that emerge from introspection can then be used " ... as tools for helping 
them [i.e. the pupils] to expand their knowledge and to learn to apply it in schoolroom contexts ... ". 
Such a syllabus might be defined as a series of topics based upon the range of diatypic and dialectal 
variants to be mastered — e.g. spoken and written forms, non-standard and standard dialect, written 
registers and styles, LI and L2 etc. — which can be explored at varying degrees of sophistication 
along various axes of enquiry (as in figure 2). 
(a) variants 	 (b) axes of exploration 
1. Form & function 	 2. Variation 	 3. Language & society 
- spoken & written 
- non-standard & standard 
- styles & registers 
- LI and L2 
[metamorphophonological] lmetasemanticl 	 [metapragmatic] 
Figure 2 
Such a model is not dissimilar to that advocated by Ivanic (1990) or Fairclough (1992) in which 
functional differentiation is explored along the axes of 'accuracy', 'appropriacy' and 'social action'. 
Clearly, within such a framework, there can be further refinement in that the various axes can be sub-
divided into more specific themes, as in the case of axis 3 (e.g. Language and society) which will 
involve not only the relation of genre to purpose, audience and context but also to wider and more 
controversial issues of ideology and power. 
One of the most important features of such a syllabus would be, of course, its recursive pattern in 
the sense that mastery of a given language variant corresponds to different levels of reflective 
analysis. The child's mastery of written texts, for example, may involve a shift from the initial 
196 
morphophonological knowledge necessary to 'break the code' through the metasemantic knowledge 
regarding the way in which ideas are organized in extended texts (in terms of their 'coherence' and 
'cohesion') to metapragmatic knowledge, that is, knowledge of the different genres of text related to 
domain-specific areas of knowledge. Others, such as Taylor (1990: 57), argue a further refinement in 
the recursive nature of such a syllabus in suggesting, within each axis, a cycle in which use is 
followed by description of what one 'knows' in context and only later by real analysis. 44 Although 
the pattern of recursivity may vary, however, most would agree with Carter (1990: 5) that the child's 
reflection on language use — the rendering explicit of his implicit knowledge in order to master new 
aspects of the new linguistic variant — is not a linear process but a "recursive, cyclical and mutually 
informing relationship" which extends up to, and includes, foreign language study. An interesting 
example of this might be the development of writing skills where, as Clark and Ivanic (1991: 179) 
point out, reflection on their existing skills will "help learners to become consciously aware of 
aspects they already know" which, in turn, helps them to "put on the agenda aspects that bother or 
interest them". Children who have reflected, for example, on how to structure an informal letter are 
much more able — through the process of contrastive analysis — to focus on and evaluate what will be 
required to structure a formal letter and knowledge of both will contribute to a more abstract analysis 
(at a later stage) of the notion of textual 'formality' and its ideological connotations. Other examples 
of this recursive process can be found in Kent's (1992) study of the role played by a series of 
contrastive features between speech and writing in accessing initial literacy or Jensen's (1992) study 
of the role played by 'language histories' at differing levels of complexity in the transfer from non-
standard to standard dialects. 
4. 2. Cognitive and affective axes 
One of the advantages of viewing metalinguistic reflection as playing a functional role in the 
expansion of the child's linguistic repertoire is that it helps to identify those aspects of language 
which might — at any given stage — constitute the object of such reflection. This issue has, of course, 
long been the source of considerable controversy in that it is possible to build up a typology of 
knowledge sources that can be rendered explicit in terms of accessing new linguistic functions across 
the diatypic/dialectal spectrum. As Barnes (1988) or Dixon (1988), among others, have indicated, 
sources of implicit awareness that can be made explicit operate in terms of a hierarchy of choices 
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from the metapragmatic (that is, the relation of language to its social and psychological context of 
use) to the metaphonological, as below: 
* Metapragmatic 	 A. Context: 	 1. Awareness of audience, situation and relationships. 
2. Purpose(s). 
* Metasemantic 	 B. Message: 	 1. Constituents of the message ('gist units'). 
2. Role choice (in speech, on which style, polite form 
etc., depend, genre style in writing). 
C. Utterance, 	 1. Speech act: elicit, command, state etc. 
Paragraph: 	 2. Organization of information within the utterance or 
Paragraph. 
* Metasyntactic 	 D. Forms I: 	 1. Syntax. 
Metalexical 	 2. Intonation in speech 
3. Choice of words. 
* Metamorphophonological 	 D. Forms II: 	 Medium of production (in speech, delivery, phonology 
etc; in writing, the forms of the medium, including 
spelling). 
Figure 3 
Partly because the hierarchy of choice is so complex, there has been a tendency traditionally to 
prioritize certain of these levels at the expense of others and, in particular, to separate the 'higher' 
levels (options A-C) from the 'lower' ones (options D-E) on the assumption that knowledge of the 
appropriate use of a new skill takes precedence over its structural form. As already indicated, such a 
view characterizes, for example, the work of writers such as Barnes (1988: 35) who, in his 
anticipation of the Kingman Committee Report, was to suggest that the focus be placed upon the 
metapragmatic and metasemantic aspects of language in that they are more "open to direct conscious 
control" than are the metasyntactic or metaphonological aspects. Awareness of the "... situation we 
are operating in and of our own purposes is open to reflection, to discussion with others, and to 
refinement by conscious effort", he was to write, in a way in which awareness of the lower level 
grammatical structures simply is not. In other words, children should be encouraged to attend less to 
the cognitive aspects of the functions they are required to master and more to the affective aspects, 
that is, to valorize the use of certain linguistic behaviours rather than others in relation to differing 
contexts of use. 
If the role of (metalinguistic) reflection is to help the child access a range of new semiotic 
practices, however, it is clear that any attempt to counterpose the affective to the cognitive aspects of 
language is simply counter-productive. The central feature of secondary (as opposed to primary) 
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semiotic practices is that meaning is embedded less in extra-linguistic than in the linguistic encoding 
of the message. Insofar as this is true, accessing and mastering such practices depends primarily 
upon the child's ability to reflect upon his own use of language and identify those structural features 
that will help him to 'break the code' of the new function. It is only by reflecting upon pronominal 
use in his own language, for example, that the child is able to identify, 'make sense' of and decode 
alternative forms of pronominal use in SE or in a foreign language. Accessing a new language 
variant, however, as already indicated, involves the ability to reflect not only upon the systematic but 
also the arbitrary nature of language, what Tinkel (1981: 115) refers to as the "arbitrariness of 
linguistic signs". 45 The child not only needs to identify those structural properties in his existing use 
of language which provide a 'bridge' to deciphering the new code but also to realize that those 
properties vary from function to function in a way which is appropriate to different contexts of use. 
As Crystal (1978) was to put it, children must become " ... polyglots in their own speech and 
writing" by developing a command of a range of formal patterns and "... the knowledge of when 
and where to use them, and the ability to put this knowledge into practice ...". It is largely by 
reflecting on changes in the rule-governed nature of language across given functional variants that 
the child will develop a sense of the 'validity of difference', what Donmall (1984), following the 
original NCLE definition, refers to as the 'affective" aspect of language awareness or what Carter 
(1990: 14) refers to, in relation to the Cox report, as its "social" aspect, that is, one which 
... underlines the benefits in enhanced social tolerance and understanding which can follow 
from greater awareness of language diversity and of the necessary variation which occurs 
within and across language, often for social reasons ... 
What is important to bear in mind, however, is that the affective side of metalinguistic reflection — 
the 'sensitivity' to, and 'tolerance' of, diversity that emerges from it — is not counterposed to but 
dependent upon the cognitive dimension. 46 It is because the child is aware of language as a system 
that he is increasingly able to measure the arbitrary nature of this system as it is embodied in a series 
of semiotic practices corresponding to purpose, audience and context. The cognitive and affective 
aspects of metalinguistic reflection constitute, in this sense, two crucial (and interdependent) axes 
underpinning the language curriculum based on functional differentiation. 
The notion that metalinguistic awareness should be seen as helping pupils to valorize and master 
new semiotic practices appropriate to differing contexts of use has, of course, been criticized more 
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recently by writers within the CLA such as Ivanic (1990) and Fairclough (1992). 47 While accepting 
that there may be a link between "developing awareness and developing capabilities", they suggest 
that uncritical mastery of these new practices may involve an equally uncritical acceptance of the 
social relations in which they are embedded and which they serve to reproduce. As Fairclough 
(1992: 15) was to argue in relation to SE, children's life chances may be enhanced by mastering it 
but the passing on of such prestigious practices without developing a critical awareness of them 
could lead to " ... implicitly legitimizing them and the asymmetrical distribution of cultural capital" 
that exists between them and other, less prestigious, practices. There is a basis of truth in 
Fairclough's approach, in that mastery of a curriculum based on the appropriate use of a range of 
semiotic practices may imply the acceptance of the power relations which underpins that use in a 
given speech community. Such a view — which prompts Fairclough to see CLA as, in contrast, an 
`emancipatory discourse practice' — may add a valuable perspective but is possibly over-simplistic in 
two respects. In the first place, it fails to realize that the principal problem in children's language 
development is not their acceptance of 'prestigious practices' such as SE at the expense of less 
prestigious ones but, on the contrary, the difficulty they experience in valorizing and mastering 
semiotic practices which may not seem relevant to their experience but which are crucial to their 
socio-cognitive development. In the second place, it fails to appreciate that mastery of such semiotic 
practices involves mastery of what Gramsci (1985: 166-7) referred to as "technically superior" forms 
insofar as such forms open for children an increasing range of socio-cultural doors at the national and 
international level. . 48 
Summary 
The relation between metalinguistic reflection and linguistic performance has long been a 
controversial one. The negligible (if not harmful) effect prescriptive grammar teaching was deemed 
to have on certain areas of language behaviour provoked a hostile reaction, particularly in EMT 
circles, to the notion that any form of explicit language study aided skill development. A more 
balanced approach was developed by the NCLE where, despite considerable theoretical confusion in 
the definition of the term and its rationale for inclusion in the curriculum, certain strands of thinking 
did advance the debate in a significant way. In particular, the notion that metalinguistic reflection 
plays a facilitative role in the extension of competence and that it possesses both an affective and 
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cognitive dimension are valuable acquisitions on which any new curriculum model needs to be built. 
Perhaps the most fruitful starting point in the elaboration of a more comprehensive model is 
Halliday's notion of language learning as a process of `functional variation' or that of Wells as a 
`semiotic apprenticeship'. The latter is particularly helpful in re-examining the notion of 
metalinguistic reflection in language development as part of a wider view of the learner as 'reflective 
practitioner' in which the ability to evaluate one's own behaviour is seen as playing a crucial 
mediating role in developing new socially valorized skills. Such a view of the nature and function of 
metalinguistic reflection allows the elaboration of a set of guidelines for its integration within the 
curriculum and the elaboration of a syllabus model based upon the principle of 'contrastive analysis' 
operating along cognitive and affective axes. 
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Notes 
1. The Kingman Committee Report appears bolder in arguing against the view that "conscious knowledge of 
the structure and working of the language is unnecessary for effective use of it" (p. 1) and slightly more hesitant 
in arguing for the view that such knowledge will "... increase their [i.e. children's] ability to control and be 
sensitive to the use of the English language" (p. 17). As Garrett and James (1991: 17) point out, the latter is 
expressed merely as a 'hope' or a 'belief . 
2. Wray (1994: 7) also finds claims for such a link "highly controversial". His equivocation on the issue does 
not simply concern the wider theoretical question of the relationship between knowledge and skill but the 
pedagogical implications of such a relationship. "Baldly stated", he was to argue, "it concerns the question of 
whether linguistic awareness can be taught directly in such a way that it leads to improved linguistic 
performance, or whether increased awareness is itself a product of broadening experience of language use". 
3. The skepticism was to extend as far as the National Association of Advisers in English (1988: 221) whose 
submission to the Kingman Committee explicitly argues that it is difficult to substantiate any claim that 
language study improves performance "... since all the research of which we are aware shows no positive 
correlation between theoretical linguistic study and linguistic performance". 
4. It is to be noted, however, that Fairclough (1992: 15-16), even when arguing the importance of 'critical 
language study' or 'critical discourse analysis', does not deny that the latter should "... be fully integrated with 
the development of practice and capabilities". Clark and Ivanic (1991) or Clarke and Smith (1992) were to 
specifically develop practical strategies for linking the two at different stages in the 'vertical curriculum'. 
5. Brumfit et al (1994: 7) likewise argue that it is further research which is required to resolve such issues 
since "... little is known about the explicit and articulated 'knowledge about language' which they might 
possess, or how pupils might exploit this knowledge to improve performance in the language classroom". 
6. As Goswami and Bryant (1990: 4) suggest in their review of the literature, while there is "... plenty of 
evidence for a connection between children's reading and their awareness of sounds", what needs to be 
developed is an adequate interpretation of such evidence in terms of "cause and effect". 
7. Robinson's negative conclusions were based upon a comparative study published in the British Journal of 
Educational Psychology (1960) "In the present enquiry", she was to write, "there is no evidence that pupils 
from schools where there is a higher degree of association between knowledge of grammar and ability in 
composition, or pupils from schools with a significantly different level of attainment in grammar, obtain, as a 
group, marks in composition which are significantly different from those obtained by pupils from schools with 
neither of these characteristics". 
8. It is even reflected in the Kingman Committee Report (1988: 3) itself which explicitly rejects a "... return 
to old-fashioned grammar teaching and learning by rote" largely because, it continues, the latter was "... 
ineffective as a means of developing a command of English in all its manifestations". 
9. Interestingly enough, Stubbs (1986: 94) notes an even wider range of ambiguities in the use of the term, 
e.g. as an accepted authority as in 'standard work' or a means of comparison as in 'gold standard'. Like 
Cameron and Bourne, he suggests that connotations from such uses only serve to further confuse the debate 
about the role and function of Standard English. 
10. It should be recalled that the Newbolt Report (1921) was unashamed in its bid to use Standard English as a 
means of developing a 'common culture' to offset the threat of class division and conflict. "If the teaching of the 
language were properly provided for", it stated, "the difference between the educated and uneducated speech, 
which at present causes so much prejudice and difficulty on both sides, would gradually disappear". 
11. The extent of this paranoia can be seen in the National Curriculum treatment of non-indigenous minority 
languages spoken in the United Kingdom. As Roberts (1991: 8) was to suggest, their inclusion under the brief 
of the Modern Foreign Languages Working Group was "... based on deliberately excluding them from the 
`common culture' Kingman was asked to define and Cox to concretize". 
12. As Cameron and Bourne (1989: 13) persuasively argue, the National Curriculum takes "... an authoritarian 
position by advocating cohesion around one variety of language (Standard English...) while at the same time 
seeking to contain diversity by downgrading minority languages and nonstandard dialects". 
13. Whereas, Stables (1992: 5) argues, a cultural heritage viewpoint seeks to develop in the child an 
appreciation of common cultural values (embodied in literature), a cultural analysis viewpoint "... emphasizes 
the role of English in helping children towards a critical understanding of the world and the cultural environment 
in which they live". 
14. As Rosen and Stratta (1979: 35) were to put it, "It remains a problem to find a way of linking the study of 
language not only with active learning but also with the productive uses of language. It may be that language 
study will remain in its own niche with only tenuous links with the rest of English". 
15. It is interesting to note that the view advocated by Wilkinson, that grammar study was not only irrelevant 
but potentially harmful, runs like a leitmotif through the responses to the Kingman Committee report. Barnes 
(1988: 34) refers to it, for example, as "ineffective and even perhaps inhibiting", Keith (1988: 79) describes it as 
"unhelpful and as peculiarly alien..." and Finney (1988: 43) argues that it may "hinder the development of 
children's written English...". 
16. The work of Chomsky (1968: 103-4) was particularly influential in its claim that "...A person who knows a 
language has mastered a system of rules that assigns sound and meaning in a definite way for an infinite number 
of possible sentences ... Of course, the person who knows the language has no consciousness of having 
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mastered these rules or putting them to use, nor is there any reason to suppose that this knowledge of the rules of 
language can be brought to consciousness...". 
17. It is noticeable that even the Bullock Report (1975: para. 11.19) was less condemnatory in its criticism of 
traditional grammar teaching than many when it pointed out that "What has been shown is that the teaching of 
traditional analytic grammar does not appear to improve performance in writing. This is not to suggest that there 
is no place for any kind of exercises at any time and in any form". 
18. It is worth noting how Strevens (1986: 8), in his retrospective attempt to explain the emergence of the 
interest in 'language awareness', sees it as a recognition of linguistic pluralism, that is, as a "... response to 
changing problems in the learning and teaching of foreign languages, in the study and teaching of the mother 
tongue, and above all in the education and assimilation of different cultural and linguistic groups within the 
community". 
19. The 1981 Conference Reports, in particular, were concerned with developing a cross-curricular approach to 
language work, as reflected in Mittins' The concept of a school language policy or Sharp's Language policies in 
schools: a critical evaluation. 
20. The Bullock Report (1975) was to be subjected to particular criticism from advocates of the 'language 
awareness' movement, such as Hawkins (1978, 1984), for limiting linguistic pluralism to variation within EMT 
rather than adopting a wider and less parochial view of the languages curriculum which included FLL. 
21. Sinclair (1984: 1) was to make the same point when arguing that "Language awareness courses arise in 
different schools for different reasons, are devised by different groups and are applied at different stages to 
different pupils in pursuit of different objectives". 
22. Interestingly enough, Garrett and James were also to refer to the initial statement -- "Language awareness 
is a person's sensitivity to and conscious awareness of the nature of language and its role in human life" 
(Donmall, 1985: 7) — as pleonastic. 
23. As Donmall (1991: 2) puts it, "A person who is linguistically aware is sensitive to language in use, has a 
good understanding of its nature and functioning which he/she can express clearly and has an appreciation of its 
importance in all areas of life. The words 'sensitivity' and 'awareness' are used to indicate dimensions of 
experience and personal involvement over and above 'knowledge' which is usually associated with factual 
information only and from which the individual can stand apart". 
24. Stubbs (1990: 4) was to dismiss the language awareness movement as one "... appropriated by different, 
incompatible educational philosophies; a back-to-basics view of learning skills; the anti-intellectualism of 
learning-by-doing; a child-centred view that all pupils are expert native speakers of some language; a 
preparation for the world of work; and the view that pupils should have a critical cultural understanding of the 
social conditions in which they live". 
25. As Quaiffe puts it, in relation to Hawkins' (1984: 4) section entitled A Definition of Awareness of 
Language, "A close scrutiny ... will reveal that what it actually contains is nothing more than a brief summary 
explaining who the work is aimed at, what it might consist of and how it might be approached. In other words, 
yet again, a description of the course replaces any attempt to define the state of language awareness which the 
work aims to achieve". 
26. In The Linguistic Needs of Pupils (1979: 37), Hawkins was to argue that foreign language learning "... 
makes demands on empathy, which few other parts of the curriculum make" and that combating the prejudice 
that might preclude such empathy is one of the central tasks of 'language study'. 
27. Roberts (1991: 7-9), in particular, was to suggest that the opportunity offered by the National Curriculum to 
develop a comprehensive language policy was largely wasted. Beneath the facade of 'planning', he stresses, 
decisions were made by subject-discrete Working Parties in the same ad hoc and piecemeal way as in the past 
and were based on the same anti-pluralist assumptions. 
28. Cox (1990: 17) is quite explicit that the main function of KAL is "... to consolidate what is already known 
intuitively" in order to allow children to refine their written work and discuss it with teachers. Harris (1990: 54-
55), on the other hand, downplays the role of conscious awareness in mastering the target language when he 
argues only that it "... can be an important ingredient in learners' progress..." (emphasis added). 
29. As Wells (1997) was to put it, "The third advantage of thinking of learning in these terms is that it 
recognizes the complexity of real-life activities and of the need for collaboration between participants with 
different kinds and levels of expertise." 
30. Dewey's (1933: 12) view of reflective practice is, in many ways, similar to that of Piaget in that it is 
occasioned by ".. a state of doubt, hesitation, perplexity, mental difficulty in which [reflective] thinking 
originates, and ... an act of searching, hunting and inquiring to find material that will resolve the doubt, settle 
and dispose of the perplexity". 
31. It is interesting to note that Widdowson, in his Note of Reservation to the Kingman Committee Report 
(1988: 77), was to draw attention to the latter' s failure to reconcile these two traditional rationales for the 
inclusion of English in the curriculum, that to do with the "functioning of language in adult life" (product) and 
that to do with the "functioning of language in ... different aspects of child development..." (process). Lack of 
clarity here, he argues naturally leads to a lack of clarity in the motivation given for the inclusion of KAL into 
the curriculum. 
32. Britton's (1970: 98) distinction pivots around the emergence in school of 'displaced speech', that is speech 
where "... language is used to refer to or interpret or recount an experience (or experiences) and not as an 
embedded part of the here and now of the experience concerned" (emphasis in original). 
33. Cf. B Derewianka (1990: 199). 
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34. Derewianka (1990: 197-214) provides a useful exploration of the shift in young children's use of language 
in dealing with an action-based project in geology. As she points out, the language used reflected quite differing 
levels of metalinguistic processing as it moved from a simple accompaniment to their exploration of a given 
geographical site to discussing (i.e. restructuring) their experience and, fmally, to classifying (structuring) their 
findings in written texts. 
35. As Wartofsky (1979: xxiii) was otherwise to put it, " ... our own perceptual and cognitive understanding of 
the world is in large part shaped and changed by the representational artifacts we ourselves create. We are, in 
effect, the products of our own activity, in this way; we transform our own perceptual and cognitive modes, our 
ways of seeing and of understanding, by means of the representations we make". 
36. Stubbs (1990), for example, includes in the 'principles' he envisages as underpinning a KAL syllabus such 
items as learning "should start from pupils' own linguistic competence and implicit knowledge", should be 
"based on children's own fieldwork", and should involve a "non-linguistic, non-judgmental approach to 
language and its diversity". Such principles would seem to be similar to those of writers such as Carter (1990) 
and endorsed by others supporting the approach of the LINC Reader. 
37. As Hudson (1992: 10) was to put it with reference to teaching grammar, "We assume ... that children 
already know (unconsciously) a great deal about grammar before they reach school ... This means that most of 
the data needed for a grammar lesson are already in the children's heads...". 
38. While Carter (1990: 4) admits that reflection on implicit knowledge may "influence use", the emphasis in 
his exploration of the value of KAL for pupils focuses upon its role in empowering them to deal with its 
ideological content. Implicit in such an approach, as already indicated, is a tendency to prioritize the affective or 
social aims of language study over potentially cognitive ones. 
39. Gass (1990: 137) sees her work as similar to that of Schmidt (1990) in terms of the crucial role played by 
selective attention — based on prior knowledge — in the L2 learning context. "What I am claiming is that 
selective attention is a major factor in second language development. I have argued elsewhere (Gass 1988a) that 
selective attention results in 'apperceived input'. It is what triggers the learner's noticing of a mismatch between 
the speech of native speakers of the target language and her own organization of the target language, a first step 
in grammar restructuring". 
40. It is interesting that theoretical linguists such as Stubbs (1991) or Hudson (1992) continue to stress the 
distinction between 'descriptive' and 'prescriptive' grammar as if a valid distinction in synchronic linguistics 
was operable in the same way in a diachronic process of language acquisition. 
41. Such an argument does not mean, of course, that metalanguage can be imposed on children as part of a 
crude stage-related process. The Cox Committee Report was quite correct, in this sense, to reject a taxonomy of 
metalinguistic terms and any timetable for its introduction. Children will extend their metalanguage repertoire 
differentially, i.e. as a consequence of the need to render explicit what they implicitly know in order to access 
new semiotic practices. 
42. One of the supportive arguments in favour of metalanguage was the need to develop a language to 'talk 
about language'. This is nowhere more needed than in the area of foreign language learning where attempts to 
make pupils focus upon the differences between the target language [IL] and native language [NI] — as in 
adjectival positioning in French and English — is facilitated precisely by the use of a metalanguage common to 
each. 
43. As Stubbs (1990: 3) was to put it, "Although pupils' knowledge about language should be integrated with 
their use of language, incidental teaching about language is not enough. Important areas of English are neglected 
if the curriculum does not include an explicit focus on how language works". 
44. Wray (1994: 7-14), on the other hand, argues that the axes along which language areas can be studied in the 
vertical curriculum could include the linguistic (i.e. formal), psycholinguistic, sociolinguistic, communicative, 
discourse and strategic. 
45. As Tinkel (1981: 115) was to put it, "A language course would also emphasize the arbitrariness of 
linguistic signs and help the pupil to make a distinction in his mind between the concept and the naming of the 
concept". It is, of course, precisely this process which Hawkins, in relation particularly to foreign language 
study, saw as crucial in helping the pupil to break out of the "monolingual straightjacket". 
46. It is interesting to note that Donmall (1984) tends to see the two dimensions as virtually discrete when she 
writes that "Language awareness programmes "... will have a cognitive aspect (developing awareness of 
pattern, contrast, system, units, categories, rules of language in use and ability to reflect on them to make 
pertinent interpretative judgements and to convey meaning appropriately and effectively); and an affective 
aspect (forming attitudes, awakening and developing attention, sensitivity, curiosity, interest and aesthetic 
response) ...". 
47. As Fairclough (1992: 13) argues, the traditional approach of the 'language awareness' movement appeared 
to be "making up for and helping to overcome social problems (e g making up for a lack of 'verbal learning 
tools' in the home, extending access to standard English to children whose homes do not give it to them)" rather 
than helping children to understand why such problems exist in the first place. 
48. Fairclough (1992: 49), somewhat ironically, invokes Gramsci's notion of 'hegemony' to support his view 
without recognizing that, in the major educational debate in Italy in the 1920s, it was precisely this notion that 
led Gramsci (1985: 182) to favour the introduction of standard Italian on the grounds that it represented a 
welcome step forward over existing regional/class dialects which he associated with "local particularisms and 
phenomena of a narrow and provincial mentality ...". He was particularly scathing of those who polemicised 
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against such an introduction, as in the case of Gentile, whose views he dismissed as containing "a great deal of 
unconscious reactionary thought". 
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Chapter 6 
Metalinguistic awareness and pedagogy 
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Chapter 6 
1. 0. Language curriculum and pedagogy 
As van Lier (1996: 6) points out, in addition to specifying the content of pedagogy, the "...  
purpose of a curriculum is to guide the processes of teaching and learning". The view of the 
curriculum as a form of semiotic apprenticeship in which the child 'realizes' himself through mastery 
of a range of cultural practices is certainly no exception. Learning, within this framework, can be 
seen as a process of reflective practice in which the child's ability to monitor his linguistic 
performance ever more consciously prepares the ground for extending and refining that performance 
across a range of new functional variants. Insofar as there is a symbiotic relation between learning 
and teaching, the task of the latter is clearly to facilitate this process, that is, to provide the relevant 
level of 'scaffolding' (in the Vygotskyan sense) that may be necessary at any stage to help the learner 
reflect on those elements in his semiotic practice that will enable him to extend that practice and 
become more autonomous in its use. It is important to be aware, however, that this process is not a 
linear one. The level of metalinguistic reflection that the child will need to engage in to access a new 
linguistic variant will clearly vary according to the degree of decontextualisation of that variant. Such 
differences will, in turn, have a 'knock-on' effect upon pedagogy insofar as they determine the 
quantity (and quality) of scaffolding that the child will require to identify those aspects of his existing 
knowledge which will facilitate his access to new knowledge. Put another way, the notion of the 
curriculum as an 'apprenticeship' does not downplay differences in pedagogy between different 
language areas but, on the contrary, sees them as integral to the extension of the child's linguistic 
repertoire.2 
The emphasis in the 'apprenticeship' model of the curriculum on what distinguishes pedagogy in 
different language areas runs counter to the growing interest, in recent years, in language 'planning'. 
Attempts by writers within the NCLE tradition to develop a more cross-curricular approach to 
language provision, as in the case of Mittins (1981) or King (1981: 99), for example, were based on 
elaborating a set of guidelines common to all forms of language pedagogy, particularly EMT and 
FLT where " ... the development of functional-notional courses" appeared to offer a "growth point 
for co-operation between English and foreign language departments" . 3 This tendency to define 
cross-curricular planning in terms of a set of common guidelines (or principles) can be traced up into 
writers such as Brumfit (1989) or Stubbs (1986: 248) who, likewise, argues that all language 
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pedagogy should be based upon a "communicative and functional view of language" which is 
"grounded in the ethnography of communication and speech act theory". Consistent with such an 
approach, Stubbs (1986: 36-38) argues, FL teachers — like their EMT colleagues — would benefit 
from training in discourse analysis as a basis for shaping the interactive activities that characterize a 
'communicative' approach to language use. This tendency to interpret a cross-curricular language 
policy in terms of what different language areas have in common is, however, singularly unhelpful in 
terms of pedagogy. As Roberts (1991: 8), among others, has argued, focusing on what the learner 
needs to 'know' in order to be able to function effectively across a range of areas can easily lead to 
downplaying very real differences in the processes by which such 'knowledge' is acquired. As he 
continues: 
... the processes the learner passes through to achieve a given goal will necessarily differ 
according to the precise inter-relation of socio-cognitive variables involved which current 
linguistic models simply cannot account for. 
A functional description of language might be useful in determining the aim of both EMT and FLT 
but will not clarify the radically different means the learner will need to employ to achieve that aim 
in an L1 as opposed to an L2 context or within different L2 contexts. 
This tendency to downplay differences in pedagogy related to different language processes 
operates at both the intra- and interlinguistic levels. At the intralingual level, it is evident in the way 
that writers such as Smith (1971) or Goodman (1979) have sought to disregard the crucial difference 
in metalinguistic reflection needed to master text- as opposed to situation-dependent language uses 
and, at the interlingual level, in the way writers from Widdowson (1978) to Brumfit and Johnson 
(1979) have similarly tended to neglect such a difference between acquiring competence in a 
second/foreign (as opposed to a first) language.' In many ways, the tendency at both levels to slight 
differences in the pedagogic process is indebted to nativist models of language acquisition where 
competence is viewed as an evolving form of 'tacit' knowledge which is achieved independently of 
conscious reflection. While such a view has permeated language teaching generally, however, it has 
been particularly influential in the area of second/foreign language pedagogy where it has tended to 
blur the differences both between L2 and L1 and, within L2, between such areas as 'second' and 
`foreign' language acquisition/learning. As van Els (1984: 130) was to put it, writers and researchers 
often incorrectly " .... equate L1 learning with L2 learning, or assume that L2 learning in a classroom 
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be compared with L2 learning in a natural environment". Insofar as the 'apprenticeship' metaphor 
emphasizes the differences in pedagogy that make up the 'vertical curriculum', it may be useful to 
tease out the relationship between pedagogy and the child's level of metalinguistic functioning, both 
in terms of the difference between L1 and L2 and within L2. 
2. 0. Differentiation between Ll and L2 
The view that it is possible to replicate in second/foreign language learning the same processes 
that characterize first language acquisition has its roots in what has come to be known as the 
`invariant route' hypothesis. 5 Evidence that the mother tongue was acquired in a pre-determined 
way, independent of contextual variables, appeared to emerge from a range of studies in child 
morpheme acquisition carried out within the nativist framework by writers such as Cazden (1968, 
1972), Brown (1973) and de Villiers and de Villiers (1973). The notion of an internally-driven 
process of rule formation that such studies seemed to confirm was soon extended, however, in the 
work of writers such as Dulay and Burt (1973), to second/foreign language learning where a similar, 
although not identical, pattern was detected (i.e. the L1---L2 hypothesis). 6 It was against this 
background that interest in the pedagogic process began to shift away from the teacher to the learner 
insofar as the latter was deemed to possess an 'internal syllabus' developing at its own speed through 
a series of pre-programmed stages. After all, as Felix (1981: 109) was to argue, if the learner 
acquires the L2 in a predetermined way according to his own 'syllabus', what is the purpose of 
seeking to develop a pedagogic syllabus that may contradict the child's and/or inhibit his access to 
the target language [TL]? Second/foreign language learning, he pointed out, 
... under classroom conditions seems to partially follow the same set of natural processes that 
characterize other types of language acquisition ... there seems to be a universal and common 
set of principles which are flexible enough and adaptable to the large number of conditions 
under which language learning may take place. These observations furthermore suggest that 
the possibility of manipulating and controlling the students' verbal behaviour in the classroom 
is in fact quite limited. 
The implications of this hypothesis for second/foreign language learning were considerable. If the 
learner decides what is internalized and when, then the role of pedagogy is primarily to provide the 
meaningful chunks of the TL from which the learner can induce the underlying rule system at his 
own speed. As Prabhu (1985: 169) was to put it, if the interlanguage hypothesis is correct, " ... one 
can no longer expect language pedagogy to benefit from a planned linguistic progression, 
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preselection of language for particular activities or language practice as such. The only important 
requirement is that language data be made available continually". Prabhu was, of course, writing 
specifically within a second language acquisition [SLA] context but such highly inductive 
conclusions had already begun to permeate foreign language circles where writers such as Newmark 
and Reibel (1973: 231) could argue that the task of pedagogy was simply to provide the raw data, 
through a series of communicative interactions, which the learner tacitly "stores, segments and 
eventually recombines" to convey personal meaning in new contexts. 
Perhaps the clearest exposition of the nativist hypothesis in second/foreign language learning has 
been Krashen's (1978, 1981, 1985) Monitor Theory which was to receive a pedagogical application 
in Krashen and Terrell's (1983) Natural Approach. The main principles underpinning such an 
approach — that the learner should be encouraged to induce the TL rule system as a by-product of 
functional use; that he should be allowed to pass through a series of interlanguage states without 
correction; and that comprehension of the TL should precede production — represent a serious 
attempt to replicate the L1 maturational process in the L2 classroom. 8 The underlying assumption 
behind such a highly inductive approach is that, while pedagogy might affect the rate at which the L2 
rule system is acquired, it cannot in any serious way alter the route which, as in L1, is predetermined 
and operates independently of external stimuli.9 It is true that Krashen's model represents a strong 
nativist viewpoint — what Ellis (1993: 5) refers to as the 'zero position' — which has rarely received 
wide endorsement. The principles on which it is based, however, have permeated second/foreign 
language teaching, albeit in diluted form, as can be seen in the early work of writers such as 
Widdowson (1978), Brumfit and Johnson (1979) or Littlewood (1978, 1986) who did so much to 
promote the 'communicative' approach to FL learning. The central tenet of Krashen's work, i.e. that 
language form can only be internalized unconsciously through functional interaction, is reflected, for 
example, in Widdowson's (1978: 19) claim that `usage' can only be internalized through 'use' or 
Allwright's (1979: 168) somewhat more practical view that a "focus on communicative skills ... will 
necessarily involve developing most areas of linguistic competence as an essential part of the 
product". 10 Balet (1985: 178), interestingly enough, seeks to summarize the principles underpinning 
communicative language teaching as fourfold: 
• A second language is best learnt as the mother tongue has been learnt, i.e. by using it in real-life 
situations; 
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• As a result, classroom activities should be 'empirical' in nature and should involve processes 
which are spontaneously creative; 
• Explicit study of the grammatical structure of the language and appeal to the students' cognitive 
skills should be discarded or kept to a minimum; and 
• Real life should be brought into the classroom in the form of 'authentic' materials and tasks. 
Such principles were also to structure the growing interest in immersion programmes as far afield as 
Canada (Canale and Swain, 1980; Swain, 1981) to Australia (Fernandez, 1992) where the teaching of 
the second/foreign language through a content syllabus was seen as the most fruitful application of 
Krashen's highly inductive model. As Fernandez (1992: 4) was to put it, if it is accepted that one " 
learn[s] language best when ... attention is focused on understanding messages rather than 
learning about the language", it follows that the most effective environment for second language 
learning would "provide maximum exposure to the target language communicating meaningful and 
interesting information". 
2. 1. 'schematic' and 'systemic' knowledge 
While the highly inductive premises underpinning second/foreign language learning were widely 
accepted, however, they were rapidly challenged. It is not simply that the 'invariant route' 
hypothesis was questioned as being empirically weak (McLaughlin, 1978, 1987) or as confusing an 
order of acquisition with an order of accuracy (Widdowson, 1990). u More important still, the notion 
that 'usage' can be internalized through 'use', as in LI, simply fails to appreciate the differing 
contextual variables shaping the two processes and which have a major effect upon the quality and 
quantity of input. In the first place, the L2 learner simply does not possess the same opportunities for 
communicative interaction as the L1 user and, in the second place, he is denied the contextual clues 
to meaning that might sustain such interaction while the rule system is being internalized. 
Widdowson (1990: 110) was, somewhat later, to draw attention to such differences when examining 
the way in which 'schematic' and 'systemic' knowledge interrelate in the L1, as opposed to L2, 
process. In the former, he argues, the child's schematic knowledge (i.e. what Romaine (1984) refers 
to as 'real world knowledge') provides both the impetus for communication and the framework in 
which such communication assumes meaning. It is precisely because he is able to rely upon 
contextual clues to meaning to structure his interaction that he can communicate while still 
internalizing the rule system, that is, at various stages of the interlanguage process. Such a process 
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cannot be replicated in exactly the same way in the L2, however, he argues, simply because the 
relationship between 'schematic' and 'systemic' knowledge has changed or, more precisely, been 
reversed. The learning context simply cannot provide the same impetus for communicative 
interaction (Searle's 'intention to mean') as in an L1 acquisition process or the same pragmatic 
support to the internalization of the rule-system. It is because of the 'poverty of the stimulus', as 
Littlewood (1986) puts it, that the L2 learner — as opposed to the LI user — is compelled from the 
very early stages in the learning process to pay greater attention to form rather than function, to the 
medium of language rather than the message it conveys. 12   It is only by exploring how the linguistic 
structure encodes meaning that he is able to overcome the impoverished extra-linguistic context and 
identify what Jakobovits (1973: 278) refers to as the " elaborate system of abstract rules" governing 
II, use. 
For Widdowson (1990: 161), the fact that the L2 learner does not have the same opportunity — in  
terms of quantity and quality of input — to induce the underlying rule system means that, more often 
than not, he ends up in communicative-led learning with a "patchy and imperfect repertoire of 
performances" without any underlying competence. The criticism that Widdowson directed, 
somewhat belatedly, at the communicative approach is reflected in the findings of a range of process-
product studies such as Mitchell (1981), Spada (1986) or Higgs and Clifford (1982) who were 
likewise to argue that lack of attention to linguistic form, while not impeding lower level 
transactional skills based on the internalization of formulaic phrases, was a serious obstacle to higher 
level communicative interaction.. 13 As the latter (ibid. 61) were to put it: 
Broadening the range of language proficiency expected from our students absolutely changes 
the rules of the game. Paralinguistic communication strategies become inefficient and counter-
productive, and speakers whose communication repertoires are thus limited are rendered 
incapable of efficient or even marginally successful communication. 
What was to emerge from such findings was a clear suggestion that learning outcomes are directly 
related to instructional differences and, more specifically, that accuracy in the use of the IT is 
directly correlational with an emphasis in the instructional process upon identifying form-meaning 
relationships. A similar response was to emerge from the immersion programmes that had been 
undertaken, within the Krashen paradigm, in Canada and in Australia. Canale and Swain (1980), for 
example, were relatively early to question the prevailing view that mastery of TL, rules would occur 
`incidentally', i.e. as a by-product of meaningful interaction through a content-based syllabus. They 
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stressed the preponderance of learner errors that arose through a lack of focus on form and the 
tendency for such errors to fossilize and develop into a classroom 'pidgin'. Others, such as Bibeau 
(1984), Harley and Swain (1985) and Pellerin and Hammerley (1986), were to go even further in 
their criticism. As Hammerly (1991: 215) was to put it, to say that immersion students 'do not 
perform at native-like levels' of proficiency is a misleading understatement. "These students' speech 
and writing are very far from native-like -- nowhere near it. Theirs is a terminal classroom pidgin -- 
`Frenglish' in Canada (and Spanglish' in the US)." The fact that immersion courses failed to 
develop an accurate use of the TL — that is, that the errors tended to fossilize relatively rapidly — 
would seem to contradict the notion, implicit in Krashen's model, that errors are a necessary part of 
the learner's interlanguage which spontaneously self-correct. On the contrary, in a context where 
input is both limited in quantity and relatively random in quality, such self-correction seems unlikely 
in the absence of a deliberate teacher-induced focus on form. 
2.1.1. 'medium' and 'message' 
For Widdowson, the root cause of the error behind nativist approaches to second/foreign language 
learning is that they fail to grasp the reversal between schematic and systemic knowledge occasioned 
by socio-cognitive variables or, as Vygotsky (1962: 110) had put it, the fact that " ... analogous 
systems develop in reverse directions, at the higher and at the lower level.". While, in Ll, implicit 
knowledge of the system develops through communicative interaction, in L2 the relative lack of 
opportunities for such interaction mean that the learner has to focus attention on that system in order 
to access meaning, that is, has to use high level metalinguistic processing developed, as indicated, 
primarily through Ll literacy skills. Such a view is central to McLaughlin's (1987, 1990) critique of 
Krashen's highly inductive approach insofar as it argues that second/foreign language learning, 
unlike first language acquisition, involves a passage from 'controlled' (i.e. conscious and deliberate) 
to automatic (i.e. unconscious and spontaneous) processing. As he was to put it (1990: 125), 
... a complex cognitive skill, such as acquiring a second language, involves a process whereby 
controlled, attention-demanding operations become automated through practice. This is essent-
ially learning through accretion, whereby an increasing number of information chunks are 
compiled into automated procedures. In addition, however, there are qualitative changes that 
occur as learners shift strategies and restructure their internal representation of the TL. 
McLaughlin's view is reflected in Littlewood's differentiation (1984) between 'pre-communicative' 
and 'communicative' strategies, Skehan's (1998) between`structure-oriented tasks' and 
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`communication-driven tasks' and Dodson's (1985: 332) between 'medium' and 'message' oriented 
speech where even bilingual learners are seen to develop strategies "... initially satisfying a linguistic 
need in order to satisfy a subsequent non-linguistic need". This reversal in the mastery of the two 
processes can be seen, as in Roberts (1991), as operating along four major 'axes' or interlinked 
dichotomies. 
• Medium/message: In L1 acquisition, the child only gradually becomes aware of what he 
spontaneously uses, i.e. is concerned not so much with what language is as with what it does. 
This initial focus on 'message-oriented' speech is hardly accidental in that extra-linguistic clues 
to meaning are so rich that he has little need to rely upon awareness of how linguistic form 
encodes messages to understand/convey meaning. This process is necessarily reversed in an L2 
context, however, precisely because of the changing relation between cognition and context. 
Reduced contextual clues mean that the learner (as opposed to the user) can only access meaning 
by focusing consciously on language form and it is only as a result of controlled practice that he 
can internalize that form to such an extent whereby attention can be switched from the 'medium' 
to the 'message', i.e. to spontaneous use. 
• System/function: In L1 acquisition, the child develops a mastery of the language system largely 
as a by-product of functional use, i.e. 'propositional' meaning encoded in that system is accessed 
via 'illocutionary' meaning in achieving interpersonal goals. It is no accident, as Halliday 
(1975) suggests, that the child's representational use of language — that is, his ability to convey 
meaning depending less on its contextual interpretation than on its linguistic formulation — is 
only gradually acquired. Such a process is again reversed in a second/foreign language context 
precisely because the same opportunities for communicative interaction do not exist and, even if 
they did, would be ineffective in the more limited exposure time available. In a situation where 
there is no genuine 'intention to mean', the learner is initially constrained to focus more upon the 
propositional meaning encoded in the language system which only gradually, through a range of 
appropriate activities, assumes illocutionary force. 
• Accuracy/fluency: In L1 acquisition, the use of language is largely unplanned and contextual 
clues to meaning often overcome 'distortions' in the message caused by linguistic errors. It is 
largely because communication is not impaired that adults focus more on the correction of 
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semantic rather than systemic errors. In an L2 context, however, where extra-linguistic clues to 
meaning are sharply reduced and language becomes largely its own context, such errors 
inevitably assume a different role. If meaning is dependent more upon accurate use of the 
language system, errors in that system (i.e. in the propositional use of language) have 
considerably more potential for distorting the message than in an L1 acquisition process. Error 
correction necessarily focuses, therefore, more on form than on meaning since what might be an 
effective 'utterance' in the context of language use might be a defective one in the context of 
language learning. Attempts to differentiate between those systematic deviations which impede 
communication and those 'lapses' that do not (Corder, 1972) are simply unhelpful in this sense. 
As Borman (1983) has pointed out, it is difficult — if not impossible — to distinguish between the 
two categories in a cumulative learning process since an error that might not impede 
communication in one situation may well be indicative of, or lead to, a systematic deviation that 
will impede it in another. 14 
• Meaning/sense: As Vygotsky observed (1962), communication depends upon a common 
conceptual framework. In LI acquisition, the child achieves such a framework as a result of 
successive approximations in which the 'sense' (i.e. pragmatic meaning) of an item only 
gradually gives way to its 'meaning' (semantic meaning). In an L2 context, however, this 
process is once again reversed in the sense that the learner's already well-developed conceptual 
repertoire allows him to access meaning directly through the linguistic form. It is only 
gradually, by the recycling of such items across a range of contexts, that he is able to concretize 
and thereby enrich them, i.e. develop an increasing appreciation of their 'sense' and, as 
Volosinov (1973) argued, to transform a 'signal' into a 'sign'. 15 
For Roberts, as for McLaughlin or Widdowson, what is critical about the reversal in process between 
LI and L2 is precisely the conscious attention to form which characterizes the latter. The fact that 
the learner has no 'self-generating communicative needs' means that — at least in the initial stages — 
he is compelled to pay attention to the linguistic as opposed to extra-linguistic structuring of 
meaning. Learning an L2 implies, in this sense, as indicated in Chapter 3, a greater degree of 
metalinguistic awareness in terms of being able to identify those formal properties which the learner 
will have to attend to, at various levels, in order to access that meaning. 
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2. 2. 'attention enhancing strategies' 
One of the principal features of research into L2 development in the past decade or so has, indeed, 
been a marked shift away from unconscious to conscious attention to language form, i.e. to 
metalinguistic processing. As Cohen (1990: 108-109) observes, the 'incidental' approach to L2 
learning -- that is, the view that mastery of TL form is 'incidental' to communicative interaction --
has increasingly been seen as ineffective and as resulting in an unnecessary fossilization of the 
16 learner's interlanguage. Conscious attention to form has, on the other hand, been viewed as critical 
to the learning process precisely because it allows the learner to 'identify' those features of the IL 
that he needs to master at any given stage. As Nagle and Sanders (1986: 17) were to suggest, in 
discussing what is involved in comprehension of TL input, "... attending involves the application of 
mental energy to processing tasks and may range from focusing on specific features of input to 
controlled processing for retrieval". Attention, in such a perspective, is clearly a metalinguistic act 
that transforms 'input' into Intake' by allowing the learner to identify and control those features that 
need to be internalized. Schmidt (1990: 129) argues that there are potentially three levels in second 
language acquisition/learning in which conscious attention can play a role: that of 'noticing' the input 
(as opposed to 'subliminal' learning); 'paying attention' to features of it (as opposed to 'incidental' 
learning); and, finally, seeking to `understand' the features identified and generalize upon them 
through hypothesis-testing (as opposed to 'implicit' learning). While Schmidt himself argues that 
not all levels are necessarily invoked at any given point in the learning process, what is clear is that 
the ability to notice, attend to and generalize upon the features identified depends in large measure on 
what the learner brings to the learning process. 17 As Gass (1990) was to suggest, if the learner is, in 
particular, to transform 'input' into 'intake', he must already 'know' the features he wishes to 
internalize or, at the very least, be able to highlight them by comparing what he 'knows' with what 
he doesn't know. 
For Gass, as for Ringbom (1990) or Lightbrown (1990), the process by which previous 
knowledge allows the learner to identify and access new knowledge operates at both the inter- and 
intralingual level. In the early stages, the L2 learner uses knowledge of his mother tongue to identify 
the required TL features and, as competence in L2 grows, this is gradually replaced by knowledge of 
the L2, along the lines of Selinker's (1969, 1972) interlanguage [IL] model. Differences exist, it is 
true, as to whether the role of such prior knowledge consists of provoking a match or mismatch with 
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TL input. In the case of Gass (1990: 135), for example, the transfer from 'input' to 'intake' (or what 
she refers to as 'apperceived input') is clearly based upon a mismatch between what is known and 
what the learner needs to know. As she puts it: 
With regard to second language learning, attention is what allows a learner to notice a mis-
match between what she produces/knows and what is produced by speakers of the target 
language. Readjustment of one's grammar is triggered by the perceptibility of such a mis-
match. 
In the case of Ringbom (1990: 172), on the other hand, it is the 'perceived similarities' between 
knowledge of the L1 and what is required to be learnt in the L2 which facilitates the child's 
progressive mastery of form. 18 While such differences may exist, however, the emphasis in both 
writers upon the conscious application of prior knowledge to identify and access new TL features is 
clearly counterposed to the nativist tradition represented by a Felix (1981) or Krashen (1982). 
Various process-product studies have, moreover, sought to empirically demonstrate the impact of 
selective attention on mastery of various aspects of TL form even in second language acquisition 
contexts, as in the case of Tarone (1983), Hulstijn (1989), Bardovi-Harlig (1987) and, in particular, 
Ijaz (1986) where the access of non-central meanings of lexical items (in this case prepositions) was 
seen to occur only when those meanings had been made 'linguistically salient', that is, when the 
learner had been helped to selectively attend to them. The growing link in such findings between 
attention to form and efficiency in language learning has prompted others to stress the importance of 
linguistic 'consciousness-raising' as a pre-requisite for second/foreign language study. Both 
Sharwood-Smith (1981) and Rutherwood and Sharwood-Smith (1985), for example, have argued that 
such programmes should seek to aid the learner to make efficient use of the resources available in the 
learning process, primarily to be able to reflect upon his own 'implicit' knowledge and to use such 
knowledge to implement what Cohen (1990: 111) refers to as 'attention-enhancing strategies' in 
making sense of and accessing the input. 9 
2.2.1. 'scaffolding' the learner 
One of the important implications of selective attention in the L2 acquisition/learning process is in 
the area of pedagogy. As indicated earlier, the notion that TL form was mastered incidentally 
through communicative interaction led to a highly inductive approach in which the role of pedagogy 
was simply to provide the 'raw data' on which the learner's 'internal syllabus' would operate. In a 
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situation where conscious attention to form is seen as a pre-requisite for efficient learning, however, 
the role of pedagogy plays a much more proactive role in 'scaffolding' the learner in order to help 
him perceive the intended regularities in the TL input and, thereby, turn 'input' into 'intake'. This 
means, in particular, that the 'roughly-tuned input' that was crucial to Krashen's 'natural approach' 
should give way to input that is based upon clearly defined selection and sequencing criteria. 
Choosing what Hornsey (1981) refers to as items of 'high transfer value' -- i.e. items capable of 
generating utterances across a range of contexts -- and sequencing them in a progressively more 
complex way would appear to be crucial in helping the learner to identify what he needs to 
internalize. 20 Such a view is clearly implied in Rutherwood and Sharwood-Smith (1985: 275), for 
example, who suggest the use of instructional strategies which " ... draw the attention of the learner 
to specifically structured regularities of the language, as distinct from the message content". Gass 
(1990: 137) is even more specific. Explicit instruction, in her opinion, 
.... facilitates student awareness of the target language forms and/or meanings and of the 
discrepancies between what they themselves have constructed for their second language and 
the system which becomes apparent to them (through instruction) from the target language 
data they are confronted with. In other words, it acts as a selective attention device. 
It is not enough, however, simply to aid the learner to perceive the regularities that need to be 
internalized since, as in Schmidt's (1990) three-level model, he also needs to test out his hypotheses 
and draw significant generalizations on the basis of relevant feedback. Such a process is facilitated 
by the grading of input in such a way that the learner is able to move from controlled interaction with 
the teacher to growing autonomy in his responses or, as Ellis (1994: 1) was to put it, from making to 
testing hypotheses "in a search for structure". 
One of the potential dangers of the current emphasis upon the role of selective attention in L2 
acquisition/learning is the relationship between learning and communication strategies. As Roberts 
(1994: 10) points out, while the current literature correctly stresses the importance of a conscious 
attention to language form in the initial stages, there is a corresponding lack of clarity at times — as in 
Gass — as to how the learner, having internalized a given item, can be aided to use it unconsciously in 
interaction with others, i.e. move from 'knowing' about it to 'doing' things with it. Such a process 
will not arise spontaneously unless, as Roberts (1994: 11) continues, it forms "part of a planned cycle 
of activities in which the learner is encouraged not only to consciously form hypotheses about a 
given item — and to test out those hypotheses in practice — but to use the item spontaneously for 
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communication". 21 Useful models describing the process by which an initially conscious focus on 
form gives way to an unconscious focus on function can be found in Hawkins' (1981) four-stage or 
Allen's (1983: 36) three-stage 'variable-focus' model moving from structural mastery to experiential 
use on a cyclical basis: 22 
Level 1 	 Level 2 	 Level 3 
Structural 	 Functional 	 Experiential 
Focus on language 	 Focus on language 
	
Focus on the use of 
(formal features) 	 (discourse features) 	 language 
(a) structural control 	 (a) discourse control 	 (a) situational or topical 
control 
(b) materials simplified 	 (b) materials simplified 	 (b) authentic language 
structurally 	 functionally 	 use 
© mainly structural 	 © mainly discourse 	 © uncontrolled, free 
practice 	 practice 
	
practice 
Figure 1 
The latter is not dissimilar from Roberts (1991) three-stage 'input-practice-use' model which also 
views L2 learning as a process from structural mastery to functional use of new linguistic items (Cf. 
Appendix 5). In the first (i.e. input) stage, the task of pedagogy is to help the learner — through 
sensitively applied selection and sequencing criteria — to use his existing metalinguistic knowledge of 
language to selectively attend to those features in the input that need to be internalized. 23 In the 
second (i.e. practice) stage, the learner needs to be encouraged to test out the hypotheses he has 
formed regarding the TL item and to develop a generalized understanding of its use, based on 
relevant feedback, so that, in the third (i.e. use) stage, he can use the n, item more flexibly to convey 
personal meaning. As in the Allen model, the process between the teacher-scaffolded activities of the 
first stage to the autonomous activities of the final stage reflect a shift, on the part of the learner, 
from attention to form via internalization to functional use, that is, to the use of language to achieve 
non-linguistic goals. 
3. 0. Differentiation within L2 
There has been a growing recognition in recent years that attempts to replicate what Grenfell 
(1990: 8) refers to as the 'natural process of language' acquisition in the L2 context are simply 
ineffective. Second language acquisition/learning is, as Hawkins (1981) suggested, an even more 
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`parasitic' activity than reading and, as such, depends ultimately on the (meta-) linguistic knowledge 
the child brings with him to make sense of the process and 'crack the code'. Skehan (1985: 17) was, 
as indicated, to view such knowledge as a form of 'aptitude' which seems to involve "both a 
language processing ability as well as the capacity to handle decontextualised material". Whether it 
is referred to as metalinguistic knowledge or aptitude, however, it is this capacity that the language 
teacher can arouse and direct in helping the learner to identify (`attend to') those aspects of the TL 
input that are to be internalized. Such a process, it might also be pointed out, is true of all second 
language acquisition/learning processes — apart possibly from child bilingualism — insofar as the 
learner already 'possesses' a language whose knowledge can be utilized to help focus his attention, in 
a variety of ways, upon specific features in the acquisition/learning of the second language. As 
Vygotsky (1986:159-60) pointed out some considerable time before, the L2 learner does not return to 
the "immediate world of objects" in his acquisition/learning of the L2 but "... uses the semantics of 
his native language as its foundation". 
While all L2 processes will tend to be parasitic upon the development of Ll, however, they will 
clearly do so to quite different extents, depending upon the opportunities for communicative 
interaction in the L2 available to the learner, that is, on the quantity and quality of the input. A child 
who has access on a daily basis to the it in a range of communicative exchanges within the host 
community (e.g. second language acquisition) will rely less upon the 'knowledge' built up through 
the L I to access the L2 than will a child who is exposed to an L2 solely in the acquisition-poor 
context of the classroom (e.g. foreign language learning). If, in the past, differences between the L I 
and L2 learning processes were downplayed or ignored, however, the same disregard has often 
developed with respect to similar differences between L2 acquisition/learning processes in terms of 
exposure to the TL. Bialystock and Ryan's (1985a, 1985b) model is illustrative of the problem in that 
it assumes that all L2 processes will develop unidirectionally along the same axes as L 1 acquisition, 
that is, from unanalyzed to analyzed knowledge and from low to high control. As Hulstijn (1990) 
points out, such a view not only downplays (or ignores) the difference in contextual variables 
between L 1 and L2 but, equally, between non-instructed and instructed processes within the L2. 
Such a blur can lead, he argues, to incorrectly assuming that activities which require low levels of 
analysis and control in one process necessarily do the same in another. One example of this might be 
the case of spontaneous conversation which, in an acquisition-poor FL context, may very well 
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require much higher degrees of metalinguistic processing than in an acquisition-rich SLA context on 
account of the lack of opportunities for communicative interaction. 
Stern (1983) has severely criticized the tendency to blur the difference between instructed and 
non-instructed L2 contexts, as in the Bialystock model, or to use data drawn from the latter as the 
basis for motivating changes in pedagogy in the former. Phillipson (1990: 45) goes further in 
suggesting that the blur between second and foreign language processes, as that between ESL and 
EFL, can often be an educational 'life or death' issue affecting children's life chances and argues that 
course planning " ... should take the specificities of each context as its starting point ... ". 24 A useful 
example of the attempt to show the impact of differing socio-cognitive variables on learners' 
strategies can be seen in Pica's (1983: 495) comparative study between learners in 'natural', 	 d' 
and 'instructional' contexts. While somewhat indebted to Krashen, such a study concluded that "... 
differing conditions of L2 exposure appear to affect acquirers' hypotheses about the target language 
and their strategies for using it". A similar study was carried out by Smith (1997) using a similar 
typology of learning/acquisition contexts, that is, second language acquisition, immersion and 
foreign languages which are posited as points along a spectrum of increasing decontextualisation. It 
may be useful to re-examine the differences between such contexts with the emphasis upon teasing 
out the pedagogical implications of the shifting relationship between metalinguistic processes and 
context-embeddedness. 
3. 1. Second language acquisition/learning 
As Littlewood (1984: 2) was to put it, a second language (as opposed to a foreign one) has " 
social functions within the community in which it is learnt" and the second language learner has 
contact with it usually both through exposure to it in the community and in school. Partly because of 
the incentives to interact with members of the host community to fulfil a variety of needs and partly 
because of the extra-linguistic clues to meaning that 'scaffold' such interaction, it is widely expected 
that second language learners will rapidly develop communicative competence with little (or no) 
necessity for formal L2 study. As Townsend's (1971: 38) survey of LEA reaction in the UK to the 
integration of bilingual pupils into mainstream education revealed, the majority view was that 
"immigrant infants ... will pick up the language just as a child picks up his native language from an 
early age". There is some truth in the view that acquisition of oral competence in L2 bears a strong 
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resemblance to the acquisition of such competence in L I insofar as, as Cummins & Swain (1986: 
153) note, "context-embedded communication derives from interpersonal involvement in a shared 
reality which obviates the need for explicit linguistic elaboration of the message". This is 
particularly the case with young second language learners in mainstream classes who, as John-
Steiner (1985: 352) points out, are "resourceful in maximizing their communicative means" largely 
because they focus their interests on "shared behaviour" and tend to "limit their talk to the activity at 
hand", that is, replicate the L1 process of using language in the initial stages as an accompaniment of 
action. While it is partly true that the young second language learner does follow the L 1 route in 
developing oral proficiency, however, it should be noted that he rarely achieves the same level of 
proficiency as his L1 counterpart for whom it is a 'primary' rather than 'secondary' skill. This is 
partly because he may rely, in the early stages, upon use of the L1, particularly within the minority 
community, and in the absence of formal L2 tuition, his L2 interlanguage may fossilize at a stage 
where communicative interaction is no longer impeded. In addition to cognitive reasons, there may 
well also be affective ones in that his own minority community may not valorize the L2 and/or the 
learner may himself feel rejected by the L2 host community. 
While the second language learner in mainstream classes may seemingly develop a sufficient level 
of communicative competence to meet his needs, this is by no means the case with the more analytic 
competence required to access context-reduced uses of language, as in the case of written texts. On 
the contrary, as Cummins and Swain (1986: 207) have stressed in the contrast between surface 
fluency (BICS) and academic proficiency (CALP), there is a major distinction in L2 as there is in LI 
between " ... using language in a richly contextualised situation and using language where clues to 
meaning come primarily from the text itself'. In L1, the child's ability to cross this gulf depends, as 
has been argued, upon disembedding those aspects of his oral competence which can serve as 
decoding strategies for accessing the new skill. In L2, partly because the child's L2 oral competence 
may be too 'weak' to provide a base for metalinguistic processing, the only way he can cross that 
gulf is by relying upon the development of such processing in L1. This is, of course, the basis of 
Cummins (1986) 'Common Underlying Proficiency' theory in which it is the metalinguistic 
processing built up through literacy skill development in L I which can be transferred to L2 text-
related language use to compensate for weak L2 oral competence. As the latter (1986: 211) was to 
argue, evidence seems to suggest 
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.... that context-embedded grammatical L2 skills develop primarily as a function of exposure 
to and use of the L2 in the environment whereas L2 academic skills are relatively more dep-
endent on cognitive attributes of the individual. 
While Cummins views such a transfer of proficiency as crucial for the second language learner if he 
is to master the demands of formal schooling in the host community, however, the fact that the child 
may have been denied the opportunity to develop literacy skills in the L1 can place him in what 
Skinner (1985: 378) called a "... 'no-win' situation where academic failure is the inevitable result". 
The reasons why the second language learner may have been denied the opportunity to study his L I 
vary, of course, from the fact that the minority community may no longer valorize the L1 to the fact 
that, as Geach and Broadbent (1989: 119) point out, the host community may, through the 
educational system, simply refract ethnocentric attitudes towards pupil use of any language other 
than that of the dominant culture for pedagogic purposes. Whatever the reason, what is clear is that 
the lack of metalinguistic skills needed to make sense of L2 text-dependent language in formal 
schooling condemns many bilingual children to academic failure.25 
3.1.1. 'threshold' levels 
The central thrust of Cummins' approach to second language development is, as Hamers and Blanc 
(1989: 51) point out, that " ... competence in the mother tongue has to be sufficiently developed 
before the child can successfully acquire a second language". Cummins (1979, 1984) himself often 
referred to the notion of a 'threshold' that had to be reached in LI proficiency if the second language 
learner was to navigate the complex text-related uses of language that constitute formal schooling. 
Much of his empirical research was aimed at highlighting the difficulties facing US minority group 
immigrants who, he pointed out (1984: 4) "had attained apparently fluent English face-to-face 
communication skills" without reaching the 'threshold' in L1 and who were consequently unable to 
deal with the academic demands of mainstream learning. For Cummins, as indicated, the 'threshold' 
was intimately linked with the development of literacy skills in the L1 and it is no accident that he 
was, therefore, to associate age with success in second language learning. As he (1984: 3) was to put 
it, " ... older immigrant students (10-12 years old) whose academic proficiency (e.g. literacy skills) in 
L1 was well-established, developed L2 academic proficiency more rapidly than younger immigrant 
students". Such a view was supported by writers such as John-Steiner (1985) and by Skutnabb- 
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Kangas and Toukomaa (1976: 75) in their large-scale study of Finnish immigrant students enrolled in 
Swedish schools. Older children aged above 10 who had well-developed literacy skills, they 
claimed, found it much easier to access Swedish than their younger siblings whose verbal 
development in L I often underwent "serious disturbances" with a consequently detrimental effect on 
their progress in L2. 26 More recently, further studies have sought to show the type of metalinguistic 
skills that emerge in LI literacy development and their impact on second language learning. Hakuta 
(1986) and Snipper (1985), for example, have sought to establish a general correlation between 
literacy levels among children in LI and in English as L2 and others, such as Goldman (1984: 54), 
have sought to show how an understanding of various narrative skills, such as story comprehension 
in L 1 , "appear to be transferred to comprehension of English" as L2. 27 
Cummins' work was, in large measure, prompted by the underachievement of minority group 
immigrants in terms of dealing with the academic demands of formal schooling. What is central to 
his argument, however, which has undergone numerous shifts in nuance over the years, is the 
emphasis that is placed on the role of metalinguistic processing in second language 
acquisition/learning. 28 Even in a context where the second language learner has considerable 
opportunities for communicative interaction in the TL, the latter is clearly viewed as a 'secondary' 
rather than a 'primary' skill which cannot be accessed by seeking to replicate the 'natural process' of 
language acquisition. On the contrary, accessing the 'IL -- and, in particular, those aspects of it 
which are text- rather than situation-dependent — is seen as requiring the type of metalinguistic 
processing skills that can only be developed through L 1 literacy skill development. The only way of 
combating academic underachievement, Cummins was to stress, was by implementing a pedagogic 
strategy that gave status to the child's L1 within the education system as a pre-requisite for 
successful L2 development. There are two inter-related aspects of such a strategy which merit 
attention. The first is the importance of ensuring mother tongue maintenance, that is, providing 
second language learners with the opportunity of developing oracy and literacy skills within their Ll. 
It is, as writers such as Saville-Troike (1982: 216) note, only by using the " ... opportunity to discuss 
the concepts they are learning in their native language with other children or adults" that second 
language learners will be able to access the decontextualised discourse of formal schooling. The 
second is the importance of placing greater attention in the teaching of the TL on form-functional 
relationships rather than on communicative and discourse strategies. As writers from Gass (1990) to 
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Lightbrown (1990) have recently stressed, there appears to be growing evidence that — even within a 
process of high exposure to the TL — the learner can be helped to tap his metalinguistic skills 
developed in L1 to focus attention upon those aspects of his interlanguage in the TL which are the 
source of ongoing problems. This might include, for example, features that are in danger of 
fossilization and/or the subject of avoidance strategies. 29 
3. 2. Immersion programmes 
Immersion programmes differ from second language acquisition/learning programmes in that the 
learner lives in an L1 environment (such as Hong Kong), or a bilingual environment (such as 
Montreal in Canada), and uses the L1 as a mother tongue outside of formal schooling. The LI is, in 
this sense, the language of daily communicative interaction and the L2 — even if taught through a 
content-based curriculum — the language exclusively of the school. Largely because the learner's 
exposure to the L2 differs negatively from that of a second language learner, both in terms of the 
quantity and quality of input, it might be expected that such a programme would be clearer as to the 
parasitic role that L2 will play in relation to the L I and that this would be reflected in the way in 
which pedagogy seeks to tap the metalinguistic skills of the learner. What is interesting to note, 
however, is that despite such differences, the attempt to teach L2 through a content-based approach 
has been motivated almost exclusively by the desire to replicate L 1 acquisition processes in the 
classroom. As Swain and Lapkin (1982: 5) were to put it, the aim is for the school to provide 
... a naturalistic setting for second language acquisition; that is, the second language is 
acquired in much the same way as children acquired their first language by interacting 
with speakers of the language in authentic and meaningful communicative situations 
The attempt to replicate the L1 acquisition process — in which form is induced as a by-product of 
functional interaction -- was to be informed, particularly in the Australian model, by a strictly 
Krashenite pedagogical approach. Children were to be exposed to 'comprehensible' input and only 
required to produce what they had internalized when they were ready, errors made as part of the 
child's developing interlanguage were to be self-correcting and no attempt was to be made to direct 
or focus learners' attention on form in the comprehension/production of utterances. 30 It is interesting 
to note that the transfer to literacy skills was, within this framework, undertaken initially through the 
L2 rather than the L I although, as within the Canadian model on which it was partly based, there was 
225 
a staged phasing in of English (L1) literacy from grade 1, which gradually assumed a preponderant 
role. 
Partly because content teaching was seen, as Swain notes (1990: 234) as "communicative language 
teaching par excellence" expectations for the levels of fluency reached by immersion students were 
considerable. Early reports did, indeed, tend to suggest that children reached a threshold level 
relatively early although, as Swain (1985: 12) went on to admit, this was partly because motivation 
was high and the threshold level was relatively low "... given the young age of the learners and the 
relative simplicity of the content initially taught". It soon became apparent, however, that as the 
programme developed and the content became conceptually more complex, considerable weaknesses 
began to emerge in learners' L2 (as compared with LI) proficiency. The primary weakness focused 
around productive skills which, unlike receptive ones which were recorded as near native-like in their 
sophistication, appeared to develop much more slowly and fossilize much more rapidly. Spilka 
(1976: 5534), for example, noted that, after six years of content teaching, immersion students 
seemed to make little progress in accuracy and that their IL [interlanguage] actually contained 
increasing error percentages. Conners et al (1978: 69) likewise observed the "deviant and painfully 
simple nature of their [i.e. immersion students] output", as illustrated through errors, inappropriate 
grammatical forms, avoidance of complex tenses (such as the conditional) and a generally simple use 
of language, and even Swain (1986: 13') was forced to admit that, after seven years of 
`comprehensible input' in French, immersion students in Canada were "somewhat limited in their 
grammatical development relative to native speakers". Other writers such as Bibeau (1984: 45) were 
somewhat less reticent in their criticism when noting that 
When it comes to expressing themselves and demonstrating their knowledge in an active 
fashion, they hesitate, speak in incomplete sentences, produce stereotyped utterances, 
avoid difficult structures by using overly complex sentences, have a strong foreign accent 
and make numerous errors in grammar and vocabulary... 31  
Perhaps the clearest cause for concern were the results from a comparative study that Swain (1983) 
herself conducted between early and late-start immersion students which seemed to suggest that the 
latter did as well as the former despite receiving less than half the exposure time. Such a result 
appeared to question the assumption, drawn from writers such as Krashen and underpinning 
immersion programmes, that proficiency develops automatically as a function of exposure to the TL 
as it appears to do in L1.32 A similar result, it should be noted, was found in a later comparative 
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study among immersion students in Hong Kong. As Ho (1985) records, Cantonese-speaking 
children who were taught English as a foreign language in grade 8 appeared to achieve identical 
results after five months to those who had been taught 60% of their curriculum through English over 
the same period of time.33 
3.2.1. Limitations of content-based programmes 
While such results were disappointing, the apparent failure of immersion students to develop 
grammatical accuracy in TL use was explained away initially by deficiencies in the implementation 
of the programme rather than by questioning the highly inductive premises on which the programme 
was based. In particular, writers such as Conners et al (1978: 69-70) sought to attribute the problem 
to such factors as the limited range of interactive tasks the learner could undertake in a formal setting 
or the restricted nature of the input to which he was exposed, i.e. the absence of certain kinds of 
discourse "in their ordinary social circumstances", the "unusually artificial" material, the 
"conservative and stylistically undifferentiated grammar" of the non-native teachers and the stilted 
interlanguage of non-native peers. There is no doubt that some of these criticisms may be valid but 
they do not address the central problem which is, as Swain (1990: 249) was somewhat later to 
recognize, that "typical content teaching is not necessarily good second language teaching", that is, 
that teaching a 'parasitic' language skill through functional interaction is not necessarily the most 
efficient way to do so. There are, perhaps, three areas in which this is most apparent and which pivot 
around the Krashen-derived pedagogy that characterizes immersion programmes: 
• Selective listening. In the first place, in content-related language teaching, the emphasis is upon 
comprehending meaning rather than on exploring the ways in which linguistic form encodes that 
meaning. Since the input is bound to be relatively random in this respect, the learner is 
compelled to use whatever strategies exist at his disposal -- both linguistic and non-linguistic --
to disembed that meaning. Unfortunately, as Swain (1990: 239) was to point out, " ... it is 
possible to comprehend input — to get the message — without a syntactic or, I would add, a 
morphological analysis of that input. What appears to occur is 'selective listening' (Van Patten, 
1985)". By 'selective listening' is meant an attention to input which relies upon non-linguistic 
strategies and which can, over time, make the learner insensitive to many aspects of the 
linguistic encoding of meaning or what Gary and Gary (1981: 3) referred to as a range of " 
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redundant grammatical and semantic functions such as concord, definite/indefinite distinctions, 
singular/plural distinctions etc". 34 
• Interlanguage. In the second place, even if the learner is able to form hypotheses of form-
meaning relationships, the insights are likely to mirror the randomness of the input itself rather 
than be part of a planned linguistic progression. Certainly, within the framework of content-
based teaching, there is little opportunity for the learner to systematically test out his hypotheses, 
to receive relevant feedback and — on that basis — to integrate new systemic knowledge into 
existing knowledge as a means of facilitating more complex uses of the target language. On the 
contrary, the unsystematic or random nature of the learner's discovery of form-meaning 
relationships — and what Swain (1990: 249) refers to as the equally "unsystematic, possibly 
random feedback" on the part of the teacher to learners' errors — would suggest that there is no 
automatic progression in the learner's interlanguage. What is required to assure such 
progression, as Swain (1990: 240) continues, involves a willingness to structure the input in such 
a way that it will "... help learners focus their attention on particular form-functional 
relationships" and then to "contrive contexts in which [their] use is natural". 
• Fossilization: In the third place, even if the learner can be aided to focus attention upon form-
meaning relationships, the notion that he should be placed under no 'cognitive pressure' to test 
out his hypotheses in productive use can further underline competence. Not only will he be 
tempted to 'make do' with his existing level of competence but — insofar as he does seek to test 
out any new hypotheses -- to downplay any inaccuracy in their use provided that meaning is not 
impeded. The danger of fossilization, which Littlewood (1984: 34) suggested arose when a 
learner "realizes (subconsciously) that the error does not hinder him in satisfying his 
communicative needs (at the functional or social level)", is as real among immersion students as 
it is among second language learners. Both tend quite rapidly to reach a plateau in their 
interlanguage precisely because there is no teacher-induced pressure for them to develop 
accurate use of new structures as long as, as Swain (1986: 133) suggests, "their current output 
appears to succeed in conveying their intended meaning'. 35 
The weaknesses identified by writers such as Swain in immersion programmes have led them 
increasingly to question the premises on which they were based, notably the view that an L2, like an 
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L1, is best learnt through 'meaning making'. While she never explicitly rejects the value of a 
content-based approach, her work has sought to combat the highly inductive pedagogy that results by 
arguing that (a) input should be less random and should encourage the learner to attend to form-
meaning relationships, and (b) activities should be structured to encourage the learner to test out 
hypotheses about such relationships in productive use. "Students", she (1990: 249) was to suggest, 
"need to be guided through this process by engaging them in activities which have been contrived by 
the teachers to focus the learners' attention and to naturally elicit particular uses of language". 
There can be no doubt that Swain's critical review of immersion programmes — like that of Spilka 
(1976), Bibeau (1984) or Hammerly (1992) — would appear to be further confirmation that, in an L2, 
as opposed to L 1 process, 'use' does not necessarily lead to 'usage'. If anything, however, the 
critique does not go far enough in that the immersion student is in a more disadvantageous position 
than the second language learner. Unlike the latter, for example, he has less contact with the TL, a 
more restricted range of interactive situations in which to use it and, very often, less non-linguistic 
clues to scaffold his access to meaning in a content-based syllabus. In such a situation, if the learner 
is to overcome the errors and distortions of a fossilized interlanguage, he has to be able to make use 
of his developing metalinguistic skills to attend to the linguistic structuring of meaning from a 
relatively early stage. The task of the teacher is clearly, as Swain suggests, to help the learner form 
and test out hypotheses about these relationships by reducing the randomness of the input and 
providing a series of more carefully sequenced and graded activities. Whether this can be achieved 
within a content-based syllabus — or whether the latter should be dismissed as confusing rather than 
clarifying the child's attempt to move from pragmatic to semantic processing -- is a valid discussion. 
3. 3. Foreign language learning 
In contrast to immersion programmes, foreign language learning occurs within the learner's native 
country where he has no contact with the TL outside the classroom except in a peripheral or 
accidental way. As Littlewood (1984: 2) was to suggest, a foreign language is learnt " ... primarily 
for contact outside one's own community". Such a situation involves a considerably more 
decontextualised process than in either second language or immersion programmes in two respects. 
In the first place, the foreign language learner has virtually no opportunities for communicative 
interaction outside or inside the classroom (as in a content-based syllabus) and, consequently, 
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progress in TL learning/use is not motivated at all by what Searle (1968) referred to as an 'intention 
to mean'. This lack of an 'interpersonal' dimension -- what Hammerley (1991) refers to as the 
learner's sense of "delayed gratification" -- can, in turn, be the cause of affective as well as cognitive 
problems. 41 In the second place, even if opportunities for such interaction were to exist, there are no 
extra-linguistic clues to meaning that can scaffold such interaction while the learner is internalizing 
the TL form as in an immersion programme. The fact that the foreign language learner lacks both the 
opportunity for, and scaffolding of, communicative interaction means that he is compelled from a 
very early stage to focus attention upon form-meaning relationships. It is only by using his 
metalinguistic skills developed through L I to attend to and identify form-meaning relationships in 
the input — and to test out those relationships in a range of suitably graded activities — that the foreign 
language learner's interlanguage can progress.36 As Roberts (1991: 27) was to put it, development in 
FLL " ... is dependent upon the learner's prior metalinguistic awareness which alone can allow him 
to associate form and meaning as a pre-requisite for subsequent use". 37 
It is against the decontextualised nature of foreign language learning that the current emphasis on 
`communicative' language teaching has to be assessed. Although writers such as Widdowson (1978) 
or Bnunfit and Johnson (1979) were never to adopt the highly inductive approach characterizing 
immersion programmes, their work was — at least initially -- inspired by the same (quasi-nativist) 
assumption that language form can be mastered through communicative interaction. This assumption 
can be detected in terms of a revision at the level of both syllabus design and methodology even 
though, as Widdowson (1991) correctly observes, there is no necessary link between the first and the 
second. In the area of syllabus design, for example, the view that grammatical accuracy could be 
developed through illocutionary function led to the rejection of the structural in favour of the 
`semantic' or 'notional-functional' model in which content was defined in terms of such categories as 
`ordering', 'warning', 'promising' or 'denying' etc. As Wilkins (1976: 19) was to put it, structuring 
the content in terms of functions is " ... potentially superior to the grammatical syllabus because it 
will produce a communicative competence". The emphasis on function in the sequencing of 
language items was, in turn, to lead to a range of methodological 'guidelines' in which the emphasis 
was on involving the learner in interactive activities information-gap') through which form could 
be internalized as a function of meaningful use. Out of 10 points listed in the CILT (1987) guidelines 
on communicative language teaching, for example, three are worth stressing: 
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• Legitimacy of tasks and activities, i.e. learners should learn by being involved in activities which 
correspond to their own interests and needs and which, thereby, have 'motivational force'; 
• Meaningful use, i.e. learners should be given opportunities to use language in a purposeful way 
in which the emphasis is upon the 'message' rather than the 'medium' (dismissed as 
structurespeech'); 
• Authenticity in language, i.e. learners should be exposed to authentic materials which emphasize 
the importance of intake rather than input control. 
There is a causal relation between these three features which pivot around the notion that, as Prabhu 
(1984) suggests, "form is best learnt when the learner's attention is focused on meaning". Tapping 
the learner's interests allows him to engage with, and make sense of, authentic language texts which, 
in turn, provide the basis for internalizing the form-meaning relationships needed for further task-
based activities. Within this process, as in immersion programmes, the emphasis on 'fluency' leads 
to a corresponding de-emphasis on 'accuracy' and a greater tolerance towards error-formation which 
is seen, not so much as an unnecessary deviation from the TT, system, as an inevitable and valid part 
of the learner's interlanguage. 38 
3.3.1. 'motivational force' 
Even though the 'communicative approach' is a diluted version of the highly inductive pedagogy 
advocated in immersion programmes, it has perhaps proved even more problematic in terms of 
facilitating access to the TL. The notion that a syllabus should be based on functional rather than on 
formal progression is clearly confused in that it assumes that what the learner needs to 'know' to 
operate effectively in the TL is synonymous with how he acquired that 'knowledge', that is, it 
prioritizes the pragmatic aspect of language use over the systemic aspect of its acquisition, as in L1 
acquisition. It may well be true, as Wilkins (1976) claimed, that in order to be able to communicate 
effectively a learner needs to be able to use the TL functionally but that hardly means -- in a context 
where there is minimal exposure time and opportunities for genuine communicative interaction --
that he can internalize form-meaning relations as a by-product of functional use. On the contrary, as 
writers such as Brumfit have stressed, since there is no one-to-one relation between functional and 
formal progression, the learner usually ends up with a shopping list of expressions learnt in a 
formulaic way which he is unable to adapt — because of constraints in time and use — outside of the 
context in which they were learnt to convey personal meaning. As the latter was to put it (1978: 79-
82), in his critique of Wilkins' model: 
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The point about the grammatical system is that a limited and describable number of rules 
enable the learner to generate an enormous range of utterances which are usable, in 
combination with paralinguistic and semiotic systems, to express any function. To ask 
learners to learn a list instead of a system goes against everything we know about learning 
theory. 
The tendency in semantic-based syllabi to obstruct rather than facilitate learners' access to the 
generative system — or parts of that system — is reinforced by classroom procedures. The emphasis 
on 'authentic' (i.e. `random' as opposed to selected and sequenced) input, for example, further acts to 
impede the learner's ability to attend to and identify relevant form-meaning relationships and the 
more tolerant attitude to error-formation tends to encourage incorrect hypotheses to fossilize as a 
permanent part of the learner's interlanguage. As Allen (1983: 91) was to suggest, in the absence of 
systematic teacher feedback and correction, " ... learners may develop fossilized interlanguage when 
they become able to communicate fairly successfully". 
In a rather belated critique of the 'communicative' approach, Widdowson (1990: 112) was to 
suggest that the attempt to replicate natural L1 acquisition in the L2 classroom was 'simplistic'. 39 
The latter is, he went on, a "long and rather inefficient business" and the task of pedagogy is to help 
the learner to draw relevant conclusions which avoid such a wasteful process of trial and error. 
Widdowson's point is a valid one but possibly does not go far enough insofar as the communicative 
approach is not so much inefficient as pedagogically unprincipled. Its central premise is, as 
indicated, that it is possible to internalize TL form through functional interaction and the emphasis in 
pedagogy is, consequently, on tapping learners' "self-generated communicative needs" (Grenfell 
1990: 8) in a range of interactive activities, such as information-gap etc. While the latter may be a 
valuable pedagogic procedure, however, it is as well to remember that — as writers from Swan (1985) 
to Skehan (1988) have stressed — it still remains a simulated and not a real 'speech act', that is, an act 
which is intended to learn the 1-1, rather than achieve any genuine communicative purpose. " Insofar 
as this is true, attempts to simulate classroom interaction can never carry the same 'motivational 
force' which, as in first (or second) language acquisition, will allow the form-meaning relation to 
`stick'. On the contrary, it is precisely because such activities are never more than simulations — i.e. 
do not stem from any genuine "self-generated" needs — that their completion can only come after the 
pupil has attended to and practised the form-meaning relationships necessary to carry them out rather 
than, as in Bnimfit's earlier communication-led model, before them. 41 Such an approach would 
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seem to suggest that, in the early stages of foreign as opposed to second language learning or even 
immersion programmes, the learner needs to be scaffolded in using his metalinguistic skills to access 
the 'formation rules' through considerable selection and sequencing of material before he can focus 
on the 'speaking rules'. 42 
4. 0. Summary 
The principles underpinning a curriculum concern not only what is taught but how also how it is 
taught, that is, not only content but also pedagogy. Until recently, attempts to explore a wider cross-
curricular approach to language education have tended to stress more what, in terms of themes and 
practices, the traditionally different areas have in common than what distinguishes them. The 
`apprenticeship' approach to curriculum design, however, focuses more upon the differences between 
such areas as part of the child's expanding semiotic repertoire. Such differences are not random, of 
course, but represent a process based upon the growing importance of metalinguistic processing in 
allowing the child to make sense of, and access, increasingly decontextualised skills. Such an 
approach, it is argued, is crucial for understanding differences in pedagogy between first language 
acquisition and second language acquisition/learning and, within the latter, differences between such 
processes as second language acquisition, second language 'immersion' programmes and foreign 
language learning. Differences between the latter are particularly important to appreciate in that 
there has long been a tendency to transpose findings from one process to another in a way which has 
often been unprincipled and which has rendered pedagogy both inappropriate and ineffective. 
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Notes 
1. As Brown and Ferrara (1985: 281-2) were to put it, when discussing the pedagogic implications of 
Vygotsky's notion of the 'zone of proximal development', this is a gradual process "from other-regulation to 
self-regulation" which proceeds through the nurturing of the emergence of personal planning in the child. 
2. This is similar, as already indicated, to Hawkins' (1978, 1981) notion of a 'vertical curriculum' in which 
language awareness was designed — as part of the trivium' — to bridge the gap in pedagogy between first and 
foreign language learning. 
3. Interestingly enough, convergence between the two areas was widely interpreted in NCLE reports as due to 
a shift in FL pedagogy towards a more communicative approach. As Tinkel (1981: 118) was to point out, "The 
foreign language teacher's conception of language is beginning to change towards seeing language in terms of 
communicative acts rather than in terms of grammatical categories", and it is this which facilitates cross-
curricular collaboration. 
4. Brumfit's (1978) distinction between 'fluency' and 'accuracy' is a case in point. As Ellis (1982: 77) 
observes, Brumfit's view that fluency can only stem from acquired and not learnt knowledge implied a highly 
inductive methodology in which, as in LI, "pupils first 'communicate' as far as possible with all available 
resources" and only secondly receive systematic practice if it is required. 
5. The nativist assumptions underpinning the 'invariant route' hypothesis can be detected, albeit in a more 
diluted form, in Pienemann's (1984, 1989) Multidimensional model or Bialystock's (1985) Analysis-Control 
model. While there are important differences between them, what they all share is a view that second language 
acquisition/learning proceeds unidirectionally along the same axes as does Ll acquisition, that is, through a 
series of 'cumulative stages' (from low to high analysis/control). 
5. The view that language can be acquired as a function of communicative interaction can, in a wider sense, of 
course be traced back to the Reform Movement at the turn of the century. It was to receive its most consistent 
theoretical rationale, however, in the work of applied linguists influenced by Chomsky's nativist hypothesis. 
6. Dulay and Burt's (1973) tests were carried out on two groups (one Spanish and one Chinese) learning 
English as a second language and involved a sub-set of the 14 morphemes analyzed in Brown's (1973) earlier 
study. They claimed to fmd identical results in the order of acquisition between the two groups, thereby 
suggesting that the process was both developmental and invariant and not susceptible to contextual factors such 
as LI transference 
7. With admirable consistency, Reibel and Newmark were to draw out the implications of this approach for 
syllabus design somewhat earlier than Wilkins (1976) when suggesting that "The pedagogical implications of 
our position is that we abandon all notion of structural grading and structural ordering of exercise material in 
favour of situational ordering". 
8. The extent of the nativist assumptions underpinning Monitor Theory can be seen in Krashen's (1985: 4) 
attempt to summarize the 'five hypotheses'. "People", he was to write, "acquire second languages only if they 
obtain comprehensible input and if their affective filters are low enough to allow the input 'in'. When the filter 
is 'down' and appropriate comprehensible input is presented (and comprehended), acquisition is inevitable. It 
is, in fact, unavoidable and cannot be prevented — the language 'mental organ' will function just as automatically 
as any other organ". 
9. Although Ellis (1985: 15) tends to accept such a view, he is careful to indicate the lack of empirical 
supporting evidence: "The few studies of the effects of formal instruction on the developmental route suggest 
that the 'natural' route cannot be changed. These are not conclusive, however. Formal instruction can take many 
different forms and it is possible that the route of development is amenable to influence by certain methods but 
not by others". 
10. Widdowson may, in his later writings (1990), been highly critical of the 'communicative approach' but, in 
his early work, he clearly accepts its premise that form can be internalized as a byproduct of functional use as in 
L 1 . As he was to argue (1978: 19), while use cannot be acquired through usage, "the teaching of use ... does 
seem to guarantee the learning of usage since the latter is represented as a necessary part of the former". 
11. As Widdowson (1990: 17) points out, the assumption underpinning the invariant route hypothesis that 
accuracy coincides with acquisition, that is, that competence mirrors performance, may simply not be true: "It 
may be", he writes, "that learners have internalized aspects of the system which for one reason or another they 
cannot access on particular occasions, that circumstances of different kinds prevent them from acting on this 
knowledge". Rosansky (1976), it might be noted, had reached a similar conclusion some time before. 
12. Swan (1985: 82) was to express a similar viewpoint somewhat more prosaically when arguing that "A 
certain amount of artificiality is inseparable from the process of isolating and focusing on language items for 
study, and it is a serious mistake to condemn types of discourse typically found in the classroom because they do 
not share all the communicative features of other kinds of language use". 
13. Roberts (1993: 25) makes the same point when suggesting that learners often "... cannot transfer what they 
have learnt outside the context in which they learnt it. They may know how to ask where the nearest café is (Est-
ce qu'il y a un café pres d'ici?) but, because they have learnt this as a formulaic expression for a given task, are 
unable to transfer the underlying pattern to ask if there is any cheese in the fridge (Est—ce qu y a du fromage 
dans le frigo?)". 
14. The reply Je vais au disco to a question in French may be a valid utterance but may also reveal a confusion 
in the use of gender which will lead to non-valid (i.e. non-communicative) utterances at a later stage. 
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15. If the learner needs to focus initially on semantic rather than pragmatic meaning, this would seem to 
suggest that the current obsession with 'authentic' materials could be considered counter-productive. The fact 
that the latter are often context- and/or register-discrete means that they can hinder rather than facilitate the 
learner's access to semantic (i.e. socially accepted) meaning which depends more upon the selection of items of 
`high transfer' that can be recycled across contexts. 
16. As Cohen (1990: 108) was to argue, seeking to develop conscious learning strategies in L2 learners — partly 
through training programmes such as those advocated by Rubin and Thompson (1982), O'Malley et al (1985) or 
Wenden (1986) — is designed "...to ensure that average learners do not waste their valuable time while in 
language courses, simply because they do not know how to go about learning effectively". 
17. Schmidt (1990: 149) was to conclude, "Incidental learning in another sense, picking up target language 
forms from input when they do not carry information relevant to the task, appears unlikely ... Paying attention 
to language form is hypothesized to be facilitative in all cases, and may be necessary for adult acquisition of 
redundant grammatical features. In general, the relation between attention and awareness provides a link to the 
study of individual differences in language learning, as well as to consideration of the role of instruction in 
making formal features of the target language more salient and facilitating input encoding". 
18. For Ringbom (1990: 172), the L2 learner is "constantly concerned with the question of how similarity, 
intralingual or interlingual, can be efficiently used in learning". By developing input which in the early stage 
stresses such similarity, he argues (ibid. 179), the learner will fmd it easier to focus on and identify novel TL 
features since "...perceived crosslinguistic and intra-lingual similarities provide learners with a reference frame 
which they can lean on when learning new tasks and material". 
19. Gass (1990: 138) was to argue that developing conscious L2 learning strategies through training, as in 
Sharwood-Smith, is important in "... showing how 'natural' language development can be 'short-circuited' by 
capitalizing on learners' abilities to generalize". 
20. As Homsey (1994: 7) was to argue in relation to authentic input " ... authenticity is a possible goal, a point 
of arrival rather than a point of departure. The means do not have to be identical with the aim and authentic 
materials are not necessarily the medium through which a learner can progress most effectively towards eventual 
authentic use of the target language". 
21. Interestingly enough, Balyayev (1963; 221) was to warn of the same danger some time ago when 
suggesting: "There is not and cannot be any direct transition from the study of a language to the mastery of it 
the second is not and cannot be a necessary and direct consequence of the first. Practical mastery of language is 
always the result only of previous linguistic practice". 
22. Hawkins (1981: 246-248), for example, argues in favour of a four stage model in which the first level 
involves a focus on the 'medium', the second on 'message-relaying' as a rehearsal for an eventual performance, 
the third on the `conveying of messages' with an 'element of rehearsal' and the fourth on 'true speech acts' or 
`real performance'. 
23. "In a situation where the learner has little (or no) genuine 'intention to mean', Roberts (1991: 27) writes, 
"his/her attention is initially focused upon the language itself, i.e. upon using whatever clues are available to 
form (and test out) hypotheses about how the patterned nature of speech encodes meaning. The key role of the 
teacher at this stage is to help ... the learner to form the correct hypotheses in terms of the selection and 
sequencing of the language items to which s/he is exposed". 
24. As Phillipson (1990: 43) points out "It goes without saying that there are quite different teaching needs 
and strategies in the many various ESL and EFL situations. Yet judging by this authoritative definition, the same 
label, ESL, is supposed to do service for a multitude of different contexts, in addition to which in North America 
`foreign' and 'second' are used interchangeably". 
25. Broadbent and Geach (1989: 119) stress that "... negative attitudes to the use for educational purposes of 
any language other than English (or possibly French or German) are so deep-seated that even where the 
possibilities of actually using the target language are high, inhibiting psychological factors inevitably come into 
play". 
26. As John-Steiner (1985: 350) points out, with regard to the research conducted by Skutnabb-Kangas and 
Toukomaa (1976), "They found that students who had moved from Finland to Sweden at an average age of 10 
years knew their first language and learned Swedish much better than their younger siblings". 
27. Goldman (1984: 52) was to conclude that "... the group mean data for students dealing with two 
languages during elementary school indicate that there is transfer of prior knowledge of story content and 
structure across input languages ". 
28. It is interesting to note how Cummins sees metalinguistic awareness playing a dual role in bilingual 
development. If, on the one hand, it operates as a 'threshold' in allowing the child to access analytic skills in the 
L2, it is skills developed in the L2 (both communicative and analytic) which are seen in turn to enhance such 
awareness. As he argues (1978: 148) in relation to an empirical study carried out on bilingual children in 
Ireland, the latter "... showed a significantly greater awareness of the arbitrary nature of the word-referent 
relationships and were also better able to evaluate non-empirical and contradictory statements". 
29. Lightbrown (1990 197), who was particularly concerned with fossilization among French children learning 
ESL, draws attention to the work of Higgs and Clifford (1982) who argued that a "... focus on form is 
particularly crucial in the earliest stages of learning to prevent learners from leveling off at a stage of basic — but 
inaccurate — communication in the second language". 
30. As Fernandez (1992: 7) points out, the Canadian immersion programme had commenced before the 
publication of Krashen's major works although the results have "lent much support to his theories". 
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31. Bibeau was concerned not only with poor productive capacity among immersion children but also with the 
tendency for their proficiency to decrease over time. "The deterioration of language skills at the age of eight or 
nine", he argued (1984), "is a very important phenomenon that has been given too little attention. Many 
children in early immersion are very successful in the first three years, but regress in the second language for 
reasons that seem related to their phase of social identification". 
32. As Swain (1985: 9) records, the performance of one group of 16 year olds who had only two years contact 
with the TL (1400 hours) appeared comparable with that of a group of 14 year olds who had 9 years contact 
(4000 hours). Swain was to conclude, in a way similar to John-Steiner (1985), that "These results ... suggest 
that in school settings, at least, older learners are more efficient in some aspects of language learning than young 
learners. It has been suggested that this is so because older learners are cognitively more mature. Their ability to 
abstract, classify and generalize may aid in the task of consciously formulating and applying second language 
rules" 
33. Swain (1990: 236) admits that there are various possible explanations for the result but argues that the most 
likely one is the methodology that was used and which downplayed attention to language form, i.e. one in which 
"... teachers work through a content lesson by asking a lot of questions about something they have just 
presented before, or that the students have read before..." in order simply to ensure comprehension. 
34. As Van Patten (1985: 91) was to put it, selective listening "... seems to involve concentrated focus on 
informational content and not necessarily on how that content was delivered". Thus a question such as 'Qu 'est-
ce que to ferais si to gagnais la loterie?' may receive the response je vais mettre dans la banque' and be 
accepted in terms of meaning despite the fact that, from a formal point of view, there is an incompatibility in the 
tenses used. 
35. As Swain (1990: 249) was to put it, "Appropriately, content teaching focuses on comprehending meaning. 
However what second language learners need is to focus on form-meaning relationships. Doing so is facilitated 
through the production of language, whether in written or spoken form". 
36. Larsen Freeman and Long (1991: 322) admit that a focus on form is a key feature of foreign (as opposed to 
second) language instruction insofar as it brings 'saliency' to targeted features in the TL input but — they argue —
this should not lead to the teaching of a sequence of `decontextualised forms' as in the past. In a situation in 
which the learner has no opportunities for communicative interaction in the TL, however, it is difficult to know 
what can realistically replace the sequencing of structural forms. 
37. It is interesting to note that Hawkins (1981: 227) was to see the absence of 'intention to mean' in the 
language interactions of the classroom combined with the absence of 'insight into pattern' needed to rapidly 
process incoming data as the two main causes of failure in foreign language learning in the UK context. 
38. As Riddell (1990: 28) points out, errors within the nativist framework were considered part of the learner's 
interlanguage, that is, " ... a part-way house situated between the native language of the learner and the foreign 
language. It was systematic, and in the system the student error had its place. It was a transitional stage, in a 
state of perpetual flux, but which was a valid system in its own right". 
39. The assumption that "... natural conditions of language learning through use ... can be directly replicated 
in the foreign language classrooms" is, he was to argue, simply untenable. 
40. Skehan was to link the learners' ability to cope with the simulated nature of task-based activities in the 
foreign language classroom with metalinguistic awareness. As he was to put it: (1988: 52), learners "... will 
have to cope with the disembedded nature of the task and perceive its relevance to their future language 
learning. In so doing, they may well be drawing on very much the same sort of skills that are implicated in the 
decontextualised component of language aptitude tests". 
41 .Brumfit's (1979: 183) sought to reverse the traditional process in structurally-based language courses along 
the following lines: 
I 
communication as far as 	 present language items 	 drill if 
> possible with all available 	 > shown to be necessary 	 > necessary 
resources 	 for effective communic- 
ation 
42. As Swain (1990: 249) was to suggest, learners "... need to be guided through this process (i.e. of seeing 
form-meaning relationship) by engaging them in activities which have been contrived by the teachers to focus 
the learners' attention and to naturally elicit particular uses of language". 
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1.0. KAL and cross-curricular language strategies 
In seeking to define 'metalinguistic awareness', Gombert (1992: 2) noted that it involves a 
cognitive effort " ... which goes far beyond the boundaries of a strictly linguistic activity". Such a 
comment is useful in highlighting the crucial mediating role that such processing plays in the socio-
cognitive development of the child. It is, as already indicated, the latter's ability to disembed and 
reflect upon his own semiotic practice that allows him to appropriate a range of new practices and it 
is these practices which, in turn, serve to shape and refine his powers of reflective thinking. Wells' 
metaphor of education as a 'semiotic apprenticeship' is valuable precisely for highlighting the 
symbiotic relationship between (metalinguistic) reflection and (linguistic) performance in the 
language learning process. Clearly, specialist language teachers -- EMT, ESL and FL -- play a 
central role in helping the child to extend his repertoire of 'secondary' skills through attention to 
syllabus content and pedagogic practice. It is important to note, however, that insofar as these skills 
operate across the curriculum -- that is, are crucial in allowing the child to access domain-specific 
knowledge across a range of disciplines -- all teachers play a contributory role in this process. It is 
not for nothing that the Bullock Report (1975: 337-8) was to define all teachers as 'language teachers' 
and to argue that "... among the modules that go to make up the professional training element there 
should be a compulsory one on language in education". 
If all teachers have some responsibility for the child's linguistic development, this clearly implies 
the need for what Brumfit (1988: 38) was to refer to as a "co-ordinated policy on languages as a 
medium for learning and languages as subjects". The notion of a cross-curricular language policy, it 
must be admitted, has gained little support in the UK where reforms tend to operate within discrete 
language areas with little (or no) reference to general principles underpinning the wider curriculum. 
Such an approach, as Roberts (1991) argues, can be detected even in the National Curriculum where 
the opportunity for a more integrated approach to language policy was disregarded in favour of 
subject-discrete working parties operating independently of each other. If the language curriculum is 
to be viewed, however, as the extension of a functional repertoire -- in which, as Vygotsky 
suggested, each new variant 'builds upon' the preceding in terms of conscious control processing --
such a parochial tradition needs to be abandoned and teachers need to be encouraged to view their 
specific area of expertise as part of a wider 'language education'. As already indicated, this might 
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operate along two dimensions. Along the 'vertical' axis, specialist language teachers need to see their 
area as merely one semiotic practice among many in which differences in pedagogy play a 
complementary role in the development of the child's repertoire. Along the 'horizontal' axis, on the 
other hand, non-language subject teachers need to see their area as one in which the child's mastery 
of new semiotic practices can be reinforced and extended through the discourse modes specific to 
their discipline. In both cases, what is important is that any given linguistic activity is subordinated 
to the notion of a 'language education'. 
1.1. Implications for Initial Teacher Education [ITE] 
If all teachers contribute, albeit in different ways, to the child's linguistic development, however, 
the question is posed as to what the teacher (as opposed to the child) needs to explicitly 'know' about 
language to facilitate this process? This question has, at least since the Bullock Report (1975), been 
the source of some concern. Two trends can be distinguished. On the one hand, there has been a 
growing recognition that, insofar as education is primarily a process of semiotic mediation, teachers' 
explicit knowledge about the nature and function of language and language learning should be 
prioritized. Bullock (1975: 339-340), for example sought to outline a 'minimum specification' of 
what all teachers should 'know' about language and the concern underpinning his recommendations 
can be traced up into the Kingman Committee Report (1988: 62) which argued, among other things, 
that 50% of the initial training of primary teachers should be devoted to study of the four parts of the 
'model' of the English language destined to form part of the primary-secondary school curriculum. If 
the first trend has laudably sought to extend the proportion of time allocated to KAL in training 
beginning teachers [both specialist and non-specialist], however, the second trend has been 
somewhat more controversial in its attempts to define exactly what aspects of KAL should be 
prioritized. A major problem here has been a confusion between pedagogic and linguistic criteria in 
terms of establishing a taxonomy of knowledge sources which was implicit in Bullock's 'minimum 
specification' list and which has become even more pronounced in the 4-theme model of the 
Kingman Committee and/or that of writers such as Stubbs (1989), as illustrated below: 
1. Language diversity within Britain 
2. Language diversity within English 
3. Practical language planning 
4. A model of language itself 
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Attempts such as that of Stubbs to give a sharp focus to what teachers should 'know' were/are clearly 
intended to overcome the criticism of the Swan Committee report (1985: 559) that the so-called 
'permeation' of language throughout beginning teachers' courses " ... cannot be regarded as providing 
adequate provision for the kind of teaching which we have advocated". 
In one sense, there is little doubt that much of the knowledge contained in taxonomies such as that 
of Stubbs or Kingman is valuable. Language specialists in particular do need to explicitly know, for 
example, the relationship between form and function across a range of diatypic and dialectal variants 
if they are to help children to extend their functional repertoire. The problem with such taxonomies, 
however, is that the criteria for selecting certain categories rather than others and the relationship 
between them are based on linguistic rather than pedagogic considerations. As already indicated, the 
task of the KAL syllabus is not to present a body of decontextualized 'facts' to learners but to help 
them develop a reflective practice which allows them to extend their skill repertoire. What is true of 
the learner is also true of the teacher. What the latter needs is not a body of decontextualized facts 
about language but, rather, an understanding of the key features of the language acquisition/learning 
process -- including the role of conscious control (or metalinguistic) processing -- into which facts 
from a range of source disciplines, including linguistics, can be incorporated. Bnimfit (1988: 46) 
was to sum up the difference well when criticizing the contribution of taxonomies such as those from 
Bullock or Stubbs: 
Although each version is intended to serve pedagogical needs, neither one provides a pedagog-
ically based rationale for the selection of the themes it proposes. Thus, for example, Stubbs 
mentions some of the language problems that arise at school but does not attempt to provide, 
on the basis of these problems and the aims of educational process, a rationale for the help 
which he, as a linguist, would like to offer teachers 
For Brumfit, what such taxonomies lack is a "pedagogical frame of reference", that is, clarity as to 
the nature of the learning process in which various facts -- from linguists as from other source 
disciplines -- can be introduced. Roberts (1991) was to make the same case when suggesting that 
what beginning teachers require is a developmental approach to language learning (i.e. a 'learning 
theory') since it is only when they are aware of the complex socio-cognitive processes involved, for 
example, in the transfer from non-standard to standard dialect that a linguistic taxonomy of those 
differences might prove valuable. 
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To suggest that initial teacher education should be informed by a learning theory is not, of course, 
to exhaust the subject. There will clearly be differences in terms of focus and amount of time 
allocated to language development between non-specialist and specialist language teachers and, in 
the latter category, between those teaching a first or second/foreign language. What all teachers 
require, however, is a general understanding of the crucial importance of semiotic mediation in 
education, of the range and type of semiotic practices the child needs to master and of the role played 
by conscious control processing in mastering such practices. 
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Appendix 1 
Rubin's 'A theoretical taxonomy of the differences between oral and written language'. 
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Rubin's 'theoretical taxonomy' outlines a process of decontextualisation which proceeds from, at one 
end, 'listening to a conversation' to, at the other, 'reading a story without pictures'. There are, he 
claims, a wide range of intermediate stages between these two extremes which can be characterized 
by the interplay of a number of dimensions, which include: 
• modality, i.e. the differences between the spoken and written word insofar as the former can 
clarify meaning by making use of intonation, stress and other prosodic features (such as pauses 
to indicate syntactic boundaries); 
• interaction, i.e. the differences between the spoken and written word insofar as the speaker-
hearer -- unlike the reader/writer -- can clarify/disambiguate points and verify hypotheses 
through almost instant feedback; 
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• involvement, i.e. the difference between the spoken and written word in the extent to which the 
topic is based upon shared knowledge; 
• spatial communality, i.e. the extent to which the speaker/hearer, unlike the reader/writer, can see 
each other, that is, make use of paralinguistic features to clarify meaning and use words such as 
`here' and 'there' deictically rather than anaphorically; 
• temporal communality, i.e. the extent to which the speaker/hearer rather than reader/writer use 
temporal deictic expressions (such as 'now', 'tomorrow' or 'yesterday') to refer to the same time 
frame; 
• concreteness of reference, i.e. the extent to which the objects/events that are referred to are 
visually present; and 
• separability of characters, i.e. the extent to which the distinction between different people's 
statements and points of view is clearly indicated and the extent to which it is liable to 
confusion, as in reported speech and narrative. 
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Appendix 2 
Downing's (1979) 'cognitive clarity' thesis is based upon the following 8 postulates: 
"1. Writing or print in any language is a visible code for those aspects of speech that were 
accessible to the linguistic awareness of the creators of the code or writing system; 
2. This linguistic awareness of the creators of a writing system included simultaneous 
awareness of the communicative function of language and certain features of spoken 
language that are accessible to the speaker- hearer for logical analysis; 
3. The learning to read process consists in the rediscovering of (a) the functions and (b) 
the coding rules of the writing system; 
4. Their rediscovery depends on the learner's linguistic awareness of the name features of 
communication and language as were accessible to the creators of the writing system; 
5. Children approach the tasks of reading instruction in a normal state of cognitive 
confusion about the purposes and technical features of language; 
6. Under reasonably good conditions, children work themselves out of the initial state of 
cognitive confusion into increasing cognitive clarity about the functions and features of 
language; 
7. Although the initial stage of literacy acquisition is the most vital one, cognitive 
confusion continues to arise and this, in turn, gives way to cognitive clarity throughout 
the later stages; 
8. The cognitive clarity theory applies to all languages and writing processes." 
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Appendix 3 
Influence of parental styles on language acquisition as developed by Bates (1979) 
Style 1 
	
Style 2 
• Referential (Nelson) 
- predominance of nouns in first 50 words 
- interest in labeling 
- first-borns predominate 
- solitary play with objects (Rosenblatt) 
- typical or more advanced language 
learners (Ramber/Hogan) 
• Propositional speech (van Lancker) - - 
- associated with left hemisphere 
• Word babies (Dore) 
- single word utterance 
- oriented towards labeling 
• Elaboration of Noun Phrase in multi-
word speech (Bloom) 
• High noun/pronoun ratio (Bloom) 
• Relatively low use of imitation (Bloom) 
• First reference to speaker-hearer by name 
• No use of 'dummy' forms (Leonard) 
• Patterners (Wolf & Gardner) 
- interest in re-arranging and playing with 
component parts 
• 	 Elaborated code: middle class (Bernstein) 
• Field independence (Witkin) 
• Reflective (Kagan)  
• Expressive (Nelson) 
- heterogeneity of form in first 50 
words 
- focus on social forms of language 
- later-borns predominate 
- social orientation to play (Rosenblatt) 
- typical of later language learners 
(Ramber/Hogan) 
• Formulaic speech (van Lancker) 
- associated with right hemisphere 
• Intonation babies (Dore) 
- contentless babbling with sentence 
contours 
- oriented towards social functions of 
language 
• Elaboration of Verb Phrase in multi-
word speech (Bloom) 
• High pronoun/noun ratio (Bloom) 
• Relatively high use of imitation 
(Bloom) 
• First reference to speaker-hearer by 
pronoun 
• Use of empty 'dummy' forms 
(Leonard) 
• Dramatists (Wolf & Gardner) 
- interest in reproducing realistic 
patterns 
• Restricted code: working class 
(Bernstein) 
• Field dependence (Witkin) 
• Impulsive (Kagan) 
• Formulaic approach to second language 
learning in older children (Fillmore) 
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Appendix 5 
Roberts (1991) three-stage 'input-practice-use' model of foreign language learning. 
Input 	 Practice 	 Use 
medium 	 medium/message 	 message 
system 	 system/function 	 function 
accuracy 	 accuracy/fluency 	 fluency 
meaning 	 meaning/sense 	 sense 
L2 	
• 
• 
Ll 
While the stages in such a process are inevitably more fluid than indicated, they seek to highlight the 
fact that 'doing is subservient to knowing', that is, that the ability to access the TL is dependent upon 
the learner's prior metalinguistic skills which alone can allow him to associate form an meaning as a 
pre-requisite for subsequent use. 
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